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Abstract	  	  My	   thesis	   takes	   the	   intersection	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   increased	  tendency	   towards	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   concerns	   of	   sexual	   minorities	   in	   rights	   based	  terminology	  in	  international	  law	  as	  a	  Deleuzian	  ‘problem’	  to	  be	  explored	  and	  unpicked.	  	  Sexual	  orientation	   is	   a	   singular	   expression	   of	   a	   complex	   multifaceted	   virtuality,	   yet	   the	   term	   -­‐	  understood	  as	  a	  static	  and	  relatively	  unchanging	  denotation	  of	  a	  particular	  identity	  and	  mode	  of	  action	   -­‐	  holds	   increasing	  purchase	  as	  a	  human	  rights	   issue.	   	   I	  explore	   the	  way	   in	  which	  rights	  shape	   the	   expression	   of	   sexuality	   within	   institutional	   and	   activist	   practices	   in	   international	  arenas	   and	   suggest	   that	   the	   complex	   and	   contested	   encounter	   between	   sexuality	   and	   human	  rights	   in	   international	   law	   exposes	   the	   problems,	   limits	   and	   temporality	   of	   both.	   	   By	   taking	  seriously	   the	   problems	   inherent	   to	   the	   encounters	   between	   sexuality	   and	   rights,	   as	   they	   are	  expressed	  in	  different	  material	  circumstances,	  we	  can	  explore	  sexuality	  as	  a	  mutliplicitous	  and	  changing	   flux	   and	   rights	   as	   a	   dual	   sided	   paradox,	   acting	   simultaneously	   machines	   of	  territorialisation	  and	  machines	  of	  deteritorialisation.	   	  Thus,	   I	  suggest	  that	   in	  their	  engagement	  with	   questions	   of	   'sexual	   orientation',	   rights	   act	   as	   both	   modes	   of	   control,	   restriction	   and	  exclusion	   and	   as	   modes	   of	   communication	   and	   connection,	   challenge	   and	   escape,	   depending	  upon	   the	   particular	   circumstances	   within	   which	   they	   are	   expressed.	   	   As	   such,	   I	   attempt	   to	  engage	  with	   the	   embeddedness	   of	   ‘sexuality’	  within	   particular	  material	   contexts	   and	   through	  this	   engagement,	   explore	   different	   potentialities	   that	   are	   implicated	   within	   divergent	  enactments	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  in	  order	  to	  critique	  a	  mode	  of	  action	  that	  remains	  fixed	  upon	  abstract	  discussion	  of	  ossified	  ‘sexualities’	  and	  transcendental	  rights.	  	  Furthermore,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  approach	  the	  encounter	  not	  only	  as	  a	  means	  of	  critique	  but	  also	  as	  a	  moment	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  a	  site	  of	  productive	  engagement,	  vitality	  and	  becoming.	   	  Thus,	   the	  key	  question	  to	  be	  asked	  of	  the	   encounter	   between	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   rights	   is	   not	   one	   of	   which	   rights	   have	   been	  violated	  or	  of	  how	  a	  perceived	  violation	  can	  be	  expressed	   in	   relation	   to	  an	  already	  conceived	  and	   fixed	   discourse	   of	   rights,	   but	   instead,	   which	   material	   circumstances	   have	   facilitated	   the	  expression	  of	  injustice	  suffered	  by	  a	  sexual	  minority	  as	  a	  rights	  violation	  and	  in	  expressing	  the	  violation	  in	  this	  way,	  which	  possibilities,	  problematics	  and	  discourses	  are	  activated,	  and	  which	  others	  are	  ignored.	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  1	  
Chapter	  One	  -­‐	  Introduction	  
Introduction:	  Situating	  Sexualities	  In	  December	  2011,	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hillary	  Clinton	  used	  her	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Day	  speech	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  call	  for	  the	  promotion	  and	  protection	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  (LGBT)	  persons	  and	  affirm	  that	   ‘gay	  rights	  are	  human	  rights	  and	  human	  rights	  are	  gay	  rights.’1	  Acknowledging	  that	  her	  own	  country’s	  record	  on	  gay	  rights	   was	   far	   from	   perfect,	   she	   reiterated	   a	   US	   commitment	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   LGBT	  individuals	  and	  LGBT	  rights.	  While	  noteworthy	  in	  itself,	  Clinton’s	  speech	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  only	  the	  latest	  in	  a	  series	  of	  engagements	  with	  issues	  relating	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  human	  rights,	  both	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  Over	  the	  past	  15	  years,	  for	  example,	  LGBT	  progress	  at	  the	  UN	   has	   seen	   the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	   Committee	   uphold	   the	   privacy	   rights	   of	   a	   Tasmanian	   gay	  rights	  campaigner2	  and	  the	  controversial	  reading	  and	  passage	  through	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  a	   statement	   affirming	   the	   rights	   of	   all	   individuals	   to	   non-­‐discrimination	   regardless	   of	   sexual	  orientation	   or	   gender	   identity.3	  	  More	   recently,	   in	   2011,	   the	  Human	  Rights	   Council	   adopted	   a	  resolution	   condemning	   violence	   and	   discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   or	  gender	   identity.4	  	  The	   increasing	  visibility	  of	  sexual	  orientation	   issues	  at	   the	  UN	  is	  reflected	   in	  state	   based	   arenas:	   to	   take	   just	   some	   examples	   of	   this,	   we	  might	   point	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which,	  Clinton’s	   speech	   notwithstanding,	   US	   politicians	   and	   activists	   have	   fought	   fierce	   battles	   over	  issues	  of	  gay	  marriage	  and	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  US	  military’s	  Don’t	  Ask,	  Don’t	  Tell	  (DADT)	  ban	  on	  openly	   gay	   US	   service	   personnel.5	  In	   February	   2012,	   amid	   protests,	   controversy	   and	   arrests,	  lawmakers	  in	  St	  Petersburg	  debated	  and	  eventually	  passed	  a	  bill	  criminalising	  ‘gay	  propaganda’,	  defined	   as	   any	   public	   act	   exhibiting	   or	   supporting	   homosexuality	   that	   might	   be	   seen	   by	   a	  minor.6	  	   In	   Uganda,	   in	   the	   same	   month,	   a	   controversial	   private	   members’	   bill	   proposing	   the	  death	  penalty	  for	   ‘aggravated	  homosexuality’	  was	  re-­‐tabled	  in	  Parliament.7	  	   In	  the	  UK	  in	  2011,	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  used	  his	  address	  at	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  Conference	  to	  inform	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Clinton,	  Hillary	  Rodham	  ‘Remarks	  in	  Recognition	  of	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Day’	  www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178368.htm	  accessed	  7/03/12	  2	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  Toonen	  V.	  Australia,	  Communication	  No.	  488/1992	  UN	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992	  (1994)	  3	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  Sixty-­‐third	  session,	  Agenda	  item	  64(b).	  Letter	  dated	  18	  Dec	  2008	  from	  the	  Permanent	  Representatives	  of	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Croatia,	  France,	  Gabon,	  Japan,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Norway	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  addressed	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  UN	  Doc.	  A/63/635	  (2008),	  4	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  17th	  Session	  ‘Human	  rights,	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity’	  UN	  Doc.	  A/HRC/RES/17/19	  (2011)	  5	  Eg	  BBC	  ‘US	  Court	  Rules	  Ban	  on	  Gay	  Marriage	  is	  Unconstitutional’	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐us-­‐canada-­‐16940534,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  ‘US:	  Obama	  repeals	  Don’t	  Ask,	  Don’t	  Tell’	  http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/21/us-­‐congress-­‐repeals-­‐don-­‐t-­‐ask-­‐don-­‐t-­‐tell	  accessed	  7/3/12	  6	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  ‘Russia:	  Enshrining	  Homophobia’	  http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/15/russia-­‐enshrining-­‐homophobia	  accessed	  7/3/12	  ‘Russia:	  Is	  wearing	  a	  pink	  triangle	  a	  crime’	  http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/26/russia-­‐wearing-­‐pink-­‐triangle-­‐crime	  accessed	  1/5/12	  7	  Amnesty	  International	  Urgent	  Action:	  17	  Feb	  2012	  ‘Anti	  Homosexuality	  Bill	  is	  Re-­‐tabled	  in	  Uganda’	  UA:	  40/12	  Index:	  AFR	  59/001/2012	  Uganda.	  Accessed	  7/03/12	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delegates	   that	   ‘I	   don’t	   support	   gay	   marriage	   despite	   being	   a	   Conservative,	   I	   support	   gay	  marriage	   because	   I’m	   a	   Conservative’.8	  	   Yet	   in	   early	   2012,	   a	   minister	   from	   Cameron’s	   own	  government	   defended	   the	   rights	   of	   religious	   schools	   to	   distribute	   materials	   critical	   of	  homosexuality	  to	  their	  students.9	  The	  examples	  above	  are	  only	  a	  small	  selection	  of	  recent	  incidents.	  	  All	  occurred	  or	  are	  occurring	  in	  different	   locations,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  wildly	  different	  pressures	  and	  social	  conditions.	   	  Some	  are	  clearly	   issues	   of	   rights;	   others	   speak	   to	   other	   areas	   of	   law	   and	   citizenship	   but	   find	   clear	  resonance	  or	  implication	  in	  questions	  of	  rights	  demands	  or	  constraints.	  	  Furthermore,	  although	  the	  scenarios	  sketched	  above	  do	  differ	  greatly,	  it	   is	  also	  possible	  to	  trace	  connections	  between	  them	   –	   the	   question,	   meaning	   and	   location	   of	   sexual	   orientation,	   sexuality,	   or	   non-­‐heteronormativity	   resonates	   through	   each	   set	   of	   circumstances	   –	   although	   the	  mode	   through	  which	   these	   connections	   are	   made	   and	   questions	   are	   formulated,	   differs	   from	   location	   to	  location.	   	  More	  broadly	   this	   relates	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  how	  we	  might	   link	  or	  group	   issues	   that	  relate	   to	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   As	   such,	   while	   we	   might	   acknowledge	   that	   connections	   can	   be	  drawn,	  subsuming	  all	  of	  the	  issues	  above	  into	  a	  single	  grouping,	  or,	  as	  some	  critics	  have	  done,	  ascribing	   them	   to	   the	   work	   of	   a	   global	   ‘gay	   international’,	   appears	   reductive	   and	   overly	  simplistic.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  global	  gay	  rights	  groups	  exist	  (as	  do	  international	  groupings	  that	   oppose	   gay	   rights);	   there	   is	   also	   no	   doubt	   that	   we	   can	   draw	   connections	   between	   the	  incidents	   outlined	   above.	   	   However,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   reduce	   these	   connections	   to	   a	   one-­‐sided	  identity	  or	  representation	  of	  an	  individual,	  group,	  community	  or	  lifestyle.	  	  	  Thus,	  a	  key	  concern	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  fragmented	  connections	  which	  inhere	  in	   issues	  pertaining	   to	   sexuality,	  but	  are	   immensely	  difficult	   to	  enunciate	  or	  express	  with	  any	  precision.	   	   Taking	   the	   ‘international’	   as	   a	   sphere	   of	   analysis	   means	   that	   both	   the	   frame	   of	  reference	   and	   also	   the	   range	   of	   behaviours,	   attitudes	   and	   actions	   under	   consideration,	   are	  hugely	   diverse	   and	   thus	   difficult	   to	   analyse	   from	   a	   coherent,	   academic	   perspective.	   	   As	   the	  examples	  above	  suggest,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  say	  what	  sexuality	  is	  or	  what	  position	  it	  occupies	  within	  a	   legal	   framework	  at	  any	  given	   instance	  and	  any	  definition	   is	  guaranteed	   to	  vary	   from	  place	   to	   place.	   	   Yet	   to	   simply	   assess	   sexuality	   or	   sexual	   orientation	   on	   a	   state-­‐by-­‐state	   or	  community-­‐by-­‐community	   basis	   is	   to	   miss	   both	   the	   relationships	   and,	   significantly,	   the	  operations	  of	  power	   that	   transcend	  state	  boundaries.	   	   Sexual	  orientation	  and	  human	  rights	   is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  either	  the	  global	  or	  the	  local,	  but	  the	  interaction	  and	  communication	  between	  the	  two.	  	  It	  is	  this	  dynamic	  that	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  interrogating.	  	  Most	  particularly,	  I	  am	  interested	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  ‘David	  Cameron’s	  Conservative	  party	  conference	  speech	  in	  full’	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/oct/05/david-­‐cameron-­‐conservative-­‐party-­‐speech	  accessed	  7/3/12	  9	  ‘”Anti	  gay”	  book	  puts	  Gove	  at	  centre	  of	  faith	  school	  teaching	  row’	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2012/feb/18/anti-­‐gay-­‐book-­‐gove-­‐row?newsfeed=true	  accessed	  7/3/12	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in	   how	   to	   conceive	   of	   this	   dynamic	   in	   positive	   rather	   than	   negative	   terms:	   it	   is	   possible,	   for	  example,	  to	  make	  a	  link	  between	  issues	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  based	  on	  classifications	  of	  lack	  or	  exclusion	  –	  that	  is	  non-­‐heterosexuality	  or	  non-­‐heteronormative	  sexual	  otherness	  –	  but	  I	  want	  to	  question	  the	  usefulness	  of	  basing	  either	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging	  or	  a	  mode	  of	  political	  action	  and	  rights	  demands	  upon	  a	  connection	  based	  solely	  in	  negativity	  and	  lack.10	  	  Or	  more	  succinctly,	  can	  a	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  part	  of	  a	  heterosexual	  matrix	  be	  enough?	  	  Can	  this	  formulation	  capture	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  currently	  being	  addressed	  in	  international	  and	   local	   arenas?	   	   It	   would	   often	   seem	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   ‘heterosexuality’	   and	  ‘homosexuality’	  is	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  simple	  oppositional	  or	  exclusionary	  relationship	  might	  allow.	  	  Nor	  is	  there	  any	  particularly	  clear	  line	  that	  we	  can	  draw	  between	  behaviour	  and	  identity	  when	   considering	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   sexual	   orientation:	   same	   sex	   activity	   does	   not	  necessarily	  make	   one	   ‘gay’	   or	   ‘homosexual’,	   yet,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   is	   clearly	   some	   link,	  however	  problematic,	  between	  behaviour	  and	  identity.11	  	  Furthermore,	   the	  use	  of	  a	  heterosexual	  matrix	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  exclusion	  and	  thus	  connection	  or	  community	   is	   itself	   flawed.	   	   Homosexual	   and	   heterosexual	   are	   not	   neutral	   terms,	   but	   are	  themselves	   self-­‐reinforcing	   constructions	   and	   the	   product	   of	   a	   particular	   era	   and	   system	   of	  knowledge	  production	  in	  relation	  to	  self	  and	  society.12	  	  Moreover,	  as	  a	  technology	  of	  production	  and	   classification,	   homo/heterosexuality	   is	   unevenly	   located	   and	   embodied	   –	   there	   are	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  accurately	  reflects	  and	  describes	  identities	  and	  subjectivities,	  but	  equally	  there	  are	  situations	  and	  modes	  of	  living	  where	  it	  does	  not.	  	  Two	  key	  questions	  follow	  from	  this	  mode	  of	  analysis.	   	  First,	  what	  vectors	  of	  knowledge	  production	  do	  we	  utilise	  and	  reinforce	  by	  addressing	   issues	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   in	   this	  way	   and	   second,	   does	   addressing	   problems	   of	  sexual	  orientation	  through	  questions	  of	  knowledge	  production	  create	  any	  scope	  for	  the	  creating	  or	  uncovering	  of	  connections	  that	  are	  based	  in	  positivity	  and	  production	  rather	  than	  negativity,	  exclusion	  and	  lack?	  This	  means	  that	  my	  research	  question	  and	  focus	  begins	  not	  from	  one	  specific	  instance	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  or	  activism	  but	  from	  the	  suggestion	  of	  a	  problematic	  interconnection	  and	  communication	  between	   numerous	   different	   incidents.	   	   The	   question	   is	   one	   of	   how	   to	   account	   for	  interconnection	   and	   communication	   and	   the	   power	   dynamics	   that	   operate	   in	   relation	   to	   this	  complex	  connectivity	  without	  allowing	  understandings	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	   to	   collapse	   into	   homogeneity.	   	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   instead,	   that	   overcoded	   identity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  Postcoloniality	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000).	  P83-­‐90	  	  Simone	  Bignall,	  "Desire,	  Apathy,	  Activism,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Political	  Activism:	  Supplement	  to	  Deleuze	  Studies	  Vol	  4,	  ed.	  Marcelo	  Svirsky	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p11	  11	  Eg	  Sonia	  Katyal,	  "Exporting	  Identity,"	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Feminism	  14	  (2002).	  p153-­‐156	  12M.	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality:	  Volume	  1,	  trans.	  Robert	  Hurley	  (London:	  Penguin	  1990).	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paradigms	  or	  representations	  of	  sexual	  identity	  are	  constantly	  subverted	  by	  the	  lived	  reality	  of	  homosexual,	  queer,	  LGBT,	  (etc.)	  lives.	  	  Thus	  at	  issue	  are	  the	  dynamics	  that	  shape	  the	  distribution	  of	  representations,	  identities	  and	  subjectivities	  within	  discourses	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  This	  means	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  facets	  to	  both	  my	  research	  question	  and	  my	  approach	  to	  this	  question.	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	  however,	  two	  main	  objectives	  can	  be	  identified:	  1) To	  map	  the	  position	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  activism	  in	   such	   a	  way	   as	   to	   account	   for	   connection,	   communication	   and	   resonance	  without	   a	  collapse	  into	  unproblematic	  representations	  or	  homogenous	  ‘identities’.	  2) To	  use	  this	  problematisation	  of	  identity	  and	  representation	  to	  interrogate	  the	  operation	  of	  rights	  and	  human	  rights	   law	   in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	   in	  order	   to	  more	   fully	   illustrate	  both	  the	  productive	  and	  the	  restrictive	  potentials	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  rights	  in	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  orientation.	  This	   requires	   the	   problematisation	   of	   current	   iterations	   of	   sexuality	   and	   identity	   in	  international	   rights	   discourses.	   	   This	   itself	   is	   challenging	   –	   sexuality	   and	   sexual	   orientation	  rights	   remain	   very	   new	   in	   international	   law	   and	   there	   are	   still	   relatively	   few	   documents	   or	  judgments	   that	   refer	   to	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   Thus,	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   fuller	   picture	   of	   the	  dynamics	   at	   play,	   I	   assess	   not	   just	   legal	   documents	   or	   institutions	   but	   activism	   pertaining	   to	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  both	  of	  these	  spheres	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  issues.	  	  	  	  This	  view	  of	   sexuality	  and	  rights	  opens	  a	  number	  of	  pathways	   for	  analysis.	  The	   first	  pathway	  concerns	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   we	   might	   address	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights,	   or	   more	  accurately,	   how	   we	   might	   think	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   connection	   or	   community	   when	   the	  issues	   at	   hand	   range	   from	   those	   of	   violence	   suffered	   because	   of	   one’s	   sexual	   orientation	  (revenge	   rape,	   exclusion,	   torture),	   to	   questions	   concerning	   the	   right	   to	  marry,	   employee	   and	  partnership	   benefits,	   adoption	   and	   the	   right	   to	   raise	   a	   family.	   	   Given	   the	   breadth	   of	   possible	  concerns	  here,	   there	   is	   a	  question	  of	  whether	   there	   is	   an	   identifiable	   connection	   in	  operation	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  we	  might	  talk	  about	  such	  connections	  in	  relation	  to	  issues	  of	  power,	  visibility	  and	  invisibility,	  subalternity,	  or	  the	  asymmetries	  of	  power	  relations	  between	  East	  and	  West,	  North	  and	  South.	  These	   issues	   point	   to	   a	   second	   path	   of	   analysis:	   the	   examination	   modes	   of	   knowledge	  production.	   	   In	   particular,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	  Deleuzian	   argument	   that	   language	   is	   always	  prescriptive	   rather	   than	   communicative.13	  	   As	   such,	   we	   must	   be	   aware	   of	   what	   prescriptive	  effects	  both	  the	   language	  of	  LGBT	  activism,	   ‘sexual	  orientation’,	  etc.	  and	  the	   language	  of	  rights	  might	  have.	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  here	  that	  the	  interaction	  of	  a	  vocabulary	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Desert	  Islands	  and	  Other	  Texts	  1953-­‐1974	  (Semiotext(e),	  2004).	  p286	  
	  5	  
vocabulary	  of	  rights	  leads	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  debates	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  to	  the	  mapping	  of	  some	  connections	  and	  the	  obscuring	  of	  others.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  conjunction	  of	  these	  two	  vocabularies	  becomes	  self-­‐reinforcing	  –	  or	  becomes	  a	  demand	  that	  we	  speak	  a	  particular	  language	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  in	  a	  particular	  way.14	  	  This	   problem	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   issue	   of	  which	   constructions	   and	   narratives	   of	   sexual	  rights	   hold	   purchase	   in	   different	   scenarios,	   what	   connections	   we	   can	   make	   between	   these	  scenarios,	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case	  and	  what	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  habitual	  recognition	  and	  repetition	  of	  these	   scenarios	  might	   be.	   	   Framing	   the	   issue	   in	   this	  way	   also	   allows	   an	   exploration	   of	  wider	  questions	  of	  the	  coherence	  (or	  otherwise)	  of	  our	  conceptualisations	  of	  selfhood,	  subjectivity	  and	  rights.	  	  By	  reacting	  attentively	  to	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  when	  we	  try	  to	  use	  rights	  language	  to	  enunciate	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  or	  sexual	  orientation,	  we	  begin	  to	  expose	  gaps	  or	  blind	  spots	  in	  the	  foundations	  of	  our	  rights	  discourses.	  This	  act	  of	  uncovering	  operates	  in	  two	  related	  dimensions.	  	  The	  first	  is	  practical	  –	  the	  movement	  and	  operation	  of	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  is	  crudely	  termed	  ‘identity’.	  	  These	  are	  the	  claims	  for	  rights	  made	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one’s	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  religion	  or	  indeed,	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  This	  movement,	  however,	  has	  helped	  facilitate	  an	  increasingly	  stark	  enunciation	  of	  binary	  categories	  through	   which	   rights	   concerns	   are	   perceived	   (rights/culture,	   Western/non-­‐Western	   etc.).	  	  These	   binarisms	   become	   both	   restrictive	   and	   a	   habitual	   narrative	   of	   political	   action.	   	   They	  operate	   as	   devices	   or	  machines	   that	   allow	   an	   increasingly	   fixed	   and	   inflexible	   framework	   for	  debate.	  These	  practical	  problems	  speak	  immediately	  to	  a	  second,	  more	  theoretical	  dimension	  –	  namely	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  might	  shift	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  debate	  or	  dualistic	  narratives	  that	  are	   currently	   in	   operation.	   	   This	   issue	   is	   therefore	   one	   of	   attempting	   to	   unpick	   and	   think	  through	  binaries	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  other	  or	  new	  modes	  of	  action,	  connection	  and	  enunciation.	  	  Thus	  the	  practical	  requires	  a	  theoretical	  rearrangement,	  but	  this	  theoretical	  arrangement	  must	  be	  played	  out	  or	  explored	  through	  the	  practical	  issues	  of	  the	  day:	  the	  question	  is	  not	  just	  one	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  LGBT	  individuals,	  nor	  is	  it	  simply	  that	  of	  the	  theoretical	  foundations	  and	  groundings	  of	  rights,	  instead,	  it	  concerns	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two	  in	  a	  dynamic	  of	  mutual	  resonance,	  problematisation	  and	  change.	  	  
Theoretical	  issues:	  embodiment	  and	  difference	  The	   theoretical	   underpinning	   of	   my	   thesis	   draws	   from	   feminist,	   postcolonial	   and	   Deleuzian	  thought.	   	   My	   aim	   in	   engaging	   with	   these	   theoretical	   standpoints	   is	   to	   explore	   critiques	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Hakan	  Seckinelgin,	  "Global	  Activism	  and	  Sexualities	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  Hiv/Aids,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  P104	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singular,	  centralised	  hierarchical	  modes	  of	  power	  and	  organisation	  and	  the	  arguments	  of	  those	  who	  have	  demanded	  either	   inclusion	  with,	  or	   the	  deconstruction	  of	  a	  politics	   that	   takes	  as	   its	  foundation	  the	  heterosexual	  white	  man	  as	  the	  subject	  and	  bearer	  of	  rights.	   	   In	  exploring	  these	  critiques,	   I	   also	   seek	   to	   draw	   on	  Deleuzian	   themes	   that	   begin	   from	   an	   ontology	   of	   difference	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  sameness	  and	  identity.	  	  	  In	  using	  this	  particular	  theoretical	  outlook,	  I	  attempt	  to	  shift	  the	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  how	  the	  problems	   that	   we	   encounter	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   are	   articulated.	   	   Deleuze	  suggests	   that	   problems	   insist	   and	   persist	   in	   their	   solutions	   and	   that	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	  articulate	  and	  comprehend	  problems	  impacts	  upon	  the	  solutions	  that	  are	  available	  to	  us.15	  	  This	  means	   that	   a	   key	   starting	   point	   must	   be	   the	   avoidance	   of	   ‘false	   problems’	   that	   are	   badly	  articulated	  and	  represented	  and	  thus	  offer	  false	  or	  unhelpful	  resolutions.16	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  take	  seriously	  the	  critiques	  of	  rights	  regimes	  and	  their	   centralised,	   exclusive	   structures	   that	   have	   been	   made	   in	   particular	   by	   feminist	   and	  postcolonial	  writers.	   	  Wendy	  Brown	  notes	   for	  example,	   that	   ‘[j]ust	  when	  polite	   liberal	   (not	   to	  mention	   correct	   leftist)	   discourse	   ceased	   speaking	   of	   us	   as	   dykes,	   faggots,	   coloured	   girls,	   or	  natives,	   we	   began	   speaking	   of	   ourselves	   this	   way.'17	  	   What	   interests	   me	   is	   not	   just	   these	  demands	   for	   inclusion	  made	   through	  references	   to	  particular	   identities,	  but	   the	  way	   in	  which	  the	   very	   fact	   of	   the	  need	   for	   these	  demands	   exposes	  particular	   problematics,	   blind	   spots	   and	  fractures	  within	   rights	   regimes.	   	   	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   critiques	   of	   rights,	   and	  responses	   to	   these	   critiques	   (the	   increased	   demands	   for	   rights	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ‘identity’	   for	  example)	   facilitate	   new	   connections,	   the	   articulation	   of	   new	   problems	   and	   the	   exploration	   of	  different	  expressions	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  self.	   	  As	  such,	  I	  do	  not	  only	  seek	  to	  address	  particular	  questions	   and	   problematics	   posed	   by	   the	   intersection	   of	   rights	   and	   sexuality,	   but	   also	   to	  contextualise	  and	  emplace	  these	  problematics.	   	   In	  doing	  so,	  I	  attempt	  to	  explore	  why	  and	  how	  they	  have	  come	  to	  be	  understood	  and	  articulated,	  and	  what	  further	  articulations	  and	  encounters	  are	  brought	   to	   light	  by	   the	   continuing	  enunciation	  of	  questions	  of	   sexuality	   and	   rights.	   	  Thus,	  while	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  my	  analysis	  is	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  international	  legal	  systems,	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	  how	  connections,	  problems	  and	  enunciations	  branch	  out	  in	  a	  rhizomorphous	  construction	  around	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  assembled	  and	  articulated.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  trans.	  P	  Patton	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011).	  p203	  16	  Dorothea	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation	  (Berkely:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999).	  p91	  17	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  p53	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My	   second	   concern	   in	   adopting	   this	   theoretical	   outlook,	   is	   to	   explore	   the	   virtual	   and	   actual	  connections	  at	  play	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  For	  Deleuze,	  both	  the	  virtual	  and	  actual	  are	  real,	  but	  the	  virtual	  exists	  as	  incorporeal	  events,	  intensities	  and	  singularities	  that	  can	  only	   be	   known	   through	   their	   actualisation	   in	   material	   circumstances.18	  	   As	   such	   I	   regard	  sexuality	   as	   a	   flow	   rather	   than	   a	   fixed	   or	   fundamental	   quality:	   sexuality	   is	   the	   expression	   of	  particular	   tendencies;	   sexual	   identities	   and	   norms	   are	   counter-­‐actualisations	   that	   occur	   in	  relation	   to	   events,	  material	   circumstances	   and	   problems.	   	   Thus	   the	  movement	   of	   sexuality	   in	  relation	  to	  different	  strata	  and	  social	  conditions	  results	  in	  its	  multiplicitous	  expression	  through	  individuals,	  social	  machines	  and	  modes	  of	  living.	  	  	  This	   means	   that	   of	   central	   relevance	   to	   my	   research	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   actual,	   material	  conditions	   –	   and	   the	   individuals	  who	   inhabit	   these	  material	   conditions	   –	   interact	  with	   larger	  virtual	  movements.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  we	  cannot	  fully	  understand	  either	  virtual	  movement	  or	  actual	   conditions	   without	   each	   other	   and	   thus	   of	   vital	   importance	   is	   the	   interaction	   and	   the	  connectives	  that	  are	  in	  operation	  between	  the	  two.	  	  	  Colebrook	  argues	  that:	  ‘What	  Deleuze	   is	  doing	  with	   theory	   is	  demanding	   that	  we	  do	  not	   accept	  any	  structure	  without	   interrogating	   its	   real	   emergence.	   There	   can	   only	   be	   concepts,	   laws	   and	   societies	  because	   of	   a	   virtual	   potentiality	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   actual	   instances.	   This	   virtual	  domain	  of	  Ideas	  is	  not	  some	  abstract	  and	  undifferentiated,	  or	  unknowable	  beyond	  that	  we	  can	  only	  approach	  negatively	  and	  critically.	  	  For	  Deleuze,	  a	  strong	  theory	  of	  the	  virtual	  allows	  us	  to	  take	  a	  given	  positive	  phenomenon,	  such	  as	  law,	  and	  look	  at	  its	  actual	  and	  historical	  genesis	  and	  then	  look	  at	  its	  potentiality.’19	  	  This	  means,	  for	  example,	  that	  actual	  problems	  of	  sexuality	  –	  or	  more	  accurately,	  actual	  problems	  that	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  interaction	  and	  expression	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  human	  rights	  –	  must	  be	   understood	   through	   an	   interrogation	   of	   wider	   problematics	   of	   how	   we	   understand,	  conceptualise	  and	  articulate	  both	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  At	  base	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  rights	  are,	  and	   can	   be,	   capable	   of,	   what	   connections	   they	   make,	   which	   events	   they	   can	   precipitate	   or	  facilitate.	   	   Actual	   occurrences	   expose	   theoretical	   problematics	   and	   aporias	   in	   the	   history	   and	  foundation	  of	  rights,	  which	  can	  (and	  should)	  be	  addressed	  through	  a	  movement	  into	  the	  virtual	  domain,	   and	   through	   this	   virtuality	   we	   can	   return	   to	   the	   original	   problematic	   posed	   by	   the	  actual,	  material	   occurrence.	   	   Furthermore,	  we	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  why	   the	   interaction	  of	   rights	  and	  sexuality/sexual	  orientation	  brings	  specific	  concerns	  and	  problems	  to	  the	  fore	  –	  why	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Constantin	  V.	  Boundas,	  "Virtual/Virtuality,"	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p300	  19	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  "Legal	  Theory	  after	  Deleuze,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Law:	  Forensic	  Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).	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factors,	   connections	   and	   identities	   are	   so	   important,	   while	   others	   are	   less	   so.	   	   Thus,	   I	   am	  interested	   in	   interrogating	   which	   power	   structures	   are	   in	   operation	   at	   particular	   places	   and	  times,	  and	  how	  these	  structures	  make	  some	  issues	  so	  visible	  and	  articulable	  while	  masking	  or	  dismissing	  others.	  Following	   this	  practice	  of	  addressing	   the	   interplay	  between	  material	  and	   theoretical	  or	  actual	  and	  virtual,	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  analyse	  rights	  themselves	  as	  complex	  constructions	  of	  material	  effects	   and	   conceptual	   reordering.	   	   I	   take	   the	   view	   that	   rights	   themselves	   are	   not	   fixed,	  unchanging	  or	  transcendental	  but	  are	  instead	  double-­‐sided	  and	  sometimes	  paradoxical.	  	  Rights,	  I	   suggest,	  might	   profitably	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   Deleuzian	   ‘machines’.	   	   For	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari,	  machines	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   ‘keys’	   that	   permit	   entry	   into	   or	   understanding	   of	   particular	  assemblages.	  	  Mark	  Halsey	  notes	  that:	  	  ‘Just	   as	   there	   are	   different	   kinds	   of	   keys	   there	   are	   also	   different	   kinds	   of	  machines	   –	  some	  permit	  entry	  only	  (machines	  of	  axiomization),	  some	  permit	  one	  to	  do	  things	  to	  the	  room	  or	   assemblage	   once	  within	   it	   (machines	   of	   relative	   deterritorialization),	   and	   some	  permit	   the	  space	  entered	  to	  be	  changed	  beyond	  all	  recognition	  or	  to	  become	  part	  of	  other	  rooms,	  worlds,	  problematics,	   and	   so	   forth	   (machines	   of	   absolute	   deterritorialization).	   	   As	   Guattari	   writes,	  “Machines	  arrange	  and	  connect	  flows”’.20	  	  	  Thus,	  a	  reading	  of	  rights	  is	  also	  a	  reading	  of	  particular	  organisations	  and	  disorganisations	  of	  the	  flow	  of	  discourse,	  matter	  and	  power	  within	  a	  particular	  arena.	  	  In	  this	  way	  sexuality	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  changing	   flow	  or	  a	  moving	  point	   that	   interacts	  with	  rights-­‐based	  machines:	   the	  problems	  caused	   by	   the	   interaction	   of	   the	   two	   create	   conditions	   for	   a	   fuller	   exploration	   of	   the	   current	  organisation	  and	  underpinning	  of	  our	  rights	  regimes.	   	   In	   this	  way	  we	  might	  begin	   to	  question	  what	  this	  means	  for	  rights	  themselves,	  for	  sexuality	  and	  for	  those	  who	  work	  in	  or	  are	  impacted	  by	  the	  field	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  what	  the	  problematic	  encounter	  between	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  exposes	  and	  the	  way	  that	  we	  can	  open	  up	  and	  explore	  the	  connections	  and	  dynamics	  at	  play	  in	  the	  encounter.	  	  	  
Questions	   of	   location	   and	   perception	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	   frameworks	   and	  
multiple	  sexualities	  It	   is	   evident	   that	   the	   focus	   here	   is	   very	   wide	   –	   and	   the	   problems	   of	   this	   and	   particularly	   of	  approaching	  issues	  of	  the	  ‘international’	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  are	  discussed	  further	  as	  part	  of	  the	  methodology.	   	  However,	   it	  bears	  highlighting	  here	  that	   in	  adopting	  this	  approach,	  I	  cannot	  possibly	   hope	   to	   cover	   all	   of	   the	   diverse	   forms	   through	  which	   ‘sexual	   orientation’	  might	   find	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Mark	  Halsey,	  "Deleuze	  and	  Deliverance:	  Body,	  Wildness,	  Ethics"	  in	  Deleuze/Guattari	  and	  Ecology,	  ed.	  B	  Herzogenrath	  (London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008).	  p233.	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expression	   as	   an	   issue.	   	   Instead	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   focus	   on	   certain	   key	   events,	   the	   themes	   and	  intensities	   that	  are	  brought	  out	   in	   the	  unfolding	  of	   these	  events	  and	   the	  particular	  systems	  of	  knowledge	   production	   that	   are	   implicated	   in	   the	   way	   that	   events	   are	   approached	   and	  understood.	  	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  made	  clear	  that	  this	  stance	  is	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  objective	  –	  my	  own	  particular	  position	  and	  outlook	  is	  implicated	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  approach	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  	  I	  am	  not	  above	  or	  outside	  the	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  or	  the	  theorisation	  of	  rights	  that	  I	  am	  engaging	  with	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  a	  white,	  female,	  queer	  researcher	  based	  at	  a	  UK	  university	  has	  particular	  implications	  for	  the	  approach	  that	  I	  take,	  the	  questions	  that	  I	  ask	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  frame	  the	  wider	   context	   in	  which	   the	   events	   that	   I	   analyse	   take	   place.	   	   Thus,	  my	   own	   location	   and	  identity	  has	  impacted	  on	  the	  way	  I	  am	  able	  to	  approach	  issues	  –	  the	  effect	  of	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  methodology	  and	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  in	  particular.	  	  My	  own	  position	  impacts	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively	  on	  the	  research	  that	  I	  am	  able	  to	  do	  and	  the	  positions	  that	  I	  am	  able	  to	  take.	  	  The	  most	   significant	   effect	   of	   this	   is	   my	   interest	   in	   and	   focus	   on	   the	   conditions	   of	   production	   of	  identity	   and	   knowledge	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   feminist	   ‘politics	   of	   location’	   in	   which	   the	  interrogation	  of	  the	  familiar	  and	  axiomatic	  becomes	  the	  first	  step	  in	  approaching	  difference.	  	  My	  approach	   is	   one	   that	   simultaneously	   looks	   for	   and	   questions	   the	   basis	   of	   common	   themes,	  frames	  of	  reference	  and	  connections	  between	  and	  within	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  and	  uses	  these	  connections	  to	  explore	  how	  we	  locate,	  make	  use	  of,	  and	  theorise	  human	  rights.	  	  	  This	  approach	  necessarily	  involves	  some	  exclusions	  –	  I	  am	  exploring	  particular	  connections	  and	  particular	   flows	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   others.	   	   This	   presents	   both	   practical	   and	   methodological	  issues.	  	  Most	  important	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  a	  simple	  ‘listing’	  of	  all	  possible	  sexual	  practices	  or	  identities	   is	   neither	   possible	   nor	   useful	   in	   the	   context	   of	  my	   research.	   	   I	   am	   instead	  working	  from	   an	   acknowledgement	   that	   the	   vast	   diversity	   of	   sexuality	   can	   be	   actualised	   in	   numerous	  different	  ways	   at	   numerous	   different	   times.	   	   Thus,	   I	   am	   foregrounding	   not	   identity	   nor	   even	  diverse	   identities	   but	   pre-­‐individual	   singularities	   or	   themes	   that	   are	   actualised,	   played	   or	  simply	   lived	   in	   numerous	   different	   forms	   and	   combinations	   dependent	   upon	   spatial	   and	  temporal	   conditions.	   	   A	   simple	   recording	   of	   different	   static	   and	   self-­‐contained	   identities	   or	  practices	  is	  insufficient,	  as	  my	  concern	  is	  with	  how	  a	  system	  of	  rights,	  predicated	  upon	  identity,	  shapes,	  interacts	  and	  comes	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  material	  circumstances	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  a	  lived	  experience	  which	  resists	  classification	  within	  a	  coherent	  or	  homogenous	  framework	  of	   identity.	   	   From	   this	  point	  of	   conflict,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	  exploring	   the	   flows	  and	  structures	  of	  power,	  debates	  and	  narratives	  that	  are	  activated	  in	  response	  to	  these	  complexities.	  	  My	   particular	   location	   and	   outlook	   shapes	   the	   way	   I	   access	   and	   interrogate	   these	   themes.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  done	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  location	  or	  of	  becoming	  ‘answerable	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for	  what	  we	  learn	  to	  see.’21	  	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  making	  a	  claim	  to	  objectivity	  -­‐	  which	  would	  likely	  involve	   either	   taking	   a	   view	   that	   was	   so	   wide	   and	   removed	   from	   the	   materialities	   and	  practicalities	   of	   social	   and	   actual	   life	   as	   to	   be	   relatively	   useless,	   or	   alternatively	   taking	   an	  approach	   that	   focuses	  more	   narrowly	   on	   ‘black	   letter’	   or	   legalistic	   expressions	   of	   rights	   and	  sexuality,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  rights	  regimes	  and	  social	  machines	  -­‐	  I	  am	  making	  particular	  selections	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  access	  the	  operation,	  framing	  and	  problematics	  of	  rights	  and	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  	  	  
Chapter	  Outlines	  With	  these	  conceptualisations	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  map	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  Chapter	  Two	  is	  my	  methodology,	  in	  which	  I	  develop	  the	  ‘problem’	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  rights,	  connectivity	  and	  difference	   and	   begin	   to	   interrogate	   some	   of	   the	   structures	   in	   international	   human	   rights	   law	  that	  relate	  to	  and	  shape	  how	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  generally	  viewed.	  Chapter	   Three	   addresses	   questions	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   through	   an	   assessment	   of	  what	   international	   documents	   and	   judgments	   pertaining	   to	   sexuality	   currently	   exist.	   	   In	  particular	   I	   analyse	   the	   1994	  Human	  Rights	   Committee	   judgment	  Toonen	  v	  Australia	   and	   the	  2008	  General	  Assembly	  statement	  calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity.	  	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  not	  just	  to	  assess	  what	  steps	  have	  been	  taken,	  but	   to	  contextualise	  and	  problematise	  how	  these	  changes	  have	  reverberated	  through	  multiple	  different	   series	   and	   structures	   in	   various	   different	   locations	   with	   both	   positive	   and	   negative	  effects.	  	  The	  focus	  therefore	  is	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  can	  work	  to	  striate,	  classify,	  codify	  or	  reinforce	  particular	   institutional	  and	  organisational	  structures	  and	  alliances	  –	  even	  when	  they	  have	  been	  introduced	  with	  the	   intention	  of	  helping	  or	   furthering	  LGBT	  causes.	   	  At	   issue	   is	   the	  problem	   of	   power,	   classification	   and	   semantics	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   sexual	  orientation.	  However,	   to	   assess	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   or	   institutions	   alone	  misses	   an	   important	  vector	   of	   action	   in	   relation	   to	  human	   rights	   and	   sexuality.	   	   This	   is	  why	  Chapter	   Four	  broadly	  engages	  with	  the	  Iranian	  execution	  of	  minors	  for	  sexual	  crimes	  and	  the	  context	  of	  debates	  and	  activism	   that	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   response	   to	   these	   executions.	   	   The	   chapter	   addresses	  questions	   of	   nomenclature	   and	   representation	   in	   relation	   to	   sexual	   identity,	   particularly	   as	   a	  result	  of	  activist	  practices	  and	  suggests	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  codified	  sexual	  rights	  documentation	  does	  not	  prevent	  the	  use	  of	  rights	  as	  a	  device	  of	  stratification,	  coding	  and	  control	  in	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing	  dynamic	  of	  naming,	  representation	  and	  activism.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  interrogating	  this	  dynamic	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  explore	  questions	  of	  visibility,	  silence	  and	  unsayability	  in	  activism	  –	  to	  explore	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Donna	  J.	  Haraway,	  Simians,	  Cyborgs	  and	  Women:	  The	  Reinvention	  of	  Nature	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1991).	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the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   organisation	   of	   action	   around	   an	   identity-­‐bearing	   subject	   is	   continually	  interrupted	   and	   problematised	   by	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   material	   body	   of	   the	   subject	   is	  embedded	  within	  a	   lived	  particularity	  and	  enmeshed	  within	  a	  wider	   flow	  of	  discourse,	  power	  and	  control	  that	  extends	  the	  terms	  of	  debate	  beyond	  and	  around	  a	  stable,	  nameable	  subjectivity	  into	  questions	  of	  action,	  inaction	  and	  becoming.	   	  Of	  particular	  concern	  are	  the	  problems	  that	  a	  misrecognition	  of	  this	  dynamic	  might	  cause.	  While	   Chapter	   Four	   focuses	   primarily	   on	   the	   ‘organisational’	   problems	   of	  misrecognition	   and	  misrepresentation,	  Chapter	  Five	  begins	  with	  the	  theoretical	  problems	  that	  that	  might	  also	  arise	  –	  particularly	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  misrepresentation	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  positing	  of	   ‘false	  problems’	  and	   incoherent	   solutions.	   	   I	   use	  Deleuzian	   conceptions	  of	   event	   and	  of	   the	   three	   syntheses	  of	  time	  to	  consider	  how	  we	  might	  respond	  to	  problematics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  as	  encounters	  and	  to	  suggest	   that	  rights	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  virtual	  memory	  that	   is	  actualised	   in	  response	  to	  the	   encounter.	   	   This	   approach	   takes	   the	   view	   that	   an	   understanding	   of	   rights	   as	   either	   a	  subsumptive	  or	  transcendental	  regime	  is	  both	  distancing	  and	  depoliticising.	  	  Rights	  are	  instead	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  perception	  and	  selection.	   	   I	  explore	  what	  this	  might	  mean	  in	  the	  context	  of	  activism,	  law	  and	  judgment.	  	  	  Chapters	   3-­‐5	   outline	   both	   the	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   problems	   of	   representation,	  misrepresentation,	  memory,	  action	  and	  subjectivity	  in	  relation	  to	  rights	  and	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  Chapter	  Six	  attempts	  to	  address	  how	  we	  might	  respond	  to	  these	  problems	  by	  rethinking	  rights,	  sexuality	   and	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   an	   embodied	  materiality.	   	  Thus,	   the	  chapter	   is	  an	  exploration	  of	   spatiality	  and	  materiality	   in	  relation	   to	   the	  unevenness	  of	  rights.	  	  I	  attempt	  to	  highlight	  how	  encounters	  might	  occur	  differently	  depending	  upon	   our	   actual	   circumstances.	   	   In	   particular	   I	   think	   through	   the	   relationship	   of	   rights	   and	  sexuality	  across	  an	  uneven	  terrain	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  resonance	  and	  reverberation.	  	  The	  chapter	  addresses	  the	  embodiment	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  in	  two	  forms	  –	  first	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  figuration	  or	  conceptual	  personae	  as	  a	  device	  for	  de-­‐embedding	  sexuality	  from	  sedimented	  narratives	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   identity.	   	   This	   move	   demands	   a	   spatialisation	   of	   rights	   and	  sexuality	   as	   the	   circulation	   of	   both	   material	   and	   virtual	   multiplicities	   and	   leads	   to	   a	   second	  consideration	   of	   sexuality,	   rights	   and	   embodiment	   –	   that	   of	   how	   this	   complication	   of	   the	  encounter	   between	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   should	   be	   replayed	   in	   a	   counter-­‐actualisation	   of	   the	  event	   in	  which	   the	  virtual	  quality	  of	   the	  event	   is	  captured	   in	   its	   repetition	  or	  playing	  out	  as	  a	  singular	  and	  specific	  form	  of	  action.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  my	  research	  begins	  with	  material	  (actual)	  problems	  and	  questions,	  and	  works	  through	   them	   to	   the	   virtual	   connections	   that	   inhere	  within	   yet	   beyond	   each	   actualisation.	   	   In	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Chapter	  Two	  –	  Methodology	  
Introduction:	  frames	  and	  problematics	  A	   focus	   on	   the	   ‘international’	   sphere	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   presents	   various	  methodological	  issues.	   	   Most	   pertinent	   is	   the	   difficulty	   created	   by	   the	   breadth	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   frame	   of	  reference.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘international’	  as	  a	  sphere	  of	  analysis	  makes	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  say	  anything	  that	  will	  be	  of	  equal	  or	  significant	  relevance	  in	  all	  circumstances,	  in	  all	  areas.	  	  This	  issue	   of	   breadth	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   vast	   diversity	   of	   sexual	   identities,	   practices,	  norms	   and	  mores	   that	   exist	   at	   any	   one	   time	   or	   place.	   	   As	   such,	   both	   the	   arena	   and	   terms	   of	  analysis	  are	  broad,	  shifting	  and	  transient,	  and	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  what	  sexuality	  is	  or	  could	  be	  at	  any	  one	  time	  or	  place	  is	  subject	  to	  both	  change	  and	  controversy	  depending	  on	  the	  approach	  or	  perspective	  that	  one	  takes.	  	  In	  simpler	  terms,	  the	  key	  question	  is	  of	  how	  one	  can	  study	  sexuality	  in	  international	  arenas,	  when	  it	  is	  not	  always	  possible	  to	  identify	  what	  sexuality	  is	  at	  any	  specific	  time	  or	  place.	  Yet	   the	   existence	   of	   various	   statements	   and	   judgments	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   or	   sexual	  orientation	   (for	   example,	   Toonen	   v.	   Australia,1	  the	   Yogyakarta	   Principles,2	  the	   Declaration	   of	  Montreal3),	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  international	  and	  regional	  campaigning	  groups	  that	  specifically	  address	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  (ILGA,	  IGLHRC)	  and	  more	  generally,	  the	  presence	  of	  sexuality	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  contention	  in	  media	  and	  public	  discourses,	  suggests	  that,	  difficult	  as	  the	  topic	  may	  be	  to	  analyse	   from	   a	   structured	   academic	   perspective,	   sexuality	   is	   a	   concern	   that	   has	   emerged	   (or	  perhaps	  re-­‐emerged4)	  as	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  transnational	  and	  international	  arenas,	  and	  is	  one	  that	  is	  increasingly	  being	  posited	  in	  human	  rights	  terms.	  	  	  Despite	   this	   emergence,	   the	   problem	   of	   breadth	   and	   scope	   remains	   and	   must	   be	   both	  acknowledged	  and	  accounted	   for	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	   to	  make	  research	  possible,	  practical	  and	  of	  substance.	   	   To	   do	   this	   requires	   some	   degree	   of	   specialisation	   and	   selectivity.	   	   My	   thesis	  therefore	  focuses	  on	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights,	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  key	  question:	  	  how	  do	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights	  interact	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  become	  a	  problem	  in	  this	  way	  at	  this	  time?	  	  While	  this	   initial	   framing	  of	  my	  research	  concerns	   is	  broad,	  my	  approach	   to	   the	  problematic	   takes	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  Toonen	  V.	  Australia,	  Communication	  No.	  488/1992	  UN	  Doc	  CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992	  (1994)	  2	  www.yogyakartaprinciples.org	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  3	  www.declarationofmontreal.org/declaration	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  4	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  suggest	  here	  that	  sexuality	  is	  an	  entirely	  ‘new’	  contention	  in	  international	  law.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  ‘sexual	  orientation	  rights’	  are	  a	  very	  recent	  addition	  to	  international	  rights	  discourses,	  we	  might	  point	  to	  the	  role	  that	  sexual	  mores	  played	  in	  the	  colonising	  ‘civilisational’	  discourse	  of	  colonial	  nations.	  	  See	  eg	  Alok	  Gupta,	  "This	  Alien	  Legacy:	  The	  Origins	  of	  “Sodomy”	  Laws	  in	  British	  Colonialism,"	  ed.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2008),	  Patricia	  Uberoi,	  ed.	  Social	  Reform,	  Sexuality	  and	  the	  State	  (New	  Delhi:	  Sage	  Publications	  1996).	  	  Thus	  while	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that	  the	  location	  of	  sexuality	  in	  relation	  to	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  changing,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  suggest	  that	  sexuality	  in	  some	  form	  has	  been	  entirely	  absent	  in	  any	  form	  from	  international	  legal	  considerations.	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specific	  form.	  	  Most	  significantly,	  I	  am	  using	  ‘problem’	  in	  the	  Deleuzian	  sense	  in	  which	  problems	  are	  not	  resolvable	  questions	  but	  ‘problematic	  knots	  to	  be	  retied	  differently’.5	  	  In	  essence	  –	  what	  factors,	  forces,	  Ideas	  and	  singularities	  have	  come	  together	  to	  constitute	  sexuality	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  this	  way	  and	  at	  this	  time?	  	  A	  second	  key	  issue	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘sexuality’	  is	  itself	  problematic,	   shifting	   and	   subject	   to	   various	  different	  meanings	   and	  political	   deployments.	   	   In	  general,	   I	   take	   ‘sexual	   orientation’	   as	   it	   is	   used	   in	   various	   human	   rights	   documents	   and	  discourses	   as	   a	   point	   of	   departure,	   but	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   such	   terminology	   only	   imperfectly	  captures	   the	   issue	   at	   hand.	   	   Alternative	   terminology	   –	   such	   as	   non-­‐(hetero)normative	   sexual	  otherness	   –	   could	   be	   used	   instead,	   but	   while	   such	   phraseology	   captures	   the	   multiplicity	   of	  possibilities	  of	  sexual	  being	  or	  becoming,	  it	  risks	  being	  too	  broad	  and	  imprecise	  and	  constitutes	  the	  focus	  in	  negative	  rather	  than	  positive	  terms.	  	  Instead,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  semi-­‐coherent	  ‘sexual	  subject’	  or	  subjectivity	  that	  is	  increasingly	  perceptible	  in	   human	   rights	   terminology	   and	   documents,	   and	   the	   intersection	   of	   this	   sexual	   subject	  with	  these	  more	  open-­‐ended	  modes	  of	  sexual	  selfhood.	  With	   this	   in	   mind,	   my	   approach	   has	   necessitated	   that	   several	   issues	   be	   referred	   to	   only	   in	  passing	  or	  not	  at	  all	  –	  religion	  and	  sexuality,	  or	  HIV/AIDS	  and	  sexuality	  for	  example,	  are	  clearly	  hugely	   important	   topics	   that	   are	   increasingly	   a	  matter	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   certain	   states.	  However,	  these	  issues	  are	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  thesis	  –	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  these	  topics	  would	  require	  a	   great	   deal	  more	   time	   and	   research.	   	   Similarly,	   the	   specifics	   of	   particular	   sexual	   cultures	   or	  sexual	   practices	   are	   not	   the	   central	   concern	   of	  my	   research.	   	   Instead,	  my	   emphasis	   is	   on	   the	  conceptual	   grids	   that	   that	   underlie	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   international	   human	   rights.	  	  Analysis	   of	   specific	   sexual	   cultures,	   for	   example	   through	   fieldwork,	   was	   not	   essential	   to	   the	  examination	   of	   these	   grids	   and	   may	   even	   have	   risked	   drawing	   attention	   away	   from	   their	  centrality	  by	  introducing	  new	  discourses	  or	  vectors	  of	  analysis.	   	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  am	  ignoring	   difference	   or	   different	   expressions	   and	   embodiments	   of	   sexuality;	   instead	   I	   am	  attempting	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   difference	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   multiple	   and	  varied	  sexualities	  and	  sexual	  orientations,	  while	  avoiding	  a	  frame	  that	  selects	  and	  contrasts	  only	  one	  or	  two	  particular	  articulations	  or	  locations	  of	  sexuality.	  	  More	  precisely,	  my	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  factors	  that	  aid	  the	  framing	  of	  sexuality	  within	  often	  hierarchical	  or	  binary	  relationships	  rather	  than	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   modes	   of	   expression	   and	   embodiment	   that	   populate	   these	  hierarchies.	   	   My	   interest	   is	   not	   in	   setting	   up	   binaries	   or	   classifications	   of	   particular	   sexual	  practices	   in	  order	   to	   integrate	   them	   into	  a	  pre-­‐established	   framework	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   norms,	   which	   are	   unavoidably	   Eurocentric	   and	   rooted	   in	   particular,	   usually	   Western,	  discourses	   of	   the	   subject.	   	   Human	   rights	   norms	   must,	   by	   necessity,	   take	   a	   certain	   view	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  James	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  p111	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subjectivity	  and	  selfhood.	  	  As	  my	  research	  progressed,	  I	  became	  increasingly	  wary	  of	  pursuing	  a	  method	   that	   might	   unconsciously	   posit	   different	   modes	   of	   sexual	   selfhood	   in	   a	   hierarchical	  relationship	   with	   always	   already	   constituted	   sexual	   subjectivities	   and	   even	   more	   wary	   of	  implicitly	   creating	   a	   frame	  which	   attached	   a	   judgement	   value	   to	   certain	   sexualities	   based	   on	  their	  distance	  from	  human	  rights	  norms.	  	  Instead,	  my	  focus	  is	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  
themselves	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  discourses	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  identity	  are	  causing	  them	  to	  shift	   and	   resonate;	   most	   particularly	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   resonance	   of	  sexuality	  through	  human	  rights	  norms	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  problematic	  gaps,	  blind	  spots	  and	  silences	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  sexual	  being	  or	  belonging	  cannot	  be	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  or	  distance	  from	  human	  rights	  or	  law,	  but	  this	  consideration	  must	  be	  rhizomatic	  rather	  than	  arborescent.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  consideration	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  foregrounds	  the	  context	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  sexual	  selfhood	  with	  the	  rational	  legal	  subject,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  exposes	  the	  power	   relations	   that	   constitute	  normativity,	   sexuality	   and	   embodiment	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   law.	  	  Grear	  suggests	  the	  complexity	  of	  embodied,	  material	  human	  lives	  are	  often	  ‘lost	  in	  translation’	  once	   considered	   through	   the	   law’s	   scheme	   of	   reason	   and	   rational	   legal	   subjectivity6:	   I	   am	  interested	  in	  how	  this	  occurs	  and	  what	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  loss	  can	  be.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  that	   research	   into	   different	   sexual	   cultures	   or	   into	   specific	   relationships	   between	   a	   sexual	  culture	  and	  human	  rights	   is	  not	   important	  or	  necessary	  work,	   it	   is	  more	  an	  acknowledgement	  that	   an	   analysis	   of	   specific	   singularities	   of	   sexuality	   is	   not	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   addressing	   my	  central	  concerns.	  	  	  Part	   of	   the	   reason	   for	  my	   caution	  here	   also	   relates	   to	  my	  own	  position	  within	   a	   hierarchy	   of	  knowledge	   production	   and	   perhaps	   also	   of	   law.	   	   Educated	   at	   Cambridge,	   the	   LSE	   and	   the	  University	   of	  Westminster,	   I	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   represent	   a	   particularly	  Western	   and	   privileged	  tradition	  of	  knowledge	  production.7	  	  I	  am	  also	  conducting	  research	  into	  an	  area	  which	  has	  a	  long	  colonial	  history;	  indeed	  many	  national	  anti-­‐gay	  laws	  took	  their	  format	  from	  legislation	  first	  put	  in	   place	   by	   British	   colonial	   forces.8	  This	   history	   makes	   the	   legacy	   of	   colonialism	   particularly	  relevant	  to	  my	  research.	  	  Of	  particular	  concern	  is	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  Darian	  Smith’s	  argument	  that	  ‘[i]t	   is	   by	   now	   close	   to	   a	   truism	   in	   the	   literature	   of	   post	   colonialism,	   and	   elsewhere,	   that	  European	   and	   Western	   identity	   is	   constituted	   in	   opposition	   to	   an	   alterity	   that	   it	   has	   itself	  constructed.’9	  	  My	   aim	   is	   to	   try	   to	   avoid	   reconstructing	   a	   binary	   or	   dualism	   of	  Western/non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Anna	  Grear,	  "Challenging	  Corporate	  'Humanity':	  Legal	  Disembodiment,	  Embodiment	  and	  Human	  Rights,"	  Human	  
Rights	  Law	  Review	  7,	  no.	  3	  (2007).	  p523-­‐4	  7	  For	  further	  analysis	  of	  this	  see	  eg	  Linda	  Tuhiwai	  Smith,	  Decolonizing	  Methodologies	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  1999).	  p58	  8	  Alok	  Gupta,	  "This	  Alien	  Legacy:	  The	  Origins	  of	  “Sodomy”	  Laws	  in	  British	  Colonialism,"	  	  9	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  Eve	  Darian-­‐Smith,	  "Laws	  of	  the	  Postcolonial:	  An	  Insistent	  Introduction,"	  in	  Laws	  of	  the	  
Postcolonial,	  ed.	  P	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  E	  Darian-­‐Smith	  (University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1999).	  p1	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Western	   sexualities	   in	   which	   the	   uncategorised	   ‘otherness’	   of	   non-­‐Western	   sexual	   behaviour	  can	  be	  used	  to	  bring	  both	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  Western	  sexualities	  into	  sharper	  focus.	  	  In	  doing	  this,	   I	  am	  not	  disregarding	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  global	  North/South	   interactions,	  but	  rather	  than	   adopting	   an	   approach	   that	   takes	   these	   divisions	   as	   axiomatic,	   their	   conditions	   of	  production	   must	   themselves	   be	   brought	   into	   clearer	   focus.	   I	   am	   interested	   therefore,	   in	  attempting	  to	  unpick	  why	  such	  dynamics	  are	  so	  often	  the	  dominant	  mode	  for	  framing	  issues	  of	  sexuality	   in	   international	   spaces,	   and	  what	   this	   could	  mean	   in	   relation	   to	  questions	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexual	  subjectivity.	  	  Or,	  with	  Narayan,	  we	  must	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘Third	  World’	  as	  the	  West’s	  ‘mirror’:	  a	  reflecting	  pool	  that	  gives	  a	  Western	  Narcissus	  back	  his	  own	  pale	  reflection.’10	  Her	  argument	  here	  goes	  on	  to	  centre	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  engage	  with	  suffering	  –	  and	   the	  role	  of	   the	   ‘Third	  World’	  as	  a	  reflection	  of	  Western	  guilt	  over	  power	  and	  hegemony	  that	   does	   not	   truly	   engage	   with	   those	   who	   suffer	   mistreatment	   and	   injustice	   within	   these	  contexts,	  or	  allow	  for	  the	  voice	  of	  those	  constituted	  as	  objects	  of	  study	  or	  reflection.	  	  Her	  point	  is	  that	  particular	  narratives	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘Third	  World	  subject’	  or	  a	  ‘Western	  subject’	  can	  create	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  social	  realities	  of	  those	  most	  in	  need	  are	  not	  always	  adequately	  reflected.	   	   In	  essence,	  what	  must	  be	   centralised	   is	   the	  danger	  of	  using	   ‘the	  other’	   to	  bring	   the	  issues,	   questions	   and	   problematics	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   into	   sharper	   focus.	   	   This	  approach	   fails	   to	   treat	   ‘otherness’	   on	   its	   own	   terms,	   viewing	   it	   instead	   as	   essential,	   self-­‐contained	   and	   eternally	   posited	   on	   one	   side	   of	   an	   identificatory	   dualistic	   structure	   in	   which	  otherness	  becomes	  explicable	  primarily	  through	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  its	  dominant	  binary	  pair.	  	  	  	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  research	  done	  in	  this	  way	  will	  necessarily	  fall	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  replaying	  such	  dualisms	  –	  to	  take	  such	  a	  position	  would	  seriously	  limit	  the	  possibilities	  of	  research.	  	   	  My	  intention	  is	  to	  practice	  a	  ‘politics	  of	  location’	  that	  begins	  from	  my	  own	  embeddedness	  within	  a	  particular	   framework	   of	   knowledge	   production	   and	   attempts	   to	   problematise	   that	   frame.	  	  Braidotti	   refers	   to	   this	   as	   a	   practice	   of	   ‘unveiling	   the	   power	   locations	   which	   one	   inevitably	  inhabits	  as	  the	  site	  of	  one’s	  identity.’11	  	  This	  is	  a	  profoundly	  spatialising	  process	  that	  demands	  a	  self-­‐emplacement	  within	  the	  cartography	  of	  power	  that	  we	  share	  with	  others	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  illuminate	   the	   limits	  and	   locations	  of	  our	  own	  particular	  embodiments	  and	  understandings	  of	  truth,	  knowledge	  and	  power.	   	   It	   is	  an	   interactive	  practice	  of	   interrogating	  and	   thus	  distancing	  the	   self	   from	   the	   familiar	   as	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   approaching	   difference.	   	   This	   therefore,	   is	  why	  I	  take	  what	  might	  seem	  a	  circuitous	  or	  cautious	  approach	  to	  the	  topic	  on	  hand.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  unfamiliar	  in	  order	  to	  emplace	  it	  within	  an	  already	  existing	  binary	  of	  familiar/unfamiliar	   but	   to	   attempt	   to	   interrogate	   the	   conditions	   that	   contribute	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Uma	  Narayan,	  Dislocating	  Cultures:	  Identities,	  Traditions	  and	  Third	  World	  Feminism	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997).	  p141	  11	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2008).p12	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construction	  of	  this	  binary	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  in	  order	  to	  cast	  light	  on	  the	  particular	  power	   structures	   which	   ‘we’,	   as	   LGBT	   individuals,	   inhabit.	   	   Thus	   the	   ‘familiar’	   with	   which	   I	  engage	  is	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  LGBT	  identities	  and	  the	  politics	  that	  follow	  from	  them.	  	  My	   interest	   is	   in	  more	  solidly	  emplacing	  these	  questions	  of	  rights	  and	   identity	   in	  relation	  to	  a	  complex,	   multifaceted	   understanding	   of	   sexuality.	   	   This	   demands	   a	   shift	   from	   a	   simple	  acceptance	  and	  contrasting	  of	  	  ‘identities’	  to	  their	  problematisation	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  finding	  modes	  of	  connection	  across	  difference	  and	  to	  then	  rethink	  these	  questions	  of	  identity,	  connection	  and	  difference	   in	   relation	   to	   structures	  of	   international	  human	  rights	   law.	   	   I	   attempt	   to	   trace	  why	  these	  particular	  forces	  have	  come	  to	  constitute	  this	  particular	  problem	  in	  this	  way	  and	  what	  the	  effects	  of	  this	  might	  be.	  	  As	  Kollman	  and	  Waites	  point	  out:	  	  	   ‘The	  radical	  anti	  essentialist	  understanding	  of	  human	  identity	  and	  meaning	  construction	  espoused	  by	  queer	   theory	  and	  activism	  allows	   for	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  human	  expression	  by	  challenging	  many	  universal	   categories.	   	   The	  problem…is	   that	   law,	  policy	   and	   states	   appear	   to	  need	   identifiable	   categories	   to	   combat	   discrimination.	   	   These	   categories,	   while	   constraining	  certain	   moves	   towards	   liberation,	   appear	   necessary	   for	   movement	   creation	   and	   state	  activism.’12	  	  	  At	  issue	  here	  is	  the	  disjunction	  that	  exists	  between	  a	  multiplicity	  or	  multi-­‐sided	  mode	  of	  sexual	  being	  and	  becoming,	   and	   international	  human	   rights	  norms	  and	  movements	   that	   increasingly	  acknowledge	   sexual	   subjectivity	   and	   sexual	   identity	   as	   a	   (sometimes)	   legitimate	   subject	  position.	  	  Thus,	  while	  even	  human	  rights	  themselves	  may	  be	  predisposed	  to	  view	  sexuality	  and	  subjectivity	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  dualism	  –	  an	  either/or	  in	  relation	  to	  identity,	  legality	  and	  applicability	  –	  I	   look	  to	  unpick	  some	  of	  the	  series	  that	  are	  brought	   into	  resonance	  with	  each	  other	  through	  the	  conjunction	  (or	  disjunction)	  of	  the	  flux	  of	  sexuality	  and	  the	  categories	  of	  human	  rights.	  By	  approaching	  these	  issues	  as	  Deleuzian	  series,	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  distance	  myself	  from	  analysis	  according	   to	   a	   logical	   or	   foundational	   definition	   of	   the	   structures	   of	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   in	  circulation,	   particularly	   one	   that	   rests	   upon	   the	   conscious	   synthesising	   subject.	   	   For	   Deleuze,	  series	   are	   not	   defined	   primarily	   as	   combinations	   of	   objects	   and	   substances	   but	   ‘variations	  independent	   of	   objects	   and	   not	   limited	   to	   them.’13	  	   Of	   central	   importance	   is	   variation	   and	  combination,	   rather	   than	   the	   logical	   organisation	   and	   identification	   of	   particular	   structures	  within	   the	   consciousness	   of	   a	   synthesising	   subject.	   	   This	   shift	   allows	   a	   focus	   away	   from	   and	  outside	  the	  subject	  as	  the	  organisational	  focal	  point	  or	  grounding	  of	  a	  set	  of	  universal	  rules.	  	  As	  Williams	   suggests,	   for	   Deleuze,	   ‘series	   are	   not	   defined	   by	   logical	   function	   or	   a	   grammatical	  definition…We	   may	   deduce	   patterns	   and	   structures	   in	   them	   and	   thereby	   explain	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Kelly	  Kollman	  and	  Matthew	  Waites,	  "The	  Global	  Politics	  of	  Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  Human	  Rights:	  An	  Introduction,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  p13-­‐14	  13	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide.	  	  p26	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conditions	  under	  which	   series	  appear,	  but	   these	  are	   secondary	   to	   series	  as	   something	   sensed	  and	   expressed.	   	   Logic	   and	   grammar	   always	   come	  after;	   they	   follow	   change	   and	   events	   rather	  than	  dictate	  them.’14	  	  The	  focus	  then,	  is	  not	  upon	  totalising	  structures	  of	  oppositions,	  hierarchy	  or	  negation,	  but	  points	  of	  productiveness,	   connection,	  mutation	  and	  paradox	  and	   the	   changes	  that	   these	   points	   mark	   or	   precipitate.	   	   	   This	   perspective	   is	   an	   attempt	   –	   made	   with	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  problematics	  of	  sexuality	  mentioned	  above	  –	  to	  trace	  why	  now;	  why	  has	  sexual	  orientation	  become	  increasingly	  pertinent	  at	  this	  time.	  	  This	  is	  a	  question	  of	  what	  factors	  make	   the	  problematisation	  of	   sexual	  orientation	  possible,	  which	   factors,	   identities	   and	  names	  occupy	   a	   structuring	   role,	  which	   forces	   can	   operate	   to	   open	   up	   these	   structures.	   	   It	   is	   also	   a	  question	  of	  what	   framing	   the	   issue	   in	   this	  way	  can	  mean	   for	   the	  way	   that	  we	  can	   think	  about	  activism	  in	  relation	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  	  
Theoretical	  Outlines	  1:	  Postcolonial	  framings	  of	  power,	  knowledge	  and	  law	  The	   considerations	  outlined	   above	   require	   that	  particular	   attention	  be	  paid	   to	   the	   theoretical	  framework	   through	   which	   the	   issues	   above	   are	   analysed.	   	   My	   framework	   is	   in	   large	   part	   a	  feminist	  Deleuzian	  approach;	  I	  return	  to	  the	  advantages	  and	  implications	  of	  this	  approach	  later.	  	  However,	  in	  focusing	  on	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  norms,	  I	  draw	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  work	  of	   those	  who	  have	  mapped	   the	   social	   relations	  of	   struggle	   and	  uneven	  power	  dynamics	  upon	  and	  through	  which	  our	  global	  structures	  of	  law	  and	  power	  operate.	  At	  issue	  then,	  is	  the	  context	  in	  which	  thought	  or	  knowledge	  about	  sexuality	  and	  about	  rights	  are	  produced:	  the	  tools	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  use	  to	  frame	  and	  enter	  this	  particular	  set	  of	  problems.	  	  In	  relation	   to	   sociology	   and	   social	   theory,	   Connell	   has	   addressed	   the	   question	   of	   positing	  knowledge,	  or	   frameworks	  of	  knowledge	  as	  universal	  or	  universally	  applicable.	   	  She	  notes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  claims	  to	  the	  universal	  will	  in	  fact	  be	  teleological,	  imperialist	  and	  Eurocentric:	  that	  knowledge	  production	   is	  marked	  by	   a	   particular	   history	   and	  power	   structure	   that	   posits	   ‘the	  metropole’	  as	  the	  space	  in	  which	  theory	  is	  produced,	  and	  ‘the	  periphery’	  –	  the	  global	  South	  -­‐	  as	  simply	  a	  source	  of	  data,	  where	  theories	  developed	  elsewhere	  can	  be	  refined	  and	  put	  into	  play.	  	  Connell’s	   question	   is	   thus	   one	   of	   whether	   there	   is	   theorising	   that	   originates	   from	   the	   global	  South.	  	  	  	  Or:	  	  	  'The	  underlying	  problem	  of	   the	   social	   scientific	   approaches…is	   their	   geopolitical	   logic.	  	  They	   rely	   exclusively	   on	   the	   metropole	   for	   their	   intellectual	   tools	   and	   assumptions	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.	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therefore	   treat	   the	   majority	   world	   as	   object.	   	   This	   closes	   off	   the	   possibility	   of	   social	   science	  working	  as	  a	  shared	  learning	  process,	  a	  dialogue,	  at	  the	  level	  of	  theory'.15	  For	   Connell,	   the	   dominance	   of	   metropolitan	   theoretical	   constructions	   has	   become	   a	   self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy.	   	  The	  Eurocentrism	  that	  she	  traces	  in	  the	  history	  of	  sociology	  first	  obscures	  the	   historical	   and	   theoretical	   traditions	   that	   existed	   outside	   the	   West	   and	   then	   prevents	  development,	  debate	  and	  dialogue	  between	  and	  within	   these	   traditions,	   instead	  assuming	   the	  global	  applicability	  of	  theory	  developed	  in	  American	  and	  European	  universities.	   	  Her	  project	  is	  to	   focus	   on	   ‘Southern	   Theory’	   –	   theory	   that	   is	   both	   grounded	   in,	   and	   applicable	   outside	  dominant	  Western	   understandings	   of	   subject	   and	   self.	   	   Linda	   Tuhiwai	   Smith	  makes	   a	   similar	  point	   in	  her	  work	  Decolonizing	  Methodologies	  when	  she	  critiques	   the	  historical	  processes	   that	  have	  shaped	  the	  speaking	  and	  archiving	  of	  history	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  erode	  indigenous	  frames	  of	   reference	   and	   systems	   of	   knowledge,	   including	   the	   ability	   and	   right	   to	   determine	   what	  legitimate	  knowledge	  was	  and	  is.16	  	  In	  essence,	  and	  as	  both	  Connell	  and	  Tuhiwai	  Smith	  bring	  to	  the	   fore,	   much	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   think	   about	   rights,	   subjectivity	   and	   selfhood	   have	  philosophical	  and	  historical	  origins	  in	  a	  period	  in	  which	  imperialistic	  conquest	  and	  domination	  of	  those	  deemed	  ‘other’	  was	  the	  norm.	  Consequently,	   the	   rights	   discourses	   that	   are	   now	   used	   to	   make	   liberatory	   claims	   are	   deeply	  implicated	   in	  a	  historical	  process	  and	  power	  dynamic	  of	  dominance	  and	  silencing.17	  	  Mamdani	  takes	   this	   analysis	   further	   as	   he	   explores	   the	   creation	   of	   both	   the	   colonial	   subject	   and	   the	  system	   of	   colonial	   rule.18	  	   His	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   colonial	   subject	   is	   a	   creation	   of	   European	  governmental	   processes	   in	   which	   administrative	   functions	   came	   to	   define,	   standardise	   and	  naturalise	   a	   particular	   understanding	   of	   what	   the	   African	   ‘was’.	   	   In	   doing	   this	   Mamdani	  highlights	  the	  Eurocentric	  nature	  of	  discourses	  through	  which	  Africa	  is	  often	  addressed:	  	  'Whatever	  their	  differences	  [between	  those	  engaged	  in	  debating	  contemporary	  Africa’s	  transition	  to	  capitalism],	  both	  sides	  agree	  that	  African	  reality	  has	  meaning	   insofar	  as	   it	  can	  be	  seen	   to	   reflect	   a	   particular	   stage	   in	   the	   development	   of	   an	   earlier	   history.	   	   Inasmuch	   as	   it	  privileges	   the	  European	  historical	  experience	  as	   its	   touchstone,	  as	   the	  historical	  expression	  of	  the	   universal,	   contemporary	   unilinear	   evolutionism	   should	   concretely	   and	   appropriately	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15Raewyn	  Connell,	  Southern	  Theory	  (Polity,	  2007).	  p68	  	  16	  Smith,	  Decolonizing	  Methodologies.	  p173	  17	  Patton,	  for	  example,	  has	  highlighted	  the	  role	  of	  law,	  if	  not	  rights,	  in	  deterritorialising	  indigenous	  territories	  and	  then	  reterritorialising	  them	  as	  crown	  land.	  	  Paul	  Patton,	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Political	  (Oxon:	  Routeledge,	  2000).	  p124	  18	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  Citizen	  and	  Subject:	  Contemporary	  Africa	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Late	  Colonialism	  (London:	  James	  Currey,	  1996).	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characterised	  as	  Eurocentrism.	  	  The	  central	  tendency	  of	  such	  a	  methodological	  orientation	  is	  to	  lift	  a	  phenomenon	  out	  of	  context	  and	  process.	  	  The	  result	  is	  history	  by	  analogy’.19	  In	   his	   analysis	   of	   international	   law,	   Rajagopal	   notes	   a	   similar	   process	   in	   which	   dominance	  becomes	   governance	   and	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   becomes	   systematised	   and	   disguised. 20	  	  Rajagopal	  draws	  on	  a	  notion	  of	  governmentality	  and	  resistance	  to	  highlight	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  process	  of	   institutionalisation	  and	  rationalisation	  works	  to	  bring	  resistance	  within	  a	  particular	  structure	  of	  power.	   	   Power,	  we	  might	   suggest,	   can	   increasingly	  be	   addressed	  as	   a	  biopolitical	  relation	   that	   works	   through	   productive	   incorporation	   rather	   than	   exclusion21	  and	   thus	   the	  system	  through	  which	  subject	  and	  self	  is	  constructed	  contains	  –	  and	  indeed	  perhaps	  requires	  -­‐	  a	  complementary	  space	  for	  the	  ‘other’.	  	  As	  Braidotti	  suggests,	  we	  may	  now	  all	  be	  ‘in	  this	  together’,	  but	  we	  differ	   radically	   in	   terms	  of	   locations	  and	  allocations	  of	  power.22	  	  Notions	  of	   self/other,	  inside/outside	   are	   profoundly	   complicated	   and	   intimately	   related.	   	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   this	  complexity	   and	   relationality	   is	   integral	   to	   any	   understanding	   of	   sexual	   subjectivity	   and	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  	  Thus,	  with	  Mamdami,	  we	  can	  view	  the	   law	  as	  operating	  by	  analogy	  and	  binarisms,	   in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  incorporation	  of	  otherness	  into	  an	  already	  established	  framework.	  	  As	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  Darian	  Smith	  note,	  Western	  identity	  was	  formed	  in	  relation	  and	  opposition	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	   however,	   once	   formed,	   this	   identity	   grew	   to	   dominate	   and	   fill	   all	   available	   space	   as	  ‘universal’	   identity	   that	   postcolonial	   states	   and	   their	   subjects	   were	   both	   excluded	   from	   and	  exhorted	   to	   join.23	  In	   relation	   to	   such	   ‘binary	  machines’	  Deleuze	  and	  Parnet	   comment	   that	   ‘so	  many	  dichotomies	  will	  be	  established	  that	  there	  will	  be	  enough	  for	  everyone	  to	  be	  pinned	  to	  the	  wall,	  sunk	  in	  a	  hole.’24	  We	   should	   note	   that	   this	   is	   not	   the	   only	   possible	  mode	   of	   organisation	   of	   knowledge	   –	   even	  within	  the	  history	  of	  Western	  thought.25	  And	  indeed,	  the	  need	  (and	  space)	  for	  the	  existence	  and	  construction	  of	  decentred	  knowledges	  originating	   from	  paradigms	  outside	   the	  global	  North	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid.	  (1996)	  p12	  20	  Balakrishnan	  Rajagopal,	  International	  Law	  from	  Below:	  Development,	  Social	  Movements	  and	  Third	  World	  Resistance	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  21	  Pheng	  Cheah,	  "Biopower	  and	  the	  New	  International	  Division	  of	  Reproductive	  Labor,"	  in	  Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?	  
Reflections	  on	  the	  History	  of	  an	  Idea,	  ed.	  Rosalind	  C.	  Morris	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  22	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Locating	  Deleuze’s	  Eco-­‐Philosophy	  between	  Bio/Zoe-­‐Power	  and	  Necro-­‐Politics,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  
Law:	  Forensic	  Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).	  p97	  23	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  Darian-­‐Smith,	  "Laws	  of	  the	  Postcolonial:	  An	  Insistent	  Introduction."	  24	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Claire	  Parnet,	  Dialogues	  2,	  trans.	  Hugh	  Tomlinson	  and	  Barbara	  Habberjam	  (London	  Continuum,	  2006).p16	  25	  J.P.	  Singh	  Uberoi,	  The	  European	  Modernity:	  Science,	  Truth	  and	  Method	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  Although	  we	  might	  also	  note	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Deleuze	  too	  talks	  of	  a	  ‘secret	  link’	  (perhaps	  a	  secret	  history)	  of	  philosophers	  who	  challenged	  the	  rationalist	  tradition	  of	  Western	  philosophy,	  see	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  (Chichester:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1995).p6	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and	   should	   be	   a	   particular	   concern	   of	   critiques	   of	   human	   rights	   law.26	  	   But	   despite	   these	  important	   critiques,	   the	   regimes	   of	   particular	   structuring	   devices,	   binaries	   and	   assemblages	  persist	  –	  even	   in	   the	   face	  of	   recent	   ‘turns’	   that	   foreground	   their	   limits.	   	  Braidotti,	   for	  example	  points	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   seeing	   and	   knowledge	   and	   the	   victory	   of	   the	   seeable	   as	  knowledge,	   that	   has	   persisted	   since	   Plato.27	  	   Olkowski	   develops	   this	   point	   by	   viewing	   Plato’s	  cave	   as	   the	   arena	   for	   the	   structuring	   of	   oppositions	   in	  which	   the	   pure	   is	   separated	   from	   the	  impure,	  authentic	  from	  the	  unauthentic.	  	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  separation	  and	  classification,	  claims	  to	  truth	  can	  be	  made	  by	  analogy	  and	  under	  a	  principle	  of	  identity,	  and	  can	  presumably	  be	  enshrined	   in	   law.28 	  	   With	   such	   background	   in	   mind,	   we	   can	   question,	   for	   example,	   the	  relationship	  between	  visibility,	   ‘coming	  out’	   and	  declaring	  oneself,	   as	   an	  LGBT	  political	   tactic,	  and	   the	  relationship	  between	   these	   tactics,	   the	   law	  and	  wider	  social	   imaginaries.	   	   It	   is	  on	   this	  level	  that	  my	  analysis	  takes	  place	  and	  as	  such,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  not	  just	  what	  has	  happened	  but	  also	  in	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  ‘what	  is	  happening’	  a	  viable	  form	  of	  action.	  I	  have	  spent	  some	  time	  outlining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  how	  law	  and	  subjectivity	  exist	  as	  non-­‐neutral	  constructs	  in	  order	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  addresses	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  in	  relation	  to	   such	   discourses	   is	   greatly	   dependent	   on	   positionality.	   	   Sexuality	   exists	   within	   a	   complex	  assemblage,	  which	  is	  impacted	  upon	  by	  power,	  history,	  space	  and	  place.	  	  It	  is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  object	   that	   can	   be	   viewed	   or	   addressed,	   so	   much	   as	   a	   relationship	   or	   a	   connecting	   force	  occupying	  various	  disparate	   series.	   	   	  To	  paraphrase	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  at	   issue	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  one	   orients	   oneself	   towards	   issues	   of	   sexuality; 29 	  this	   orientation	   will	   necessarily	   have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ground	  that	  one	  occupies	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  chooses	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  –	  what	  one	  particularly	  seeks	  to	  frame	  or	  emphasise	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  complex	  multiplicity	  at	  hand.	  In	  my	   own	   research	   I	   approach	   sexuality	   through	   international	   human	   rights.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	  view	  rights	  as	  machines	  or	  keys,	  that	  is,	  means	  of	  structuring,	  understanding	  or	  entering	  into	  a	  particular	  assemblage.	   	  Rights	  are	  not	   fixed	  and	   immutable,	  but	  are	   themselves	  relational	  and	  structuring	  devices.	   	  Thus,	   the	  problem	  or	  paradox	  under	   investigation	   is	   that	  of	   ‘sexuality’	  or	  ‘sexual	   orientation’	   (in	   the	   understanding	   that	   sexuality	  will	   always	   have	   another	   dimension,	  excess,	   resonance,	   line	   of	   flight,	   beyond	   the	   frame	   that	   I	   am	   temporarily	   setting)	   and	   I	   use	  human	  rights	  to	  enter	  and	  frame	  my	  analysis	  of	  sexuality.	  	  This	  approach	  raises	  two	  key	  points	  –	  first	   the	   fact	   that	   my	   mode	   of	   enquiry	   and	   approach	   will	   impact	   upon	   the	   direction	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  eg	  Brewster	  Kneen,	  The	  Tyranny	  of	  Rights	  (Ottowa:	  The	  Ram's	  Horn,	  2009).	  27	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Affirming	  the	  Affirmative:	  On	  Nomadic	  Affectivity,"	  Rhizomes	  11/12	  (2005).	  	  28	  Dorothea	  Olkowski,	  "Body,	  Knowledge,	  and	  Becoming-­‐Woman,	  Morpho-­‐Logic	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Irigaray,"	  in	  Deleuze	  
and	  Feminist	  Theory,	  ed.	  Claire	  Colebrook	  and	  Ian	  Buchanan	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  p99	  29	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  Queer	  Phenomenology:	  Orientations,	  Objects,	  Others	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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conclusions	  of	  my	  analysis	  and	  second,	  the	  use	  of	  human	  rights	  as	  machines	  reveals	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  human	  rights	  themselves	  –	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  relate	  to	  each	  other,	  the	  blind	  spots	  and	  history	  of	  the	  rights	  discourse	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  themselves	  are	  both	  subject	  to,	  and	  facilitators	  of,	  changing	  social	  dynamics.	  	  Rights	  here	  are	  therefore	  not	  objective	  ‘givens’,	  they	  are	  neither	  stable	  nor	  universal	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  transcendental	  or	  equally	   applicable	   in	   all	   circumstances	   or	   locations.	   	   Instead	   I	   view	   rights	   as	   situated,	  ‘immanent’	  and	  instrumental	  devices	  of	  strategy,	  politics	  and	  connectability.	  	  This	  makes	  rights	  themselves	   as	   much	   part	   of	   the	   analysis	   as	   issues	   and	   developments	   around	   sexuality	   and	  sexual	  orientation.	  
Theoretical	  Outlines	  2:	  Deleuzian	  encounters	  and	  events	  The	   analysis	   above	   draws	   heavily	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   postcolonial	   theorists	   in	   order	   to	   set	   the	  context	  of	  the	  questions	  asked.	  	  Given	  this	  reliance	  on	  postcolonial	  thought	  alongside	  the	  wider	  Deleuzian	  question	  of	  how	  the	  issues	  at	  hand	  are	  constituted	  at	  any	  particular	  time	  and	  place,	  there	   is	   perhaps	   a	   question	   of	  why	  my	  outlook	  needs	   to	   draw	  on	   feminist	  Deleuzian	   thought,	  particularly	   given	   Spivakian, 30 	  feminist, 31 	  and	   postcolonial 32 	  critiques	   of	   Deleuze.	   	   With	  Braidotti,	   I	  would	  argue	   that	  my	  use	  of	  Deleuze	   is	  perhaps	  not	  always	   the	  most	  orthodox,	  but	  again	  with	  Braidotti,	   I	  would	  suggest	   that	   this	   is	  perhaps	   the	  best	  way	   to	  approach	  Deleuzian	  thought.33	  	   And	   despite	   critiques	   and	  misgivings,	   there	   are	   certain	   key	   advantages	   to	   using	   a	  Deleuzian	  framework	  to	  structure	  an	  analysis	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  international	  law.	  To	  address	  this	  point,	  however,	  it	  might	  first	  be	  necessary	  to	  more	  clearly	  foreground	  how	  my	  approach	   to	   sexual	   orientation	   rights	   can	   be	   situated	   within	   a	   specifically	   a	   Deleuzian	  understanding	  of	  law	  or	  a	  Deleuzian	  jurisprudence,	  particularly	  given	  Deleuze’s	  own	  critique	  of	  rights.34	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  although	  critical	  of	  rights	  in	  their	  ‘transcendent’	  or	  universal	  form,	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  jurisprudence	  on	  Deleuze	  offers	  significant	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  tools	  for	  addressing	  questions	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  Therefore,	  my	  own	  approach	  is	  one	  that	  draws	  upon	  analysis	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  law,	  and	  reads	  these	  arguments	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  particular	  problematics	   presented	   by	   LGBT	   rights	   discourses.	   	  What	   is	   at	   stake	   here	   is	   a	   jurisprudence	  characterised	  by	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ‘material	  bodies	  of	  citizens	  and	  their	  interests	  rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak,	  ""Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?"	  Revised	  Edition,	  from	  The	  "History"	  Chapter	  of	  Critique	  of	  Postcolonial	  Reason,"	  in	  Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?	  Reflections	  on	  the	  History	  of	  an	  Idea,	  ed.	  Rosalind	  C.	  Morris	  (Chichester:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  31	  Eg	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.p76,	  Jami	  Weinstein,	  "Introduction	  Part	  2,"	  
Deleuze	  and	  Gender:	  Supplement	  to	  Deleuze	  Studies	  2	  (2008).	  p26	  32	  J	  Wuthnow,	  "Deleuze	  in	  the	  Postcolonial:	  On	  Nomads	  and	  Indigenous	  Politics,"	  Feminist	  Theory	  3,	  no.	  2	  (2002).	  33	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2008).	  p87-­‐88	  	  I	  address	  this	  point	  at	  more	  length	  below.	  34	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  On	  Human	  Rights	  L'Abécédaire	  de	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  avec	  Claire	  Parnet,	  Vidéo	  Éd.	  Montparnasse,	  1996	  at	  www.generation-­‐online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm	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the	   abstract	   formless	   subject	   of	   law.’35	  	   This	   process	   considers	   law	   and	   legal	   theory	   as	   a	  ‘differential	   jurisprudence’36	  focusing	   not	   on	   the	   abstract	   subject	   of	   law,	   but	   the	   material	  circumstances	  through	  which	  rights	  and	  law	  are	  lived.	  	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   points	   to	   be	   unpicked	   here.	   	   The	   first	   is	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   material	  circumstances	   in	  which	   law	   is	   lived,	   or	   rights	   are	   experienced	   and	   expressed,	   rather	   than	   an	  abstract	   transcendent	   and	   always	   already	   existing	   body	   of	   rights,	   to	   which	   material	  circumstances	   must	   be	   subsumed	   or	   represented.	   	   As	   such,	   a	   Deleuzian	   approach	   to	  jurisprudence	   (and	   law,	   rights	  and	   jurisdiction)	   involves	  a	  movement	  away	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  there	   is	   law,	   to	   an	   investigation	   of	   the	  manners	   in	  which	   law	   surrounds	   and	   emplaces	   us	   in	  terms	   of	   its	   processes,	   technologies,	   expressions,	   forums	   etc.37	  This	   is	   a	   process	   that	   centres	  upon	  ‘situated	  law’	  and	  a	  involves	  focus	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  we	  are	  engaged	  by	  law.	  	  Thus	  the	   point	   is	   not	   the	   totality	   or	   the	   unity	   of	   a	   body	   of	   law,	   its	   coherence	   or	   even	   a	   search	   for	  singular	   and	   legitimate	   foundations	   of	   law	   or	   rights,	   but	   the	  material	   circumstances	   through	  which	  rights	  are	  engaged	  and	  expressed,	  the	  form	  that	  their	  expression	  takes,	  the	  circumstances	  that	  allow	  such	  expressions	  and	  the	  possibilities	  and	  potentialities	  facilitated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  rights	  claim	  has	  been	  made	   in	  a	  particular	  way	   in	  a	  particular	   time.	   	  Throughout	   this	   thesis,	   I	  examine	   a	   number	   of	   different	   circumstances	   and	   forums	   in	   which	   sexual	   rights	   claims	   are	  made,	   aiming	   not	   to	   find	   a	   coherent	   or	   cohesive	   body	   of	   sexual	   rights,	   but	   to	   examine	   the	  circumstances	  that	  have	  activated	  a	  language	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  and	  investigate	  the	  way	  in	  which	   these	   rights	   are	  expressed	  and	  become	  expressible	  within	  a	  particular	   jurisdiction	  at	   a	  particular	  time.	  	  	  The	   second	   point	   that	   we	   might	   outline	   here	   relates	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   a	   Deleuzian	  jurisprudence	   demands	   that	   close	   attention	   be	   paid	   to	   the	   vital	   politics	   of	   lived	   bodies	   and	  material	  lives.	  	  Mussawir	  addresses	  this	  point	  when	  he	  discusses	  the	  ‘dramatization’	  of	  rights,	  or	  the	  ‘masks’	  through	  which	  law	  and	  rights	  are	  known	  and	  made	  liveable.38	  	  	  	  The	  abstract	  subject,	  he	  argues,	  ‘related	  to	  rights	  in	  a	  universalized	  and	  abstract	  way.	  	  It	  is	  capable	  simply	  of	  “bearing	  rights”	  -­‐	  or	  indeed	  capable	  of	  bearing	  any	  imaginable	  right	  -­‐	  and	  thus	  retains	  only	  the	  potential	  of	   acting.’39	  	   Instead,	   he	   focuses	   upon	   the	   ‘legal	   person’,	   with	   a	   determinate	   relation	   to	   a	  particular	   set	   of	   rights,	   which	   are	   lived,	   known	   and	   dramatised.	   	   ‘The	   legal	   person…has	   a	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determinate	  relation	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rights	  and	  capacities	  which	  it	  performs.'40	  	  Immediately	  then,	  we	  can	   think	  of	   rights	  as	  active,	  or	  as	  elements	   that	  are	  determined	  and	   lived	  within	  a	  particular	  location	   -­‐	  and	  as	  such,	   the	  question	  becomes	  one	  of	  which	   location	  and	  which	  persons.	   	  Thus,	  this	   framing	  demands	  a	  consideration	  of	   the	  situatedness	  of	   the	  persons	  through	  which	  rights	  are	  lived.	   	  At	  issue	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  location	  might	  determine	  both	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  set	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  person	  within	  or	  through	  which	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  rights	  can	  be	  expressed.	  	  Of	  key	  importance	  is	  a	  process	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  ‘spatialisation’	  of	  rights,	  that	  focuses	  on	  how	  rights	  connect	  with	  different	  sets	  of	  circumstances	  and	  individuals	  rather	  than	  on	  abstract,	  transcendent	  universality.	  	  It	  is	  through	  this	  lens	  that	  we	  must	  ask	  what	  rights	  are	  capable	  of	  and	  what	  actions	  they	  might	  facilitate.	  The	   idea	   that	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   these	   approaches	   to	   Deleuzian	   jurisprudence	   is	   that	   of	   the	  possibility	  of	  viewing	  rights	  as	  immanent	  to	  those	  who	  live	  them.	  	  Thus,	  we	  might	  centralise	  the	  process	  of	  working	  through	  cases,	  circumstances	  and	  encounters	  in	  order	  to	  ‘put…the	  law	  into	  variation.’41	  	   In	   this	   understanding,	   rights	   are	   not	   static,	   but	   moving,	   lived	   and	   subject	   to	  processes	   of	   re-­‐selection	   and	   re-­‐distribution.	   Rights	   here	   act	   less	   as	   an	   inert	   monolith	   or	  universal	   body	   and	   more	   as	   an	   active	   process	   of	   expression	   or	   creation	   in	   response	   to	   an	  encounter.	   My	   approach	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   focus	   on	   particular	   cases,	   events	   or	  singularities	   in	  order	   to	  explore	   the	  particularities	  at	  play	  –	  or	   in	  order	   to	  ask	  not	  what	  LGBT	  rights	  are,	  but	  what	  LGBT	  rights	  might	  be	  capable	  of	  as	  they	  are	  enacted	  in	  different	  locations.	  	  	  	  	  This	  approach	  centralises	  questions	  of	  judgment	  and	  particularity.	  	  Mussawir	  argues	  that	  there	  is	   no	   universal	   value	   to	   judgment	   –	   it	   is	   instead	   something	   that	   must	   be	   expressed,42	  or	   as	  Lefebvre	   argues,	   ‘active	   judgment’	   is	   a	   process	   that	   requires	   the	   active	   perception	   of	   an	  encounter,	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   relevant	   elements	   of	   that	   encounter	   and	   the	   creation	   and	  expression	  of	  jurisprudence	  in	  response	  to	  what	  has	  been	  perceived	  and	  selected.43	  	  What	  is	  key	  to	  my	   analysis	   of	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   then,	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   no	   universal	   set	   of	   LGBT	  rights	  that	  requires	  recognition	  and	  application,	  but	  instead	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  an	  investigation	  into	   the	  particular	   circumstances,	   procedures	   and	   ‘local	   dramatisations’	   through	  which	   rights	  are	  known	  and	  lived.44	  	  This	  takes	  us	  some	  way	  from	  Deleuze’s	  initial	  critique	  of	  empty,	  abstract	  rights.	  	  In	  its	  place,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  Mussawir’s	  suggestion	  that	  a	  right	  is	  worthless	  if	  it	  does	  not	  invent	  a	  way	  of	  doing	  something.45	  	  Thus	  the	  focus	  here	  is	  not	  simply	  on	  law’s	  ‘representation’	  of	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LGBT	   rights,	   but	   on	   immanent	   rights	   and	   the	   circumstances	   through	  which	   they	   are	   lived	   or	  made	   livable.	   	   At	   stake	   are	   the	   particularities,	   connections	   and	   contradictions	   in	   different	  material	  conditions.	  	  The	  key	  question	  that	  a	  Deleuzian	  jurisprudence	  leaves	  us	  with	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  is	  not	  necessarily	  one	  of	  the	  content	  of	  a	  right,	  but	  relates	  more	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	   far	   rights	  might	   be	   pushed:	  What	   do	   rights	  make	   possible?	  How	   are	   rights	   known?	  And	  what	  will	  this	  mean	  in	  a	  particular	  place	  and	  at	  a	  particular	  time?	  However,	   at	   this	   point	   we	   might	   also	   engage	   with	   Lefebvre’s	   suggestion	   that	   in	   turning	   to	  Deleuze’s	  concept	  of	  jurisprudence	  in	  order	  to	  flesh	  out	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  law,	  or	  in	  our	  case,	  a	  positive	   account	  of	   rights,	   commentators	   risk	   eclipsing	   those	   elements	  of	  Deleuze’s	   thought	  that	   are	   useful	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   potential	   for	   a	   specifically	   Deleuzian	   conception	   of	  human	   rights.46	  	   Thus,	  while	   I	   emplace	  myself	  within	   a	   Deleuzian	   jurisprudence,	   and	   as	   such	  focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   how	   rights	   might	   be	   made	   liveable,	   and	   expressed	   as	   immanent	  through	   a	   process	   of	   active	   judgment,	   I	   am	   also	   interested	   in	   pushing	   further	   than	   this.	   	   The	  question	  might	  be	  not	  only	   ‘how	  are	  rights	  dramatised	  and	  spatialised?’	  but	  what	  conflicts	  do	  rights	  illustrate	  and	  what	  questions	  do	  they	  open	  up	  to	  creative	  repetition	  or	  virtual	  movement?	  	  Mussawir	  highlights	  the	  abstract	  nature	  of	  subjectivity	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  dramatised.	  	  At	  issue	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  line	  of	  flight	  from	  such	  questions	  –	  or	  the	  potential	  for	  creative	  renewal	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  abstract	  and	  abstracting	  subjectivity.	  	  Thus,	  while	  we	   might	   agree	   with	   Mussawir	   that	   we	   must	   be	   attentive	   to	   jurisdiction	   as	   the	   frame	   for	  understanding	  how	  rights	  are	  dramatised,	  expressed	  and	  lived,	  there	  is	  a	  second	  element	  to	  be	  unpicked	   –	   that	   of	   how,	   within	   a	   Deleuzian	   frame,	   rights-­‐based	   responses	   to	   questions	   of	  sexuality	   could	   potentially	   be	   creative	   repetitions	   and	   re-­‐formulations	   (or	   counter-­‐actualisations)	   of	   the	   problems	   posed	   by	   law,	   subjectivity,	   selfhood,	   desire,	   sexuality,	   family,	  state	   etc.	   	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   both	   the	   actual	   circumstances	   and	   the	   virtual	   repetitions	   that	  populate	   rights	  questions,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   surface	  of	   expression	   and	   sense	   at	  which	   they	  meet.	  	  This	   virtual	   aspect	   draws	   on	   a	   Deleuzian	   theoretical	   standpoint	   to	   posit	   rights	   demands	   as	  potential	  encounters	  that	  activate	  not	  just	  immediate	  material	  questions	  but	  also	  repetitions	  or	  counter-­‐actualisations	   of	   Ideas	   of	   subjectivity,	   sexuality	   and	   justice	   (this	   point	   is	   addressed	  further	   throughout	   the	   thesis	   and	  most	   particularly	   in	   Chapter	   Five).	   	  With	   Deleuze,	   we	   can	  address	   not	   just	   the	   actuality	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   it	   is	   specifically	   dramatised,	   nor	   simply	   the	  virtual	  movement	  of	  Ideas	  or	  of	  justice,	  but	  the	  surface	  of	  sense	  at	  which	  the	  two	  intersect.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  role	  that	  rights	  play	  at	  this	  intersection.	  	  Thus,	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  Deleuzian	  jurisprudence,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  more	  clearly	  sketch	  out	  how	  elements	  of	  Deleuzian	   thought	  can	  be	   relevant	   to	  questions	  of	   international	  LGBT	  rights.	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  Alexandre	  Lefebvre	  ‘Human	  Rights	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Bergson’s	  Later	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  and	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  no.	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  (2011)	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The	  most	  significant	  point	  to	  address	  here	  is	  that	  of	  transnationality.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  emergence	   of	   issues	   of	   sexuality	   and	   sexual	   orientation	   into	   international	   human	   rights	  discourses	  makes	  an	  analysis	  of	   ‘the	   international’	  as	  a	  dimension	  necessary.	   	  Yet	  at	   the	  same	  time,	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   take	   such	   a	  wide	   focus	  while	   avoiding	   exclusionary	   or	   Eurocentric	  arguments.	   	   International	  human	  rights	  may	  theoretically	  be	  a	  domain	  that	   is	  now	  addressing	  sexual	  orientation,	  but	  as	  an	  area	  of	  analysis,	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  to	  focus	  on	  everything	  that	  happens,	  or	  on	  all	  of	  the	  specific	  variables	  and	  singularities	  that	  can	  impact	  upon	  different	  and	  differing	  constructions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  To	  try	  to	  mediate	  this	  apparent	  impasse,	  I	  draw	  on	   Deleuzian	   conceptions	   of	   encounter	   and	   event.	   	   Deleuzian	   events	   are	   not	   simply	   bodily,	  material	  or	  corporeal	  shifts,	  but	  are	  incorporeal	  transformations	  subsisting	  over	  and	  above	  the	  spatio-­‐temporal	  world.47	  	  They	  are	  ‘moments	  of	  sense	  that	  exceed	  already	  constituted	  concepts	  but	  which	  open	  the	  problems	  that	  concepts	  will	  answer.’48	  	  As	  such:	  ‘The	  event	  is	  never	  simply	  an	  occurrence	  for	  the	  mind	  of	  a	  conscious	  human	  being,	  it	  is	  rather	  a	  set	  of	  multiple	  interactions	  running	  through	  bodies,	  idea	  structures	  (such	  as	  languages	  or	  moral	  codes)	  and	  virtual	  structures	  (such	  as	  relations	  of	  emotional	  investment	  considered	  in	  abstraction	  from	  the	  bodies	  that	  carry	  them	  –	  changes	  in	  the	  ratios	  of	  the	  intensities	  of	  fear	  and	  attraction	  in	  a	  new	  relationship	  for	  instance).’49	  	  An	   event	   is	   neither	   a	   beginning	   nor	   an	   end,	   but	   something	   ‘in	   the	   middle’,	   it	   indicates	   a	  reorganisation	  –	  a	  new	  selection	  or	  ordering	  that	  runs	  through,	  communicates	  and	  resonates	  in	  multiple	   series	   perpetuating	   and	   continuing	   as	   mutual	   variations.	   	   Events	   are	   double-­‐sided	  ‘something	   that	   runs	   through	   a	   series	   but	   is	   also	   transformed	   by	   it.’50	  	   An	   event	   involves	   the	  selection	   or	   actualisation	   of	   material	   occurrences,	   but	   the	   other	   side	   of	   this	   material	  restructuring	   is	   the	   reordering	   of	   sense	   or	   of	   virtuality	   –	   a	   change	   in	   intensity	   of	   a	   virtual	  potentiality	   or	   values	   (sense)	   that	   are	   actualised	   in	   the	   event.	   	   This	   virtual	   dimension	  means	  that	  every	  actualisation	  is	  haunted	  by	  a	  series	  of	  virtual	  objects	  that	  are	  never	  fully	  present,	  but	  consist	   in	   virtuality	   or	   the	   pure	   past.	   	   Thus,	   the	   event	   intimately	   connects	   corporeal	   and	  incorporeal,	   but	   is	   not	   itself	   material:	   it	   is	   instead	   the	   locus	   and	   connection	   of	   ‘ideational	  singularities’51,	  and	  is	  measured	  or	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  effects,	  or	  resonance	  through	  series.	   	  In	  this	   framework	   ‘sense’	   is	   both	  hugely	   significant	   and	  hugely	   complicated.	   	   It	   invokes	   ‘thought	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  trans.	  M.	  Lester	  and	  C.	  Stivale	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  p64	  	  
27	  	  
and	   thing,	   concept	   and	  object,	   universal	   and	   singular’52	  and	   significantly,	   the	   surface	   at	  which	  these	   realms	  meet.	   	   It	   is	   the	   capacity	   for	   relations	   and	   the	   orientation	   or	  map	  within	   which	  thought	  moves53:	   	   ‘sense	  is	  the	  surface	  that	  divides,	  holds	  together,	  and	  constitutes	   through	  its	  synthetic	  function,	  leaving	  nothing	  outside	  of	  sense	  in	  either	  the	  depths	  of	  things	  nor	  the	  heights	  of	   Ideas.’54	  This	   insistence	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   sense	   and	   thus	   the	   movement	   (but	   not	  resemblance)	  of	  both	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  actual	   in	  the	  event,	  means	  that	  a	  mode	  of	  connection	  persists	  and	  insists	  without	  a	  primary	  demand	  for	  unity	  through	  identity	  or	  resemblance.	   	  For	  Deleuze,	   the	   series	   that	   are	   selected	   and	   ordered	   in	   the	   event	   coexist,	   the	   virtual	   haunts	   the	  actual	  and	  in	  this	  process	  the	  event	  resonates	  through	  all	  series	  without	  demanding	  a	  principle	  of	  singular	  identity	  –	  each	  path	  is	  implicated	  in	  all	  others.	  	  ‘An	  event	  for	  Deleuze	  is	  therefore	  any	  significant	   change	  within	   a	   process,	  where	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   significance	   and	   on	   a	   limitless	  extension	   of	   this	   change	   through	   all	   other	   series,	   and	   in	   principle,	   through	   the	   whole	   of	  reality.’55	  	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  approximate	  a	  framework	  that	  attempts	  to	  unpick	  both	  sexual	  subjectivity	  as	  a	   static	   entity	   and	   the	   structure	   that	   works	   to	   constitute	   sexual	   subjectivity	   in	   this	   way,	   yet	  maintains	   a	   degree	   of	   connection	   or	   communication	   that	   does	   not	   depend	   upon	   identity	   or	  resemblance.	   	   My	   approach	   depends	   upon	   a	   non-­‐unitary	   embedded	   subjectivity,	   formed	   of	  moments	  of	  movement,	  stillness	  and	  speed	  on	  a	  plane	  of	  immanence.	   	  Neither	  subjectivity	  nor	  identity	  is	  fixed,	   instead	  they	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  unfolding	  of	  becoming	  in	  response	  to	  new	   problems	   and	   new	   encounters.	   	   The	   focus	   then,	   is	   on	   emerging	   actualisations	   and	   an	  exploration	  of	  the	  virtual	  tendencies	  activated	  in	  this	  process.	  	  The	  problematic,	  the	  new	  and	  the	  encounter	  are	  central	  to	  this	  process:	  ‘Problems	  are	  the	  order	  of	  events	  –	  not	  only	  because	  cases	  of	  solution	  emerge	  like	  real	  events,	   but	   because	   the	   conditions	   of	   a	   problem	   themselves	   imply	   events	   such	   as	   sections,	  ablations,	  adjunctions.	   	   In	  this	  sense,	   it	   is	  correct	   to	  represent	  a	  double	  series	  of	  events	  which	  develop	  on	  two	  planes,	  echoing	  without	  resembling	  each	  other:	  real	  events	  on	  the	   level	  of	   the	  engendered	  solutions,	  and	  ideal	  events	  embedded	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  problem,	  like	  the	  acts	  –	  or,	  rather	  the	  dreams	  –	  of	  the	  gods	  who	  double	  our	  history.’56	  This	  understanding	  of	  events	  is	  pertinent	  as	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  and	  through	  the	  complexity	  of	  developments	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	   	  Events,	  as	  the	  order	  of	  the	  problem,	  mark	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the	   thresholds	   of	   reordering	   and	   transformation;	  my	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   space	   occupied	   by	  sexuality	  in	  international	  law	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  transformation	  and	  flux.	  	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  tracing	  the	  problems	  that	  mark	  this	  state	  of	  flux,	  and	  the	  flow	  of	  sexuality	  that	  characterises	  and	  moves	  through	   the	   structures	   that	   are	   brought	   into	   a	   problematic	   clarity	   in	   this	   process.	   	  We	  might	  think	  of	  this	  problematisation	  through	  both	  Deleuze	  and	  Foucault	  –	  as	  ‘an	  adequate	  description	  for	  how	  a	  new	  object,	  such	  as	  sexuality,	  appears	  in	  discourse.’57	  	  This	  then,	  is	  a	  question	  of	  what	  can	  and	  does	  become	  visible	  and	  articulable	  in	  any	  particular	  historical	  period.58	  By	  asking	  what	  has	  become	  visible	  or	  articulable,	  we	  must	  question	  the	  relations	  of	  knowledge-­‐power-­‐self	  that	  govern	  any	  era	  and	  assess	  what	  these	  relations	  render	  possible	  or	  impossible:	  ‘What	  is	  our	  light	  and	  what	  is	  our	  language,	  what	  is	  our	  capacity	  for	  resistance,	  today	  when	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  content	  to	  say	  that	  the	  old	  struggles	  are	  no	  longer	  worth	  anything?’59	  Moreover,	  while	  events	  express	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  virtual,	  the	  series	  in	  which	  they	  resonate	  and	  the	  actuality	  in	  which	  the	  event	  is	  expressed	  are	  not	  inert	  receivers	  of	  motivation.	  	  Instead	  series	  themselves	  resonate,	  transform	  and	  react	  to	  their	  selection	  and	  reordering	  in	  the	  event:	  it	  is	  in	  the	  actual	  that	  we	  experience	  the	  virtual.60	  	  We	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  predict	  when	  or	  where	  this	  flux	  will	  lead,	  but	  an	  understanding	  of	  event	  as	  selection	  of	  series	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  through	  the	  potentials	  and	  forces	  at	  play	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  might	  counter-­‐actualise	  the	  event	  in	  order	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  it.	  	  Or	  as	  Williams	  suggests:	  ‘When	  citizens	  resist	  and	  modify	  the	  political	  turmoil	  that	  envelops	  them	  they	  change	  its	  value	   and	   themselves.	   	  Neither	   an	   estuary	  nor	   a	   port	   are	   submissive	   recipients	   of	   changes	   in	  river	  flows,	  they	  exploit	  new	  opportunities	  and	  struggle	  against	  the	  silting	  of	  their	  ongoing	  life-­‐forms,	  thereby	  implying	  different	  senses	  and	  values	  in	  the	  changes	  in	  flow.’61	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  are	  not	  simply	  subjects	  of	  or	  to	  events.	  	  Events	  are	  not	  of	  the	  present	  –	  they	  have	  already	  occurred	  or	  are	  yet	  to	  come.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  present,	  we	  must	  become	  worthy	  of	  the	  event	  by	   replaying	   it	   as	   an	   actor	   who	   counter-­‐actualises	   it	   in	   the	   present	   by	   capturing	   an	   eternal	  quality	   or	   idea	   or	   the	   infinitive	   of	   the	   event	   as	   always	   there	   to	   be	   replayed	   differently.	   	   We	  represent	   the	   event	   by	   actualising	   it,	   ‘but	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   entirely	   different	   from	   the	  actualization	  of	  the	  event	   in	  the	  depth	  of	  things.	   	  Or	  rather,	   the	  actor	  redoubles	  this	  cosmic	  or	  physical	  actualization,	   in	  his	  own	  way,	  which	   is	  singularly	  superficial	  –	  but	  because	  of	   it	  more	  distinct,	  trenchant	  and	  pure.	  	  Thus,	  the	  actor	  delimits	  the	  original,	  disengages	  from	  it	  an	  abstract	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line,	  and	  keeps	  from	  the	  event	  only	  its	  contour	  and	  its	  splendour,	  becoming	  thereby	  the	  actor	  of	  one’s	  own	  events	  –	  a	  counter-­‐actualization.’62	  	  This,	   for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	   is	   the	  becoming-­‐worthy	  of	   the	  event.63	  	  Colebrook	  relates	  this	  question	  of	  counter-­‐actualisation	  to	  questions	  of	  queerness,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘the	  queer	  self	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  counter-­‐actualisation	  of	  the	  material	  repetitions	  that	  make	  up	  man’64;	  a	  counter-­‐actualisation	  might	  involve	  the	  repetition	  of	  questions	   of	   selfhood	   and	   desire	   which	   draws	   on	   the	   pure	   past	   or	   virtuality	   to	   reorder	   and	  rethink	   the	   singularities,	   forces	   and	   flows	   that	   constitute	   our	   current	   organisation	   of	   the	  problem	  of	  selfhood	  and	  desire	  in	  our	  particular	  historical,	  visible	  and	  articulable	  form.65	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  event	  resolves	  or	  brings	  the	  problem	  to	  an	  end,	  it	  is	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	   that	   that	   the	  problematic,	  determined	  by	   its	  singular	  points	   that	  express	   its	  conditions,	  opens	   up	   these	   singularities	   and	   series	   to	   their	   reordering,	   rethinking	   and	   creative	   renewal	  which	  is	  expressed	  in	  and	  by	  the	  event.	  	  The	  event	  expresses	  both	  the	  productive	  potential	  and	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  ordering	  of	  the	  forces	  from	  which	  it	  arose.	  	  Significantly,	  events	  carry	  no	  determinate	  outcome	  ‘only	  new	  possibilities,	  representing	  a	  moment	  at	  which	  new	  forces	  might	  be	   brought	   to	   bear.’66	  	   Relative	   to	   sexuality	   therefore,	   my	   interest	   is	   in	   events	   in	   which	  singularities	  pertaining	  to	  sexuality	  or	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  disembedded	  from	  their	  position	  within	  a	   sedimented	  narrative	  structure	  and	  replayed	  within	  an	  event	   that	   resonates	   through	  multiple	   series;	   or	   the	   way	   in	   which	   questions	   pertaining	   to	   sexuality	   can	   be	   repeated	   in	  multiple	   different	   forms	   and	   formulations	   depending	   upon	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   are	  encountered.	   	   Furthermore,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	   context	   that	   surrounds	  both	   the	   successful	  and	   unsuccessful	   replaying	   of	   events	   and	   what	   this	   might	   mean	   for	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  event	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  prioritise	  the	  virtual	  over	  the	  actual	  or	  to	  posit	   the	  virtual	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  actual	  problems	  (the	  virtual	  as	  a	  realm	  of	   ideal	  unity	  of	  being	  etc).	   	  Both	  virtual	  and	  actual	  are	   formally	  but	  not	  ontologically	  distinct	  sides	  of	  the	  real.67	  	  Actual	  and	  virtual	  act	  upon	  each	  other	  reciprocally,	  virtuality	  is	  never	  experienced	  in	  itself	  but	  mediated	  by	  the	  actual	  encounter:	  in	  the	  double-­‐sided	  event,	  the	  actual	  determines	  the	  conditions	  through	  which	  the	  event	  reorders	  and	  expresses	  the	  new.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  therefore	  that	  what	  is	  required	  is	  not	  a	  turning	  away	  from	  the	  actual	  or	  an	  immediate	  abandonment	  of	  the	  problems	   of	   identity	   (a	   depoliticisation	   of	   identity	   politics),	   but	   instead	   an	   approach	   that	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permits	   a	   fuller	   engagement	  with	   the	   illusion	   that	   lies	   ‘not	   in	   representation	   itself,	   but	   in	   the	  hypostasis	   of	   the	   empirical/actual	   as	   the	   totality	   of	   Being’68	  and	   instead	   allows	   for	   a	   ‘second	  level	   of	   thought	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   see	   the	   actual	   as	   the	   singular	   expression	   of	   virtual	  conditions.’69	  	   The	   point	   therefore,	   is	   the	   necessity	   of	   viewing	   the	   complex	   multiplicity	   of	  sexuality	   as	   an	   expression	   not	   of	   identities,	   but	   as	   the	   combination	   and	   selection	   of	   pre-­‐individual	   tendencies,	   affects	   and	   virtual	   objects	   that	   finds	   multiple	   different	   expressions	   in	  multiple	  different	  forms.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  might	  begin	  to	  read	  the	  expression	  of	  sexuality	  outside	  the	   sedimented	   narratives	   (for	   example,	   assumptions	   of	   ‘unchanging’	   traditions,	   relations	   or	  identities,	   teleologies	   of	   gay	   liberation	   which	   hold	   Western	   LGBT	   identities	   as	   the	   natural	  destiny	  of	  organising	  around	  gay	  rights,	  binaries	  of	  culture	  vs.	  modernity,	  North/South)	  within	  which	  it	  is	  usually	  found.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  question	  of	  ‘universals’	  or	  ‘transnational	  identities’,	  I	  am	  interested	  not	  in	  a	  simple	  cumulative	  listing	  of	  all	  sexual	  practices,	  expressions	  or	  identities	  as	  they	  currently	  stand.	   	   Instead,	   I	   explore	   the	   context	   of	   these	   multiple	   and	   multiplicitous	   expressions	   of	  sexuality,	   the	   encounters	   and	   problems	   that	   provoke	   the	  movement	   of	   the	   virtual	   resonating	  through	   series	   and	   returning	   in	   new	   actualisations	   and	   expressions	   of	   virtual	   objects.	   	   	   For	  Deleuze,	  heterogeneous	   terms	  or	  singularities	  constitute	  series	   through	  which	   the	  event	  runs,	  selects	   and	   transforms.	   	   These	   singularities	   are	   pre-­‐individual	   and	   pre-­‐identitarian,	   it	   is	   only	  through	   selection	   and	   limitation	   of	   series	   in	   static	   genesis	   that	   identities	   emerge.	   	   Any	  name,	  identity	   or	   existence	   exists,	   yet	   recalls	   the	   other	   potentials	   or	   singularities	   not	   selected	   or	  actualised:	  ‘every	  idea,	  figure,	  proper	  name	  or	  event	  is	  strangely	  doubled,	  at	  once	  evidence	  of	  an	  expression	   of	   life	   and	   yet,	   in	   its	   very	   formation	   also	   a	   path	   taken	   (an	   actualisation)	   at	   the	  expense	  of	  other	  potentials.’70	  	  The	  actor	   counter-­‐actualises	   the	   infinite	  nature	  of	   the	  event	   in	  the	  singular	  particular.	  	  Thus,	  a	  Deleuzian	  theoretical	  framework	  allows	  us	  to	  both	  acknowledge	  yet	  not	  be	  limited	  by	  a	  key	  problem	  faced	  by	  those	  who	  undertake	  research	  into	  sexuality	  –	  how	  to	  explain	  or	  account	  for	  simultaneous	  connectedness	  and	  difference	  in	  communities	  of	  sexual	  otherness.	  	  	  It	  is	  with	  these	  clarifications	  that	  we	  might	  return	  to	  questions	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  I	  do	  this	  by	  attempting	  to	  situate	  actual	  problems	  and	  then	  think	  through	  the	  virtual	  movements	  in	  operation.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  questions	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  currently	  tend	   towards	   either/or	   binarisms	   (either	   universalism	   or	   relativism,	   either	   straight	   or	   gay,	  either	   Western	   or	   true	   to	   one’s	   traditional	   culture)	   that	   too	   often	   end	   in	   impasse.	   	   The	  framework	  outlined	  briefly	  here	  and	  elaborated	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  instead	  frames	  the	  issues	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in	  terms	  of	  and/and	  –	  the	  addition,	  connection	  and	  disjunction	  of	  multiplicitous	  difference,	  not	  restricted	   by	   prior	   conceptualisations	   of	   identity	   or	   representation.	   	   The	   key	   question	   of	  my	  thesis	   is	   an	   investigation	   of	   the	   points	   where	   this	   conceptualisation	   of	   sexuality	   can	   connect	  profitably	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  conceptualisations	  of	  rights.	  	  	  Thus	   the	   use	   of	   a	   Deleuzian	   framework	   is	   a	   deliberate	   attempt	   to	   engage	   with	   some	   of	   the	  dualisms	   that	   seem	  to	  characterise	  debates	  around	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	   	  The	  problem	  identified	  by	  much	  work	  in	  this	  area	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  issues	  are	  currently	  conceptualised	   requires	   firm	   and	   unchanging	   ‘identities’	   to	   cohere	   around	   in	   order	   to	   make	  political	   demands.	   	   However,	   such	   universals	   quickly	   become	   flattening	   or	   restrictive	   rather	  than	  simply	  platforms	  by	  which	  groups	  are	  able	  to	  put	  forward	  a	  political	  agenda.	  	  A	  framework	  that	  puts	  difference	  before	   identity	   and	  pre-­‐individual	   singularities	  before	   individual	   subjects	  allows	  a	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  in	  relation	  to	  these	  issues	  as	  it	  demands	  the	  comprehension	  of	  both	  pre-­‐individual	   trends,	   the	  wider	   narratives	   and	  political	   conditions	   in	  which	   these	   trends	   are	  situated	  and	  perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  the	  foregrounding	  of	  movement	  in	  which	  identity	  exists	  only	   as	   a	   temporary	   stabilisation	   and	   selection	   of	   virtual	   and	   material	   objects.	   	   In	   this	   way,	  identity	   is	   not	   fixed	   or	   transcendent,	   but	   is	   an	   expression,	   to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   degree	   of	  intensity,	  or	  of	  particular	  tendencies	  and	  flows.	   	   In	  this	  way	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue	  that	  a	  state	   of	   affairs	   is	   inseparable	   from	   the	   virtual,	   but	   the	   event	   goes	   beyond	   actualisation.	   	   ‘It	   is	  necessary	  to	  go	  back	  up	  to	  the	  event	  that	  gives	  its	  virtual	  consistency	  to	  the	  concept,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  necessary	   to	   come	   down	   to	   the	   actual	   state	   of	   affairs	   that	   provides	   the	   function	   with	   its	  references.’71	  	  As	  Colebrook	  suggests:	  ‘At	  the	  level	  of	  sense	   for	  example,	   it	   is	  possible	  for	  one	  and	  the	  same	  event	  –	   let	  us	  not	  say	   the	   same	  person	  –	   to	   affirm	   life,	   to	  be	  pro-­‐choice,	   pro-­‐euthanasia,	   opposed	   to	  biopolitical	  management,	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   critical	   of	   the	   very	   discourse	   of	  rights,	   be	   actively	   advocating	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   awareness	   and	   tolerance,	   be	   sceptical	   of	   the	  culture	  of	  sexual	  identity…and	  so	  on.’72	  	  What	   Colebrook’s	   argument	   seems	   to	   affirm	   here	   is	   the	   space	   to	   address	   a-­‐centred	   or	  multi-­‐centred	   capacities	   for	   knowledge	   and	   action.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time	  however,	   the	   disjunction	   and	  resonance	   of	   series	   and	   their	   connection	   in	   the	   event	   allow	   for,	   if	   not	   a	   unity,	   at	   least	   a	  framework	  –	  or	   a	  multiplicity	   that	  does	  not	   collapse	   into	   incoherence.	   	  The	  way	   in	  which	   the	  actual	   is	  expressed	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  disjuncture	  or	  even	  conflict.	   	  This	  is	  not	  then	  a	  question	   of	   sense	   operating	   unproblematically	   as	   a	   unifying	   force	   –	   it	   is	   instead	   a	  movement	  away	  from	  static	  sedimentations	  of	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  counter-­‐actualisation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	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of	   sense	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   encounter	   in	   which	   a	   ‘theme’	   is	   repeated	   or	  replayed	  anew.	   	  Thus,	  a	  lack	  of	  resemblance	  in	  the	  actual	  does	  not	  necessarily	  signify	  a	  lack	  of	  potential	   for	   resonance	   at	   the	   level	   of	   sense	   or	   in	   the	   event	   which	   resonates	   and	   therefore	  communicates	  through	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  distinct	  series.	  	  The	  point	  is	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  co-­‐existence	  and	  resonance	  of	  multiple	  series	  and	  expressions	  of	  sexuality,	  multiple	  actualisations	   that	  can	  communicate	  without	  a	  demand	  for	  linear	  progression	  according	  to	  an	  identifiable	  history	  or	  a	  singular	   narrative	   of	   law	   and	   activism.	   	   This	   requires	   the	   existence	   of	   expressions	   that	   can	  paradoxically	  move	   in	   two	  directions	   at	   once,	   or	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   possibility	   that	  questions	   or	   expressions	   of	   sexuality	   can	   return	   in	   multiple	   different	   repetitions.	   	   The	  advantage	   of	   this	   approach	   then,	   is	   its	   potential	   to	   hold	   and	   maintain	   several	   elements	   in	  tension	  with	   each	   other,	  without	   requiring	   their	   synthesis	   or	   assimilation	   into	   one	   particular	  identity,	   idea	  or	  One	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  transcendent	  or	  unificatory	  force,	  despite	  the	  way	  in	  which	  dominant	  paradigms	  of	  law	  and	  rights	  might	  prefer	  that	  this	  be	  the	  case.	  	  	  This	  is	  therefore,	  an	  attempt	   to	   resist	   the	   temptation	   of	   a	   totalising	   or	   universalising	   approach,	   but	   maintain	   a	  theoretical	  mode	  of	  analysis	  that	  offers	  some,	  if	  not	  total,	  coherence	  and	  connection.	  	  	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   there	   are	   no	   dualisms	   or	   binaries	   in	   Deleuze’s	   and	   Deleuze	   and	  Guatarri’s	  framework	  –	  indeed,	  they	  acknowledge	  dualisms	  as	  ‘the	  furniture	  that	  we	  are	  forever	  rearranging.’73	  	   The	   critique	   remains	   however	   -­‐	   stressed	   most	   forcefully	   by	   Badiou	   -­‐	   that	   all	  dualisms	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  devolve	  on	  the	  pair	  virtual/actual	  in	  which	  the	  virtual,	  as	  the	  transcendent,	   is	   prioritised	   as	   the	   movement	   of	   the	   extra-­‐worldly	   power	   of	   the	   One.74	  	   One	  response	   to	   this	   critique	  –	  and	   the	  approach	   that	   I	   am	  attempting	   to	   take	  –	   is	   to	   suggest	   that	  rather	  than	  prioritising	  virtual	  movements,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  view	  virtual	  and	  actual	  as	  formal	  but	   not	   ontologically	   separate	   constituents	   of	   the	   real	   and	   to	   avoid	   the	   a	   view	   of	   the	  transcendent	  virtual	  as	  a	  prior	  and	  motivating	  force.	  	  Thus,	  Nunes	  summarises	  the	  relationship	  between	  actual	  and	  virtual	  by	  commenting	  that	  ‘[t]he	  event	  of	  an	  actual	  encounter	  between	  two	  bodies,	   being	   determined	   by	   mechanical	   causality,	   cannot	   create	   the	   new	   itself;	   but	   it	  determines	   new	   relations	   among	   virtual	   conditions,	   effecting	   a	   virtual	   Event	   that	   produces	   a	  new	   actualisation.’75	  	   At	   work	   here	   is	   neither	   the	   operation	   of	   singular	   phenomena	   in	   linear	  historical	  progression,	  nor	  the	  unmediated	  operation	  of	  virtual	  relations,	  but	   the	  resonance	  of	  the	  two	  as	  interacting	  but	  not	  identical	  multiplicities.	  	  	  However,	  both	  the	  relationship	  of	   the	  virtual	  and	  actual	  and	  the	  critiques	  that	  extend	  from	  an	  analysis	  of	   this	   relationship	  have	   important	  political	   ramifications	   that	   should	  be	  unpicked	   in	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relation	  to	  the	  problematic	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexual	  orientation.	   	  I	  have	  already	  highlighted	  Nunes’	   critique	   of	   an	   approach	   to	   dualisms	   that	   is	   situated	   purely	   in	   the	   actual	   or	   the	  ‘hypostasis’	   of	   identity.	   	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   this	   hypostasis	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   characterise	   an	  approach	  to	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  that	  sees	  them	  both	  as	  always	  already	  existing	  and	  totalising,	  that	   leads	   most	   often	   to	   impasse	   or	   deadlock	   in	   international	   legal	   and	   political	   arenas.	   	   By	  failing	   to	  emplace	   the	   frameworks	   through	  which	  we	  constitute	  our	   issues	  of	   sexuality	  within	  both	   a	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   dynamic,	   binarisms	   (such	   as	   North/South,	   straight/gay	  universal/relative)	   are	   reinforced.	   	   It	   is	   this	   dynamic	   which	   seems	   to	   speak	   to	   a	   Deleuzian	  critique	   of	   dualisms	   or	   more	   accurately	   to	   what	   Deleuze	   views	   as	   the	   ‘distortion	   of	   the	  dialectic’76:	  the	  image	  of	  thought	  that	  restricts	  and	  restrains	  an	  affirmative,	  dialectical	  approach	  to	  the	  problems	  that	  we	  encounter	  and	  instead	  substitutes	  it	  for	  one	  of	  abstract	  or	  transcendent	  universals	   based	   in	   coherent	   identities	   which	   can	   be	   defined	   through	   their	   negation.	   	   The	  critique	   here	   is	   of	   an	   identification	   that	   is	   based	   both	   in	   actual	   hypostasis	   and	   negative	  oppositions	  posited	  within	  an	  equivocal	  framework	  in	  which	  each	  side	  of	  a	  binary	  is	  rendered	  comparable	  under	  an	  overarching	  and	  explicatory	  frame	  of	  reference.	  	  	  	  We	  might	  argue	  then,	   that	  what	  Deleuze	  seems	  to	  oppose	   is	   the	  opposition	  of	  unitary	   identity	  and	   its	  negation.	   	  He	  argues	   in	  Difference	  and	  Repetition	   that	   ‘[r]evolution	  never	  proceeds	  by	  way	   of	   the	   negative…The	   negative	   is	   both	   shadow	   of	   the	   problem	   and	   false	   problem	   par	  
excellence.	   	   Practical	   struggle	  never	  proceeds	  by	  way	  of	   the	  negative	  but	  by	  way	  of	  difference	  and	  its	  power	  of	  affirmation.’77	  	  Reynolds	  suggests	  in	  response	  to	  this	  that	  Deleuze’s	  position	  is	  thus	   a	   ‘dialectic	   of	   the	   multiplicities	   of	   difference’	   rather	   than	   one	   in	   which	   dialectics	   are	  straightforwardly	  dismissed.78	  	  However,	  the	  dualisms	  at	  work	  here	  are	  complex,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  rest	  upon	  identity	  or	  its	  negation.	   	  Nunes	  suggest	  that	  it	   is	  profitable	  to	  instead	  view	  dualisms	  (other	  than	  that	  of	  the	  virtual/actual	  pair	  which	  remain	  formally	  but	  not	  ontologically	  distinct)	  as	   dyads,	   or,	   ‘a	   relation	   of	   exclusive	   disjunction	   between	   two	   indefinite	   terms	   in	   a	   dynamic	  relation	  of	  tension	  that	  constitutes	  a	  field	  in	  which	  the	  terms	  themselves	  become	  singularised.’79	  	  This	   involves	   a	   replacement	   of	   the	   negative	   with	   the	   problematic	   and	   the	   question	   then	  becomes	   one	   not	   of	   absolute	   opposites	   but	   poles	   or	   ‘polarised	   directionality	   between	   two	  infinite	  extremes.’80	  	  Each	  pole	  constitutes	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  actualisation	  of	  virtual	  conditions	  or	  the	  expression	  of	  virtuality	  at	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degree	  of	  intensity.	  	  This	  means	  that	  at	  issue	  is	  not	  an	  either/or	  choice:	   ‘there	  is,	  strictly	  speaking,	  only	  the	  middle:	  if	  they	  constitute	  virtual	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continua,	   it	   would	   be	   absurd	   to	   ascribe	   an	   actual	   existence	   to	   either	   pole.’81	  	   Thus,	   within	  questions	   of	   rights	   and	   sexuality,	   the	   point	   is	   not	   to	   ‘pick	   a	   side’	   but	   to	   interrogate	   what	  tendencies	  are	  being	  actualised,	  what	   intensities	  are	  at	  play	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  and	  how	  they	  have	  come	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  their	  particular	  context.	  	  This	  then	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  dualisms	  or	  divisions	  as	  productive	  rather	  than	  oppositional.	   	  This	  approach	   is	  significant	   in	  relation	  to	  the	   content	   of	   this	   thesis	   in	   light	   of	   Bignall’s	   suggestion	   that	   negativity	   forms	   a	   problematic	  starting	  point	  for	  action:	  that	  negativity,	  and	  desire	  as	  lack,	  can	  easily	  lead	  to	  apathy	  rather	  than	  transformation. 82 	  For	   Deleuze,	   desire	   is	   positive,	   connecting	   and	   generative	   rather	   than	  negative,	  restrictive	  or	  based	  in	  lack.	  	  Thus	   Deleuze’s	   critique	   can	   be	   used	   to	   bring	   the	   limitations	   of	   a	   debate	   that	   rests	   upon	   the	  intersection	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  into	  sharper	  focus.	  	  By	  supplementing	  our	  understanding	  of	  these	  debates	  with	  a	  critique	  of	  negative	  dualisms	  based	  in	  identitarian	  structures	  and	  instead	  thinking	  the	  movement	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  actual	  and	  virtual	  multiplicities	  we	  might	  begin	  to	   expose	   and	   think	   virtual	   tendencies	   and	   pre-­‐individual	   singularities	   of	   the	   structures	   to	  which	  we	  are	  currently	  subject.	  	  This	  critique	  exposes	  and	  emplaces	  these	  dualistic	  structures	  as	  oppositional	  poles	   traversed	  by	  multiplicitous	   flows.	   	  What	  operates	   then	   is	  not	  a	  negation	  of	  identity	  politics	   as	   such	  but	   an	  opening	  up	  of	   the	   terms	  by	  which	  we	   currently	   structure	   and	  give	  meaning	  to	  identities.	  	  	  There	  is	  however,	  a	  second	  level	  to	  this	  issue	  –	  one	  to	  which	  we	  have	  already	  alluded.	  	  This	  level	  concerns	  the	  privileging	  of	   the	  virtual	  as	  either	  transcendent	  unity	  or	  revolutionary	  escape:	   ‘a	  philosophy	  and	  politics	  of	   the	  virtual,	   the	  minor,	   the	  molecular,	   the	  micro-­‐political	  nomadism,	  lines	   of	   flight	   and	   (absolute)	   deterritorialisation.’83	  The	   result	   of	   this	   is	   either	   a	   depoliticised	  contemplation	   of	   univocity	   or	   alternatively,	   a	   wild	   deterritorialisation	   devoted	   to	   the	   pre-­‐eminence	  of	  the	  micro-­‐political	  and	  minoritarianism,	  leading	  to	  a	  ‘cult	  of	  the	  small’	  and	  all	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  microfascisms	  and	  suicidal	   ‘black	  holes’	  that	  this	  might	  entail.	   	  Instead	  of	  this,	  we	  must	   acknowledge	   that	   ‘[t]o	   affirm	   deterritorialising	   power	   does	   not	   mean	   saying	   yes	   to	   all	  deterritorialisations,	   but	   knowing	  how	   to	   select:	   hence	   relative	  deterritorialisations	   are	  never	  separated	   from	   the	   problem	   of	   constructing	   a	   plane	   of	   consistency	   that	   allows	   for	   mutually	  reinforcing	  transversal	  connections	  –	  to	  the	  point,	  at	  times	  of	  open	  antagonism.’84	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  putting	  forward	  a	  critique	  of	  rights	  and	  identity	  politics,	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  privilege	  the	  line	  of	  flight	   and	   deterritorialisation	   and	   thus	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  minoritarian,	   the	   radical	   and	   the	   new.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ibid.	  p118	  82	  Simone	  Bignall,	  "Desire,	  Apathy,	  Activism,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Political	  Activism:	  Supplement	  to	  Deleuze	  Studies	  Vol	  4,	  ed.	  Marcelo	  Svirsky	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  	  p11	  	  83	  Nunes,	  "Politics	  in	  the	  Middle:	  For	  a	  Political	  Interpretation	  of	  Dualisms	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari."	  p108	  84	  Ibid.	  p123	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However	   questions	   of	   (de)territorialisations	   are	   not	   absolutes	   or	   given	   –	   to	   assume	   that	   the	  minor	   or	   the	   minority	   will	   always	   express	   the	   virtual	   and	   deterritorialisation	   is	   to	   think	  transcendentally,	  ascribing	  an	  a	  priori	  form	  to	  actualisations	  of	  the	  virtual	  ‘separating	  the	  actual	  from	   its	   virtual	   conditions,	   reducing	   it	   to	   an	   always	   already	   existing	   form	   that	   is	   ‘filled’	   each	  time	  with	   content,	   rather	   than	   a	   singular	  being	   each	   time.’85	  	   There	   is	  no	  pre-­‐given	  or	   always	  already	  decided	  upon	  actualisation	  of	  virtuality,	  the	  virtual	  is	  actualised	  each	  time	  as	  a	  singular	  response	  to	  a	  problematic	  encounter.	   	  At	  issue	  then	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  absolute	  givens	  but	  of	  locating	   the	  molecular	   in	   the	  molar,	   and	   indeed,	   the	  molar	   in	   the	  molecular.	   	  This	  demands	  a	  process	  of	   locating	  structures	  and	   thinking	   through	   the	  virtual	   tendencies	   that	   traverse	   them,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  done	  through	  the	  singular	  actual	  expressions	  of	  virtuality.	  	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  might	  avoid	  imposing	  an	  artificial	  clarity	  upon	  the	  structures	  with	  which	  we	  are	  faced,	  particularly	  one	   in	  which	  each	   ‘side’	  may	  be	  taken	  as	  equal	  and	  comparable.	  Thus	  what	  we	   are	   problematising	   is	   both	   a	   focus	   that	   restricts	   dualisms	   to	   simple	   either/or	   closed	  connections,	  and	  a	  focus	  that	  assumes	  the	  basic	  identity	  or	  comparability	  of	  the	  terms	  that	  make	  up	   each	   side	   any	   such	   connection.	   	   This	   requires	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   form,	   content	   and	  structure	  of	  the	  elements	  that	  are	  being	  used	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  	  	  In	   such	   an	   approach,	   the	   role	   of	   sexuality	   is	   particularly	   interesting.	   	   I	   am	   problematising	  sexuality	  by	  viewing	  it	  not	  as	  an	  object	  that	  can	  be	  grasped,	  but	  as	  a	  relationship,	  or	  better	  as	  an	  aleatory	  point,	  or	  empty	  square	   that	   causes	   series	   to	   resonate	  with	  each	  other,	  without	  being	  limited	  by	  particular	  states	  of	  affairs.86	  	  The	  empty	  square	  does	  not	  maintain	  a	  fixed	  position	  or	  identity,	  it	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  a	  particular	  series	  and	  its	  content	  can	  never	  be	  fully	  captured	  or	  identified.	  	  Yet	  the	  empty	  square	  is	  that	  which	  puts	  series	  into	  resonance	  and	  communication	  as	  it	   moves	   through	   them.	   	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   therefore,	   that	   although	   sexuality	   tends	   to	   be	  expressed	   through	   discourses	   of	   identity	   or	   sexual	   orientation,	   a	   more	   accurate	   reading	   of	  sexuality	   is	   as	   an	   empty	   square	   or	   paradoxical	   element	   that	   eludes	   capture	   but	   facilitates	  communication.	   	   This	   interpretation	   allows	   both	   a	   flexible	   approach	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  understand	   the	   location	   of	   sexuality	   in	   any	   particular	   series	   and	  provides	   a	   degree	   of	   insight	  into	  why	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  are	  often	  so	  fraught	  with	  contradiction	  –	  in	  essence,	  an	  attempt	  is	  being	  made	  to	  stabilise	  or	  identify	  something	  that	  is	  always	  unstable	  and	  unidentifiable.	   	  As	  such,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sexuality	  operates	  in	  these	  various	  locations	  means	  that	  there	  must	  be	  sufficient	  flexibility	  within	  any	  methodology	  or	  theoretical	   framework	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  holding	  of	   multiple	   positions	   without	   descending	   into	   incoherence,	   it	   is	   through	   sexuality	   as	   the	  paradoxical	  element	  or	  empty	  square	  that	  we	  might	  allow	  for	  this	  flexibility.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Ibid.	  p113	  86	  Deleuze,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sense.	  p67	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This	   approach	   shifts	   focus	   from	   one	   particular	   truth	   or	   rightness	   of	   sexuality	   (and	   for	   that	  matter,	   one	   particular	   foundation	   or	   truth	   of	   rights)	   and	   instead	   looks	   to	   map	   the	   contours	  through	  which	   these	   constructions	   intersect	   and	   interact	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   such	   interactions,	  both	  materially	  and	  virtually.	  	  As	  Williams	  notes,	  a	  component	  of	  Deleuze’s	  moral	  philosophy	  is	  the	  charting	  of	  series	  of	  actual	  turning	  points	  and	  the	  ideas	  that	  they	  express	  in	  order	  to	  divine	  how	   they	   constitute	  new	  and	   connected	  problematic	   events.87	  	   The	   focus	   is	   upon	   connections	  and	  multiplicity,	  both	  against	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  structures	  and	  norms	  of	  rights.	  	  	  The	  aim	  is	  not	  to	   interrogate	  how	  well	  we	  can	  adapt	  demands	  for	  sexual	   justice	  to	  existing	  human	  rights	   law	  and	  norms,	  but	   to	  draw	  out	   the	   intensity	  of	   forces	  when	   these	   series	   interact	  and	   to	  map	   the	  reverberations	  that	  such	  interactions	  precipitate.	  	  To	  be	  worthy	  of	  the	  event,	  Williams	  suggests,	  we	  must	  not	   restrict	   our	   focus	   to	   communication	  between	   identities	  or	   allow	  ourselves	   to	  be	  blocked	   by	   claims	   of	   final	   negations,	   ‘untouchable	   and	   invariant	   transcendences,	   values	   or	  laws’. 88 	  	   Instead	   ‘to	   be	   worthy	   of	   the	   event	   is	   to	   redouble	   it	   by	   creating	   a	   synthetic	  communication	   through	   disjunction,	   variation	   and	   difference,	   refusing	   pure	   oppositions’.89	  	  While	  we	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  anticipate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  event,	  we	  can	  respond	  to	  its	  demands	  for	  creative	  change	  and	  selection.	  	  Thus,	  the	  question	  is	  one	  of	  what	  demands	  are	  being	  made	  of	  those	  working	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  in	  international	  law,	  and	  how	  we	  might	  respond	  creatively	  to	  these	  contingencies.	  
Theoretical	  Outlines	  3:	  ‘Undutiful	  daughters’	  A	   final	   brief	   point	   should	   be	   made	   here	   regarding	   the	   importance	   of	   an	   explicitly	   feminist	  reading	  of	  Deleuze	  to	  my	  theoretical	  framework.	  	  Above,	  I	  highlight	  three	  different	  elements	  of	  my	  theoretical	  approach	  –	  postcolonial	  law	  and	  theory,	  Deleuzian	  theory,	  particularly	  Deleuzian	  approaches	   to	   law	   and	   jurisprudence,	   and	   feminist	   theory.	   	   	   In	   my	   analysis	   of	   postcolonial	  framings	   of	   power,	   knowledge	   and	   law,	   I	   note	   the	   significance	   of	   a	   number	   of	   postcolonial	  theorists	   and	   postcolonial	   legal	   theorists	   in	   foregrounding	   the	   dynamics	   of	   power	   and	  governmentality	   that	   striate	   the	   questions	   that	   are	   central	   to	  my	   thesis.	   	   In	  my	   discussion	   of	  Deleuzian	   encounters	   and	   events,	   I	   draw	   heavily	   on	   both	   Deleuzian	   jurisprudence	   and	  Deleuzian	  approaches	   to	  actual	  and	  virtual,	   event	  and	  encounter.	   	  The	  question	   that	  might	  be	  asked	   here	   is	   why	   I	   find	   it	   necessary	   to	   complement	   these	   two	   strands	   of	   my	   thesis	   with	   a	  feminist	   and	  more	   specifically	   Braidottian	   reading	   of	   Deleuze	   –	  why	   I	   prefer	   to	   remain	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide.	  p141	  88	  Ibid.	  p168	  89	  Ibid.	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Braidotti	   has	   called	   an	   ‘undutiful	   daughter’ 90 	  rather	   than	   simply	   exploring	   the	   complex	  intersection	  of	  postcolonial	  theory	  and	  Deleuzian	  jurisprudence.	  	  	  	  Any	  clarification	  of	  why	  a	  feminist	  reading	  of	  Deleuze	  is	  significant	  must	  acknowledge	  both	  the	  sometimes	   uneasy	   relationship	   between	   feminist	   theory	   and	   Deleuzian	   concepts91	  and	   the	  potentiality	  for	  a	  useful	  intersection	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  feminism	  –	  in	  later	  chapters	  for	  example,	  I	  discuss	   the	   relationship	   between	   feminist	   figurations	   and	   Deleuzian	   conceptual	   personae	   as	  useful	   strategies	   of	   dis-­‐organisation	   familiar	   to	   both	   Deleuzian	   and	   feminist	   thought. 92	  	  However,	  while	  the	  points	  of	  resonance	  between	  Deleuze	  and	  feminism	  are	  key	  to	  my	  analysis.	  	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  a	  feminist	  Deleuzian	  and	  more	  specifically	  a	  Braidottian	  approach	  allows	  an	   important	   and	   unique	   perspective.	   	   The	   key	   point	   to	   be	   drawn	   out	   here	   is	   Braidotti’s	  commitment	  to	  an	  embodied	  or	  ‘enfleshed’	  materialism	  and	  most	  significantly,	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	   power	   relations	   within	   which	   embodied	   subjects	   are	   enmeshed.	   93 	  	   Thus,	   Braidotti’s	  approach	   foregrounds	   the	   politics	   of	   location	   in	   a	   way	   that	   I	   find	   particularly	   useful.	   	   This	  politics	   of	   location	   or	   ‘situated	   epistemology’94	  does	   not	   demand	   a	   unitary	   subjectivity	   or	  stabilised	   identity,	  but	   it	  does	  demand	  that	  we	  pay	  attention	  to	   the	  specifics	  of	  difference	  and	  power	   within	   our	   particular	   locations:	   	   ‘Non-­‐unitary	   subjectivity	   here	   means	   a	   nomadic,	  dispersed,	  fragmented	  vision,	  which	  is	  nonetheless	  functional,	  coherent	  and	  accountable,	  mostly	  because	   it	   is	   embedded	   and	   embodied.'95	  	   Braidotti’s	   approach	   is	   one	   of	   thinking	   ‘different	  differences’	  against	  binarisms	  or	  restrictive	  (molar)	  accretions	  of	  power	  or	   identity,	  yet	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  her	  focus	  on	  the	  embodied,	  the	  enfleshed	  and	  the	  material	  allows	  her	  to	  continue	  to	  ask	  questions	  of	  power	  dissymmetries	  and	  differential	  locations	  experienced	  and	  embodied	  by	  non-­‐unitary,	  nomadic	  subjects.	  	  As	  such,	  Braidotti	  notes	  that:	  	   Going	  deliberately	  against	  the	  grain	  of	  most	  contemporary	  hyper-­‐loyal	  reception	  of	  the	  co-­‐author	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  I	  shall	  never	  tire	  of	  asking	  the	  debunking	  question:	  ‘that’s	  all	  very	  well,	   but	   whatever	   happened	   to	   sexual	   difference	   understood	   as	   the	   dissymmetrical	   power-­‐relations	  between	  the	  sexed	  subjects?’96	  These,	  I	  would	  argue	  are	  the	  type	  of	  debunking	  questions	  that	  we	  must	  ask	  if	  we	  are	  to	  remain	  reflexive	  and	  responsible	  for	  what	  we	  come	  to	  know.	  	  In	  Braidotti’s	  approach,	  we	  can	  find	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  p68	  91	  See	  eg	  Ibid.	  p86-­‐87,	  p68.	  Teresa	  De	  Lauretis,	  Technologies	  of	  Gender:	  Essays	  on	  Theory,	  Film	  and	  Fiction	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  Unviersity	  Press,	  1987).p24,	  Jami	  Weinstein,	  "Introduction	  Part	  2."	  Deleuze	  and	  Gender:	  
Supplement	  to	  Deleuze	  Studies	  2,	  (2008).	  p25	  92	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  “Introduction”	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Feminist	  Theory.	  	  Deleuze	  Connections	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  p5	  93	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  p15	  94	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "A	  Critical	  Cartography	  of	  Feminist	  Post-­‐Postmodernism,"	  Australian	  Feminist	  Studies	  20,	  no.	  47	  (2005).	  p12	  95	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Transpositions	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2006).	  p4	  96	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  p103	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questions	  and	  this	  responsibility	  towards	  the	  differential	  impact	  of	  power	  relations.	  	  Difference	  here	   is	   foregrounded	   not	   just	   as	   an	   ontology	   or	   as	   that	   which	   returns	   eternally,	   but	   as	   a	  grounded	  lived	  experience	  –	  as	  sexual	  difference,	  and	  more	  broadly,	  as	  a	  dynamic	  of	  power.	  Thus	   from	  Braidotti,	  we	  can	   take	  a	  nomadic,	  vitalist	  positivity	   that	   foregrounds	   transposition,	  movement,	  creation	  and	  activity.	  	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  her	  work	  also	  sounds	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  or	   a	   reminder	   to	   remain	   firmly	   focused	  on	   the	  material	   and	  grounded	  circumstances	   through	  which	   such	   creation	   is	   experienced	   and	   the	   particular	   power	   dynamics	   or	   tensions	   to	  which	  individuals	   are	   subject.	   	   This	   is	   what	   leads	   her	   to	   repeatedly	   point	   to	   the	   dangers	   of	  deconstructing	  a	  subjectivity	  that	  has	  never	  been	  fully	  realised.97	  	  With	  Braidotti	  and	  in	  sexual	  difference	   feminist	   readings	   of	   Deleuze	   more	   generally,	   we	   can	   find	   both	   a	   celebration	   of	  immanent	  creativity,	  transpositions	  and	  becoming,	  and	  a	  warning	  to	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  circumstances	  through	  which	  these	  transpositions	  are	  lived	  and	  known.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  my	  approach	  to	  Deleuze	  is	  mediated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  practice	  a	  responsible	  politics	  of	  location	  of	   the	  sort	   found	   in	  Braidotti;	  a	  commitment	  to	   this	  approach	  enhances	  our	  ability	   to	  analyse	  the	  play	  of	  difference	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  power.	  
Methodological	  issues	  The	   aim	   of	   this	   thesis	   then,	   is	   not	   just	   to	  map	   the	   contours	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   are	   at	   play	   in	  relation	  to	  rights	  and	  sexuality,	  but	  also	  to	  attempt	  to	  chart	  the	  intensities	  of	  different	  issues	  in	  their	   individual	   repetitions	   in	   different	   settings.	   	   If	  we	   read	   sexuality	   as	   part	   of	   a	  multiplicity	  constituted	  of	  desire,	  family,	  nationhood,	  class,	  gender,	  labour,	  state	  and	  many	  other	  forces	  and	  assemblages,98	  we	  must	  also	  accept	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  series	  of	  forces	  are	  constituted	  will	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   space	   and	   time	   in	   which	   they	   are	   encountered.	   	   The	   question	  therefore	   is	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   forces	   at	   play	   at	   each	   point	   –	   the	   way	   in	   which	   virtuality	   is	  actualised	  into	  a	  particular	  present.	  	  	  The	  thesis	  has	  thus	  been	  in	  large	  part,	  an	  attempt	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  number	  of	  key	   issues	  or	  events	   in	  order	   to	  map	  the	  series	  and	  structures	   through	  which	  they	  have	  resonated	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  resonance.	  	  As	   such,	   the	   specific	  moments,	   political	   debates	   or	   laws	   discussed	   in	   the	   thesis	   can	   be	   taken	  neither	  as	  a	  general,	  totalisable	  representation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  sexuality,	  nor	  as	  unconnected	  singularities	  that	  have	  no	  relevance	  or	  resonance	  with	  each	  other.	  	  They	  mark	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  through	  the	  resonance	  of	  connected	  yet	  disjunctive	  series.	  	  My	   intention	  has	  been	  to	  analyse	  the	  way	   in	  which	  certain	  moments	  have	  been	  addressed	  (or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Ibid.	  p82	  98	  See	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  p83	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sometimes	  not	  addressed)	  as	  human	  rights	  issues,	  or	  the	  way	  in	  which	  issues	  around	  sexuality	  have	   been	   taken	   up	   by	   and	  within	   a	   human	   rights	   discourse.	   	   Such	  moments	   or	   occurrences	  were	   chosen	  because	   they	   seemed	   to	   encapsulate	  many	   of	   the	   issues	   at	   play	   in	   discourses	   of	  international	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  at	  this	  particular	  time.	   	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  can	   be	   taken	   as	   entirely	   representative	   of	   all	   issues	   of	   relevance.	   	   Instead,	   I	   work	   with	   a	  Deleuzian	  acknowledgement	  that	  all	  events	  contain	  the	  shadows	  of	  virtual	  objects	  within	  their	  actualised	   series.	   	   By	   taking	   a	   particular	   focus,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   I	   will	   close	   down	   some	  avenues	  of	  analysis:	   it	   is	  simply	  not	  possible	  to	  engage	  with	  or	  consider	  all	   instances	  in	  which	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights	  interact.	  	  However,	  while	  a	  restricted	  focus	  is	  inevitable,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	   draw	   on	  multiple	   instances	   to	   show	   the	   connections	   and	   interconnections	   at	   play,	   and	   in	  doing	  so	  attempt	  to	  map	  a	  number	  of	  different	   fields	   in	  which	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  are	  able	   to	  interact	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   are	  of	   key	   significance	   in	   these	   interactions.	   	  Broadly	   speaking,	   I	  begin	  by	  addressing	   ‘molar’	  or	   identitarian	  politics	   and	   law	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	  and	   rights	  and	  move	  to	  addressing	  those	  elements	  of	  campaigning	  in	  this	  area	  that	  might	  more	  broadly	  be	  termed	  ‘molecular’.	  	  Or,	  I	  move	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  politics	  of	  identities,	  dualities	  and	  rights,	  to	  the	   politics	   of	   the	   imperceptible,	   flows	   and	   pre-­‐identitarian	  micro-­‐movements.	   However,	   this	  approach	  is	  taken	  in	  the	  understanding	  that	  political	  change	  and	  activism	  rarely	  fits	  neatly	  into	  a	  simple	  molar/molecular	  dualism	  –	  that	  change	  tends	  to	  contain	  elements	  of	  both:	  ‘Abstract	   machines	   do	   not	   exist	   only	   on	   the	   plane	   of	   consistency,	   upon	   which	   they	  develop	  diagrams;	  they	  are	  already	  present	  enveloped	  on	  or	  “encased”	  in	  the	  strata	  in	  general,	  or	   even	   erected	   on	   particular	   strata	   upon	   which	   they	   simultaneously	   organise	   a	   form	   of	  expression	   and	   a	   form	   of	   content…Thus,	   there	   are	   two	   complementary	   movements	   one	   by	  which	   abstract	   machine	   work	   the	   strata	   and	   are	   constantly	   setting	   things	   loose,	   another	   by	  which	  they	  are	  effectively	  stratified,	  effectively	  captured	  by	  the	  strata.’99	  This	   paradox	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   function	   of	   rights	   themselves.	   	   Thus,	   I	   begin	   by	   addressing	  specific	  legal	  changes	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  international	  governmental	  bodies	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  I	  then	  address	  the	  way	  in	  which	  activism	  has	  engaged	  with	  these	  changes,	  and	  more	  significantly,	  with	   the	   more	   structural	   shifts	   that	   have	   made	   such	   changes	   possible	   –	   in	   particular	   the	  tentative	  emergence	  of	  what	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  sexual	  subject.	  	  Finally,	  my	  analysis	  turns	  to	  the	  embodiment	   of	   such	   subjectivities	   within	   particular	   locations	   –	   or	   how	   the	   sexual	   subject	  relates	   to	   the	   human	   of	   human	   rights.	   	   Each	   of	   these	   areas	   of	   analysis	   presented	   specific	  methodological	  issues,	  as	  discussed	  below.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  p159	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It	   bears	   reinforcing	   that	   by	   addressing	   questions	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   and	   by	  selecting	   issues	   of	   law	   and	   activism,	   I	   am	   already	   limiting	   and	   framing	   the	   way	   in	   which	   I	  approach	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   My	   focus	   on	   the	   international	   as	   an	  arena	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  is	  deliberately	  chosen	  in	  response	  to	  the	  numerous	  debates	  in	  international	  legal	  and	  activist	  arenas	  which	  call	  into	  question	  ideas	  of	  a	  ‘global	  gay’	  and	   emplace	   questions	   of	   identity	   and	   belonging	   as	   both	   intensely	   situated	   and	   embedded	  within	  specific,	  locational	  contexts	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  interactions	  that	  move	  beyond	  state	  borders.	  	  Widening	  the	  arena	  of	  analysis	  to	  questions	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  brings	  this	   double	  movement	   between	   particularities	   of	   local	   singularities	   and	  multiplicitous,	   global	  networks	   into	   the	   frame.	   	   This	   frame	   however,	   is	   complex	   and	   multifaceted	   –	   selection	   and	  exclusion	  of	  cases,	   issues	  and	  debates	  has	  been	  necessary.	   	  To	  try	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  selection	  does	  not	   entirely	   close	   off	   all	   other	   avenues	   of	   analysis,	   I	   adopt	   a	   frame	   that	   leaves	   open	   the	  possibility	   of	   viewing	   sexuality	   as	   part	   of	   a	   transnational	   mulitiplicity	   actualised	   in	   different	  ways	   at	   different	   times	   and	   places,	   and	   thus	   highlights	   the	   opportunity	   for	   connections	   and	  relationality.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  can	  or	  should	  be	  subsumed	  under	  one	  particular	  paradigm	  or	  mode	  of	  expression	  –	   in	  highlighting	  multiple	  different	  and	  sometimes	  conflicting	  actualisations	  of	  sexuality,	  we	  simultaneously	  highlight	  the	  multiple,	  open-­‐ended	  and	  changing	   expressions	   through	  which	   both	   singularities	   and	   the	   ‘whole’	   of	   sexuality	  might	   be	  understood.	   	   Instead,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   unpicking	   the	   various	   clusters	   of	   identity	   and	  representation	  through	  which	  we	  currently	  approach	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  read	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  outside	  already	  established	  or	  dominant	  frameworks	  or	  narratives.	  	  As	  such,	  while	  I	  do	  initially	  divide	  chapters	  into	  issues	  of	  rights	  and	  activism,	  these	  divisions	  are	  not	   intended	   to	  be	   total	  or	  oppositional	  –	  questions	  of	   law	  and	  activism	   interact	  and	   replay	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   in	   different	   ways	   dependent	   upon	   context.	   	   It	   is	   these	  connections	  and	  questions	  in	  which	  I	  am	  most	  interested.	  	  
International	  Legal	  Frameworks	  	  In	   light	   of	   these	   connections	   and	   considerations	   a	   key	  question	   that	  motivates	  my	   analysis	   is	  that	  of	  what	   type	  of	  LGBT	  human	  rights	  politics	   is	  possible	  at	   this	   time,	   in	  particular	  political	  and	  legal	  structures.100	  	  With	  this	  context	   in	  mind	  I	  begin	  by	  analysing	  what	  we	  might	  broadly	  term	   ‘legal	   changes’	   within	   institutions	   of	   international	   law	   –	   particularly	   the	   UN	   -­‐	   in	   recent	  years.	   	   Such	   considerations	   can	   be	   slightly	   problematic,	   particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   case	   law	   in	  international	  or	  even	  regional	  institutions	  (with	  some	  notable	  exceptions).	  	  Much	  of	  what	  can	  be	  measured	   consists	   of	   declarations,	   statements	   and	   debates	   originating	   from	   both	   within	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Here	  I	  am	  paraphrasing	  an	  argument	  that	  comes	  through	  strongly	  in	  Hakan	  Seckinelgin,	  "Global	  Activism	  and	  Sexualities	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  HIV/AIDS,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).p110	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without	  international	  governmental	  and	  legal	  organisations.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear,	  well-­‐structured	  body	  of	  law,	  or	  treaty	  specifically	  addressing	  sexuality	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  there	   have	   been	   no	   significant	   normative	   shifts	   in	   relation	   to	   sexual	   orientation,	   particularly	  over	   the	   last	   two	  decades.	   	   I	   take	  both	   these	  normative	   shifts	   and	   two	  particular	   instances	   in	  which	  clear	  movement	  on	  issues	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  identifiable	  –	  the	  Toonen	  Judgment	  of	  1994101	  and	  the	  General	  Assembly	  Statement	  2008102	  -­‐	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  address	  the	  causes	  and	  consequences	   of	   such	   shifts	   as	  well	   as	   the	   role	   of	   human	   rights,	   broadly	   conceived	   as	   both	   a	  language	  and	  a	  normative	  framework	  in	  discourses	  of	  sexuality	  currently	  at	  play	  in	  the	  UN.	  	  	  My	   interest	   in	  addressing	   the	  position	  of	  sexuality	  at	   the	  UN	   is	  not	  so	  much	   in	  a	   listing	  of	   the	  particular	   changes	   that	  have	  occurred,	  but	   in	  an	  analysis	  of	  wider	   structural	   shifts	   that	  might	  have	   contributed	   to	   making	   such	   changes	   possible.	   	   An	   analysis	   of	   the	   changing	   position	   of	  sexuality	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights	   norms	   is	   also	   an	   analysis	   of	   changes	   to	   these	   norms	  themselves	  –	  changes	  that	  make	  possible	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  sexual	  subject.	  	  Thus	  human	  rights	  emerge	  both	  as	  an	  object	  of	  analysis	  in	  themselves	  and	  a	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  unpicking	  some	  of	   the	   wider	   theoretical	   implications	   of	   the	   presence	   or	   otherwise	   of	   discourses	   of	   sexual	  otherness	  in	  international	  institutions.	  	  	  Central	   to	   this	   analysis	   is	   the	   double	  movement	   of	   rights	   as	   facilitators	   of	   both	   emancipation	  and	  control.	  	  By	  viewing	  rights	  as	  Deleuzian	  machines,	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  explore	  their	  various	  different	  capabilities	  as	  facilitators	  of	  connection	  and	  disconnection,	  organisation	  and	  flow.	  	  As	  De	  Vos	  argues:	  ‘the	  law	  (like	  any	  form	  of	  power)	  does	  not	  just	  prohibit	  and	  control,	  it	  does	  not	  simply	   denounce	   and	   discredit.	   	   It	   also	   produces	   and	   delivers,	   and	   it	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	  empower	   people.	   	   It	   engenders	   behaviour,	   it	   generates	   ideas	   and	   action,	   it	   bounds	   individual	  responsibility	   as	   well	   as	   promoting	   individual	   capacity	   and	   agency	   and,	   in	   so	   doing,	   it	  constitutes	  individualized	  notions	  of	  identity.’103	  	  This	  double	  movement	  I	  would	  suggest	  forms	  both	  the	  basis	  of	  many	  critiques	  for	  rights	  that	  are	  based	  in	  or	  around	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  identity,	  but	  also	  a	  potential	  opening	  or	  mode	  of	  engagement	  with	  questions	  of	  not	  only	  rights	  and	  sexuality,	  but	  also	  the	  wider	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  language	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  is	  deployed.	  
Activism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  Toonen	  V.	  Australia,	  Communication	  No.	  488/1992	  UN	  Doc.	  CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992	  (1994)	  102UN	  General	  Assembly,	  Sixty-­‐third	  session,	  Agenda	  item	  64(b).	  Letter	  dated	  18	  Dec	  2008	  from	  the	  Permanent	  Representatives	  of	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Croatia,	  France,	  Gabon,	  Japan,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  Norway	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  addressed	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  UN	  Doc.	  A/63/635	  (2008)	  	  103	  Pierre	  De	  Vos,	  "'the	  Constitution	  Made	  Us	  Queer':	  The	  Sexual	  Orientation	  Clause	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Identity,"	  in	  Sexuality	  in	  the	  Legal	  Arena,	  ed.	  Carl	  Stychin	  and	  Didi	  Herman	  (London:	  Athlone	  press,	  2000).p29	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An	   analysis	   of	   legal	   developments	   alone	   provides	   a	   limited	   view	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  sexuality.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  work	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  form	  of	  interaction	  taken	  by	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  occurs	  not	  immediately	  through	  law,	  but	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  language	  in	  activist/political	  and	  academic	  discourse.	  	  This	  process	  however,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   smooth	   one,	   and	   methodologically,	   it	   has	   presented	   several	  problems,	  particularly	  relating	  to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  processing	  and	  unpicking	  the	  various	  different	  forces	  and	  affects	  at	  play	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  are	  often	  highly	  contentious	  and	  sensitive	  issues.	  	  	  Of	  concern	  here	  is	  what	  the	  deployment	  of	  the	  unstable	  sexual	  subject	  that	  has	  begun	  to	  emerge	  can	  mean.	  More	  pointedly,	  what	  possibilities	  does	  it	  close	  down,	  and	  what	  potentialities	  can	  it	  open	   up?	   	   As	   such,	   at	   issue	   is	   the	   power	   dynamic	   within	   which	   gay	   rights	   groups	   (or	   LGBT	  groups,	  or	  queer	  groups,	  or	  groups	  seeking	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  sexual	  belonging)	  operate	  –	  this	  is	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  my	  research.	  	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  double-­‐sidedness	  to	  this	  issue	  of	  power	  –	  the	  first	  side	  relates	  to	  the	   flow	   of	  material	   resources,	  money,	   etc.	   and	   to	   a	   dynamic	   in	  which	   (particular)	   ‘Western’	  groups	   have	   access	   to	   resources,	   which	   are	   then	   channelled	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  world.	   	   In	   this	  dynamic	  there	  is	  an	  unevenness	  of	  ability	  to	  work	  and	  to	  speak	  according	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  particular	  locations	  and	  concerns	  which	  relates	  in	  part	  to	  this	  flow	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  agenda	  setting	   power	   that	   comes	  with	   the	   control	   of	   this	   flow.	   	   However,	   such	   an	   analysis	  would	   be	  incomplete	  without	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  agency	  of	  groups	  in	  the	  global	  South	  in	  relation	  to	  negotiating	  and	  interacting	  with	  such	  flows.	  	  This	  acknowledgement	  must	  take	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  second	  power	  dynamic	  that	  relates	  not	  just	  to	  the	  organisation	  of	  material	  resources	  but	  to	  the	  organisation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  organisational	  function	  of	  language	  and	  pre-­‐linguistic	  conceptualisations	   which	   colour	   the	   very	   way	   in	   which	   ‘gay	   rights	   politics’	   as	   such,	   can	   be	  undertaken,	   even	  at	   a	  global	   level.	   	  This	  organisation	  of	   language	  and	  knowledge,	   rather	   than	  the	  organisation	  of	  resources	  is	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  chapter:	  my	  interest	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  increasingly	   established	  modes	   of	   control	   govern	   the	   possibility	   for	   both	   critique	   and	   action.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  denial	  of	  agency,	  but	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  framework	  through	  which	  agency	  can	   work	   within	   global	   gay	   rights	   movements	   and	   in	   particular	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	  frameworks	  can	  shape	  the	  possibilities	   for	  action	  and	  enunciation	  of	  assertion	  and	  resistance;	  how,	   for	   example,	   the	   use	   of	   LGBT	   discourses	   by	   Western	   groups	   or	   even	   by	   domestic	  politicians	   might	   influence,	   but	   not	   necessarily	   entirely	   dictate,	   the	   forms	   through	   which	  domestic	  groups	  engage	  in	  the	  enunciation	  of	  selfhood	  and	  resistance.104	  	  As	  such,	  this	  analysis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104Tom	  Boellstorff,	  "Dubbing	  Culture:Indonesian	  Gay	  and	  Lesbi	  Subjectivities	  and	  Ethnography	  in	  an	  Already	  Globalized	  World,"	  American	  Ethnologist	  30,	  no.	  2	  (2003).	  Oliver	  Phillips,	  "Constituting	  the	  Global	  Gay:	  Issues	  of	  Individual	  Subjectivity	  and	  Sexuality	  in	  	  Southern	  Africa,"	  in	  Sexuality	  in	  the	  Legal	  Arena,	  ed.	  D	  Herman	  and	  C.	  F	  Stychin	  (Athlone,	  2000).	  p18	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involves	   a	   repositioning	   of	   subjectivity	   or	   subjective	   identities	   in	   order	   to	   situate	   the	   subject	  within	  a	  wider	  locus	  and	  frame	  of	  space,	  power,	  law	  and	  becoming	  and	  explore	  how	  this	  framing	  impacts	  upon	  capacities	  for	  action	  and	  resistance.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  therefore	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	   problematic	   of	   recognition	   and	   identity	   in	   relation	   to	   activism	   and	   the	   dangerous	  consequences	  of	  misrecognition	  or	  problematic	  deployments	  of	  particular	  identities.	  	  	  This	   pillar	   of	  my	   research	   provided	   various	  methodological	   issues.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   questions	   of	  misrecognition	   and	   critique	   of	   identities,	   the	   issue	   becomes	   one	   in	   which	   developments	   and	  problematics	  are	  marked	  by	  multiple	  controversies	  and	  contentious	  encounters,	  through	  which	  tensions	   are	   enacted	   and	   embodied	   in	   various,	   often	   tragic,	  ways.	  My	   point,	   and	   perhaps	   the	  methodological	   concern	   at	   hand	   is	   that	   because	   such	   issues	   are	   so	   steeped	   in	   controversy,	  engagement	  with	  a	  set	  of	  circumstances	  –	  and	  often	  even	  attempting	  to	  establish	  what	  actually	  happened	   -­‐	   becomes	   highly	   political	   or	   even	   impossible,	   and	   is	   thus	   charged	   with	   difficult	  ethical	  issues.	  	  	  For	   example,	   much	   activism,	   discussion	   and	   research	   produced	   by	   human	   rights	   bodies	   has	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  Iran	  executing	  minors,	  on	  charges	  that	  in	  some	  way	  relate	  to	  sexual	  crimes,	  and	  differing	  responses	  and	  engagements	  with	  the	  Iranian	  state’s	  actions	  has	  fomented	  controversy,	  public	  and	  private	  disagreements	  and	  much	  bitterness.	  	  In	  engaging	  with	  this	  issue,	  I	  felt	  that	  it	  captured	  many	  of	  the	  problematics	  that	  currently	  inhere	  within	  gay	  rights	  politics.	  	  One	   method	   of	   analysing	   the	   issue	   at	   hand	   might	   have	   been	   to	   attempt	   to	   interview	   those	  involved	   in	   campaigning	   and	   activism	  around	   this	   issue	   and	   in	  doing	   so	   attempt	   to	  unpick	   in	  some	  way	  what	  actually	  happened	   in	   one	   or	   a	   number	   of	   these	   cases	   and	   attempting	   to	   read	  these	  facts	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  discourses	  that	  were	  constructed	  afterwards.	  	  However,	  two	  factors	  prevented	  me	  from	  taking	  this	  approach.	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  investigating	  this	  particular	  case	  in	  this	  particular	  way,	  I	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  talking	  to	  particular	  activists	  based	  in	  the	  West	  –	  practical,	  safety	  and	  even	  linguistic	  concerns	  would	  shape	  or	  constrict	  the	  undertaking	  of	  any	  primary	   research.	   	   Thus,	   my	   analysis	   would	   be	   limited	   to	   communication	   with	   those	   who	  engaged	  with	  the	  case	  second	  hand,	  often	  in	  a	  second	  language.	   	  This	  seems	  to	  undermine	  any	  possibility	  of	  doing	  much	  more	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  particulars	  of	  such	  events.	  Alone,	   this	   would	   probably	   not	   be	   sufficient	   to	   prevent	   me	   from	   pursuing	   interviews	   with	  particular	   campaigners	   involved	   in	   the	   case	   and	   there	   may	   indeed	   be	   space	   to	   undertake	  research	  similar	  to	  this	  in	  future	  work.	  	  However,	  a	  second,	  point	  is	  also	  of	  relevance:	  while	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  truth	  or	  otherwise	  of	  the	  guilt	  of	  those	  hanged	  in	  Iran	  is	  unimportant,	  I	   am	   mindful	   that	   because	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   excess	   significance	   that	   Rubin	   suggests	   can	   be	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attached	   to	   sexuality105 ,	   the	   meaning	   of	   such	   executions	   becomes	   heavily	   coded	   and	   is	  sometimes	   fed	   into	   a	   dynamic	   of	   representation	   and	   recognition	   with	   a	   little	   less	   care	   than	  should	  be	  taken.	  	  To	  me,	  this	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  wider	  problematic	  in	  play	  here	  and	  viewed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  are	  subsumed	  under	  a	  wider	  flow	  of	  power	  and	  discourse,	  or	  visibility	  and	  articulability	  within	  a	  particular	  activist	  field.	  	  	  As	   such,	   the	   determination	   of	   ‘the	   facts	   of	   the	   case’	   seemed	   to	   recede	   as	   both	   a	   legitimate	  possibility	  and	  an	  ethical	  requirement.	  	  Long	  suggests	  that	  the	  boys	  involved	  in	  three	  particular	  incidents	  that	  he	  discusses	  ‘did	  not	  stop	  dying’106	  and	  that	  the	  overcoding	  of	  their	  deaths	  within	  discourses	  of	  sexual	  rights	  contributed	  to	  an	  erasure	  of	  their	  selves.	  	  The	  ethical	  imperative	  here	  –	  whether	  Long’s	  interpretation	  of	  all	  of	  that	  occurred	  is	  entirely	  correct	  or	  not	  –	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  be	  to	  try	  to	  stop	  contributing	  to	  this	  overcoding.	  	  Thus,	  while	  such	  controversies	  remain	  my	  starting	  point	   for	  analysis,	   I	  am	  more	   interested	   in	  the	  way	   in	  which	  a	  dynamic,	  or	  dualism	  of	  identity	  and	  belonging	   contributes	   to	  a	   self-­‐perpetuating	  political	  binary	  of	   confrontation	  and	  omission.	   	  My	  concern	  is	  with	  ways	  to	  short-­‐circuit	  this	  binary	  rather	  than	  to	  participate	  in	  its	  reproduction.	   	   It	   is	  unlikely	  that	  I	  have	  been	  entirely	  successful	   in	  doing	  so,	  but	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  a	  shift	  of	  focus	  and	  an	  awareness	  of	  how	  a	  problem	  is	  constituted	  as	  sayable	  or	  seeable	  is	  a	  significant	  first	  step.	  	  My	  aim	  then,	  is	  not	  an	  objective	  account	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  a	  particular	  case,	  or	  even	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  particular	  individuals,	  but	  an	  attempt	  to	  think	  through	  why	   the	   global	   gay	   rights	   discourse	   operates	   as	   it	   does	   and	   how	   its	   operation	   in	   this	   way	  contributed	  to	  particular	  outcomes.	  	  My	  focus	  is	  the	  confluence	  of	  forces	  that	  played	  out	  in	  the	  event	  and	  how	  they	  worked	  to	  reproduce	  rather	  than	  repeat	  (in	  a	  Deleuzian	  sense)	  particular	  dynamics	   of	   identity	   politics.	   	   The	   wider	   question	   here	   then	   is	   that	   of	   emplacement	   and	  intensities,	   the	   connections	   that	   are	   being	  made	   and	   the	   potentials	   that	   are	   closed	  down	   and	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  particular	  modes	  of	  understanding	  and	  expression	  through	  which	  a	  problem	  is	  approached.	  	  	  My	   analysis	   then	   turned	   to	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   breakdown	   of	   identities	   in	   the	   activist	  processes,	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   political	   engagement	   can	   force	   the	   dissolution,	   rather	   than	  hardening,	   of	   territorialised	   identities.	   	   The	   consequences	   of	   such	   deterritorialisation	   are	  difficult	   to	   track,	   but	   do	   allow	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   particular	   tensions	   at	   play	   in	   the	   political	  process	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  one	  might	  exploit,	  or	  at	  least	  be	  worthy	  of	  the	  demands	  made	  by	  the	  exigencies	  of	  such	  tensions.	  	  I	  discuss	  this	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  debates	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Sao	  Paolo	  and	  the	  UK	  at	  different	  (limited)	  time	  periods.	   	  My	  focus	  is	  how	  activism	  and	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sexuality	   might	   operate	   oriented	   towards	   what	   Grosz	   calls	   a	   politics	   of	   the	   imperceptible.107	  	  This	   is	   not	   a	   claim	   that	   any	   of	   these	   movements	   exhibited	   a	   wholly	   imperceptible	   politics;	  instead,	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   elements	   of	   their	   actions	   showed	   this	   imperceptible,	   micro-­‐political	  tendency.	  	  My	  interest	  is	  what	  this	  might	  mean	  for	  future	  political	  action.	  	  	  Of	   particular	   interest	   here	   is	  what	  we	  might	   term	   the	   relationship	   between	  molecularity	   and	  duration	  or	  the	  virtual	  in	  relation	  to	  multiple	  knowledges	  or	  possibilities	  for	  action	  that	  haunt	  each	  actualised	  event.	  	  As	  such,	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  the	  role	  that	  rights	  might	  play	  at	  the	  time	  of	  ‘critical	   events’	   both	   as	   a	   political	   tactic	   and	   as	   a	  mode	   of	   exploring	  multiple	   knowledges	   or	  hidden	  histories	   that	   are	   not	   necessarily	   visible	   or	   articulable	   in	   particular	   political	   and	   legal	  strata	  but	  may	  be	  perceived	  through	  molecular	  movements,	  or	  counter-­‐actualised	   in	  response	  to	  particular	  material	  possibilities.	  	  	  It	  is	  clear	  therefore,	  that	  this	  is	  a	  discussion	  that	  moves	  from	  the	  molar	  to	  the	  molecular,	  and	  I	  focus	  in	  some	  detail	  on	  the	  consequences	  of	  a	  ‘molecular’	  politics.	  	  However,	  any	  such	  discussion	  takes	  place	  against	  the	  background	  of	  molar	  structures	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  and	  thus	  my	   interest	   stems	   not	   from	   a	   desire	   to	   unquestioningly	   embrace	   a	  molecular	   politics,	   but	   to	  identify	   the	  meeting	   points	   between	  molar	   law	   and	  molecular	   movement,	   the	   surfaces	   upon	  which	  they	  can	  interconnect	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  tend	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  both.	  	  	  	  
Personhood	  The	  main	  body	  of	  my	  research	  is	  therefore	  an	  attempt	  to	  map	  the	  formations	  or	  strata	  through	  which	   concepts	   of	   human	   rights	   or	   sexuality,	   the	   emerging	   idea	   of	   a	   sexual	   subject	   and	   the	  notion	  of	   human	   rights	   claims	   related	   to	   sexual	   orientation	   can	  be	   seen	   and	  understood.	   	  My	  final	  area	  of	  analysis	  is	  the	  position	  that	  particular	  figures	  occupy	  and	  as	  such	  the	  way	  in	  which	  persons,	   actors,	   agents,	   activists,	   subjects	   in	   any	   form,	   are	   able	   to	   operate	  within	   such	   strata.	  	  Such	  analysis	   comes	   from	  a	   concern	  with	   the	   ‘human’	   aspect	  of	  human	   rights.	   	   It	   is	   relatively	  clear	   that	   rights	   discourses	   are	   increasingly	   subject	   to	   challenge,	   modification,	  deterritorialisation	   from	   various	   directions.	   	   I	   consider	   how	   explorations	   of	   the	   ‘human’,	  materially	   embodied,	   enfleshed	   entity,	   coincide	  with	   and	   reinforce	   such	  problematisations.	   In	  essence,	  while	  the	  main	  body	  of	  my	  thesis	  considers	  frames,	  rhizomes	  and	  operations	  of	  rights	  and	   sexuality,	   my	   final	   stage	   of	   analysis	   turns	   to	   how	   what	   Povinelli	   calls	   ‘the	   uneven	  distribution	   of	   the	   flesh’108	  interacts	   with,	   embodies	   and	   articulates	   such	   structures.	   	   More	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particularly	  then,	  the	  question	  is	  one	  of	  how	  particular	  abstract	  machines	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  human	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  This	  aspect	  of	   the	   thesis	  draws	  on	   two	  different	  modes	  of	   engaging	   ‘humanity’	  or	  materiality.	  	  The	   first	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘figuration’	   –	   a	   construct	   found	   particularly	   in	   feminist	   theory.	  	  Braidotti	   describes	   the	   figuration	   as	   ‘a	   bringing	   into	   representation	   the	   way	   of	   the	  unthinkable’109,	  or	  a	  means	  of	  illuminating	  previously	  unexpected	  blind	  spots.	  	  She	  draws	  links	  between	  figurations	  and	  Deleuzo-­‐Guattarian	  ‘conceptual	  personae’:	  ‘A	  conceptual	  persona	  is	  no	  metaphor,	  but	  a	  materially	  embodied	  stage	  of	  metamorphosis	  of	  a	  dominant	  subject	  towards	  all	  that	   the	   phallogocentric	   system	   does	   not	   want	   it	   to	   become.’110	  	   Thus	   figurations	   mark	   the	  borders,	   the	  becoming-­‐monster	  or	  becoming-­‐other,	   the	  embodiment	  of	  that	  which	  does	  not	  fit	  and	  an	  expression	  and	  genealogy	  of	   its	   specific	  positioning	   in	  space	  and	   time.111	  	  The	  point	  of	  such	   figurations	   is	   not	   to	   express	   new,	  more	   accurate	   representations	   of	   sexual	   being,	   but	   to	  trace	  lines	  and	  emplacements	  of	  sexual	  becoming	  in	  order	  to	  map	  the	  hidden	  histories	  of	  sexual	  otherness	  and	  perhaps	  actualise	  or	  connect	  with	  their	  molecular,	  imperceptible	  potentialities.	  The	  second	  means	  by	  which	  I	  consider	  the	  human	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  as	  the	  materially	  embodied	  person	   of	   the	   activist	   engaging	  with	   the	   possibility	   of	   counter-­‐actualising	   the	   event.	   	   Deleuze	  notes	  that	  in	  counter-­‐actualising,	  the	  actor	  will	  not	  look	  to	  capture	  an	  eternal	  truth	  or	  origin	  (of	  rights,	   sexuality,	   subjectivity)	   but	   to	   ‘draw	   out	   the	   intensity	   and	   breadth	   of	   the	   event	   by	  selecting	   its	  underlying	  movements	   in	  a	  new	  way,	   and	  by	  playing	   these	   through	  a	  new	  acting	  out,	  replay	  or	  counter-­‐actualisation.’	  112	  	  Thus,	  we	  could	  suggest	  that	  the	  actor	  is	  not	  mediating	  theory	   and	   practice,	   but	   actively	   drawing	   on	   virtual	   objects	   in	   response	   to	   the	   particular	  contingencies	  of	  location	  as	  embodied.	  	  This	  consideration	  is	  thus	  an	  attempt	  to	  begin	  to	  bring	  together	   some	  of	   the	   paradoxes	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   and	   an	   attempt	   not	   to	   resolve	  them,	   but	   to	   find	   a	  way	   to	   actively	   hold	   them	   together	   in	   a	   productive	   disjunction	   specific	   to	  each	  problematic,	  viewed	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  what	  is	  visible	  and	  articulable	  at	  any	  particular	  place	  and	  time.	  	  Such	  an	  approach	  will	  not	  resolve	  the	  issues	  of	  rights,	  sexuality	  and	  power,	  but	  may	  offer	  a	  productive	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  escaping	  some	  of	  the	  binaries	   in	  which	  the	  discourse	  currently	  finds	  itself.	  	  	  Thus	   my	   research	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   discover	   an	   identifiable	   sexual	   subject	   that	   can	   be	  essentialised	  within	  a	  particular	  rights	  treaty	  or	  discourse.	  	  Instead	  it	  seeks	  to	  widen	  the	  frame	  of	  analysis	  through	  a	  mechanism	  of	  dual	  emplacement.	  	  I	  look	  to	  emplace	  the	  sexual	  subject	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Terratologies,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Feminist	  Theory,	  ed.	  Claire	  Colebrook	  and	  Ian	  Buchanan	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  p171	  110	  Ibid.	  111	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.	  p90	  112	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide.	  p174	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it	   is	   increasingly	   possible	   to	   identify,	   within	   the	   particular	   structures	   that	   have	   made	   such	  visibility	  and	  articulation	  possible	  and	  explore	  why	  this	  is	  now	  the	  case.	  	  This	  connects	  with	  my	  second	   strand	   of	   emplacement,	  which	   relates	   to	   the	   positioning	   of	   the	   activist	   in	   a	   particular	  time	   and	   place,	   and	   the	   potentiality	   of	   using	   this	   position	   to	   pose	   the	   questions	   that	   lead	   to	  counter-­‐actualisation	  and	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  event	  in	  each	  location.	  	  There	  is,	  I	  think,	  a	  sense	  of	  awkwardness	  to	  such	  analysis	  –	  in	  taking	  this	  approach	  I	  circumvent	  some,	  although	  not	  all,	  of	  the	  more	  recognised	  means	  of	  addressing	  law	  and	  sexuality.	  	  However,	  some	  of	   this	   awkwardness	   allows	   for	   a	   productive	   disjunction:	   that	   which	   causes	   us	   to	   pause	   or	  stutter	   can	   be	   a	   productive	   encounter	   or	   a	  marker	   of	   a	   problematic	   waiting	   to	   be	   unpicked.	  	  There	   is	   a	   multitude	   of	   such	   encounters	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights;	   my	  primary	  aim	  is	  to	  engage	  with	  some	  of	  them.	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Chapter	  Three	  –	  The	  changing	  role(s)	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  
institutions	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  locate	  one	  single	  moment	  as	  the	  point	  of	  emergence	  of	  rights	  concerning	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  international	  debates.	  	  In	  large	  part,	  this	  difficultly	  arises	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  always	  possible	  or	  useful	  to	  view	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  in	  isolation.	  	  Instead	  we	  might	  conceive	   of	   such	   rights	   as	   situated	   within	   a	   genealogy	   of	   rights	   that	   encompasses	   sexuality,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  orientation,	  but	  also	  relates	  to	  issues	  of	  equality,	  agency,	  bodily	  integrity	  and	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  among	  many	  others.	  	  Thus,	  while	  Petchesky	  argues	  that	  sexual	  rights	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘the	  newest	  kid	  on	  the	  block	  in	  international	  debates’1	  and	  places	  the	  turning	  point	  or	  the	  point	  of	  emergence	  for	  sexual	  rights	  at	  the	  World	  Conference	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Vienna	  in	   1993,	   we	   might	   attempt	   to	   understand	   the	   events	   of	   the	   conference	   in	   relation	   to	   other,	  earlier	   and	   later	   events.	   	   For	   example,	   case	   law	   from	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  1981	  Dudgeon	  v	  UK	  decision2,	  debates	  on	  sexuality	  in	  spheres	  other	  than	  the	  law,	  or	  feminist	  challenges	  to	  public/private	  dichotomies	  might	  all	  be	  viewed	  as	  key	  factors	  that	  have	  allowed	  for	  a	  sustained	  focus	  on	  issues	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  or	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  We	  might	  suggest	  then,	  that	  the	  ‘mainstreaming’3	  of	  issues	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  one	  particular	  event	  or	  organisation	  of	   forces.	   	   Instead	  a	  number	  of	  different	  and	  often	  contradictory	  factors	  shape	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sexuality	  can	  be	  understood	  internationally	  as	  a	  human	  rights	  issue.	  	  	  My	  focus	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  question	  of	  LGBT	  or	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  as	  they	  exist	  in	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law,	  but	   it	   is	   important	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   these	   issues	  have	  not	  emerged	   in	  isolation.	   	   There	   is	   instead	   a	   crossover	   of	   discourses,	   tactics	   and	   critiques.	   	   There	   are	   also	  significant	  differences	  and	  conflicts	  within	   this	  genealogy	  of	   sexual	   rights	  –	  as	  well	  as	  various	  issues	  that	  can	  arise	  through	  the	  conflation	  of,	  for	  example,	  women’s	  rights	  to	  sexual	  agency	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  rights.4	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  connections	  that	  are	  in	  operation	  here	  in	  order	  to	  situate	  the	  debates	  that	  are	  currently	  in	  circulation.	  The	   focus	  of	   this	  chapter,	  however,	   is	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  (or	  LGBT	  rights)	  and	  the	  place	  that	  they	  currently	  occupy	  in	  international	  debates.	   	  The	  chapter	  first	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  key	  international	   legal	  documents	   and	  developments	   specifically	   relating	   to	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Petchesky	  cited	  in	  	  Richard	  Parker,	  Regina	  Maria	  Barbosa,	  and	  Peter	  Aggleton,	  "Introduction:	  Framing	  the	  Sexual	  Subject,"	  in	  Framing	  the	  Sexual	  Subject:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Gender,	  Sexuality,	  and	  Power,	  ed.	  Richard	  Parker,	  Regina	  Maria	  Barbosa,	  and	  peter	  Aggleton	  (London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2000).p13	  2	  Douglas	  Sanders,	  "Sexual	  Orientation	  in	  International	  Law,"	  ILGA,	  www.ilga.org.	  http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/577	  accessed	  28/02/2012	  3	  Matthew	  Waites,	  "Critique	  of	  ‘‘Sexual	  Orientation’’	  and	  ‘‘Gender	  Identity’’	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Discourse:	  Global	  Queer	  Politics	  Beyond	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).p151	  4	  See	  eg	  Cynthia	  Rothschild,	  Scott	  Long,	  and	  Susana	  Fried,	  Written	  Out:	  How	  Sexuality	  Is	  Used	  to	  Attack	  Women's	  
Organising	  (2005).	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then	   addresses	   two	   key	  moments	   –	   namely	   the	   Toonen	   Judgment	   and	   the	   2008	   letter	   to	   the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  in	  order	  to	  unpick	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  of	  power,	  language	  and	  subjectivity	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights.	   	  The	  broader	  methodological	  point	  to	  be	  made	  here	  relates	  specifically	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  addressing	  ‘international’	  scapes	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	   and	   law.	   	   I	   have	   suggested	   above	   that	   questions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   have	   been	  addressed	  in	  various	  different	  modes	  in	  recent	  international	  documents:	  any	  one	  of	  these	  might	  be	  a	  means	  by	  which	  we	  could	  address	  themes	  of	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights	  international	  law.	  	  The	   relevant	   issue	   here	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   neither	   one	   particular	   instant	   that	   perfectly	  embodies	  all	  possible	  expressions	  of	  either	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights	  in	  international	   law,	   nor	   a	  way	   in	  which	  we	  might	   address	   every	   single	   instance	   in	  which	   these	  topics	  are	  relevant.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  a	  simple	  cumulative	  listing	  of	  all	  instances	  would	  suffice	  to	  express	  the	  complexity	  at	  hand.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  instead	  that	  the	  event	  becomes	  the	  ground	  by	  which	  we	  can	  determine	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  our	  analysis5	  as	   it	   is	   only	   by	   locating	   instances	   in	   the	   event,	   as	   simultaneous	   but	   not	   identical	  material	   actualisations	   and	   virtual	  moments,	   that	  we	   can	   fully	   comprehend	   their	   connection.	  	  This	  however,	  does	  not	  detract	   from	  the	  fact	   that	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  Toonen	  Judgment	  and	  the	  UNGA	  statements	  form	  an	  act	  of	  selection	  that	  will	  necessarily	  bring	  particular	  elements	  to	  the	  forefront,	  while	  masking	  others.	  	  This	  is	  inevitable:	  some	  selection	  must	  occur	  in	  order	  to	  make	  analysis	  possible.	  	  My	  motivation	  for	  selecting	  Toonen	  and	  the	  General	  Assembly	  Statements	  in	  this	   chapter	   is	   their	   direct	   engagement	   with	   the	   terminology	   of	   ‘sexual	   orientation’	   in	   high	  profile	  arenas	  –	  this	  is	  still	  a	  relatively	  recent	  and	  rare	  occurrence	  in	  international	  institutional	  legal	  and	  political	  frameworks.	  	  However,	  this	  selection	  takes	  place	  while	  recognising	  both	  that	  each	   expression	   and	   enunciation	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   human	   rights	   is	   one	   particular	  expression	   of	   a	   larger	   whole	   and	   further,	   that	   the	   particularities	   of	   Toonen	   and	   the	   UNGA	  statements	  did	  not	  take	  place	  in	  isolation.	  	  As	  such,	  I	  attempt	  to	  situate	  these	  occurrences	  within	  a	  wider	  framework	  of	  political	  and	  legal	  activity	  and	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  various	  themes	  that	  are	  at	  play.	  
Sexual	  Orientation	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  and	  Institutions	  Parker,	   Barbosa	   and	   Aggleton	   cite	   Petchesky	   in	   order	   to	   suggest	   that	   prior	   to	   1993	   ‘no	  international	  instrument	  relevant	  to	  human	  rights	  made	  reference	  to	  sexuality	  or	  sexual	  rights	  –	  the	  idea	  of	  sexual	  rights	  simply	  did	  not	  exist	  as	  part	  of	   international	  human	  rights	  discourse.’6	  	  The	  case	  is	  not	  necessarily	  as	  clear	  cut	  as	  this	  quote	  indicates:	  cases	  from	  the	  European	  Court	  as	  well	  as	  international	  campaigns	  linking	  sexuality	  to	  other	  human	  rights	  issues	  indicate	  that	  links	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Nathan	  Moore,	  "Icons	  of	  Control:	  Deleuze,	  Signs,	  Law,"	  International	  Journal	  for	  the	  Semiotics	  of	  Law	  20	  (2007).	  p40	  6	  Parker,	  Barbosa,	  and	  Aggleton,	  "Introduction:	  Framing	  the	  Sexual	  Subject."p13	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had	   been	   made	   between	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   in	   public	   international	   discourse,	   if	   not	   in	  international	  law	  prior	  to	  1990.7	  	  It	  might	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  suggest	  instead	  that	  throughout	  the	   course	   of	   the	   1990s	   and	   2000s,	   a	   number	   of	   developments	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	  stabilisation	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   sexual	   rights	   are	   emplaced	   and	   understood	   within	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  and	  discourse.	  	  Rights	  specifically	  addressing	  sexual	  orientation	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  both	  contributing	  to	  and	  emerging	  from	  this	  process	  of	  stabilisation.	  A	   number	   of	   factors	   and	   events	   are	   significant	   here.	   	   Petchesky	   rightly	   points	   to	   the	   1993	  Human	  Rights	  Conference	  in	  Vienna	  in	  which	  there	  was	  sustained	  pressure	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  gender	  based	  violence,	  sexual	  harassment	  and	  exploitation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  1994	  International	  Conference	  on	  Population	  and	  Development	  in	  Cairo	  as	  important	  turning	  points.	  	  More	  directly	  relevant	  to	  this	  chapter	  however,	  is	  the	  landmark	  1994	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  ruling	  on	  sexual	  orientation	  and	   the	  right	   to	  privacy;	   the	   implications	  of	   this	  decision	  are	  considered	   in	  more	  detail	  below.	   	  A	  number	  of	  scholars	  and	  activists	  have	  also	  sought	  to	  indicate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  already	  implicated	  in	  existing	  human	  rights	  documents	   and	   norms.	   	   One	   of	   the	   best	   examples	   of	   this	  might	   be	   the	   Yogyakarta	   Principles,	  which	   were	   drafted	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   meeting	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   experts	   in	  Yogyakarta	  in	  2006	  and	  outline	  a	  ‘set	  of	  international	  principles	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity.’8	  	  The	  document	  produced	  does	  not	  create	  new	  laws	  so	  much	  as	  outline	  the	  specific	  violations	  of	  rights	  that	  are	  suffered	  as	  a	  result	  of	  discrimination,	  violence,	  exploitation	  or	   abuse	   based	   on	   sexual	   orientation	   or	   gender	   identity.	   	   Similarly	   in	   2006,	   the	   International	  Conference	   on	   LGBT	   Human	   Rights,	   held	   as	   part	   of	   the	   1st	   World	   Outgames	   endorsed	   the	  Declaration	   of	  Montreal,	   described	   by	   its	   authors	   as	   ‘an	   attempt	   –	   perhaps	   the	   first	   one	   –	   to	  summarize	   the	  main	   demands	   of	   the	   international	   LGBT	  movement	   in	   the	   broadest	   possible	  terms,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  the	  document	  useful	  at	  a	  global	  level	  and	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world.’9	  Documents	   such	   as	   the	   Yogyakarta	   Principles	   or	   the	   Declaration	   of	   Montreal	   remain	   hugely	  controversial.	   	   They	   have	   in	   no	   sense	   been	   uncritically	   accepted	   either	   by	   those	  who	   seek	   to	  block	   the	  consideration	  of	   issues	  of	   sexual	  orientation	  or	  gender	   identity,	  or	  by	   those	  who	  do	  not	  consider	  such	  measures	  to	  go	  far	  enough.	  	  Despite	  such	  criticism,	  there	  is	  scope	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  have	  become	  increasingly	  significant	  soft	  law	  documents	  and	  have	  been	  endorsed	  and	  cited	   by	   both	   governmental	   and	   intergovernmental	   bodies.10	  	   Within	   the	   UN	   itself,	   battles	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  eg	  Dudgeon	  v	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  (App	  no	  7525/76)	  (1982)	  4	  EHRR	  149	  8	  www.yogyakartaprinciples.org	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  9	  www.declarationofmontreal.org/declaration	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  10	  Ettelbrick,	  Paula	  &	  Zeran,	  Alia	  Trabucco	  ‘The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles	  on	  International	  Human	  rights	  Law	  Development’	  A	  Study	  of	  November	  2007-­‐June	  2010	  	  www.ypinaction.org	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regarding	   the	   meaning	   and	   place	   of	   sexuality	   have	   been	   particularly	   contentious,11	  but	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  trace	  an	  increasing	  awareness	  –	  albeit	  an	  awareness	  that	  is	  not	  always	  welcome	  –	  of	  tools	  and	  terminology	  for	  addressing	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  specific	  experiences	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  (most	  often	  addressed	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity’).	  As	   Saiz	   suggests,	   political	   concerns	   do	   colour	   the	   context	   in	   which	   this	   is	   a	   more	   coherent	  possibility	   –	   there	   has	   been	   a	  marked	   increase	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   in	   the	  reports	  of	  special	  rapporteurs12	  and	  other	  treaty	  monitoring	  bodies13	  for	  example.	   	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Saiz’s	  article	  (2004),	  these	  developments	  were	  matched	  by	  a	   lack	  of	  movement	  in	  other	  UN	  bodies	  –	  particularly	  those	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (now	  replaced	  by	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Council).	  	  Saiz	  suggests	  that	  as	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  were	  made	   up	   of	   government	   representatives,	   domestic	   political	   considerations	  might	   play	   a	  more	   significant	   role	   in	   decision-­‐making.14	  	   While	   this	   political	   tension	   remains	   extremely	  relevant,	   there	  have	  been	  some	  developments	   in	  even	   the	  most	   ‘political’	   of	  UN	  bodies.	   	  Most	  notably,	   in	  2008	  a	   letter	  condemning	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  endorsed	  by	  a	  small	  majority	  of	  member	  states.15	  	  	  More	  recently,	  in	  June	  2011,	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  (UNHRC)	  adopted	  its	  first	  ever	  resolution	  on	  Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  Gender	  Identity.16	  	  Mention	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  periodic	  reviews	  to	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Council	   has	   also	   become	   more	   normalised 17 	  (though	   again,	   not	  uncontroversial).	   	   A	   small	   number	   of	   LGBT	  organisations	   now	  hold	   consultative	   status	   at	   the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council.18	  	  Such	  developments	  remain	  controversial	  and	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	   great	   deal	   of	   slow	   and	   painstaking	   work,	   but	   they	   do	   suggest	   that	   an	   interlinkage	   is	  increasingly	  being	  made	  between	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  individuals	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  gender	  identity.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Department	  of	  Public	  information	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  General	  Assembly,	  Third	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  Doc.	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  (2009)	  12	  A	  number	  of	  special	  rapporteurs	  have	  made	  special	  reference	  to	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  (2010),	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  Ignacio	  Saiz,	  "Bracketing	  Sexuality:	  Human	  Rights	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  Sexual	  Orientation	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  and	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  in	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  from	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  Parker,	  Rosalind	  Petchesky,	  and	  Robert	  Sember	  (Sexuality	  Policy	  Watch).	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  Ibid.	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  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  Sixty-­‐third	  session,	  Agenda	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  dated	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  accessed	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Such	  developments	  are	  significant,	  not	  only	   in	   their	  own	   terms,	  but	  also	   for	   the	  wider	   impact	  that	  they	  may	  have	  –	  for	  their	  potential	  to	  open	  new	  channels	  of	  discussion	  and	  contribute	  to	  a	  wider	  framework	  of	  change.	  	  For	  example,	  Saiz	  celebrates	  the	  ‘new	  conceptual	  tools’	  created	  by	  the	  Toonen	  Judgment.19	  	  He	  argues	  that	  decisions	  like	  Toonen	  contribute	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  discourse	   and	   framework	   for	   action	   that	   makes	   it	   increasingly	   possible	   to	   address	   sexual	  orientation	   as	   a	   credible	   issue	   in	   human	   rights	   terms	   and	  within	   international	   human	   rights	  bodies.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  changes	  within	  the	  UN	  are	  matched,	  and	  sometimes	  preceded	  by	  developments	  in	  regional	  bodies	  and	  courts.	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  been	  the	  most	  prolific	  in	  this	  area,	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  cases	  heard,	  if	  not	  always	  successfully,	  in	  this	  arena.	  	  (The	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  perhaps	  a	  cause	  for	  analysis	  of	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  LGBT	  issues	  are	  being	  addressed.)	  	  Similarly,	  conditions	  for	  entry	  into	  the	  European	  Union	  have	  included	  stipulations	  on	   LGBT	   rights.20	  	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   LGBT	   human	   rights	   work	   occurs	   in	  Europe	  –	   for	  example,	  10	  days	  before	  the	  UNHRC	  resolution	  on	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity	  was	  adopted,	   the	  General	  Assembly	  of	   the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States	  adopted	  a	  resolution	   condemning	   ‘discrimination	   against	   persons	   by	   reason	   of	   their	   sexual	   orientation	  and	   gender	   identity.’21	  	   These	   transnational	   movements	   have	   also	   found	   some	   resonance	   in	  particular	  national	  cases	  and	  constitutions	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  states.22	  	  	  Two	   observations	   should	   be	  made	   here.	   	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   impact	   of	   such	  changes	  in	  the	  UN	  and	  in	  regional	  and	  national	  jurisdictions	  will	  have	  varying	  impact	  depending	  upon	   location.	   	   The	  use	  of	   both	  human	   rights	   terminology23	  and	  notions	  of	   sexual	   orientation	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  "Bracketing	  Sexuality:	  Human	  Rights	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  Sexual	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  ‘On	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  “give	  its	  consent	  to	  the	  accession	  of	  any	  country	  that,	  through	  its	  legislation	  or	  policies,	  violates	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  lesbians	  and	  gay	  men”.	  It	  went	  on	  to	  criticize	  Austria,	  Bulgaria,	  Cyprus,	  Estonia,	  Hungary,	  Lithuania	  and	  Romania	  for	  unfair	  treatment	  of	  lesbians	  and	  gay	  men.	  Discriminatory	  laws	  were	  repealed	  in	  Lithuania	  in	  September,	  2000,	  Estonia	  in	  September,	  2001,	  Romania	  in	  December	  2001,	  Cyprus	  in	  July,	  2002,	  and	  Hungary	  and	  Bulgaria	  in	  September,	  2002.’	  Sanders,	  "Sexual	  Orientation	  in	  International	  Law."	  21	  Organization	  of	  American	  States	  General	  Assembly,	  41st	  Regular	  Session,	  2011	  Proceedings	  Vol	  1	  AG/DEC.	  66	  –	  AG/DEC	  68	  (XLI-­‐O/11)	  AG/RES.2617	  –	  AG/RES.2689	  (XLI-­‐O/11)	  	  22	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  list	  all	  developments	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  here,	  but	  we	  might	  particularly	  note	  the	  2009	  Naz	  Foundation	  v.	  Delhi	  ([2009]	  4	  LRC	  838)	  case	  in	  the	  Delhi	  High	  Court	  in	  which	  read	  down	  Section	  377	  of	  the	  Indian	  Penal	  Code.	  	  	  Also	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  2010	  HJ	  (Iran)	  &	  HT	  (Cameroon)	  v	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Home	  Department	  ([2010]	  UKSC31)	  in	  which	  the	  grounds	  of	  ‘reasonable	  tolerance’	  and	  the	  ‘discretion	  test’	  were	  overturned	  as	  grounds	  for	  refusing	  asylum.	  	  These	  cases	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  totality	  of	  national	  developments	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality,	  but	  they	  are	  both	  interesting	  in	  that	  there	  was	  an	  international	  component	  to	  both	  judgments	  –	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Naz	  judgment,	  a	  campaigning	  pack	  produced	  by	  those	  favouring	  decriminalization	  drew	  explicit	  attention	  to	  the	  regionalisation	  of	  the	  criminalisation	  of	  homosexuality.	  	  The	  UK	  judgment	  both	  concerned	  questions	  of	  asylum	  and	  movement	  across	  borders	  and	  was	  attended	  and	  observed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  international	  organisations,	  including	  the	  UN.	  	  	  	  	  23	  Kelly	  Kollman	  and	  Matthew	  Waites,	  "The	  Global	  Politics	  of	  Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  Human	  Rights:	  An	  Introduction,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	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and	   gender	   identity24 	  will	   have	   more	   resonance	   in	   certain	   locations.	   	   Some	   groups	   and	  individuals	   are	   better	   positioned	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   legal	   changes,	   others	   are	   simply	   not	  constituted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  changes	  to	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  or	  instruments	  a	  relevant	  or	  significant	  factor	  in	  the	  place	  of	  sexuality	  in	  their	  lives.	  	  	  The	  second	  significant	  factor	  to	  consider	  here	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  backlash	  against	  these	  gains,	  which	  can	  be	  played	  out	  both	  within	  and	  without	  intergovernmental	  bodies.	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  a	  number	   of	   states	   have	   attempted	   to	   introduce	   or	   hardened	   legislation	   criminalising	  homosexuality.25	  	   	   While	   it	   would	   not	   necessarily	   be	   accurate	   to	   draw	   a	   direct	   causal	   link	  between	   recent	   gains	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   and	   national	   law	   without	  considering	   other,	   contributing	   factors,	   we	   might	   speculate	   that	   an	   increased	   visibility	   of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  human	  rights	  intervention	  may	  work	  to	  motivate	  both	  national	  legislators	  and	   powerful	   international	   coalitions	   seeking	   to	   oppose	   the	   possibility	   of	   increasing	   sexual	  rights	   in	   any	   sphere. 26 	  	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   all	   those	   who	   seek	   to	   (re)-­‐criminalise	  homosexuality,	   or	   to	   constitute	   sexuality	   as	   a	   cultural	   rather	   than	   a	   human	   rights	   issue	   are	  motivated	  by	  the	  same	  factors.	  	  Issues	  around	  sexuality	  are	  intensely	  political	  and	  multifaceted	  –	  what	  may	  be	  primarily	  a	  religious	  issue	  for	  one	  group	  or	  individual	  can	  be	  an	  issue	  of	  power,	  scapegoating	   or	   seeking	   public	   support	   in	   sympathetic	   arenas	   for	   others.	   	   Therefore,	  while	   a	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  has	  been	  done	  on	  micro-­‐politics	  within	  sexual	  rights	  movements	  (this	  thesis	  included),	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  such	  micro-­‐politics	  are	  not	  necessarily	  always	  limited	  to	  those	  in	  favour	  of	  sexual	  rights	  –	  in	  recent	  debates	  for	  example,	  the	  Vatican	  has	  distanced	  itself	  from	  any	   legislation	   or	   amendments	   that	   seek	   the	   criminalisation	   of	   homosexuality.27	  	   In	   essence,	  while	   their	   opposition	   to	   the	   normalisation,	   acceptance	   and	   legislation	   in	   favour	   of	  homosexuality	  may	  unite	  such	  groups;	  their	  responses	  and	  tactics	  may	  differ.	  	  Despite	  these	  differences,	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  an	  opposition	  to	  homosexuality	  can	  often	  be	  a	  unifying	  factor	  among	  hugely	  disparate	  groups.	  Such	  groups	  can	  have	  powerful	  political	  impact,	  in	   terms	   of	   removing	   or	   adjusting	  wording	   in	   treaties28,	   blocking	   statements	   or	   rejecting	   the	  recommendations	   of	   special	   rapporteurs 29 or	   simply	   by	   closing	   down	   or	   ensuring	   that	  discussions	   remain	   trapped	  within	   particular	   paradigms	   or	   binaries.	   	   As	   Kate	   Sheill	   suggests	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Waites,	  "Critique	  of	  ‘‘Sexual	  Orientation’’	  and	  ‘‘Gender	  Identity’’	  in	  Human	  Rights	  Discourse:	  Global	  Queer	  Politics	  Beyond	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles."	  25	  Most	  contentious	  has	  been	  the	  ‘Kill	  the	  gays’	  bill	  recently	  tabled	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  Legislature:	  http://www.ugandans4rights.org/issues.php	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  ‘IGLHRC	  shocked	  at	  possible	  passage	  of	  Ugandan	  Anti-­‐Homosexuality	  Bill’	  http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-­‐bin/iowa/article/pressroom/pressrelease/1384.html	  accessed	  6/12/2011	  26	  See	  Rothschild,	  Long,	  and	  Fried,	  Written	  Out:	  How	  Sexuality	  Is	  Used	  to	  Attack	  Women's	  Organising	  	  27UN	  General	  Assembly	  Sixty-­‐third	  session	  71st	  Plenary	  Meeting,	  UN	  Doc	  A/63/PV.71	  (2008)	  p2	  28	  Joke	  Swiebel,	  "Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Search	  for	  an	  International	  Strategy,"	  
Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  p25-­‐26	  29	  Richard	  Parker,	  Rosalind	  Petchesky,	  and	  Robert	  Sember,	  eds.,	  Sexpolitics:	  Reports	  from	  the	  Front	  Lines	  (Sexuality	  Policy	  Watch).	  p20,	  p325.	  p352	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however,	  what	   such	   coalitions	   have	   failed	   to	   do	   is	   to	   remove	   the	   issue	   of	   sexuality	   from	   the	  agenda	   entirely.30	  	   Sexuality	   remains	   an	   issue	   or	   a	   problematic	   in	   international	   human	   rights	  norms	  and	  institutions.	  	  I	  would	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  norms	  and	  institutions	  approach	   and	   constitute	   issues	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   is	   increasingly	   in	   a	   position	   of	  change	   and	   instability,	   which	   may	   further	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   increased	   visibility	   and	  contentiousness	  of	  the	  topic	  in	  international	  and	  national	  discourses.	  	  It	  should	  be	  highlighted	  that	   I	  am	  not	  pointing	  to	  this	   instability	  as	  a	   ‘new	  beginning’	  or	   ‘new’	  visibility	  of	  sexuality.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  constitute	  a	  foundational	  truth	  of	  sexuality,	  but	  to	  start	  in	  the	  middle	  and	   trace	   its	   flux	  and	  continual	   reformulation.	   	   	  As	  such,	   the	   law	  has	  not	  suddenly	  ‘discovered’	   sexuality;	   indeed,	   the	   ‘Alien	   Legacy’	   of	   colonial	   involvement	   in	   and	   regulation	   of	  sexuality	   has	   been	   well	   documented.31	  The	   ‘civilisational’	   aims	   of	   the	   colonial	   era	   brought	  different	   constitutions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   into	   focus	   and	   often	   resulted	   in	   either	   the	  simplification,	   essentialisation	   or	   reification	   of	   complex	   systems	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  norms32	  or	  in	  a	  brutal	  repression	  of	  what	  were	  viewed	  as	  backwards	  or	  uncivilised	  practices.	  We	  might	  suggest	  then	  that	  sexuality	  and	  power	  will	  always	  be	  interlaced	  in	  complex	  ways	  and	  that	   the	   mode	   in	   which	   sexuality	   is	   lived	   and	   configured	   will	   always	   be	   multifaceted	   and	  contested.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  makes	  two	  further	  points	  of	  particular	  significance.	  	  The	  first	   is	   the	   argument	   that	   sexuality	   exists	   as	   an	   ‘empty	   square’	   or	   ‘aleatory	   point’:	   it	   draws	   a	  number	   of	   resonating	   series	   or	   sequences	   together,	   but	   itself	   remains	   unfixed	   and	  moving.33	  	  	  Sexuality	   circulates	   among	   series	   distributing	   singularities	   and	   creating	   connection	   but	   not	  synthesis.	   	  Thus	   in	   this	  way,	  we	  can	   think	  of	   sexuality	  as	   the	  bringing	   together	  of	   related	  and	  diverse	  singularities	  of	  bodies,	  matter,	  forms	  and	  expressions	  yet	  the	  structure	  that	  these	  forms	  take	   is	   neither	   pre-­‐ordained	   nor	   permanent,	   it	   is	   instead	   a	   nomadic	   distribution.34	  What	   this	  means	  is	  that	  our	  understandings	  of	  sexuality	  must	  necessarily	  include	  a	  process	  of	  limitation	  or	  prioritisation	   of	   how	  we	   understand	   sexuality	   –	   our	   attempt	   to	   give	   shape	   and	   definition	   to	  what	  constitutes	  what	  we	  currently	  understand	  to	  be	  ‘sexuality’	  must	  be	  limited,	  we	  must	  select	  the	  arena	  within	  which	  we	  work.	   	  However,	  this	  process	  of	  selection	  must	  take	  place	  against	  a	  background	  understanding	  of	  the	  constantly	  unfinished	  and	  open	  nature	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  with	   which	   we	   are	   dealing:	   in	   short,	   there	   will	   always	   be	   an	   aspect	   of	   sexuality	   that	   our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Kate	  Sheill,	  "Human	  Rights,	  Sexual	  Orientation,	  and	  Gender	  Identity	  at	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,"	  J	  Human	  Rights	  
Practice	  	  (2009).	  31	  Alok	  Gupta,	  "This	  Alien	  Legacy:	  The	  Origins	  of	  “Sodomy”	  Laws	  in	  British	  Colonialism,"	  ed.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Human	  	  Rights	  Watch,	  2008).	  32	  Patricia	  Uberoi,	  ed.	  Social	  Reform,	  Sexuality	  and	  the	  State	  (New	  Dehli:	  Sage,1996).	  Uma	  Narayan,	  Dislocating	  
Cultures:	  Identities,	  Traditions	  and	  Third	  World	  Feminism	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997).	  p67	  33	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sense,	  ed.	  Constantin	  V.	  Boundas,	  trans.	  M.	  Lester	  and	  C.	  Stivale	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  p199	  34	  Ibid.	  p87	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definitions	  cannot	  capture.	  This	  openness	  or	  unfinished	  aspect	  demands	  that	  while	  we	  may	  pay	  attention	   to	  or	   single	  out	  particular	   aspects	  of	   sexuality	   for	   analysis	   (in	   this	   case	   for	   example	  sexuality	   and	   human	   rights	   in	   international	   law)	   this	   analysis	   must	   take	   place	   against	   a	  background	  that	  acknowledges	  that	  which	  is	  elided	  or	  pushed	  into	  the	  background	  by	  the	  way	  that	  our	  analysis	  is	  framed.	  The	  second	  point	   to	  consider	  here	  relates	   to	  my	  emphasis	  on	  viewing	  work	   in	  and	  analysis	  of	  sexuality	   as	   starting	   from	   the	   middle	   rather	   than	   constituting	   itself	   as	   part	   of	   some	   kind	   of	  teleological	  development.	  	  Binnie	  has	  pointed	  to	  the	  danger	  of	  configuring	  gay	  liberation	  as	  the	  pinnacle	   of	   sexual	   development	   and	   the	   point	   towards	   which	   all	   campaigning	   should	   be	  moving.35	  	  I	  am	  wary	  of	  constituting	  the	  emergence	  of	  sexual	  rights	  as	  a	  ‘new’	  and	  thus	  ‘better’	  or	  more	  civilised	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  sexuality,	  thereby	  reinforcing	  colonial	  norms	  of	  Western	  civilisation	  that	  must	  be	  exported	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  developments	  relating	   to	   sexual	   rights	   are	  not	   to	  be	  welcomed;	  what	   is	  needed	   is	   instead	  a	   shift	   in	  how	  we	  approach	   these	   changes	   –	   viewing	   them	   as	   points	   of	   tension	   through	   which	   we	   can	   trace	  rhizomatic	   expansion	   and	   multipliclitous	   flows	   rather	   than	   an	   ‘arborescent’	   development	  towards	  a	  particular	  always	  already	  established	  end.	  	  	  
Toonen	  vs.	  Australia	  The	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   two	   key	   instances	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   rights	   and	  sexuality	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  then	  attempt	  to	  use	  these	  instances	  to	  advance	  some	  insights	  into	  both	  the	  opportunities	  and	  problems	  that	  form	  part	  of	  the	  complex	  multiplicity	  that	  is	  human	  rights	  and	   sexuality.	   	   The	   first	   area	   of	   analysis	   concerns	   the	   case	   of	   Toonen	   vs.	   Australia	   (1994)	   in	  which	   the	   UN	   Human	   Rights	   Committee	   held	   that	   under	   Article	   17	   of	   the	   ICCPR,	   current	  Tasmanian	   law	  breached	   the	  privacy	  rights	  of	   the	  Tasmanian	  gay	  rights	  campaigner,	  Nicholas	  Toonen.36	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  Toonen	  decision	  was	  an	  extremely	  significant	  moment	  in	  relation	   to	   the	   position	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   sexual	   orientation	   in	   international	   arenas.	   	   Saiz	  suggests	  that	  it	  has	  become	  ‘an	  authoritative	  reference	  for	  a	  series	  of	  successful	  legal	  challenges	  to	  discriminatory	  criminal	  laws	  around	  the	  world’37	  Referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  first	  juridical	  recognition	  of	  gay	  rights	  on	  a	  universal	  level’38,	  the	  Toonen	  judgment	  offered	  clear	  opportunities	  for	  doing	  further	   work	   in	   human	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   at	   the	   UN	   and	   beyond.	   	   	   While	   sexuality	   had	  previously	  only	  been	  on	   the	  UN	  agenda	  as	   something	   to	  be	   circumscribed	  or	   regulated	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  J	  Binnie,	  The	  Globalization	  of	  Sexuality	  (London:	  Sage,	  2004).	  36	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee,	  Toonen	  V.	  Australia,	  Communication	  No.	  488/1992	  UN	  Doc	  CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992	  (1994)	  37	  Saiz,	  "Bracketing	  Sexuality:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	  -­‐	  a	  Decade	  of	  Development	  and	  Denial	  at	  the	  UN."	  p459	  38	  Joseph	  1994	  cited	  in	  Ibid.	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interest	   of	   public	   health,	   order	   or	   morality,	   with	   Toonen,	   it	   was	   ‘for	   the	   first	   time	   implicitly	  recognized	  as	  a	   fundamental	   and	  positive	  aspect	  of	  human	  development.’39	  	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	  that	  there	  have	  been	  no	  controversies	  or	  setbacks	  since	  1994,	  but	  as	  Saiz	  sketches	  out,	  there	  is	  now	   considerable	   scope	   to	   address	   issues	   of	   sexuality	   through	   certain	   (but	   not	   all)	   UN	  institutions.	   	   He	   concludes	   that	   ‘10	   years	   on	   from	   Toonen,	   the	   momentum	   at	   the	   UN	   for	  addressing	   issues	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   within	   a	   broader	   framework	   of	   sexual	   rights	   is	  unstoppable.’40	  	  For	  Saiz,	  Toonen	  marks	  a	  turning	  point	  and	  a	  movement	  away	  from	  a	  particular	  structure	  of	  silencing	  or	  containment	  of	  sexual	  issues	  within	  the	  UN	  and	  despite	  setbacks,	  this	  development	  remains	  positive.	  Interestingly,	  while	  Saiz’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Toonen	  decision	  at	  the	  UN	  is	  that	  it	  was	  generally	  positive,	  Henderson	  suggests	  that	  in	  Tasmania,	  the	  judgment	  became	  something	  of	  a	  double-­‐edged	   sword.	   	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   it	   resulted	   in	   legal	   changes,	   but	   for	   some,	   the	  changes	   were	   an	   outside	   imposition	   on	   ‘authentically	   Tasmanian	   values’,	   a	   challenge	   to	  Tasmanian	   sovereignty	   from	   both	   federal	   and	   international	   authorities.	   	   This	   feeling	   was	  perhaps	  not	  helped	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  although	  Toonen	  referred	  to	  a	  Tasmanian	  law	  and	  the	  right	  to	  privacy	  or	  otherwise	  of	  Tasmanian	  citizens,	  it	  was	  the	  Australian	  state	  that	  defended	  the	  case	  –	  and	  it	  did	  so	  without	  any	  particular	  conviction	  at	  a	  UN	  body	  formed	  of	  members	  whose	  own	  states	  did	  not	  necessarily	  grant	  any	  more	  recognition	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  than	  Tasmania.	  	  Such	  dynamics	  were	  reinforced	  by	  the	  particular	  relationship	  between	  Tasmania	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Australian	  state	  –	  a	  history	  in	  which	  the	  sense	  that	   ‘Tasmania	  is	  not	  Australia’	  or	  perhaps	  that	  Tasmania	  had	  a	  cultural	  identity	  separate	  from	  that	  of	  mainland	  Australia,	  persists	  and	  inheres.	  	  The	  position	  of	  Tasmania	  as	   culturally	   separate	  or	  as	  both	  an	   insider	  and	  an	  outsider	   creates	  particular	  tensions	  that	  were	  only	  reinforced	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  ability	  to	  make	  direct	  representation	  to	   the	   UN.	   	   As	   such,	   once	   the	   judgment	   was	   handed	   down,	   it	   could	   easily	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	  invasive	  imposition	  rather	  than	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  integral	  members	  of	  Tasmanian	  society.	   	   Thus	   the	   Toonen	   victory	  may	   have	   achieved	   legal	   reform,	   but	   it	   did	   not	   necessarily	  foster	  wide	  ranging	  social	  change.	  	  In	  essence,	  same	  sex	  activity	  may	  no	  longer	  have	  been	  illegal	  in	  private,	  but	  it	  was	  certainly	  not	  always	  welcomed	  or	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  equal	  or	  valued	  way	  of	   living	  one’s	   life:	   public	   equality	  did	  not	   correlate	  with	  private	   tolerance.41	  	  The	   recourse	   to	  legal	  methods	   and	   rights	   eventually	   resulted	   in	   decriminalisation,	   but	   did	   nothing	   to	   further	  (and	  may	  even	  have	  hindered)	  the	  institution	  of,	  for	  example,	  safer	  sex	  education,	  the	  inclusion	  of	   gay	   sexuality	   in	   public	   school	   sex	   education	   classes,	   or	  more	   generally	   an	   acceptance	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Ibid.p459	  40	  Ibid.	  p470	  41	  Emma	  M.	  Henderson,	  "'I'd	  Rather	  Be	  an	  Outlaw':	  Identity,	  Activism,	  and	  Decriminalization	  in	  Tasmania,"	  in	  
Sexuality	  in	  the	  Legal	  Arena,	  ed.	  Carl	  Stychin	  and	  Didi	  Herman	  (London:	  Athlone,	  2000).	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legitimate	   claim	   to	   belonging	   and	   visibility	   on	   the	   part	   of	   gay	   Tasmanians.42 	  	   Thus	   the	  Tasmanian	  example	  suggests	  that	  the	  use	  of	  legal	  channels	  can	  have	  contradictory	  outcomes.	  	  As	  Henderson	  notes,	  the	  legislation	  eventually	  put	  in	  place	  ‘was	  equal	  to	  the	  best	  yet	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  Australia’43,	   but	   the	   relationship	   between	   law,	   politics	   and	   cultural/social	   norms	   is	   one	   of	  resonance	   rather	   than	   reflection	   and	   as	   such,	   decriminalisation	   did	   not	   create	   an	   immediate	  space	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  far	  reaching	  social	  change	  and	  indeed,	  may	  have	  created	  conditions	  in	  which	  far	  reaching	  changes	  were	  more	  difficult	  to	  institute.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  fact	  that	  Toonen’s	  claim	  was	  upheld	  by	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  suggests	  that	  he	   had	   a	   legitimate	   grievance	   to	   be	   addressed,	   but	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   event	   ultimately	  played	  out	  led	  to	  a	  (re)positioning	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  questions	  as	  un-­‐Tasmanian,	  inauthentic	  and	  the	  concern	  of	  external	  legal	  bodies.	   	  This	  positioning	  illustrates	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  law	  and	  legal	  bodies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  cultural	  or	  social	  formations.	  	  Sexuality	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  this	   case	   occupies	   a	   complex	   position	   as	   it	   speaks	   to	   and	   is	   addressed	   by	   multiple	   different	  discourses	   and	   structures	   –	   including	   law,	   social	   and	   cultural	   formulations,	   private	   desires,	  family	   structures	   –	   sexuality	   brings	   all	   of	   these	   series	   together	   in	   a	   complex	   assemblage.	  	  Changes	  to	  one	  part	  of	  this	  assemblage	  -­‐	  for	  example	  legal	  changes	  -­‐	  will	  resonate	  within	  other	  parts	   –	   in	   this	   case,	   social	   and	   cultural	   mores	   –	   however	   this	   resonance	   is	   not	   necessarily	  predictable,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  more	  simply,	  social	  and	  cultural	  factors	  will	  be	  impacted	  upon	  by	  legal	  changes,	  but	   these	  social	  and	  cultural	   factors	  will	  not	  directly	  mirror	  what	   is	  occurring	   in	   the	  legal	   sphere.	   	   A	   re-­‐positioning	   or	   reiteration	   of	   Tasmanian	   norms	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	  occurred	  because	  of,	  or	   in	  relation	  to,	  a	  specific	   legal	   judgment,	  but	   this	  normative	  reiteration	  resonated	  with,	  or	  responded	  to	  rather	  than	  reflected,	  the	  judgment	  that	  was	  handed	  down.	  This	  hardening	  of	  insider/outsider,	  belonging/non-­‐belonging,	  authentic/foreign	  binaries	  is	  not	  unique	   to	   the	   Toonen	   Judgment.	   	   Other	   cases	   have	   reflected	   this	   sketching	   out	   of	   binaries	   of	  belonging/non-­‐belonging	   as	   part	   of	   arguments	   around	   sexual	   rights.	   	   In	   the	   recent	   Naz	  Judgment	   in	   the	   Delhi	   High	   Court,	   for	   example,	   much	   was	   made	   of	   both	   the	   existence	   of	   an	  ‘authentic’	   Indian	   homosexuality	   and	   the	   ‘modernity’	   of	   those	   nations	   that	   had	   already	  decriminalised	   homosexuality	   (and	   therefore	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   belonging	   to	   this	   group	  rather	   than	   the	   more	   ‘backward’	   nations	   who	   maintained	   criminal	   punishments	   for	  homosexuality).44	  	   In	   his	   dissenting	   opinion	   in	   the	   Dudgeon	   Judgment,	   Judge	   Zekia	   draws	   a	  similar	  binary	  noting	  that	  as	  a	  Cypriot	  judge,	  he	  understood	  the	  outcry	  that	  would	  result	  from	  legal	   change	   to	   the	  status	  of	  homosexuals	   in	   Ireland	  as	   ‘[b]oth	  countries	  are	   religious-­‐minded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.	  p48	  43	  Ibid.	  	  44	  Rahul	  Rao,	  Third	  World	  Protest	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010).	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and	  adhere	  to	  moral	  standards	  which	  are	  centuries	  old.’45	  	  Despite	  myriad	  differences	  between	  Cyprus	  and	  Northern	  Ireland,	  Zekia’s	  opinion	  draws	  on	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  totalising	  cultural	  morality	  (‘the	  protection	  of	  morals	  held	  in	  high	  esteem	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  people’),	  implicitly	  constituting	  the	  homosexual	  as	  both	  the	  unnatural	  other	  and	  the	  outsider	  to	  ‘normal’	  society.	  	  These	  notions	  of	   coherent	  moral	   standards	  of	  a	  nation	   (or	   indeed	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   integrity	  of	  a	  nation	   that	  might	   come	   from	   those	  who	   deviate	   from	   these	   posited	  moral	   standards)	   can	   become	   highly	  politicised.	   	   Rothschild	   has	   noted,	   for	   example,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   accusations	   of	   ‘abnormal’	  sexuality	  can	  be	  used	  to	  constitute	  an	  argument	  as	  ‘irrelevant’	  to	  a	  particular	  culture,	  or	  to	  shut	  down	   a	   particular	   line	   of	   activism	   or	   campaigning.	   	   As	   such,	   an	   accusation	   of	   ‘lesbianism’	  becomes	  a	  means	  of	  shutting	  down	  discussion	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  leaving	  campaigners	  trapped	  between	  denials	  of	  lesbian	  sexuality	  that	  both	  reinforce	  a	  dangerous	  insider/outsider	  dynamic	  and	  position	   lesbian	   sexuality	   as	   something	   to	  be	   condemned,	   and	  attempting	   to	  defend	  both	  their	   rights	   demands	   and	   suggest	   that	   lesbian	   sexuality	   is	   positive	   thing,	   thus	   potentially	  reinforcing	   the	   blurring	   of	   gender,	   sexuality,	   gender	   based	   rights	   and	   externality.46	  	   	   In	   such	  discourses,	   sexuality	   is	   a	   powerful	   tool	   for	   denoting	   insider	   and	   outsider,	   acceptable	   and	  unacceptable.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  many	  instances,	  we	  can	  read	  sexuality	  or	  at	  least	  issues	  that	  surround	  sexuality	  not	  just	  as	  questions	  of	  rights	  or	  law,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  line	  by	  which	  various	  other	  questions	  of	  identity	  and	  belonging	  are	  marked	  out,	  whether	  this	  be	  belonging	  to	  a	  nation,	  or	  to	  a	  mode	  of	  ‘civilisation’	  or	  ‘morality’.	   	   This	   becomes	   hugely	   problematic,	   as	   it	   very	   quickly	   becomes	   the	   case	   that	   any	  discussion	  of	  sexuality	  is	  rarely	  just	  about	  sexuality,	  but	  about	  myriad	  other	  factors	  which	  must	  be	  both	  acknowledged	  but	  also	  limited	  and	  selected	  from	  in	  order	  to	  make	  any	  kind	  of	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	   possible.	   	   Sexuality	   can	   rarely	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   simple	   discussion	   of	   bodies	   or	   drives	  (although	   these	  aspects	  of	   sexuality	   should	  not	  be	   ignored);	   it	  must	  be	   instead	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  an	  entire	  matrix	  of	  social,	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  relational	   forces,	  complicated	  further	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘sexuality’	  or	  indeed	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  not	  neutral	  concepts,	  but	  particular	  products	   of	   time	   and	   place.	   	   Indeed	   the	   question	   of	   ‘where	   one	   starts	   from’	   is	   perhaps	   as	  important	  as	  how	  one	  eventually	  addresses	  the	  issues	  at	  hand.	  	  	  It	   is	   not	   surprising	   therefore,	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   tension	   and	   negotiation	   in	   any	  discussion	  of	  sexual	  rights.	   	  A	   focus	  on	  sexuality	  opens	  up	  particular	  norms	  and	  discourses	   to	  destabilisation	  or	  deterritorialisation	  –	  its	  position	  as	  both	  embedded	  in,	  but	  moving	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  series	  suggests	  that,	  at	  present	  at	  least,	  sexuality	  or	  sexual	  rights	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  tool	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for	  understanding	  and	  unpicking	  various	  established	  assemblages.	   	  Sexuality	  does	  not	  provide	  answers,	  but	  can	  force	  further	  questions	  about	  established	  roles	  and	  organisations.	  	  	  
Sexual	  Orientation	  and	  Gender	  Identity	  Rights	  at	  the	  UN	  The	   second	   area	   of	   analysis	   concerns	   the	   engagement	   of	   a	   number	   of	   the	  more	   ‘political’	   UN	  bodies	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Of	  particular	  interest	  here	  is	  the	  2008	  letter	  to	  the	   General	   Assembly	   condemning	   discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and	  gender	  identity.	  	  However,	  this	  letter	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  in	  isolation	  but	  must	  instead	  be	  situated	  in	  relation	   to	  other	  recent	  developments	  concerning	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	   identity	   in	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Council.	   	   It	  should	  be	  noted	   at	   the	   outset	   that	   the	   positioning	   of	   such	   issues	   in	   the	   UN	   is	   sometimes	   tenuous,	  constantly	   contested	   and	   occasionally	   surprising.	   	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   a	   useful	   forum	   for	   further	  addressing	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  above.	  	  	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  In	   2003,	   somewhat	   unexpectedly,	   Brazil	   proposed	   a	   resolution	   to	   the	   Commission	   on	  Human	  Rights	  entitled	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation,	  modelled	  on	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	   Rights.	   	   Girand	   suggests	   that	   for	   Brazil,	   this	   resolution	  might	   have	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	  natural	   follow	   up	   to	   its	   recent	   positions	   on	   sexuality	   at	   the	   global	   level.47	  	   It	   might	   also	   be	  viewed	   as	   the	   progression	   of	   the	   kind	   of	   developments	   outlined	   by	   Saiz.	   	   However,	   to	   other	  governments	   and	   activists	   the	   move	   came	   as	   a	   surprise	   –	   perhaps	   particularly	   given	   the	  controversy	  of	   the	  subject	  matter	  and	   the	  significance	  of	  presenting	   the	   issue	   to	  a	  vote	   in	   the	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  	  There	  had	  been	  no	  consultations	  on	  the	  draft	  resolution,	  either	  with	  interest	  groups	  or	  with	  other	  governments	  before	  it	  was	  presented.	  	  	  The	   resolution	   proved	   highly	   divisive	   and	   controversial,	   Girand	   notes	   that	   ‘[a]ction	   on	   the	  resolution	  was	  confined	  to	  aggressive	  procedural	  manoeuvring,	  with	  little	  substantive	  debate.’48	  There	  was	  fierce	  opposition	  from	  states	  such	  as	  Pakistan	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  Holy	  See:	  the	  delegate	  from	  Pakistan	  described	  the	  resolution	  as	  an	  ‘insult	  to	  all	  the	  1.2	  billion	  Muslims	   in	   the	  world’	   in	  a	  memo	  addressed	   to	  other	  governments.49	  	   	  The	  view	  was	   taken	  by	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some	   African	   diplomats	   that	   homosexuality	  was	   ‘something	   that	   came	  with	   the	  white	  man’50	  rather	  than	  a	  concern	  for	  their	  countries.	  	  The	  resolution	  was	  eventually	  postponed	  until	  2004.	  	  While	   this	  postponement	  gave	  LGBT	  activists	   time	  to	  prepare	  and	  to	  attempt	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  broad-­‐based	  coalition	  in	  support	  of	  the	  resolution,51	  in	  the	  intervening	  year,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  against	  the	  resolution	  also	  took	  place,	  including	  huge	  amounts	  of	  pressure	  apparently	  placed	  on	  Brazil	  by	  the	  Holy	  See	  through	  domestic	  channels	  and	  by	  OIC	  states	  who	  threatened	  to	  boycott	  a	  trade	  summit	  Brazil	  was	  due	  to	  host	  later	  that	  year.52	  	  Brazil	  eventually	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  not	  proceed	  with	  the	  resolution	  and	  as	  no	  country	  could	  be	  found	  to	  step	  in	  as	  sponsor,	  by	  2005	  the	  resolution	  had	  lapsed.	  	  	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  resolution	  is	  both	  a	  disappointment	  and	  an	  indication	  of	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  faced	  by	  activists	  working	  in	  this	  area.	  	  There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  overt	  pressure	  was	  mobilised	  in	  order	   to	  block	  or	  change	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  resolution	  by	   its	  opponents,	  and	   these	  shows	  of	  hard	  power	  were	  doubtless	  effective.	   	  However,	   this	  was	  not	   the	  only	  problem	  faced	  by	  LGBT	  groups	   and	   allies.	   	   Of	   further	   contention,	   for	   example,	   was	   the	   question	   of	   tactics:	   Brazil	  proposed	  an	  ambitious	  resolution	  based	  on	  notions	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  rights,	  modelled	  on	   the	   UDHR.	   	   This	   is	   not	   the	   first	   instance	   of	   using	   already	   established	   rights	   discourses	   to	  claim	  sexual	  orientation	  rights53,	  but	  it	  does	  raise	  various	  issues.	  	  Most	  significant	  is	  whether	  a	  broad	   based	   resolution	  was	   the	   correct	   approach	   to	   take	   –	  whether	  more	   progress	   could	   be	  made	   by	   working	   with	   Special	   Rapporteurs	   on	   issues	   such	   as	   arbitrary	   executions	   or	   sexual	  violence,	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  to	  the	  Commission	  in	  ‘a	  more	  organic	  way.’54	  	  Additionally,	   the	  broad	  and	  undefined	  nature	  of	   ‘sexual	  orientation’	  caused	  a	  number	  of	  other	  issues.	   	   Waites	   has	   highlighted	   the	   way	   in	   which	   ‘sexual	   orientation’	   is	   often	   taken	   to	   be	  axiomatic	  in	  questions	  of	  sexuality.55	  	  However,	  a	  lack	  of	  interrogation	  of	  the	  terms	  used	  led	  to	  a	  degree	   of	   disconnect	   and	   confusion	   –	   both	   on	   the	   part	   of	   governments	   who	   viewed	  homosexuality	  as	  a	  Western	  issue,	  and	  on	  the	  part	  of	  some	  activists	  from	  the	  global	  South,	   for	  whom	   questions	   of	   identity	   rather	   than	   conduct	   had	   limited	   relevance.56	  	   These	   questions	   of	  identity	  and	  terminology	  were	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  broad	  based	  coalition	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  resolution	  had	  diverse	  aims	  and	  this	   led	  to	  different	  stances	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  issues	  of	  sexual	  health	  in	  resolutions	  on	  the	  right	  to	  health,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  questions	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  Identity,"	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Feminism	  14	  (2002).	  p153,	  p156	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visibility	   at	   the	  Commission	  or	   the	   inclusion	  of	   sexuality	   in	   various	   other	   resolutions.	   	   Girard	  concludes	   that	   the	   ‘focus	  on	  getting	   the	  Brazil	   resolution	   through	  precluded	  an	  overall	  debate	  amongst	   activists	   about	   whether	   other	   language	   or	   approaches	   would	   be	   more	   useful.’57	  	  	  Furthermore,	   this	   increased	   visibility	   and	   volatility	   of	   issues	   of	   sexuality,	   combined	  with	   the	  sometimes	   confused	   strategy,	   left	   campaigners	   in	   a	   vulnerable	   position	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  possibility	  of	  backlash:	   some	  campaigners	  have	  reported	   that	   references	   to	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  sexual	  rights	  in	  other	  resolutions	  became	  even	  harder	  to	  sustain	  in	  2005.58	  	  We	  might	  suggest	  that	   the	   increased	  visibility	  of	   sexuality	   initiated	  by	   the	  resolution	  and	   the	  controversy	   that	   it	  attracted	   facilitated	   an	   increased	   attentiveness	   to	   the	   mode	   and	   meaning	   of	   inclusions	   of	  sexuality	   in	   other	   work.	   	   The	   controversy	   of	   the	   resolution	   may	   have	   begun	   to	   resonate	  elsewhere	  as	  a	  result.	  	  	  	  While	  questions	  of	  terminology	  and	  identity	  highlight	  tactical	  and	  organisational	  questions	  for	  those	  working	  towards	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  resolution,	  they	  must	  also	  be	  read	  in	  the	   context	   of	   the	   earlier	   discussion	   of	   cultural	  mores	   and	   insider/outsider	   dualisms.	   	   In	   the	  language	   of	   both	   the	   Pakistani	   and	   African	   diplomats,	   the	   focus	   on	   sexual	   orientation	  represented	   something	   external	   to	   their	   own	   cultural	   and	   religious	   norms.	   	   The	   Pakistani	  statement	  in	  particular	  positions	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  not	  only	  external,	  but	  also	  threatening	  or	  insulting	  to	  Islam.	  	  This	  dynamic	  colours	  various	  discussions	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  at	  the	  UN	  as	  deliberations	   around	   sexuality	   tend	   to	   fall	   into	  particular	   regional	   divisions.	   	  While	  we	  might	  read	  some	  of	  the	  language	  used	  here	  as	  political	  rhetoric,	  a	  perhaps	  more	  interesting	  question	  to	  ask	  might	  concern	  the	  issue	  of	  why	  sexuality	  seems	  to	  so	  often	  divide	  the	  opinions	  of	  member	  states	  along	  a	  particular	  binary	  opposition.	  	  Or	  more	  simply	  –	  what	  power	  dynamics	  are	  at	  play	  that	  mean	   that	  sexuality	   is	  constituted	   in	   this	  way?	   	  At	   issue	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  questions	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  very	  rarely	  just	  about	  issues	  of	  sexual	  behaviour,	  but	  also	  concern	  deeper	  questions	  of	  social	  organisation	  and	  the	  power	  to	  control	  and	   impact	  upon	  the	  mode,	   truth	  or	  morality	  of	  this	  orientation.	   	  Dismissing	  the	  Pakistani	  ambassador’s	  vehement	  response	  to	  the	  Brazilian	   resolution	   as	   homophobia	  misses	   the	   opportunity	   to	   unpick	  what	   circumstances,	   or	  which	  operations	  of	  power	  led	  to	  the	  remarks	  being	  made	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  This	   is	   perhaps	   why	   the	   question	   of	   terminology	   and	   positionality	   is	   such	   a	   fraught	   issue.	  	  Girand	  notes	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  delegates	  were	  surprised	  by	  the	  ferocity	  of	  the	  backlash	  against	  their	  proposed	  resolution	  and	  that	  for	  Brazil,	  the	  resolution	  was	  simply	  a	  continuation	  of	  earlier	  work	   –	   it	   represented	   a	   legitimate	   and	   logical	   progression.59	  	   For	   others,	   differently	  placed	   in	  relation	  to	  sexuality,	  this	  progression	  was	  not	  so	  clear.	  	  There	  is	  a	  difference,	  we	  could	  suggest,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Girard,	  "United	  Nations:	  Negotiating	  Sexual	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	  at	  the	  UN."	  p349	  58	  Ibid.	  p351	  59	  Girard,	  "United	  Nations:	  Negotiating	  Sexual	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	  at	  the	  UN."	  p342-­‐344	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between	   making	   connections	   between	   acts	   which	   are	   already	   established	   as	   human	   rights	  violations	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  such	  violations	  impact	  specifically	  in	  terms	  of	  sexuality,	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity	  and	  an	  outright	  recognition	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  something	  that	   activates	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   rights	   or	   forms	   a	   coherent	   ground	   for	   equality	   based	   rights	  claims	  (or	  perhaps	  even	  a	  linkage	  between	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  sexual	  subjectivity).	   	  This	  is	  neither	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  delegates,	  nor	  a	  denial	  that	  homophobia	  exists	  in	  many	  of	  the	  states	   that	   opposed	   the	   resolution	   (and	   many	   of	   those	   who	   supported	   it).	   	   Instead	   it	   is	   an	  attempt	   to	   highlight	   the	   way	   in	   which	   ‘sexual	   orientation’	   is	   so	   often	   positioned	   next	   to	  ‘otherness’	  or	  ‘outside’,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  consistently	  link	  the	  two.	  	  I	  would	  tentatively	  suggest	  that	  discussions	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  rarely	  simply	  discussions	  of	  sexual	  otherness,	  but	  of	  a	  myriad	   of	   other	   factors	   related	   to	   power	   and	   ‘cultural	   identity’.	   	   Thus	   to	   attempt	   to	   read	   the	  dynamics	  of	  such	  discussions	  is	  to	  engage	  with	  various	  other	  issues	  at	  play	  but	  often	  unsaid.	  	  
UN	  General	  Assembly	  	  While	   the	  Brazilian	  resolution	  was	  ultimately	  unsuccessful,	   it	  did	  highlight	  many	  of	   the	   issues	  that	  activists	  and	  governments	  were	  facing	  in	  relation	  to	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  at	  the	  UN.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  sexuality	  is	  now	  more	  visible	  within	  international	  governmental	  bodies,	   including	  the	  UN,	  creates	   new	   challenges	   and	   issues,	   but	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   step	   that	   should	   be	   undone.	   	   The	  lapsing	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  resolution	  in	  2005	  was	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  process	  of	  confronting	  issues	  of	   the	   violation	   of	   rights	   in	   relation	   to	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   Again,	   somewhat	   unexpectedly,	   in	  2008,	   a	   letter	  was	   presented	   to	   the	   UN	  General	   Assembly	   condemning	   discrimination	   on	   the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation.	  	  Read	  by	  Argentina	  -­‐	  although	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  initial	  support	  and	  organising	  had	  originated	  with	  France60	  -­‐	  the	  statement	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  small	  majority	  of	  66	  states;	   it	   reaffirmed	   ‘the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐discrimination,	   which	   requires	   that	   human	   rights	  apply	   equally	   to	   every	   human	   being	   regardless	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   or	   gender	   identity’	   and	  expressed	  concern	  with	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  based	  on	  sexual	  orientation.61	  	  The	  statement	  was	  controversial,	  and	  was	  challenged	  by	  57	  states	  who	  signed	  an	  opposing	   statement,	   read	   by	   Syria,	   referring	   to	   the	   ‘ominous	   usage’	   of	   notions	   of	   sexual	  behaviour	   and	   orientation	   that	   lacked	   ‘legal	   foundation	   in	   any	   international	   human	   rights	  instrument.’62	  	   	   Debate	   and	   comments	   in	   support	   of	   Syria’s	   statement	   seemed	   to	   indicate	   a	  concern	   that	   sexual	   orientation	  was	   not	   sufficient	   grounds	   for	  membership	   of	   a	   ‘minority’	   or	  persecuted	  group,	  and	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  sexual	  orientation	  would	  either	  place	  too	  much	  work	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Sheill,	  "Human	  Rights,	  Sexual	  Orientation,	  and	  Gender	  Identity	  at	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly."	  p1-­‐2	  61	  UN	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  session,	  Agenda	  item	  64(b).	  Letter	  dated	  18	  Dec	  2008	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  Netherlands	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  United	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  President	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an	   already	   burdened	  UNGA	   agenda,	   create	   too	   divisive	   an	   approach	   to	   rights,	   or	   draw	   rights	  debates	  in	  unnecessary	  directions.	  	  	  On	   first	   examination,	   the	   opposing	   letter	   and	   statements	   seem	   to	  make	   for	   slightly	   awkward	  reading.	  	  One	  might	  question,	  for	  example,	  the	  logic	  of	  a	  statement	  such	  as:	  ‘human	  rights	  should	  be	  a	  unifying,	  rather	  than	  a	  divisive,	   factor	   in	   international	  relations.	  Such	  an	  approach	  means	  that	  no	  issue	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  confrontation	  or	  division	  among	  United	  Nations	  Member	  States	  should	  be	   included	  in	  the	  agenda’63	  	  –	  presumably	   if	  no	  confrontation	  between	  member	  states	  can	  be	  permitted	  to	  occur,	  then	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  human	  rights	  concerns	  should	  also	  be	  struck	  from	  the	  consideration	  of	  UN	  bodies,	  and	  only	  the	  most	  neutral	  and	  inoffensive	  matters	   could	   ever	   be	   addressed.	   	   One	   might	   add	   that	   such	   an	   approach	   would	   reduce	  confrontation,	   but	   would	   effectively	   remove	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   UN	   to	   say	   anything	   at	   all	   of	  relevance.	  	  	  This	   somewhat	   facetious	  observation	  aside	  however,	   in	   the	   statement	  made	  by	  Syria,	   and	   the	  supporting	  comments	  made	  by	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  and	  Belarus,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  statement	  made	   by	   the	   Holy	   See,	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   thematic	   concern	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   recognition	   of	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  gender	  identity	  in	  international	  law	  –	  the	  lack	  of	  clear	  foundations	  for	  the	  identities	  or	  subjectivities	  upon	  which	  rights	  claims	  are	  being	  made.	  This	  appears	  then,	  to	  be	  a	  question	  of	   legitimacy	  in	  relation	  to	  practices	  of	  positionality,	  or	  perhaps	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  claim	   that	   sexual	   orientation	   can	   be	   a	   visible	   and	   nameable	   subjectivity	   from	   which	   rights	  language	  can	  be	  deployed.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  affirmation	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  is	  made	  at	  the	  same	  time	   as	   a	   refusal	   to	   recognise	   the	   possibility	   of	   discrimination	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   sexual	  orientation.	  	  Thus	  discrimination	  is	  to	  be	  condemned,	  but	  the	  very	  possibility	  or	  conditions	  for	  existence	   of	   a	   group	   who	   can	   be	   discriminated	   against	   or	   persecuted	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	  sexuality	   cannot	   be	   comprehended.	   	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   very	   awkwardness	   of	   the	  statements	  stems	  in	  part	  from	  the	  awkward	  position	  occupied	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  sexual	  subject	  or	  of	   sexuality	  more	   generally.	   	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   I	   regard	   the	   Argentinian	   statement	   as	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  positive	  landmark	  vote	  and	  an	  important	  development	  in	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly.	  	  The	  statement	  forms	  an	  important	  recognition	  of	  the	  violence	  experienced	  by	  those	  perceived	  to	  be	  other	  than	  heterosexual	  and	  the	  assertion	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  suffering,	  that	  there	  are	  other	  more	  important	  grounds	  for	  discrimination	  or	  to	  address	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	   rather	   than	   the	   materiality	   of	   suffering,	   can	   only	   be	   condemned.	   	   However,	   these	  somewhat	  awkward	  arguments	  do	  expose	  an	  important	  problematic	  –	  sexual	  orientation	  must	  be	   constituted	   in	   a	   particular	  way	   in	   order	   to	   be	   assimilable	  within	   human	   rights	   norms	   and	  protections,	   but	   ironically,	   its	   very	   constitution	   in	   order	   to	   fit	   within	   these	   norms,	   detaches	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‘sexual	   orientation’	   from	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   those	   most	   in	   need	   of	   protection.	   	   The	  separation	  of	   sexual	   orientation	  or	   LGBT	  as	   a	   subject	   group	  deserving	  of	   protection	   from	   the	  embodied	  materiality	  of	   lived	   lives	  opens	  a	  gap	   that	  Syria,	  Russia	  and	  Belarus	  exploit	   in	   their	  statements.	   	   Sexual	   orientation	   cannot	   be	   a	   stable	   subject	   position,	   it	   cannot	   capture	   the	  diversity	   of	   experience,	   yet	   it	   must	   be	   adapted	   to	   this	   format	   in	   order	   to	   communicate	   with	  existing	   human	   rights	   trends,	   this	   creates	   a	   fundamental	   ambiguity	   in	   relation	   to	   how	   we	  approach	  sexuality.	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   I	   am	   convinced	   that	   a	   genuine	   and	   sincere	   concern	   for	   the	   conceptual	  validity	   of	   human	   rights	   frameworks	   is	   the	   sole	   motivational	   factor	   for	   challenges	   to	   the	  presence	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   in	   human	   rights	   language	   or	   bodies.	   	   Sexuality	   sits	   at	   a	  challenging	  crossroads	  in	  relation	  to	  power,	  community	  and	  state	  authority.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  very	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  sexuality	  to	  which	  the	  opposing	  statements	  obliquely	  refer,	  constitutes	  a	  key	   part	   of	   this	   challenge.	   	   I	   have	   suggested	   above	   that	   sexuality	   is	   an	   aleatory	   point	   that	  connects	   series,	   but	   remains	   shifting	   and	   indefinable.	   	   This	   understanding	   of	   sexuality	  contributes	   to	   the	   difficulty	   of	   accurately	   naming	   sexual	   orientation,	   or	   situating	   it	   in	  international	   human	   rights	  norms,	   but	   also	   affirms	   its	  power	   to	  disrupt	   and	   facilitate	   change.	  	  The	  Syrian	  statement,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest,	  problematises	  this	  first	  aspect	  of	  sexuality	  in	  order	  to	  close	  down	  the	  latter.	  	  	  This	  attempt	  proved	  unsuccessful	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  UNGA	  statements:	  even	  those	  states	  who	  did	  not	  support	  the	  statement	  could	  not	  succeed	  in	  entirely	  removing	  it	  from	  the	  agenda	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  concern	   if	  not	  agreement.	   	  Sheill	  highlights	  the	  way	   in	  which	  criticism	  of	   the	   language	  used	  was	  followed	  by	  condemnation	  of	  ‘all	  forms	  of	  stereotyping,	  exclusion,	  stigmatization,	  prejudice,	  intolerance,	  discrimination	  and	  violence	  directed	  against	  peoples,	  communities	  and	  individuals	  on	  any	  ground	  whatsoever,	  wherever	   they	  occur.’64	  	  While	   this	   statement	   is	   so	  vague	  as	   to	  be	  little	  more	  than	  a	  meaningless	  platitude,	  it	  can	  at	  least	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  shifting	  position	  of	  sexual	  rights	  in	  the	  forum	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly.	   	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	   Holy	   See	   delivered	   a	   statement,	   which	   while	   not	   supportive	   of	   the	   joint	   statement,	  condemned	   violence	   against	   ‘all	   homosexual	   persons’	   and	   called	   for	   the	   repeal	   of	   criminal	  penalties	  for	  homosexual	  conduct.65	  	  Sheill	  regards	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘so	  many	  states	  that	  have	  stood	  in	  opposition	  to	  advocacy	  on	  human	  rights,	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  gender	  identity	  had	  affirmed	  universality,	   non-­‐discrimination	   and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  Holy	   See,	   called	   for	   decriminalisation,	  was	   a	   success	  we	   could	  not	  have	   foreseen.’66	  	   In	   essence,	   there	  may	  not	  be	   agreement	  on	   the	  position	  of	   sexuality	  at	   the	  UN,	  but	   it	   is	   recognized	   to	  be	  an	   issue	  of	   import,	   and	  one	   through	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which	   central	   tenets	   of	   human	   rights	   theory	   and	   practice	   -­‐	   universality,	   non-­‐discrimination,	  freedom	  from	  persecution	  –	  can	  be	  reaffirmed.	  
Human	  Rights	  Council	  More	   recently	   still,	   the	  Human	  Rights	  Council	   adopted	   a	   resolution	  on	   sexual	   orientation	   and	  gender	   identity,	   of	   the	   kind	   that	   failed	   in	   2004	   at	   the	   Commission	   on	   Human	   Rights.67	  	   The	  motion	  was	  introduced	  by	  South	  Africa68,	  co-­‐sponsored	  by	  42	  other	  states	  and	  passed	  23	  to	  19	  with	   3	   abstentions.69	  	   As	   such,	   the	   vote	  was	   close	   and	   the	  motion	   can	   certainly	   be	   classed	   as	  controversial,	   with	   those	   supporting	   and	   opposing	   the	   resolution	   falling	   into	   disappointingly	  predictable	   blocs.	   	   The	   resolution	   also	   asks	   the	   High	   Commissioner	   to	   prepare	   a	   study	   on	  violence	   and	   discrimination	   based	   on	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   gender	   identity.	   	   Such	   motions	  suggest	   that,	   even	   with	   resistance	   and	   with	   the	   limits	   of	   terminology	   available,	   questions	   of	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  articulable	  at	  the	  UN.	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  the	  HRC	  resolution	   is	   perhaps	   not	   directly	   comparable	   with	   statements	   or	   resolutions	   in	   the	   General	  Assembly	   or	   the	   judgments	   of	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Committee,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   the	  movement	   from	  a	   focus	  on	  the	  right	   to	  privacy	  to	  a	  more	  general	  positioning	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  non-­‐discrimination	  or	  equality.	  	  Again,	  this	  movement	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  debate	  	  -­‐	   and	   the	   consequences	   of	   expressing	   the	   concerns	   of	   sexual	   minorities	   in	   this	   way	   are	   still	  unfolding	  -­‐	  but	   it	  does	  remain	   interesting	  to	  note	   the	  quickly	  evolving	  positioning	  of	  sexuality	  within	  UN	  documents	  and	  to	  attempt	  to	  unpick	  what	  such	  evolution	  brings	  to	  light	  and	  what	  it	  closes	  off.	  Despite	  these	  achievements,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  issues	  around	  sexuality	  in	  international	  governmental	   organisations	   remain	   imperfectly	   presented	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  debate	   and	   contention.	   	   Definitions,	   meanings	   and	   the	   emplacement	   of	   sexuality	   within	  particular	  societies	  are	  shifting	  and	  often	  unclear	  –	  subject	  to	  a	  myriad	  of	  different	  factors	  that	  influence	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   question	   of	   sexuality	   is	   perceived.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   as	   the	  statement	   from	   Syria	   to	   the	   General	   Assembly	   suggests,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   strong	   feeling	   that	  sexuality	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   ‘culture’	  as	  much	  as	   it	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   law	  or	  rights.	   	  The	  analysis	  above	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highlights	   the	   difficulty,	   or	   indeed	   impossibility,	   of	   situating	   sexuality	   in	   law	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	  clear,	  uncontroversial	  and	  based	  on	  solid	   foundations.	   	  As	   such,	  many	  achievements	   in	   recent	  years	   have	   been	   through	   a	   careful	   process	   of	   negotiation	   and	   strategic	   omission	   rather	   than	  outright	  confrontation.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  LGBT	  rights	  campaigners	  and	  their	  allies	  must	  contend	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  increased	  visibility	  of	  matters	  of	  sexuality	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  backlash	  or	  a	  hardening	  of	   resistance	   against	   sexual	   minorities.	   	   I	   have	   highlighted	   the	   way	   in	   which	   votes	   and	  discussions	  around	  issues	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  tend	  to	  follow	  relatively	  predictable	  patterns	  of	  voting.	   	   This	   binary,	   I	  would	   argue,	   is	   particularly	   dangerous,	   as	   it	   limits	   the	   possibilities	   for	  negotiation	   and	   action	   by	   dividing	   states	   into	   particular	   oppositional	   ‘sides’	   along	   the	   line	   of	  sexual	   orientation.	   	   I	   am	   not	   suggesting,	   along	   with	   the	   Russian	   delegate	   to	   the	   General	  Assembly,	   that	   confrontation	   should	   be	   avoided,	   but,	   following	   from	   the	   analysis	   above,	   it	   is	  perhaps	   worth	   revisiting	   how	   the	   increased	   visibility	   and	   articulability	   of	   sexuality	   in	   a	  
particular	   form	   at	   the	   UN	   can	   have	   unintended	   effect,	   or	   can	   politicise	   that	   which	   had	   been	  previously	   relatively	   uncontroversial.	   Recently,	   for	   example,	   a	   resolution	   condemning	   extra	  judicial	   killings	   of	   minorities	   was	   amended	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly’s	   Third	   Committee	   to	  remove	  specific	  reference	  to	  sexual	  minorities.	  	  The	  resolution,	  which	  has	  included	  a	  reference	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  since	  2002,	  was	  voted	  on	  each	  year	  until	  2010,	  when	  the	  specific	  reference	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  was	  removed	  –	  this	  was	  not	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  removal	  was	  proposed	  but	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  the	  proposal	  was	  effective.	  	  In	  response	  to	  its	  removal	  the	  US	  proposed	  an	  amendment	  condemning	  extrajudicial	  killing	  based	  on	  sexual	  orientation,	  which	  was	  passed	  by	   the	   full	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   by	   a	  margin	   of	   93	   to	   55	   (27	   abstentions,	   17	   absent	   or	   not	  voting).70	  	   This	   suggests	   perhaps,	   that	  while	   the	   possibility	   of	   backlash,	   and	   the	   controversial	  nature	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  language	  referring	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  is	  still	  a	  pertinent	  issue	  at	  the	  UN,	  it	  is	  possible,	  at	  least	  at	  present,	  to	  garner	  increasing	  support	  for	  sexual	  minorities	  in	  many	  arenas.	  However,	   increasing	   visibility	   of	   sexual	   rights	   should	   not	   mask	   the	   issues	   of	   power	   that	   are	  brought	  into	  focus	  by	  controversies	  over	  sexuality.	   	  Girard	  mentions	  that	  Brazil	  was	  put	  under	  huge	  pressure	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  proposed	  2003	  resolution.	   	  This	  pressure	  might	  also	  work	   in	  reverse	   –	   it	   is	   notable,	   that	   it	   was	   the	   US	   that	   exerted	   pressure	   on	   the	   General	   Assembly	   to	  produce	  a	  comfortable	  majority	  in	  the	  vote	  on	  extrajudicial	  killings.	  	  While	  we	  may	  welcome	  and	  celebrate	   the	   increasing	   support	   that	   powerful	   states	   such	   as	   the	   US	   are	   showing	   for	   LGBT	  rights,	   this	   support	   increasingly	   implicates	   LGBT	   issues	   within	   a	   problematic	   framework	   of	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global	  power	  relations.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  repeated	  division	  of	  states	  into	  those	  who	  are	  ‘for’	  or	  ‘against’	  measures	  in	  favour	  of	  sexual	  minorities	  is	  likely	  to	  harden	  oppositions	  or	  to	  reinforce	  essentialist	   or	   strategically	   essentialist	   definitions	   of	   sexuality,	   sexual	   orientation	   or	   sexual	  minorities.	   	   Put	   more	   simply,	   by	   working	   within	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   UN	   power	   relations	   and	  dynamics,	  LGBT	  issues	  are	  increasingly	  shaped	  and	  articulated	  as	  part	  of	  these	  power	  relations	  and	  dynamics	  and	  thus	  become	  more	  rigidly	  defined	  and	  restricted	  in	  terms	  of	  available	  action.	  This	  division	   is	  problematic	  as,	  although	  campaigning	  around	  sexuality	  may	  require	  definition	  and	  clarity71,	  such	  clarity	  works	  firstly	  to	  diminish	  the	  relevance	  and	  usefulness	  of	  human	  rights	  gains	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   once	   they	   are	   applied	   anywhere	   beyond	   the	   UN	   and	   secondly,	  leaves	  us	  trapped	  in	  an	  oppositional	  binary	  that	  solves	  little.	  	  As	  Rao,	  suggests	  in	  his	  analysis	  of	  Massad’s	  Desiring	  Arabs,	   while	   it	  may	   be	   true	   that	   LGBT	   as	   a	   label	   or	   a	   lifestyle	  may	   be	   less	  relevant	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	   than	  elsewhere,	   ‘in	   criticising	  cosmopolitan	   rescue	  politics	  and	   its	  local	  interlocutors,	  Massad	  slips	  into	  a	  reinforcement	  of	  communitarian	  authenticity	  narratives	  that	   police	   how	   sexual	   preferences	   ought	   to	   be	   expressed.’72	  	   The	   establishing	   of	   dichotomies	  that	  set	  ‘Western’	  sexuality	  against	  an	  ‘authentic’	  sexuality	  of	  a	  particular	  area	  may	  be	  a	  means	  of	   critiquing	   the	   power	   dynamics	   at	   play	   in	   transnational	   discourses	   of	   sexuality,	   but	   it	   does	  little	   to	  deconstruct	  modes	  of	  organisation	   through	  which	   it	   is	  possible	   for	   these	  dynamics	   to	  play	   themselves	   out	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   risks	   that	   we	   deny	   agency	   and	   make	   sweeping	  statements	  and	  normative	  claims	  about	  how	  non-­‐heterosexuality	  ought	  to	  be	  expressed	  within	  particular	  regions.	  	  	  
Problems	   of	   naming	   and	   nomenclature	   and	   the	   production	   of	   meaning	   in	   sexual	  
orientation	  and	  law	  Much	  of	  the	  analysis	  above	  implicates	  sexuality	  in	  a	  highly	  political	  process,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  operation	   of	   visible	   displays	   of	   power,	   diplomacy,	   political	   pressure	   and	   negotiation	   and	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  more	  subtle	  flow	  of	  discursive,	  productive	  power	  through	  which	  the	  categories	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	  belonging	  come	  to	  be	  understood.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  however,	  lies	  in	  the	  fluid	  nature	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  structural	  or	  structuring	  matrix.	   	   	   I	  have	  suggested	  that	  sexuality	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  occupying	  the	  empty	  square,	  or	  several	  positions	  at	  once	  -­‐	  a	  position	  that	   is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down	  into	  any	  rights	  based	  discourse.	  	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  attempts	   to	   explore	   this	   dynamic,	   in	   order	   to	   draw	  out	   some	  of	   the	   paradoxes	   and	  questions	  that	  currently	  tend	  to	  inhere	  in	  issues	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	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  Discourse:	  Global	  Queer	  Politics	  Beyond	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles."	  72	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An	   attempt	   to	   define	   the	   terms	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   ‘non-­‐heteronormativity’	   reveals	   the	   very	  complexity	  of	  the	  subject	  at	  hand:	  labels	  such	  as	  homosexual,	  gay,	  LGBTTQQI73,	  men	  who	  sleep	  with	  men	  (MSM)	  and	  queer	  are	  all	  weighted	  terms,	  carrying	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  meaning	  that	  is	  often	  highly	   context-­‐dependent.	   	  Although	  all	   of	   these	  names	   refer	   in	   some	  way	   to	   individuals	  who	  occasionally	  or	  primarily	  engage	   in	  non-­‐normative	  sexual	  behaviours	  or	  adopt	  non-­‐normative	  gender	   identities	   or	   behaviours,	   each	   one	   frames	   these	   non-­‐normative	   behaviour/identity	  clusters	   in	   slightly	   different	   ways	   allowing	   for	   a	   different	   interpretation	   by	   each	   reader	   in	  relation	  to	  their	  own	  understandings	  of	  normativity,	  sexuality	  and	  selfhood.	   	  These	  names	  and	  labels,	  while	  increasingly	  transnationally	  recognised,	  might	  also	  be	  supplemented	  by	  terms	  that	  have	  meaning	   in	   their	   specific	   cultural	   locations	   –	  we	  might	   ask,	   for	   example,	  whether	   terms	  such	   as	   hijra,	   kothi,	   lesbi,	   takatapui,	   among	   many	   others,	   should	   also	   be	   included	   here.	   In	  general,	   I	   attempt	   to	   use	   each	   term	   in	   the	   way	   that	   appears	   most	   appropriate	   in	   the	   given	  context,	   but	   do	   so	   with	   an	   awareness	   of	   the	   complexity	   and	   politics	   of	   meaning	   and	  interpretation	  relating	  to	  the	  language	  of	  ‘alternative	  sexualities’.	  Part	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  nomenclature	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  sexuality	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  one	  single	   discourse	   or	   framework	   of	   understanding.	   	   This	   argument	   draws	   on	   Wendy	   Brown’s	  critique	   of	   MacKinnon:	   Brown	   argues	   that	   MacKinnon	   reduces	   gender	   to	   one	   single	   social	  relation	  –	  that	  of	  sexuality.74	  Thus,	  every	  single	  feminine	  injustice	  is	  related	  back	  to	  sexuality	  -­‐	  to	  the	   eroticisation	   of	   dominance	   and	   submission	   that	   creates	   gender.	   	   Brown	   suggests	   instead	  that	  gender	  does	  not	  and	  cannot	  devolve	  on	  a	  single	  social	  relation	  –	  sexuality	  –	  but	  many	  social	  relations,	   including,	   but	   not	   limited	   to,	   discourses	   organising	  motherhood,	   race,	   philosophical	  truth,	   citizenship,	   class,	   heterosexuality	   and	   many	   others.75	  Similarly,	   sexuality	   is	   about	   the	  erotic	   and	   about	   power	   but	   it	   also	   speaks	   to	   discourses	   of	   truth,	   class,	   race,	   nation,	   gender,	  desire	   and	  more.	   	   Sexuality	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   point	  where	   it	   is	   readable	   along	   a	   single	  social	  relation	  or	  a	  single	  set	  of	  interpretive	  terms.	  	  Instead	  many	  different	  factors	  feed	  into	  the	  way	   different	   individuals	   and	   groups	   understand,	   interpret	   and	   reinterpret	   sexuality.	   	   It	   is	  therefore	   unsurprising	   that	   nomenclature	   is	   such	   an	   issue.	   	   Sexuality	   can	   speak	   to	   many	  different	  aspects	  of	  our	  being	  and	  selfhood	  as	   individuals	  and	  as	  members	  of	  communities,	   in	  large	   part,	   because	   it	   operates	   at	   a	   nexus	   of	  many	   different	   prolongations,	   permutations	   and	  lines	  of	  flight.	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I	  am	  arguing	  therefore	  that	  sexuality	  is	  implicated	  within	  a	  number	  of	  different	  assemblages	  as	  the	   empty	   square	  or	   aleatory	  point	   that	  brings	   series	   into	   resonance.	   	   Thus,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  LGBT	   nomenclature,	   as	   sexuality	   circulates,	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   grasp	   a	   surface	   of	   sense	   at	  which	  expression	  (LGBT,	  queer,	  MSM	  etc.)	  and	  content	  (series	  and	  selections	  of	  behaviour,	  action,	  pre-­‐identitarian	   singularities,	   affect	   etc.)	  meet.	   	   Yet	   as	   Lampert	   argues,	   in	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	  scheme,	  expression	  and	  content	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  simple	  dichotomy	  of	  expression	  vs.	  content	   or	   of	   idea	   vs.	   material	   reality.	   	   ‘Expressions	   do	   not	   merely	   represent	   contents	  epiphenomenally;	   rather	  expressions	  and	  events	   interpret	  each	  other	  at	   the	   level	  of	   form	  and	  interact	   causally	   with	   one	   another	   at	   the	   level	   of	   matter.’76	  	   What	   is	   significant	   here	   is	   the	  rejection	   of	   pre-­‐given	   or	   a	   priori	   systems	   of	   signs	   or	   structures	   through	   which	   the	   world	   is	  ordered.	   	  Deleuze	  argues	  against	  a	  system	  in	  which	  experience	  or	  perception	  are	  structured	  in	  advance,	   and	   instead	   looks	   to	   the	   production	   of	   relations.77	  	   The	   abstract	   machine,	   or	   the	  diagram	   of	   the	   assemblage	   by	  which	   form	   and	   content	   are	   constituted	   and	   conjugated	   is	   not	  merely	  linguistic	  or	  descriptive,	  but	  constructive:	   ‘The	  diagrammatic	  or	  abstract	  machine	  does	  not	  function	  to	  represent,	  even	  something	  real,	  but	  rather	  constructs	  a	  real	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  come,	  a	  new	   type	   of	   reality….Everything	   escapes,	   everything	   creates	   –	   never	   alone,	   but	   through	   an	  abstract	   machine	   that	   produces	   continuums	   of	   intensity,	   effects	   conjunctions	   of	  deterritorialization,	  and	  extracts	  expressions	  and	  contents.’78	  	  	  The	   key	   point	   here,	   is	   the	   argument	   that	   language	   alone	   does	   not	   constitute	   an	   abstract	  machine.	  	  Language	  does	  not	  ‘create’	  or	  even	  accurately	  represent	  content:	  ‘”Behind”	  statements	  and	   semioticizations	   there	   are	   only	   machines,	   assemblages	   and	   movements	   of	  deterritorialisation	  that	  cut	  across	  the	  stratification	  of	  the	  various	  systems	  and	  elude	  both	  the	  coordinates	   of	   language	   and	   of	   existence.’79	  	   However,	   this	   argument	   complicates	   rather	   than	  simplifies	   the	   issue	   of	   nomenclature	   and	   sexuality,	   as	   while	   we	  might	   acknowledge	   that	   ‘the	  world	   is	   prior	   to	   language	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   as	   the	  world	   is	   prior	   to	   law’80,	   we	  must	   also	  acknowledge	  that	  language,	  like	  law,	  is	  prescriptive:	  ‘Language	  defines	  or	  sets	  the	  limits	  of	  our	  world.	   	  However	  there	  is	  life	  outside	  of	  language,	  in	  problems	  and	  concepts	  -­‐	  problems	  always	  lie	   beyond	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   disciplines	   and	   beyond	   its	   common	   words’. 81 	  	   Deleuze’s	  transcendental	   empiricism	   is	   a	   commitment	   to	   pre-­‐linguistic	   difference	   which	   should	   not	   be	  subject	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  criteria.82	  	  As	  such,	  ‘language	  is	  not	  life,	  it	  gives	  life	  orders.’83	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imposes	  structure	  upon	  a	  series,	  the	  process	  of	  naming	  is	  a	  process	  of	  closing	  off,	  of	  imposing	  a	  structure	   upon	   matter.	   	   We	   can	   trace	   the	   implications	   of	   this	   in	   the	   debates	   surrounding	  sexuality	  at	  the	  UN.	  	  At	  stake	  here	  is	  not	  simply	  sexual	  rights,	  but	  the	  deeper	  question	  of	  the	  way	  in	   which	   sexuality	   is	   named,	   known	   and	   structured	   at	   the	   UN	   –	   and	   thus,	   the	   way	   in	   which	  complex,	  pre-­‐linguistic	  and	  pre-­‐individual	  singularities	  pertaining	  to	  sexuality	  are	  expressed	  as	  identities	  (or	  illegitimate	  identities)	  that	  are	  comprehensible	  within	  the	  larger	  UN	  rights	  system.	  	  	  Of	  further	  significance	  here,	  is	  the	  reciprocal	  production	  of	  meaning:	  meaning	  is	  a	  surface	  effect,	  a	   distribution	   of	   sense	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   content	   and	   expression.	   	   At	   issue	   then	   is	   the	  relationship	  between	  forms	  of	  content	  and	  forms	  of	  expression	  and	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	   as	   a	   moving	   site	   of	   the	   production	   of	   meaning.	   	   Language	   stabilises	   and	   restricts,	   yet	  language	   is	  not	  unchanging.	   	   ‘Before	  the	  actualized	  and	  stratified	  worlds	  of	   language	  and	   laws	  there	  are	  intensive	  processes	  of	  ontogenesis	  immanent	  and	  autonomous	  in	  matter	  in	  a	  field	  of	  emergence.	  Matter	   expresses	   itself,	  matters	   of	   expression	   pass	   back	   into	  matter,	   form	   settles	  into	   substance,	   and	   substance	   overtakes	   forms,	   expression	   folds	   over	   contents,	   and	   contents	  overflow	   expression.’ 84 	  	   From	   this	   perspective	   we	   can	   appreciate	   both	   why	   naming	   is	  problematic,	   and	   why	   no	   single	   name	   will	   ever	   be	   sufficient.	   	   Meaning	   here	   is	   not	   the	  identification	  of	  a	  single	  principle	  or	  even	  foundational	  identity	  or	  subjectivity85	  but	  is	  instead	  a	  constant	   production	   and	   perpetual	   becoming:	   as	   such,	   of	  most	   concern	   are	   the	   gaps	   and	   the	  fractures	   in	   the	  production	  of	  meaning	  and	   identity.	   	  We	  should	  be	   interested	  here	  not	   in	   the	  location	  of	  a	  totality	  or	  a	  foundation	  for	  identity,	  but	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  pragmatic,	  dissipative	  structures.	   	   ‘Thought,	   in	   other	   words,	   is	   not	   directed	   toward	   an	   eventual	   specified	   end,	   but	  rather	   remains	   open,	   dialogical,	   creative,	   and	   evolutionary	   directed	   toward	   an	   unspecified	  becoming.’86	  	  Thus,	  any	  name	  given	  to	  a	  set	  of	  sexual	  practices,	  sexual	  orientation	  or	  expression	  of	   sexuality	   must	   necessarily	   always	   be	   temporary	   and	   limited:	   	   ‘we	   are	   never	   signifier	   or	  signified.	  We	  are	  stratified.’87	  	  LGBT,	  queer,	  gay,	  lesbian	  and	  other	  terms	  all	  capture	  and	  stratify	  some	  part	  of	  sexuality	  but	  leave	  other	  aspects	  outside	  this	  stratification	  and	  open	  to	  recapture	  or	  re-­‐stratification	  and	  expression	  in	  a	  different	  form.	  	  	  Two	   further	   points	   can	   be	   drawn	   out	   here.	   	   The	   first	   relates	   to	   Deleuze’s	   insistence	   that	  we	  should	  not	  simply	  accept	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  system	  of	  signification,	  regime	  of	  signs	  or	  language,	  but	  examine	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  is	  produced	  and	  experienced.	  	  The	  further	  and	  more	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technical	  point	  to	  draw	  however,	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  between	  movement	  and	  meaning.	  	  If	  language	  (or	  law,	  or	  a	  regime	  of	  signs	  or	  a	  structure	  of	  signification)	  tends	  to	  constitute	  matter	  into	  identifiable	  systems	  –	  into	  relatively	  stable	  blocks	  of	  space	  time	  -­‐	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  sets	  must	   be	   understood	   simply	   as	   subdivisions	   of	   the	   whole	   of	   duration/virtuality	   more	   or	   less	  contracted.	   	   ‘These	   sets,	   however,	   are	   insistent	   illusions	   that	   we	   automatically	   perceive	   and	  cannot	  eradicate	  –	  and	  for	  good	  reason,	  since	  they	  are	  approximations	  of	  realities	  that	  are	  useful	  for	  our	  survival	  in	  the	  world.’88	  	  Of	  interest	  here,	  are	  the	  relations	  between	  terms	  and	  between	  these	  closed	  sets	  and	  open	  wholes.	  	  Deleuze	  argues	  that	  the	  whole	  (duration)	  may	  be	  defined	  as	  ‘the	   whole	   of	   relations’89	  and	   further	   that	   relations	   are	   external	   to	   their	   terms:	   they	   ‘do	   not	  belong	  to	  bodies,	  but	  to	  the	  whole,	  as	  long	  as	  one	  does	  not	  confuse	  the	  whole	  with	  a	  closed	  set	  of	  objects.’90	  	   In	   his	   work	   on	   Cinema,	   Deleuze	   examines	   the	   way	   cinematic	   products	   such	   as	   a	  montage	  allow	  us	   to	   think	  or	  perceive	   the	  open	  whole	  of	  duration	  as	  opposed	  and	  relative	   to	  closed	   sets	   and	   structures.	   	   Significant	   to	  our	   argument	  here	  however	   is	   the	  wider	  point	   that	  Deleuze	   is	   making	   about	   relations	   and	   movement	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   open	   whole.	   The	  movement	  of	  bodies	  in	  space	  is	  not	  the	  movement	  of	  a	  single	  body	  along	  a	  linear	  trajectory,	  but	  the	  connection	  of	  different	  movements	  within	  a	  dynamic,	  open	  ended	  and	  changing	  whole.	  	  That	  is,	   the	  movement	  of	   the	  parts	  extends	   into	  the	  whole:	  movement	   is	  not	  a	  change	  within	  space	  but	  a	  changing	  whole.	   	   ‘Movements	  are	  the	  production	  of	  change,	  such	  that	  each	  movement	   is	  already	  a	  change	  in	  everything	  else	  that	  moves.’91	  I	  have	  spent	  some	   time	  exploring	   these	  questions	  of	  expression,	   content	  and	  movement	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  highlight	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  process	  of	  naming.	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  an	  attempt	  to	   identify	   a	   permanent	   or	   foundational	   definition	   of	   sexual	   orientation,	   sexual	   identity	   or	  sexuality	  is	  a	  futile	  task:	  the	  names	  used,	  the	  structures	  or	  sets	  constructed	  are	  simply	  singular	  iterations	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  expression,	   form	  and	  content,	  relevant	   to	   the	  particular	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  expressed.	   	  Moreover,	  neither	  the	  grouping	  of	  terms,	  nor	  the	  actions	  and	  movements	  of	  bodies	  can	  be	  examined	   in	   isolation:	   the	  expression	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  will	   impact	   upon	   the	  whole	   of	   duration:	   the	  whole	   of	  movement	   of	   bodies	   in	   space.	  	  Thus	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  when	  Mugabe	  attacked	  homosexuals	  as	  worse	  than	  pigs	  and	  dogs,	  he	  did	  not	  just	   express	   his	   own	   or	   the	   state’s	   position	   on	   homosexuality,	   nor	   did	   he	   simply	   provoke	  publicity	  and	  a	  more	  coherent	  concentrated	  organising	  in	  favour	  of	  gay	  rights	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  he	  also	  introduced	  the	  terminology	  of	  ‘homosexuality	  and	  heterosexuality’	  to	  the	  wider	  population,	  inducing	  individuals	  who	  had	  not	  previously	  considered	  themselves	  in	  these	  terms	  to	  adopt	  and	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engage	   with	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   structures	   and	   labels	   concerning	   sexual	   identity.92	  	   Mugabe’s	  statements	  with	  regard	  to	  homosexuality	  put	  the	  terms	  used	  into	  resonance	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  provoke	  a	  more	  general	  reorientation	  of	  how	  Zimbabweans,	  both	  gay	  and	  straight,	  approached	  and	  conceived	  of	  sexual	  identity	  and	  subjectivity.	  The	  question	  then	   is	  how	  might	   law	  as	  a	  regime	  impact	  upon	  this	  process.	   	  The	  starting	  point	  must	  perhaps	  be	  a	  recognition	  that	  law	  itself	  is	  not	  formed	  upon	  a	  transcendent	  plane,	  but	  exists	  in	   the	  material	  processes	  of	   life	  –	   itself	  a	   form	  of	  open	  ended	  perception	  and	  production	  (this	  point	   is	   discussed	   further	   in	   Chapter	   Five).	   	   For	   Deleuze,	   the	   law	   administers	   a	   structure	   of	  ‘illegalisms’,	   and	   thus	   our	   focus	   must	   be	   not	   simply	   upon	   the	   procedure	   of	   law,	   but	   the	  pragmatics	  of	  law	  and	  rights:	  the	  wider	  world	  within	  which	  law	  operates	  and	  acts.	  	  Milovanovic	  argues	  that	  in	  this	  respect,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  advocate	  ‘not	  a	  stasis,	  but	  far-­‐from-­‐equilibrium	  conditions	   within	   which	   intensive	   processes	   produce	   not	   only	   relatively	   autonomous	  assemblages	   and	   abstract	   machines	   that	   are	   the	   workings	   of	   desire	   itself,	   but	   a	   constant	  breaking	  down	  (deterritorialization)	  of	  the	  present	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  continuously	  evolving,	  more	  fulfilling	  future.’93	  	  It	   is	   with	   this	   complexity	   in	   mind	   that	   we	   might	   begin	   to	   examine	   the	   law’s	   role	   in	   the	  privileging	  and	  production	  of	  particular	  systems,	  labels	  and	  identities.	  	  Phillips	  makes	  this	  point	  in	   relation	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   homosexuality	   as	   a	   ‘white	   man’s	   disease’	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   	   Referring	  specifically	   to	   criminal	   convictions	   for	   ‘unnatural	   offences’,	   he	   notes	   that	   between	   1966	   and	  1994	  all	  but	   three	  of	   the	  convictions	   in	   the	  higher	  courts	  have	   involved	  white	  men.	   	  No	  other	  sexual	  offence	  shows	   the	  same	  racial	  bias.	   	  However,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  only	  white	  men	  will	  engage	  in	  same	  sex	  behaviour.	  	  Instead,	  Phillips	  argues	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  inequalities	  in	  socio-­‐economic	   status	   led	   to	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   white	   men	   were	   more	   able	   to	   appeal	   their	  convictions	   in	   higher	   courts,	   as	   white	   men	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   able	   to	   afford	   the	   legal	  representation	   needed	   in	   these	   higher	   institutions.94	  Black	  men	   accused	   of	   the	   same	   offences	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  access	  to	  such	  resources	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  cases	  of	  black	  men’s	  same	  sex-­‐behaviour	  would	  be	  heard	  in	  the	  lower	  magistrates’	  courts,	  the	  records	  of	  which	  are	  not	  generally	  available.95	  Thus,	  the	  issue	  is	  not	  one	  of	  racially-­‐based	  behaviour,	  but	  one	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  power	  that	  facilitates	  visibility.	  But,	  as	  Phillips	  concludes,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Matthew	  Engelke,	  "'We	  Wondered	  What	  Human	  Rights	  He	  Was	  Talking	  About':	  Human	  Rights,	  Homosexuality	  and	  the	  Zimbabwe	  International	  Book	  Fair,"	  Critique	  of	  Anthropology	  19,	  no.	  3	  (1999).	  93	  Milovanovic,	  "Diversity,	  Law	  and	  Justice:	  A	  Deleuzian	  Semiotic	  View	  of	  'Criminal	  Justice'."	  p78	  94	  Oliver	  Phillips,	  "Zimbabwean	  Law	  and	  the	  Production	  of	  a	  White	  Man's	  Disease,"	  Social	  and	  Legal	  Studies	  6,	  no.	  4	  (1997).	  95	  Ibid.	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   ‘[t]he	   end	   result	   of	   this	  disparity	   in	   convictions	   is	   that	   it	   contributes	   to	   a	  discourse	  of	  discrimination	  which	  produces	  homosexuality	  as	  a	  ‘white	  man’s	  disease’.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  some	   black	   Zimbabwean	  men	   do	   have	   sex	   with	   each	   other,	   and,	   as	   with	   anyone	   else,	   this	   is	  carried	   out	  with	   varying	   degrees	   of	   furtiveness	   and	   openness	   by	  men	   occupying	   a	   variety	   of	  social	  positions.	   	  Yet	  the	  cases	  which	  go	  through	  to	  the	  higher	  courts	  are	  predominantly	  those	  which	   involve	   the	   participation	   of	   white	  men.	   	   This	  means	   that	   the	   cases	   passing	   before	   the	  senior	  judiciary,	  receiving	  publicity	  in	  the	  media,	  being	  recorded	  in	  public	  law	  reports,	  coming	  to	   the	  attention	  of	  government,	  and	   featuring	   in	   the	  market-­‐place	  discussions	  of	  an	   insatiably	  curious	  populace	  are	  those	  which	  involve	  the	  participation	  of	  a	  white	  man.	  	  Public	  discussion	  of	  homosexuality	   becomes	   fuelled	   with	   racial	   epithets,	   and	   the	   primary	   definition	   of	   the	   issue	  includes	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  white	  man	  and	  the	  relative	  obscurity	  of	  the	  black	  man’.96	  	  This	   is	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   the	   disciplinary,	   regulative	   power	   of	   the	   law	   to	   create	   ‘the	  homosexual’	  as	  a	  particular	  (white)	  individual	  and	  constitute	  homosexuality	  as	  a	  white	  ‘disease’	  in	  contrast	  to	  (presumably)	  black	  African	  heterosexuality.	  	  This	  creation	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  particular	  binaries	  is	  not	  an	  isolated	  occurrence	  in	  law	  -­‐	  De	  Vos	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  law’s	  role	  in	  producing	  homosexuality	  often	  occurs	  through	  its	  negation	  –	  that	  law	  ‘[c]ame	  to	  valorise	  the	  model	  of	  martial	  bond,	   the	  privileging	  of	   the	  conjugal	  sexuality	  and	  the	  denial	  of	   legitimacy	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  sexuality	  outside	  the	  heterosexual	  matrix.	  	  It	  is	  via	  this	  negation	  that	  the	  law	  has	  played	   a	   role	   in	   constructing	   homosexual	   identity.’97	  Homosexuality	   is	   made	   visible	   as	   the	  ‘other’	  to	  what	  is	  desirable	  and	  normative.	  	  Thus,	  through	  both	  juridical	  and	  disciplinary	  means,	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  law	  interact	  and	  react,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  law	  works	  to	  ban	  behaviours	  deemed	  unnatural	  or	  distasteful,	  which	  are	  rendered	  deviant	  and	  marginal	  in	  this	  process.	  Law,	  therefore,	   does	   not	   objectively	   operate	   on	   an	   already	   established	   homosexual	   identity,	   but	  actively	   works	   towards	   its	   construction	   and	   conceptualisation	   in	   particular	   terms.	  	  Homosexuality	   is	   positioned	   in	   a	   particular	   relation	   to	   law	   -­‐	   this	   positioning	   facilitates	   the	  increased	   visibility	   of	   homosexuality	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   it	   contributes	   to	   a	   process	   in	  which	   the	  homosexual	  is	  created	  and	  refined.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  the	  law	  fuels	  rather	  than	  singlehandedly	  creates	  this	  discourse	  –	  sexuality	  is	  a	  complex	  production,	  influenced	  by	  many	  discourses	  and	  desires,	  and	  attempts	  to	  find	  one	   foundational	   truth	  of	   its	  production	  are	  not	   generally	   very	  helpful.	   	  Nonetheless,	   the	  law	  will	  sometimes	  make	  a	  claim	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  provide	  a	  supposed	  truth	  of	  sexuality	  –	  and	  to	  attach	   a	   particular	  meaning	   and	  morality	   to	   sexual	   behaviours.	   	   This	   is	   problematic	   because	  although	   law	   does	   not	   produce	   sexuality	   alone,	   or	   comprehend	   sexuality	   in	   its	   entirety,	   law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Ibid.	  97	  Pierre	  De	  Vos,	  "On	  the	  Legal	  Construction	  of	  Gay	  and	  Lesbian	  Identity	  and	  South	  Africa's	  Transitional	  Constitution,"	  
South	  African	  Journal	  on	  Human	  Rights	  12	  (1996).	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remains	  a	  powerful	  discourse.	  	  	  Legal	  recognition	  can	  publicly	  legitimise	  or	  delegitimise	  certain	  behaviours	  and	  thus,	  implicitly,	  certain	  identities.	  Phillips	  and	  De	  Vos	  both	  use	  examples	  from	  Southern	  Africa	  –	  specifically	  Zimbabwe	  and	  South	  Africa.	   	  Similar,	  although	  not	  identical,	  operations	  of	  productive	  power	  might	  also	  be	  traced	  in	  international	   law.	   	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	  note	   for	  example,	   the	  way	   in	  which	  many	  of	   the	  earliest	  cases	   relating	   to	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   at	   an	   international	   level	   were	   heard	   in	   the	   European	  Courts.	   	   It	   is	   perhaps	   more	   than	   coincidental	   that	   while	   these	   courts	   were	   not	   always	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  petitions	  of	  sexual	  rights	  activists,	  the	  configuration	  of	  sexuality,	  subjectivity	  and	  rights	  within	  European	  historical,	  political	  and	  legal	  imaginaries	  made	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  legitimate	  sexual	  subject	  a	  significant	  possibly.	  	  Sweibel	  notes	  that	  within	  the	  EU,	  the	  concept	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  accepted	  and	  even	  included	  in	  treaties,	  while	  at	  the	  UN,	  the	   concept	   remains	   highly	   controversial.	   	   She	   highlights	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   that	   have	  contributed	   to	   this	   –	   including	   coat	   tailing	   on	   other	   anti-­‐discrimination	   law,	   better	   resources	  and	  strategies	  and	  a	  political	  climate	  that	  was	  generally	  more	  welcoming.	  	  Beyond	  this	  however,	  is	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   demands	   of	   sexual	  minorities	   could	   simply	   be	   ‘framed’	  more	   easily	  within	   the	   EU	   structure	   perpetuating	   a	   reciprocal	   discourse	   which	   both	   emplaces	   but	   then	  essentialises	   the	  position	  of	  sexuality	  within	  EU	  human	  rights	   law.	  Most	  notable	   in	  relation	  to	  European	   sexual	   rights	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   rights	   bearing	   citizens	   of	   the	   EU	   are	   defined	  primarily	  in	  economic	  terms	  –	  citizens	  are	  economic	  actors	  who	  enjoy	  core	  rights.98	  	  This	  focus	  shapes	   the	  way	   in	  which	  minority	   rights	   are	   articulated.	   	   For	   example,	   Stychin	  notes	   that	   the	  original	  motivation	  for	  sexual	  equality	  rights	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  concern	  for	  women’s	  rights	  so	  much	  as	  a	  desire	  to	  foster	  equal	  conditions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  production	  across	  the	  European	   Economic	   Community.99	  	   Arguments	   concerning	   the	   need	   to	   create	   a	   level	   playing	  field	   in	   the	   labour	  market	  have	  been	  made	  specifically	   in	   relation	   to	   sexual	  orientation	   issues	  have	  been	  made	   in	   cases	   such	  as	  P.	   v.	   S.	   and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council100,	  Grant	  v.	   South	  West	  Trains101	  and	  in	  the	  International	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Association’s	  (ILGA)	  campaign	  for	  freedom	  of	  movement	  of	  same	  sex	  couples	  around	  the	  European	  Union.102	  	  As	  Stychin	  suggests	  ‘arguments	  for	   sexual	   equality	   are	   often	   normatively	   grounded	   in	   part	   in	   the	   importance	   of	   rights	   as	   a	  means	   to	   ‘perfect’	   competition	   in	   the	   labour	  market.’103	  	   Thus,	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  EU	   system	  makes	   it	  relatively	  easy	  to	   ‘name’	  or	  to	  make	  visible	  sexual	  orientation	  rights,	  but	  at	   the	  same	  time	   this	   process	   of	   naming	   essentialises	   and	   crystallises	   notions	   and	  norms	  of	   sexuality	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Mark	  Graham,	  "Gay	  Marriage:	  Whither	  Sex?	  	  Some	  Thoughts	  from	  Europe,"	  Sexuality,	  Research	  and	  Social	  Policy:	  
Journal	  of	  NSRC	  1,	  no.	  3	  (2004).	  p26	  99	  Carl	  F.	  Stychin,	  "Sexual	  Citizenship	  in	  the	  European	  Union,"	  Citizenship	  Studies	  5,	  no.	  3	  (2001).	  p292	  100	  P.	  v.	  S.	  and	  Cornwall	  County	  Council	  ECR	  C-­‐13/94	  [1996]	  ECR	  I-­‐2143.	  Cited	  in	  Ibid	  p	  293	  101	  Grant	  v.	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  West	  Trains	  ECR	  C-­‐249/96	  [1998]	  ECR	  I-­‐621	  Citied	  in	  Ibid	  p293	  102	  Graham,	  "Gay	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  Whither	  Sex?	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  p26	  103	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  p293	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addresses	   them	   through	   discourses	   of	   economic	   citizenship	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   not	   necessarily	  particularly	  accurate.104	  	  	  This	  conceptual	  confusion	  is	  mirrored	  in	  discussions	  at	  the	  UN	  –	  I	  have	  argued,	  for	  example,	  that	  processes	   of	   naming,	   making	   visible	   and	   naturalising,	   reinforce	   particular	   structures	   or	  systemic	  binaries.	   	   	  Girard	  uses	  Butler	   to	  question	  whether	  part	  of	   the	  Holy	  See’s	  objection	   to	  claims	  based	  on	  gender	  identity	  or	  gender	  expression	  might	  be	  related	  to	  an	  understanding	  that	  these	  claims	  could	  bring	  already	  normalised	  gender	  categories	  into	  question.105	  	  In	  essence,	  we	  might	   suggest	   that	   if	   we	   read	   sexuality	   as	   inhering	   within	   a	   number	   of	   different	   discourses,	  power	   formations,	   conceptual	   frameworks,	   or	   series	   and	   as	   bringing	   all	   of	   these	   series	   into	  resonance	   with	   each	   other,	   we	   can	   begin	   to	   understand	   the	   potentially	   disruptive	   force	   that	  sexuality	  can	  have.	   	  Potentially,	  sexuality	  can	  operate	  as	  disjunction,	  or	  as	  a	  site	  of	  productive	  difference	   and	   differentiation.	   	   Sexuality	   can	   connect	   with	   a	   number	   of	   different	   flows,	  machines,	  and	  assemblages,	  or	  can	  facilitate	  the	  connection	  of	  different	  assemblages	  with	  each	  other.	   	  In	  this	  modality	  then,	  sexuality	  is	  a	  productive	  but	  always	  somewhat	  uncontained	  force	  or	   flow	   –	   a	   disjunctive	   synthesis.	   	   As	   Colebrook	   points	   out	   however,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   use	  disjunctive	  synthesis	  illegitimately	  –	  in	  a	  transcendent	  form	  that	  insists	  that	  one	  submits	  to	  one	  particular	  system	  of	  classification	  or	  thinking	  and	  adheres	  to	  the	  strictures	  of	   identifying	  with	  particular	   signifiers.106	  	   In	   Girard’s	   example,	   the	   Holy	   See	   could	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   making	   an	  illegitimate	  use	  of	  the	  disjunctive	  synthesis,	  in	  that	  it	  attempts	  to	  close	  down	  the	  possibilities	  of	  sexuality	  or	  gender,	  and	  their	  openness	  to	  becoming.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  many	  of	  the	  debates	  in	  the	  UN	  are	  marked	  by	  such	  dynamics.	  	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  also	  be	  highlighted	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	   those	   who	   oppose	   the	   furthering	   of	   sexual	   rights	   who	   are	   capable	   of	   performing	   this	  transcendent	  disjunction:	  those	  who	  predict	  or	  prefer	  only	  one	  single	  trajectory	  of	  (often	  rights	  based)	  sexual	  liberation	  (a	  teleology	  of	  sexuality)	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  performing	  a	  similar	  action	  –	  closing	  down	  rather	  than	  opening	  up	  possibilities	  for	  change	  and	  connection	  beyond	  the	  already	  planned,	  articulated	  and	  expected.	  	  In	  one	  sense,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  understand	  why	  such	  movements	  occur	  –	  the	  logic	  of	  classification,	  binaries	  and	  contradiction	  is	  a	  powerful	  model	  of	  governance	  and	  resistance:	  Deleuzian	  articulations	  of	  flow	  and	  change	  are	  much	  less	  easily	  articulated	  into	  programmes	  of	  action,	  particularly	   in	  our	   international	  political	  and	   legal	  arenas.	   	  However,	   it	  appears	   that	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   at	   least,	   political	   action	   that	   falls	   into	   transcendent	  disjunction	  in	  this	  way	  tends	  to	  lead	  to	  unproductive	  binary	  oppositions,	  which	  are	  increasingly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Swiebel,	  "Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Search	  for	  an	  International	  Strategy."	  105	  Girard,	  "United	  Nations:	  Negotiating	  Sexual	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	  at	  the	  Un."p335.	  	  This	  is	  not	  the	  only	  instance	  of	  the	  Vatican’s	  engagement	  with	  gender	  categories	  or	  the	  ‘disruption’	  of	  a	  women’s	  ‘natural’	  role	  as	  a	  carer	  and	  mother.	  	  Similar	  concerns	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  2004	  Papal	  Letter	  to	  Women.	  	  See	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  Conceiving	  Life:	  
Reproductive	  Politics	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  Contemporary	  Italy	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2007).p7	  106	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  "Disjunctive	  Synthesis,"	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p80-­‐1	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hardened	  with	  each	  repetition	  of	  a	  statement,	  a	  vote	  or	  a	  resolution.	   	  As	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue	  in	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  	   ‘no	   “gay	   liberation	  movement”	   is	   possible	   as	   long	   as	   homosexuality	   is	   caught	   up	   in	   a	  relation	   of	   exclusive	   disjunction	  with	   heterosexuality,	   a	   relation	   that	   ascribes	   them	   both	   to	   a	  common	  Oedipal	  and	  castrating	  stock,	   charged	  with	  ensuring	  only	   their	  differentiation	   in	   two	  non	   communicating	   series,	   instead	   of	   bringing	   to	   light	   their	   reciprocal	   inclusion	   and	   their	  transverse	   communication	   in	   the	   decoded	   flows	   of	   desire	   (included	   disjunctions,	   local	  connections,	  nomadic	  conjunctions).	   	  In	  short,	  sexual	  repression,	  more	  insistent	  than	  ever,	  will	  survive	  all	  the	  publications,	  demonstrations,	  emancipations	  and	  protests	  concerning	  the	  liberty	  of	   sexual	   objects,	   sources	   and	   aims,	   as	   long	   as	   sexuality	   is	   kept	   -­‐	   consciously	   or	   not	   -­‐	  within	  narcissistic,	  Oedipal,	  and	  castrating	  co-­‐ordinates	  that	  are	  enough	  to	  ensure	  the	  triumph	  of	   the	  most	  rigorous	  censors.’107	  
Sexual	  orientation	  rights	  and	  power:	  Rights	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  governance	  and	  control	  	  Unfortunately,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  simply	  remove	   the	  process	  of	  naming.	   	  As	  Reynolds	  notes,	  the	   deployment	   of	   a	   name	   or	   ‘identity’	   serves	   a	   double	   function:	   on	   one	   hand	   it	   can	  work	   to	  ‘define	   and	   reinforce	   social	   identities,	   subjective	   territories	   and	   societal	   structures’108,	   on	   the	  other,	   ‘subjects	   can	   also	  deploy	  proper	  names	   via	   the	  naming-­‐function	   to	   achieve	   agency	   and	  furnish	   themselves	   mobility	   of	   identity,	   thereby	   exposing	   the	   uncontainable	   nature	   of	   the	  subject	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   taxonomies	   that	   serve	   state	   machinery	   and	   for	   which	   proper	   naming	   is	  fundamental.’109	  Much	   work	   on	   LGBT	   rights	   reflects	   this	   problematic	   –	   as	   Girard	   notes:	   ‘To	  advance	  a	  progressive	  agenda	  on	  sexuality,	  multiple	  parallel	   strategies	  are	  needed.	  The	  battle	  for	   explicit	   words	   has	   to	   continue	   because	   those	   words	   are	   essential	   to	   combating	  discrimination	   and	   violence.	   But	   other	   approaches	   must	   also	   be	   taken.’110	  	   Names	   are	   both	  liberating	   and	   restricting	   –	   particularly	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   the	   law,	  which	   seeks	   to	  make	   subjects	  visible,	  to	  know	  and	  to	  regulate	  them	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  	  Braidotti	   traces	   this	   relationship	   between	   seeing,	   knowing	   and	   control	   in	   Western	   thought	  arguing	  that	  from	  Plato	  onwards,	  seeing	  has	  become	  synonymous	  with	  knowing,	  and	  knowing	  something	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  its	  regulation	  and	  control.111	  	  In	  this	  way,	  she	  highlights	  the	  double-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  Anti-­‐Oedipus:	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia	  (London:	  Athlone	  Press,	  1984).	  p350-­‐1	  108	  Bryan	  Reynolds,	  Transversal	  Subjects:	  From	  Montaigne	  to	  Deleuze	  after	  Derrida	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).p64	  	  109	  Ibid	  110	  Girard,	  "United	  Nations:	  Negotiating	  Sexual	  Rights	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	  at	  the	  UN."p356	  111	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Nomadic	  Subjects:	  Embodiment	  and	  Sexual	  Difference	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  p204,	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Posthuman,	  All	  Too	  Human:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Process	  Ontology,"	  Theory,	  Culture	  and	  Society	  23,	  no.	  7-­‐8	  (2006).	  p204	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edged	   sword	   for	   those	   activists	   who	   seek	   to	   work	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   law	   and	  particularly	   the	   rights	   discourse.	   	   Thus,	   visibility	   and	   coherence	   around	   a	   particular,	   claimed,	  knowable	   identity	   gives	   a	  much	  more	   powerful	   base	   by	  which	   individuals	   can	   occupy	   space,	  make	  claims	  to	  rights	  and	  demand	  inclusion	  within	  a	  political	  body.	  	  However,	  doing	  politics	  in	  such	  a	  way	  demands	  that	  groups	  are	  recognisable	  and	  positioned	  in	  a	  particular	  fashion	  –	  often	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  is	  outside	  their	  control.	  	  This	  is	  why	  Emma	  Henderson	  questions	  the	  wisdom	  of	  appealing	   to	   international	   rights	  bodies	   in	  relation	   to	  Tasmanian	  gay	  rights	  activism:	   in	  doing	  so,	   gay	   rights	   are	   positioned	   as	   an	   outside	   force,	   legislated	   for,	   at	   least	   in	   part,	   by	   external	  authorities.112	  	   Thus,	   gay	   people	   remain	   invaders,	   impure	   and	   tainting	   authentic	   Tasmanian	  belonging;	  gay	  subjectivity	  becomes	  a	  closed	  off	  subjectivity,	  one	  that	  is	  potentially	  antithetical	  to	  Tasmanian	  subjectivity.	  	  	  Yet	  appeals	  to	  the	  law	  and	  to	  the	  discourse	  of	  human	  rights	  continue,	  and	  continue	  successfully.	  	  There	   are	   increasing	   examples	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which,	   despite	   controversy,	   notions	   of	   sexual	  orientation	   are	   being	   integrated	   into	   working	   discourses	   of	   the	   UN.	   	   Working	   within	   the	  parameters	   of	   rights	   claims	   remains	   an	   important	   strategy	   -­‐	   the	   law	   remains	   a	   powerful	  discourse	  if	  it	  can	  be	  usefully	  harnessed.	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  Douzinas	  argues,	  legal	  recognition,	  or	  legal	   legitimisation	   can	   have	   a	  powerful	   psychological	   impact,	   as	   it	   has	   the	  power	   to	  position	  subjects	  as	  legitimate	  and	  accepted	  members	  of	  a	  citizen	  body.113	  In	  essence	  it	  brings	  them	  from	  marginal,	  semi-­‐legitimate	  or	  semi-­‐hidden	  existences	  and	  recognises	  their	  right	  to	  belong	  as	  full	  subjects,	   regardless	  of	   sexuality.	   	  De	  Vos	  captures	   the	   importance	  of	   this	   recognition	  when	  he	  quotes	   a	   black	   drag	   queen	   at	   the	   1994	   gay	   pride	  march	   in	   Johannesburg:	   “Darling,	   it	   means	  sweet	  motherfuck-­‐all.	   	  You	  can	  rape	  me,	  rob	  me	  –	  what	  am	  I	  going	  to	  do	  when	  you	  attack	  me?	  	  Wave	   the	  Constitution	   in	   your	   face?	   	   I’m	   just	   a	   nobody	  black	  queen	   […]	  But	   you	  know	  what?	  	  Ever	  since	  I	  heard	  about	  that	  Constitution,	  I	  feel	  free	  inside.”114	  	  Similarly,	  O’Flaherty	  and	  Fisher	  quote	  the	  response	  of	  one	  online	  commenter	  to	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  Yogyakarta	  Principles:	  “I	  am	  now,	  under	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law,	  officially	  human.	  And	  yesterday,	  I	  wasn’t.”115	  Such	   interventions	   offer	   powerful	   anecdotal	   evidence	   for	   the	   significance	   of	   a	   rights	   or	  recognition	  based	  politics.	   	  Yet,	  these	  successes	  still	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  politics	  that	  is	  specifically	  of	  rights	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  will	  be.	  	  Recognition	  is	  significant,	  but	  there	  remains	  a	  question	  of	  how	  far	  rights	  are	  able	  to	  secure	  the	  material	  well-­‐being	  of	  excluded	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groups	   or	   resolve	   material	   conflicts.116	  	   Perhaps	   the	   best	   question	   to	   ask	   in	   relation	   to	   such	  complexities	   is	   posed	   by	   Seckinelgin:	   ‘what	   sort	   of	   politics	   does	   the	   LGBTI	   [Lesbian,	   Gay,	  Bisexual,	  Transgender	  and	  Intersex]	  approach	  operationalize	  for	  recognition?’117	  	  Or,	  what	  kind	  of	  politics	  does	  LGBT	  language	  make	  possible?	  	  In	  essence,	  what	  kind	  of	  structures,	  binaries	  or	  analogies	   does	   it	   set	   up	   –	   and	   what	   is	   the	   impact	   of	   such	   structuring	   processes?	   	   There	   are	  numerous	  examples	  of	   the	   impact	  of	  binary	  divisions	   in	   this	  area,	  but	  we	  should	  also	  perhaps	  note	  a	  tendency	  in	  some,	  although	  not	  all,	  spheres	  of	  analysis	  to	  analogise	  sexuality	  with	  religion	  or	  ethnicity	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  particular	  rights.118	  Such	  comparisons	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  gloss,	  but	  at	  the	   same	   time	   raise	   questions	   of	   what	   assumptions	   such	   analogies	   must	   make	   in	   order	   to	  formulate	   useful	   comparisons.	   	   In	   particular,	   such	   comparisons	   close	   down	   the	   space	   for	  intersectionality	  or	  analysis	  at	  the	  level	  of	  multiple	  points	  of	  inclusion	  or	  exclusion.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  we	  might	  ask	  what	  assumptions	  are	  made	  when	  sexual	  minorities	  are	  viewed	   through	  a	  lens	   of	   equality	   or	   included/excluded	   as	   legitimate	   citizens.	   	   By	   constituting	   a	   binary	   of	  included/excluded	   and	   normal/other,	   we	   reinforce	   both	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   binary	   and	   the	  assumption	   of	   comparability	   between	   each	   side	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   creating	   a	   mutual	  dependency	  between	  each	  identified	  dichotomous	  name.	  	  What	  must	  be	  interrogated	  therefore	  is	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  we	  are	  defining	  difference	  in	  terms	  of	  analogy	  or	  resemblance,	  rather	  than	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  and	  what	  the	  consequences	  of	  doing	  this	  are.119	  My	  suggestion	  in	  response	  to	  these	  questions	  would	  be	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  rights	  and	  repetition	  outlined	  above	  facilitates	  a	  process	  of	  representation	  rather	  than	  repetition	  in	  a	  Deleuzian	  sense	  in	  which	  repetition	  constitutes	  not	   the	  reoccurrence	  of	   the	  same	  thing	  multiple	   times,	  but	   the	  process	  of	  affirming	  the	  new,	  discovery	  and	  experimentation	  through	  beginning	  again.120	  	  In	  this	  modality	  of	  representation,	  rights	  work	  through	  binaries,	  analogies	  or	  generalities,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	   condemn	  singularities	   (or	   subjects	  of	   law)	   to	   resemblance	  or	   recognition	   rather	   than	   their	  repetition	   as	   actualised	   singularities.	   	   	   ‘As	   an	   empty	   form	  of	   difference,	   an	   invariable	   form	  of	  variation,	  a	  law	  compels	  its	  subjects	  to	  illustrate	  it	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  their	  own	  change.’121	  	  Law	  here	  closes	  down	  the	  potentiality	   for	  change,	   for	  repetition,	  discovery	  or	  experimentation	  in	  a	  creative	   way,	   it	   is	   ‘repetition	   of	   the	   Same,	   explained	   by	   the	   identity	   of	   the	   concept	   or	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representation’122	  rather	   than	   repetition	   that	   ‘includes	   difference,	   and	   includes	   itself	   in	   the	  alterity	  of	  the	  Idea,	   in	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  an	  “a-­‐presentation”.’123	  	  Deleuze	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  this	  sense	  –	  in	  particular	  he	  denigrates	  those	  who	  ‘are	  content	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  rights,	  and	  recite	  lists	  of	  human	  rights:	  ‘It's	  not	  a	  question	  of	  applying	  human	  rights.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  inventing	  jurisprudences	  where,	  in	  each	  case,	  this	  or	  that	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  possible.’124	  	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  rights	  that	  reproduce	  binaries	  work	  by	  analogy	  and	  seek	  to	  bring	  the	  subject	  within	  an	  already	  established	  body	  of	   law	  by	  making	  her	  as	  similar	  as	  possible	  to	  those	  subjects	  who	  are	  already	  the	  bearers	  of	  rights.	   	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  operate	  in	  a	  negative	  rather	  than	  a	  positive	  power	   relation	   –	   they	   close	   down	   rather	   than	   open	   up	   new	   potentials	   for	   sexuality	   and	  connections	  that	  can	  resonate	  by	  and	  through	  sexuality.	  	  	  Human	  rights	  as	  I	  have	  outlined	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  are	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  this	  process	  and	   there	  are	  a	  number	  of	   further	  critiques	   that	   can	  be	  made	  using	   this	  as	  a	  point	  of	  departure.	   	   	   For	   example,	   Wendy	   Brown	   might	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   making	   a	   similar	   point	   to	   a	  Deleuzian	   critique	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   resemblance	   over	   repetition	   of	   difference	   when	   she	  suggests	  that	  differences	  are	  neutralised	  in	  circulation	  through	  liberal	  administrative	  discourse	  and	  through	  their	  ordination	  in	  law.	  	  Disciplinary	  power	  operates	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  people	  are	  reduced	   to	   definition	   through	   these	   differences,	  which	   are	   then	  written	   into	   law	   and	  become	  modes	  of	  control.	   	  All	  differences	  become	  ‘equivalent’	  in	  that	  they	  are	  all	  defined	  through	  their	  failure	  to	  be	  some	  kind	  of	   ideal-­‐type	  norm.	   	  Thus	  not	  only	  are	   identities	  essentialised,	  written	  into	   law	  and	  allowed	  to	  become	  part	  of	   the	  regulative	   framework,	  but	   in	   this	  way,	   the	   idea	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘normal’	  existence	  for	  any	  given	  society	  is	  also	  reinforced.	  	  The	  law	  is	  brought	  in	   to	  manage	  otherness,	   but	   in	  doing	   so	   identities	  become	   reified	   and	   individuals	   are	  divided	  into	   particular	   identity	   based	   subjectivities	   and	   subject	   groups.125	  Such	   an	   approach	   does	   not	  encourage	  reaching	  out	  and	  connecting	  across	  recognised	  difference,	  but	  reinforces	  division	  and	  separation	   into	   spheres	   of,	   at	   best,	   toleration.	   	   As	   a	   consequence,	   difference	   is	   rendered	  both	  eternal	  and	  something	   that	   can	  be	  papered	  over	  and	   ignored	  –	  we	  are	   in	  no	  way	  called	  on	   to	  interrogate	  why	  we	  position	  ourselves	  or	  others	  as	  ‘different’.	  Thus,	  we	  move	  from	  the	  question	  of	  binaries	  and	  divisions	  with	  a	  particular	  framework	  of	  law	  (Argentinan	  Statement	  vs.	  Syrian	  Statement,	  Toonen	  v	  Australia,	  cultural	  rights	  v	  sexual	  rights)	  to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   constitution	   of	   that	   framework	   itself	   and	   the	   role	   of	   law	   in	   reinforcing	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already	  existing	  structures,	  nomenclature	  and	  power	  dynamics.	  	  Brewster	  Kneen	  has	  elaborated	  on	  this	  point,	  arguing	  that:	  	   'The	   advocacy	   and	   pursuit	   of	   rights,	   both	   individual	   and	   corporate,	   is	   consequently	  bound	  to	  fragment	  a	  society	  into	  competing	  interests	  (echoes	  of	  class	  struggle),	  destroying	  any	  sense	  of	  solidarity	  and	  ultimately,	  destroying	  the	  very	  fabric	  of	  society	  itself’.126	  Furthermore,	   Kneen	   argues,	   as	   rights	   are	   primarily	   granted	   by	   the	   state,	   responsibility	   for	  justice	   and	   for	   the	   granting	   of	   rights	   is	   shifted	   further	   towards	   state	   (or	   occasionally	  international)	   institutions.	   	  These	   institutions	  become	   the	   focus	  of	  all	   claims	   to	   the	   redress	  of	  injustices,	   thus	   reinforcing	   their	   institutional	   power.	   	   This	   discursive	   repositioning	   of	   justice	  means	  that	  individual	  or	  community	  responsibility	  for	  justice	  is	  lessened	  by	  the	  very	  discourse	  and	   bodies	   that	   claim	   they	   are	   able	   to	   grant	   it.	   In	   terms	   of	   international	   law,	   he	   cites	   Falk’s	  highly	  critical	  commentary:	  	   ‘It	   is	   the	  weak,	   the	   leaders	  of	   the	  Third	  World	   countries,	  who	  are	   subject	   to	   this	   legal	  framework	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  The	  strong	  are	  exempt,	  and	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	   World	   War.	   US	   military	   people	   were	   not	   prosecuted	   for	   using	   the	   atomic	   bomb	   in	  Hiroshima	   and	  Nagasaki,	  while	   the	   Japanese	   and	   the	  Germans	  were	   held	   responsible	   for	  war	  crimes...International	   life...is	   characterized	   by	   pervasive	   double	   standards.	   It	   goes	   back	   to	   the	  UN	  Charter	  itself,	  which	  gives	  the	  five	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  a	  veto.	  And	  that	   veto,	   in	   effect,	   is	   saying	   that	   the	   UN	   Charter	   and	   international	   law	   do	   not	   apply	   to	   the	  powerful.	  The	  charter	   is	  a	  regulatory	   framework	  for	  the	  weak.	   	  The	  strong	  have	   impunity	  and	  exemption.’127	  Law	  here	  operates	  as	  a	  ‘structure	  of	  illegalisms’128	  and	  in	  their	  administration	  and	  formalisation,	  control	   is	  maintained	   by	   governmental	   regimes.	   	   This	   view	  of	   law	   and	   rights	   in	   international	  discourses	   is	   highly	   critical	   and	   perhaps	   one-­‐sided	   given	   the	   complex	  multifaceted	   nature	   of	  rights	   that	   I	   am	   trying	   to	   explore	   in	   this	   thesis.	   	   However,	   it	   is	  worth	   taking	   these	   criticisms	  seriously	  as	  the	  lived	  reality	  of	  some,	   if	  not	  all	  who	  live	  under	  human	  rights	  regimes.	   	   I	  would	  suggest	  that	  Kneen	  and	  Falk’s	  critiques	  provide	  interesting	  insight	  into	  why	  sexuality	  may	  prove	  so	   contentious:	   if,	   as	   I	   have	   suggested,	   sexuality	   does	   sit	   at	   a	   point	   of	   challenge	   to	   particular	  norms,	   normative	   structures	   and	   deeply	   regarded	   cultural	   mores,	   then	   using	   human	   rights	  discourse,	  and	  particularly	  the	  human	  rights	  instruments	  of	  the	  UN	  -­‐	  which	  can	  be	  construed	  as	  the	   tools	   of	   the	   powerful	   rather	   than	   neutral	   constructs	  which	   are	   equally	   applicable	   to	   all	   -­‐	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becomes	  a	  particularly	  potent	  challenge	  to	  these	  norms.	   	  This	  is	  not	  just	  because	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  at	  the	  time	  of	  a	  resolution’s	  passing	  but	  because	  such	  movements	  will	  also	  potentially	  recall	   the	   unjust	   historical	   structures	   of	   power	   and	   dominance	   related	   to	   both	   rights	   and	  sexuality	  (particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  colonial	  law).	   	  Thus	  resolutions	  about	  sexual	  orientation	  are	  rarely	   simply	   about	   sexual	   orientation	   alone,	   but	   a	  whole	  host	   of	   further	  dynamics,	   historical	  and	   present	   power	   relations,	   anxieties	   about	   change	   and	   control	   within	   and	   without	   the	  boundaries	  of	  household,	  state,	  family	  and	  self.	  	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  use	  of	  human	  rights	   to	   further	   the	   liberation	   of	   sexual	   minorities,	   it	   is	   instead	   an	   attempt	   to	   contextualise	  some	  of	  the	  frameworks	  within	  which	  controversies	  around	  these	  attempts	  might	  play	  out	  and	  to	   understand	   why	   issues	   of	   sexuality	   can	   become	   so	   emotive.	   	   By	   addressing	   questions	   of	  human	   rights	   and	   sexual	   orientation	   as	   Deleuzian	   ‘problems’,	   I	   am	   therefore	   attempting	   to	  widen	   the	   frame	   through	  which	  we	  can	  understand	   the	  multiple	  and	  myriad	  connections	   that	  are	  made	  through	  references	  to	  sexuality.	  	  As	  such	  I	  am	  seeking	  not	  only	  to	  embed	  questions	  of	  sexual	  rights	  within	  their	  wider	  material	  and	  contextual	  frame,	  but	  also	  to	  seek	  to	  bypass	  some	  of	   the	   debates	   that	   currently	   lead	   only	   to	   impasse	   within	   already	   established	   discursive	  formations.	  	  	  A	  second	  critique	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  approach	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Sara	  Ahmed.	   	  Ahmed	  also	  touches	  on	  issues	  of	  belonging,	  legitimisation	  and	  responsibility	  by	  addressing	  the	  discourses	  by	  which	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   are	   exercised	   and	   through	   this	   process,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	  figure	  of	  the	  stranger	  is	  constructed.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  stranger	  is	  the	  ‘known	  other’,	  someone	  who	  we	  know	  as	  ‘not	  belonging’.	  	  Thus,	  the	  stranger,	  or	  the	  other	  is	  not	  some	  unknown	  quantity,	  but	  a	  figure	  created	  by	  the	  very	  process	  of	  construction	  of	  boundaries.	  	  The	  effect,	  she	  argues	  is	  divisive:	  	   'The	  effects	  of	  stranger	  fetishism	  are	  clear:	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  stranger	  assumes	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  histories	  of	  its	  determination,	  and	  hence	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	   erases	   the	   very	   forms	   of	   difference	   that	   render	   impossible	   the	   formation	   of	   an	   inclusive	  community'129	  In	  essence,	  we	  work	  to	  make	  something	  unknown,	  known	  as	  ‘not	  like	  me’.	  	  Again,	  this	  becomes	  an	   effect	   of	   categorisation	   and	   naming:	   the	   ‘other’	   is	   categorised	   in	   a	   particular	  way	   and	   can	  then	  be	  excluded	  or	  ignored.	  	  No	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  interrogate	  differences,	  or	  explore	  avenues	  in	  which	  we	  may	  come	  to	  know	  the	  other,	  the	  potential	  for	  hybridity	  or	   ‘curdled	  otherness’.130	  Difference	   is	   essential	   and	   eternal.	   	   The	   borders	   of	   inside	   and	   outside	   are	   sharply	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  Postcoloniality	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000).	  p6	  130	  Suparna	  Bhaskaran,	  Made	  in	  India:	  Decolonizations,	  Queer	  Sexualities,	  Trans/National	  Projects	  (New	  York:	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permanently	  drawn,	  placing	  self	  and	  other	  on	  particular	  sides.	  	  Thus,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  gay	  people	  in	  Africa	  and	  homosexuality	  is	  a	  white	  man’s	  disease.	  	  Concurrently	  therefore,	  all	  Africans	  must	  be	   homophobic	   –	   placed	   permanently	   on	   the	   side	   of	   an	   unquestioned	  Western/non-­‐Western	  binary	   which	   equates	   tolerance	   and	   therefore	   civilisation	   with	   the	   West,	   and	   uncivilised	  barbarity	   elsewhere.	   	   Both	   ‘sides’	   I	   would	   suggest,	   are	   equally	   guilty	   of	   thinking	   binary	  identities.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  we	  should	   ignore	  difference	  or	  embrace	  some	  single	   teleological	  end.	   	  On	  the	   contrary,	   all	   differences,	   limits,	   boundaries	   and	   encounters	   should	   be	   thoroughly	  interrogated	  -­‐	  difference	  does	  not	  have	  to	  remain	  always	  and	  eternal	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  form	  in	  which	  we	   first	   encounter	   it.	   	   Difference	   returns,	   but	  without	   identity.	   	   The	   danger	   is	   that	   by	  ascribing	  rights	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  reified	  ideas	  of	  difference	  we	  are	  simply	  ignoring	  difference	  on	  a	  deeper	  level:	  difference	  is	  ascribed	  a	  particular	  place	  within	  our	  ontological	  framework	  and	  can	  then	   potentially	   be	   ignored,	   or	   at	   least,	   always	   responded	   to	   in	   the	   same	   legally	   prescribed	  manner.	  	  This	  is	  an	  abdication	  of	  responsibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  individual	  and	  state.	  One	   final	   point	   to	   which	   we	   have	   already	   alluded	   should	   be	   made	   explicit	   here:	   that	   liberal	  discourse	  hides	  the	  very	  fact	  and	  the	  violence	  of	  its	  own	  production	  of	  truth	  –	  law	  hides	  the	  fact	  that	  what	   it	  presents	  as	  normal	   is	  only	  one	  conception	  of	   so-­‐called	   ‘normality’	   ‘the	   rational	   is	  always	   the	   rationality	   of	   an	   irrational’.131	  	   Thus,	   the	   law	   positions	   the	   field	   for	   debate	   in	   a	  particular	  way	  and	  then	  hides	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  done	  this.	  	  Rajagopal	  has	  traced	  the	  way	  in	  which	   international	   law	  achieves	   this	  end,	  arguing	   that	   just	  as	   the	  mandate	  system	  converted	  humanitarianism	  from	  a	  system	  of	  dominance	  to	  a	  system	  of	  governance,132	  human	  rights	   too,	  facilitate	   the	   functioning	   of	   governmentality.	   	   He	   argues	   that	   human	   rights	   have	   particular	  historical	   roots,	   particular	   institutional	   and	   standardised	   features,	   particular	   conceptions	   of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  human	  and	  particular	  notions	  of	  truth	  which	  impact	  upon	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  are	   able	   to	   react	   to	   particular	   occurrences	   and	   injustices. 133 	  	   Through	   a	   process	   of	  rationalisation,	   disputes	   can	   be	   brought	   into	   an	   already	   constructed	   framework	   that	   makes	  them	   knowable	   and	   governable	   without	   ever	   challenging	   overarching	   structures	   and	  institutions	  of	  power.	  	  In	  this	  vein,	  Morgan	  argues	  that:	  	   'Indeed	  the	  whole	  genus	  of	  human	  rights	  law	  can	  be	  read	  as	  examples	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  disciplinary	  power.	   	  Human	  rights	   law	  normalizes.	   	   It	   takes	   the	  abuses	   suffered	  by	   those	  who	  assert	  difference,	  and	  colonizes	  their	  experiences	  to	  make	  them	  conformable	  to	  the	  structures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  ‘Capitalism:	  A	  Very	  Special	  Delerium’	  Interview	  with	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari.	  	  In	  Chaosophy,	  ed.	  Sylvere	  Lothringer,	  (Autonomedia/Semiotexte,	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  at	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  accessed	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  Rajagopal,	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  Law	  from	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  Movements	  and	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  World	  Resistance	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	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and	   imperatives	   of	   the	   mythological	   nation	   state.	   And	   along	   the	   way,	   it	   usually	   exonerates	  governments	  of	  any	  wrong-­‐doing'134	  	  This	   discursive	   repositioning	   is	   not	   unique	   to	   human	   rights	   law,	   in	   relation	   to	   discourses	   of	  ‘development’	   for	   example,	   D’Souza	   has	   noted	   the	   way	   in	   which	   particular	   Conventions	   and	  Commissions	   represent	   mechanisms	   by	   which	   a	   shift	   towards	   particular	   neoliberal	   regimes	  could	   be	   facilitated	   and	   legitimated.	   	   In	   essence,	   in	   examining	   developments	   in	   relation	   to	  human	   rights	   or,	   as	   in	   D’Souza’s	   analysis,	   development	   and	   access	   to	   water,	   we	   must	   be	  attentive	   not	   just	   to	   the	   decisions	  made	   or	   the	   rights	   achieved	   but	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	   such	  processes	  can	  reinforce	  particular	  regimes.135	  	  The	  question,	  with	  Deleuze	  and	  Foucault	  might	  be,	  ‘how	  is	  power	  practiced?’136	  What	  is	  the	  force	  and	  flow	  of	  relations,	  what	  is	  their	  impact	  and	  specific	  to	  the	  topic	  at	  hand,	  what	  role	  do	  rights	  play	  in	  this	  process?	  
Sexual	  orientation	  and	  ‘double	  sided’	  rights:	  Rights	  as	  control	  and	  rights	  as	  challenge	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  these	  issues	  are	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sexuality	  straddles	  two	  slightly	   different	   (but	   closely	   related)	   problems.	   	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	   immediate	   and	   real	  injustices	   faced	   by	   sexual	   minorities	   –	   extrajudicial	   executions,	   violence,	   discrimination,	  violations	   of	   privacy,	   interference	   in	   family	   life,	   restrictions	   on	   expression	   and	   assembly,	  persecution	  by	  state	  authorities	  and	  many	  more.	  	  These	  issues	  tend	  to	  be	  definable	  in	  terms	  of	  already	  existing	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  can	  use	  human	  rights	  documents	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  action.	   	   In	   this	   conceptualisation,	   the	   tools	   that	  were	   (and	   still	   are)	   objects	   of	   regulation	   and	  discipline	  can	  be	  turned	  back	  upon	  themselves	  -­‐	  in	  producing	  the	  homosexual,	  law	  also	  has	  the	  potential	   to	   empower	   him	   or	   her.	   	   ‘It	   engenders	   behaviour,	   it	   generates	   ideas	   and	   action,	   it	  bounds	  individual	  responsibility	  as	  well	  as	  promoting	  individual	  capacity	  and	  agency	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  it	  constitutes	  individualized	  notions	  of	  identity.'137	  This	   framework	   of	   rights	   is	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter	   –	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   reforms,	  legislation	   and	   criticisms	   address	   this	   aspect	   of	   rights	   discourse	   –	   an	   aspect	   that	   is	   most	  connected	  with	  law,	  administration	  and	  control.	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	  we	  might	  view	  this	  aspect	  of	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rights	   as	   machines	   of	   territorialisation,	   and	   beyond	   this	   ‘a	   way	   of	   reterritorialising	   oneself,	  conforming	  to	  a	  code	  of	  domination	  utterances,	  to	  a	  territory	  of	  established	  states	  of	  things’138	  Yet	   I	  want	   to	  suggest	   that	  within	  these	  codified,	  constitutionalised,	  contested	  rights,	   there	   is	  a	  second	  aspect,	  which	  haunts	  the	  rights	  discourse.	  	  This	  aspect	  relates	  to	  the	  virtual,	  rather	  than	  particular	  actualised	  right	  or	  law.	  	  As	  such,	  Colebrook	  notes	  that:	  	  	   ‘Deleuze	  focuses	  on	  the	  virtual	  not	  as	  some	  structural	  condition	  that	  we	  only	  know	  after	  the	   event,	   but	   the	   virtual	   as	   the	   real	   potentiality	   from	  which	   actuality	   unfolds.	   In	   addition	   to	  societies,	  revolutions	  or	  laws	  as	  they	  are	  known	  in	  history,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  idea	  of	  society,	  the	  idea	  of	  revolution	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  law.	  This	  world	  as	  it	  is	  known	  and	  lived	  emerged	  from	  a	  range	  of	  potentialities	  that	  have	  a	  real	  range	  and	  conditions.’139	  Thus	   those	   laws	   that	   we	   actualise	   are	   only	   one	   potential	   from	   the	   virtuality,	   of	   rights;	   this	  virtuality,	  or	  these	  virtual	  objects	  are	  no	  less	  real,	  or	  present	  than	  the	  laws	  that	  we	  see	  debated	  in	   courts	   or	   UN	   bodies.	   	   	   In	   this	   understanding,	   law,	   rights	   societal	   structures	   only	   emerge	  because	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  virtual	  that	  is	  expressed	  or	  repeated	  the	  actual.	  	  Thus	  we	  must	  interrogate	  the	  conditions	  of	  emergence	  of	  the	  actual	  or	  material	  structures.	  	  As	  such,	  this	  second	  dynamic	  concerns	   larger	  and	  systemic	   issues	  of	  why	  perceived	   injustices	  are	  read	  and	  posited	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  are.	   	  Or,	  how	  do	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  intersect	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  the	  claims	  to	  privacy,	  non-­‐discrimination	  or	  even	  equality	  in	  relation	  to	  sexual	  orientation	  a	   legitimate	  mode	   of	   expressing	   a	  wrong?	   	  What	   combination	   of	   factors	   is	   available	   to	   us	   to	  understand	   and	   define	   victims,	   oppressor,	  Western,	   non-­‐Western,	   culture,	   belonging,	   human,	  moral	   or	   immoral	   and	  why	   are	   these	   terms	   important?	   	   Equally	   important	   is	   the	   question	   of	  what	  approaching	  these	  problematics	  in	  this	  way	  makes	  less	  pertinent	  or	  relevant.	  	  Here	  then,	  I	  would	   suggest	   that	   rights	   begin	   to	   act	   as	   a	   machine	   of	   deterritorialisation	   –	   a	   mode	   of	  experimentation,	   expression	   or	   becoming-­‐something-­‐other.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   rights	   speak	   to	   a	  process	   not	   of	   inclusion	   within	   an	   already	   striated	   space,	   but	   what	   Colebrook	   calls	   ‘the	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  lawful,	  allowing	  new	  modes	  of	  what	  may	  lay	  claim	  to	  the	  concept.’140	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  why	  Deleuze	  suggests	  that	  ‘there	  are	  no	  human	  rights,	  there	  is	  life,	  and	  there	  are	  life	  rights.	  .	  .	  .	  That’s	  what	  being	  on	  the	  left	  is	  about.	  It’s	  creating	  the	  right’141	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This	  second,	  wider	  framework	  is	  both	  seemingly	  imperceptible	  and	  open	  ended.	  	  We	  can	  sketch	  out	   a	   framework	   of	   the	   particular	   forces	   that	   constitute	   a	   system	   of	   human	   rights	   in	  international	   law,	  the	  particular	  powers	  and	  histories	  that	  motivate	   it	  and	  the	  particular	  blind	  spots	   of	   the	   system,	   but	   we	   must	   recognise	   that	   this	   system	   is	   one	   that	   is	   both	   static	   and	  breaking	  down	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  response	  to	  new	  events,	  encounters	  and	  lines	  of	  flight.	  	  The	  reason	  that	  I	  find	  this	  to	  be	  particularly	  important	  is	  that	  such	  an	  understanding	  highlights	  the	  significance	   and	   interconnection	   of	   structure,	   contingency,	   chance	   or	   unpredictability	   and	  agency	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   	   The	  wider	   frame	  of	   law	  within	  which	  we	  must	   act	   is	   a	   territorial(-­‐ising)	   assemblage	   –	   a	   multiplicity	   that	   is	   neither	   entirely	   structured	   and	   structuring,	   nor	  amenable	   to	   the	   manipulation	   of	   particular	   agents.	   	   	   	   An	   awareness	   of	   this	   frame	   as	   both	  restrictive	   but	   open	   points	   towards	   the	   opportunities	   still	   offered	   by	   the	   human	   rights	  discourse.	   	   We	   work	   on	   and	   in	   a	   particular	   system	   of	   law,	   with	   a	   particular	   structure	   of	  language,	  binaries,	   strategies	  and	   this	   can	  mean	   that	  particular	  demands	  or	  political	  divisions	  
must	  play	  out	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  It	   is	  at	  this	  point	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  at	  their	  most	  precarious	  and	  their	  most	  interesting.	  	  Rights	  exist	  most	  demandingly	  not	  as	  a	  clear	  path	  to	  liberation	  but	  as	  a	  challenge	  –	  as	   markers	   that	   allow	   us	   to	   orient	   ourselves	   towards	   the	   problematic	   point	   at	   which	  frameworks	  of	   law	  and	  rights	  are	  at	  their	  most	  precarious:	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  what	  rights	  can	  do.	  	  Paradoxically	   then,	  our	  key	  concern	  must	  be	   the	  elusive	  point	  at	  which	  attempts	  are	  made	   to	  dismiss	   issues	   as	   not	   relevant	   to	   human	   rights;	   this	   will	   not	   be	   because	   such	   dismissals	   are	  either	  ‘right’	  or	  ‘wrong’	  but	  because	  such	  moments	  suggest	  a	  gap	  or	  a	  blind	  spot	  –	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  language	   of	   law	   to	   encapsulate	   a	   problematic	   and	   therefore	   the	   limits	   of	   what	   is	   currently	  possible.	   	   This	   is	  why	   sexuality	   and	  human	   rights	   are	  often	   so	   interesting.	   	   Sexuality	  must,	   in	  part,	  be	  a	  deferred	  totality;	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  sexuality	  is	  an	   ‘empty	  square’	  that	  resonates	  between	   series.	   	   As	   such,	   it	   continually	   shifts,	   desires	   and	   connects.	   	   This	   is	   the	   aspect	   that	  makes	   it	   so	  problematic	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   first	   codified	  and	   codifiable	   aspect	  of	   rights,	   but	   so	  interesting	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   second,	  more	   open	   ended	   articulation	   of	   rights	   –	   that	   aspect	   of	  rights	   which	   acknowledges	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   virtual	   and	   acts	   as	   a	   machine	   of	  deterritorialisation.	  	  	  	  Thus	  rather	  than	  simply	  engaging	  with	  human	  rights	  norms	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  particular	  ends	  –	  particular	  concessions	  from	  the	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  -­‐	  a	  process	  is	  needed	  by	  which	  the	  body,	  the	  lived	  experience	  and	  the	  space	  occupied	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  easily	  fit	  within	  already	  legislated	  parameters	  become	  a	  potential	  site	  of	  challenge,	  or	  a	  means	  of	  exposing	  the	  internal	  limits	  of	  the	  law.	  	  Sexuality	  operates	  and	  is	  regulated	  at	  many	  different	  levels.	  	  An	  exploration	  of	  this	   regulation	   indicates	   the	   interconnectedness	  of	   the	  discourses	   that	   structure	  our	   societies	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and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  law	  relates	  to	  such	  discourses,	  what	   it	  can	  sustain	  and	  what	   it	  struggles	  with.	  	  More	  significantly	  for	  our	  purposes	  however,	  it	  also	  shows	  the	  limits,	  the	  rationalisations,	  and	  the	  gaps	  through	  which	  the	  law	  fails	  to	  properly	  know	  the	  experience	  of	  sexuality.	  	  	  As	  such,	  the	  sexual	  subject	  becomes	  a	  site	  upon	  which	  a	  reverse	  discourse	  can	  be	  formulated.	  	  This	  is	  not	  an	   easy	  or	   obvious	   task	   –	   operating	   in	   this	  way	   requires	  not	   a	   complete	   abandonment	   of	   the	  structures	  through	  which	  human	  rights	  operate	  but	  an	  approach	  that	  seeks	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  logics	  created	  by	  law	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  expose	  their	  limits.	  	  The	  question	  therefore	  is	  one	  of	  how	  far	  to	  work	  within	  a	  particular	  legal	  discourse	  of	  truth	  and	  identity,	  and	  how	  far	  to	  work	  at	  an	  angle	   to	   it	   –	   aware	   of	   its	   powers,	   constraints	   and	   limits,	   but	   challenging	   its	   truths	   and	  historiographies.	  	  	  Clearly	  therefore,	  what	  is	  required	  is	  an	  awareness	  that	  rights	  and	  law	  in	  themselves	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  produce	  and	  sustain	  any	  kind	  of	  recognisable	  ‘truth’	  of	  sexuality	  or	  of	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	   experience	   of	   the	  myriad	   different	  ways	   of	   living	   a	   situated	   non-­‐heteronormative	   life.	  	  Donna	  Haraway	  makes	  an	  important	  point	  in	  this	  regard	  when	  she	  talks	  of	  situated	  knowledges,	  arguing	  that,	  '[f]eminist	  objectivity	  is	  about	  limited	  location	  and	  situated	  knowledge,	  not	  about	  transcendence	  and	  splitting	  of	  subject	  and	  object.	  	  In	  this	  way	  we	  might	  become	  answerable	  for	  what	  we	   learn	   how	   to	   see.’142	  Knowledge	   comes	   from	  perspective,	   from	   lived	   experience,	   not	  abstract	  morality	  or	  general	  truth.	  	  This	  means	  that	  justice	  must	  always	  be	  situated,	  responsive	  and	  responsible.	  	  What	  is	  necessary	  here	  then	  is	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  limited	  and	  situated	  nature	  of	  law	  in	  relation	   to	   sexuality	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   law	   must	   play	   a	   (re-­‐)territorialising	   role	   in	   its	  interaction	   with	   sexual	   minorities.	   	   Because	   of	   the	   particular	   historiography	   of	   law	   and	  colonialism	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality,	   this	   reterritorialising	  moment	   is	  extremely	  problematic	   in	  international	  arenas.	  	  Rights	  are	  one	  factor	  among	  many	  which	  constitute	  and	  are	  constituted	  by	  issues	  of	  sexuality.	   	  Thus	  while	  we	  can	   focus	  on	  sexuality	  as	   it	   is	  represented	   in	  human	  rights	  terms,	   this	  must	  be	  done	  against	  a	  background	  of	   the	  wider	   issue	  of	  what	  human	  rights	  make	  possible	   or	   impossible.	   	   We	   cannot	   lift	   ‘alternative’	   sexualities	   from	   their	   situatedness	   that	  contributes	   to	   their	  definition	  as	   ‘alternative’	  nor	   can	  we	  necessarily	   change	   the	   fact	   that	   law	  works	  in	  a	  constant	  push-­‐pull	  of	  emancipation/regulation.	   	  We	  can	  however,	  try	  to	  grasp	  how	  law	   functions	   and	   contributes	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   identity	   through	   this	  emancipatory/regulatory	  process.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  quote	  used	  by	  Henderson	  in	  the	  title	  of	  her	  article	  discussing	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  Toonen	  decision	   for	   Tasmanian	   gay	   people	   –	   the	   assertion	   that,	   ‘I’d	   rather	   be	   an	   outlaw’	   is	   very	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interesting.	  	  The	  outlaw	  needed	  is	  of	  a	  very	  specific	  kind	  –	  not	  one	  who	  cuts	  herself	  off	  from	  the	  operations	  of	  legal	  discourses,	  but	  one	  who,	  deliberately	  or	  otherwise,	  positions	  herself	  on	  the	  limits	   and	  margins	   of	   the	   law,	   occupying	   these	   borders	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   space	   that	  draws	  attention	  to	  their	  existence.	  	  Thus,	  the	  sexual	  other	  can	  sometimes,	  although	  not	  always,	  embody	  the	  contradictions	  inherent	  in	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  sexuality,	  and	  this	  embodiment	  is	  potentially	  a	  point	  of	  challenge.	  	  We	  cannot	  ignore	  and	  work	  completely	  outside	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  law,	   but	  we	   can	   step	   back	   from	   the	   truth	   of	   those	   limits,	   challenge	   frameworks	   and	   demand	  more.	   	  We	  cannot	  escape	  the	  discursive	  and	  regulatory	  power	  of	  liberal	  human	  rights	  law,	  but	  we	  can	  challenge	   its	  application.	   	  Put	   simply:	  when	  one	  aspect	  of	   law	  seeks	   to	   institutionalise	  sexuality	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  regulate	  and	  control	  it,	  the	  challenge	  to	  activists	  is	  to	  refuse	  to	  let	  it	  do	  so.	  	  	  In	  this	  imagining,	  claims	  to	  human	  rights,	  particularly	  when	  followed	  by	  an	  accusation	  that	  such	   issues	   are	   not	   human	   rights	   issues	   at	   all	  may	  mark	   a	   shift,	   a	   crack	   in	   the	   territorialised	  assemblage	  or	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  line	  of	  flight	  into	  new	  and	  unknown	  territory.	  	  	  Such	   lines	   of	   flight	   are	   rarely	   safe	   –	   Deleuze	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   re-­‐territorialisation	   or	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   micro-­‐fascisms	   along	   the	   line.143	  Ironically,	   in	   many	  instances,	  human	  rights	  may	  not	  always	  be	  the	  way	  forward	  –	  they	  appear	  to	  come	  into	  play,	  or	  be	  most	  needed	  when	  they	  are	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  do	  anything	  at	  all.	  	  It	  might	  be	  most	  accurate	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality,	  human	  rights	  do	  not	  always	  offer	  us	  the	  answer,	  instead	  they	  point	  to	  the	  need	  to	  ask	  more	  questions.	  	  	  Framing	  rights	  struggles	  in	  this	  way	  demands	  that	  rights-­‐related	  struggles	  should	  not	  be	  about	  top	  down	  moral	   judgements	  or	   the	   institutionalised	  and	   institution-­‐dependent	   logic	  of	  human	  rights	   but	   about	   legally	   informed	   sites	   of	   struggle	   –	   recognition	   that	   the	   law	   will	   always	   be	  regulative,	   but	   through	   its	   very	   act	   of	   regulation,	   it	   opens	   the	   door	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   re-­‐regulation	  and	  challenge.	  	  Human	  rights	  as	  legal	  instruments	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  ends	   in	   themselves,	   but	   as	   tools	   that	   are	   available	   for	   fighting	   or	   for	   clarifying	   battles	   over	  nomenclature,	  over	  existence,	  over	  morality	  and	  even	  over	  the	  very	  framework	  through	  which	  the	   rights	   discourse	   operates.	   	   This	   is	   perhaps	   why	   it	   is	   important	   to	   start	   with,	   but	   not	   be	  limited	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  human	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  are	  currently	  positioned	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  in	  international	  governmental	  organisations	  and	  courts.	  	  The	  debates	  in	  the	  UN	  and	  the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   Toonen	   Judgment	   was	   framed	   is	   interesting	   –	   such	   instances	   give	   an	  indication	  of	   the	   status	  of	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   at	   a	  particular	   time,	   as	  well	   as	  of	   the	   changing	  position	   that	   sexuality	   is	   beginning	   to	   occupy	   within	   both	   hard	   and	   soft	   law.	   	   A	   focus	   on	  international	  human	  rights	   institutions	  allows	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  forces	  at	  work	  in	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relation	   to	   sexual	   orientation,	   sexual	   subjectivity	   and	   sexuality	   more	   generally.	   	   As	   tools	   for	  addressing	  embodied	  wrongs	  however,	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  often	  find	  their	  limits.	  	  The	  paradox	  of	  rights	  as	  simultaneously	  a	  mode	  of	  emancipation	  and	  a	  mode	  of	  control	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  	  This	  approach	  severely	  reduces	  the	  potential	  of	  human	  rights	   in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  but	  does	  not	   (yet)	   completely	   destroy	   their	  worth.	   	   Rights	   here	   seem	   to	   be	   an	   entry	   point	   –	   a	  way	   of	  attempting	   to	  comprehend	  how	  the	  system	  of	  sexuality/visibility/law	   functions	  –	  a	  discursive	  terrain	   on	   which	   limits	   can	   be,	   if	   not	   fully	   explored,	   then	   at	   least	   tentatively	   and	   partially	  engaged	  with,	  creating	  new	  possibilities	  for	  action,	  engagement	  and	  empowerment	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  make	  use	  of	  existing	  human	  rights	  language.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  structures	  of	  power	  and	  law	  can	  be	  taken	  on	  in	  their	  own	  terms,	   the	  strategy	  must	  be	  to	  try	  to	  change	  the	  rules	  of	   the	  game.144	  This	   cannot	   be	   done	   without	   situating	   ‘what	   has	   happened’	   within	   a	   wider	   context.	  	  When	   approaching	   such	   occurrences	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights,	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  therefore	   necessary	   to	   explore	   both	   the	   actual	   (what	   has	   happened	   materially	   and	   how	  structures	   of	   law	   relate	   to	   this)	   but	   also	   the	   virtual	   potentialities	   that	   haunt	   each	   event	   and	  demand	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  emergence	  of	  material	  circumstances.	  	  To	  put	  this	  differently:	   exposing	   the	   limits	   within	   which	   games	   are	   played	   is	   one	   step	   in	   the	   process	   of	  changing	  the	  rules.	  	  Many	  (although	  not	  all)	  human	  rights	  campaigners	  generally	  and	  gay	  rights	  campaigners	  specifically	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  institutional	  limits	  that	  engaging	  with	  the	  discourse	  of	  human	   rights	   impose	  on	   them,	   however,	   at	   both	   the	   level	   of	   tactics	   –	   in	   achieving	   immediate	  change,	   and	   strategy	   –	   in	   challenging	   overarching	   epistemologies,	   human	   rights	   still	   have	   the	  potential	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  weapon.	  	  What	  must	  always	  be	  kept	  in	  mind,	  however,	  is	  how	  and	  why	  such	  discourses	  are	  being	  engaged:	  rights	  do	  not	  offer	  us	  truth,	  they	  offer	  us	  tactics.	  	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  of	   imposing	  an	  artificial	   clarity	  here,	  or	  of	   viewing	  binaries,	  borders	  and	  difference	  as	  static,	  when	   in	   fact	   they	  are	  anything	  but.	   	  Truth	  here	  requires	  an	  oscillation	  between	  general	  and	   particular	   –	   between	   situated	   knowledge	   and	   an	   exploration	   of	   wider	   structures	   within	  which	  such	  situated	  lives	  are	  lived.	  	  	  Thus,	  while	   the	   law	  may	   construct	   sexuality	   as	   an	   identifiable	   aspect	   of	   selfhood	   that	   can	   be	  defined	  and	   regulated,	  we	  must	   reclaim	  sexuality	  as	  a	  political	   challenge.	   	   In	   this	  perspective,	  neither	   rights	   nor	   activist	   discourse	   related	   to	   sexuality	   offer	   us	   a	   blueprint	   for	   what	   a	  gay/lesbian/trans	   person	   is	   and	   instead	   offer	   ‘holding	   space’	   from	   where	   new	   narratives	   of	  sexuality	  can	  be	  drawn,	  new	  truths	  can	  be	  interrogated	  and	  new	  challenges	  can	  be	  made.145	  	  	  To	  this	   end,	  Morgan	  argues	  –	   somewhere	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  arguments	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one	  of	   the	  key	  effects	  of	   the	  Tasmanian	   communication	  has	  been	   to	   give	   gay	  Tasmanian	  men	  and	   women	   the	   opportunity	   to	   tell	   their	   own	   stories	   about	   their	   sexuality	   and	   by	   doing	   so,	  dispute	  the	  law’s	  ‘truth’	  about	  the	  ‘homosexual’.146	  	  The	  judgment	  becomes	  one	  step	  in	  a	  process	  of	   deterritorialisation	   that	   has	   resonated	   in	   positive	   ways	   for	   some	   and	   less	   positively	   for	  others.	  	  	  At	   issue	   here	   is	   the	   dual	   sidedness	   that	   characterises	   law	   more	   generally,	   but	   rights	   in	   this	  particular	   instance.	   	   Rights	   undeniably	   have	   a	   disciplinary,	   governmental	   aspect.	   	   They	   are	  embedded	   in	   a	   particular	   historical	   discourse	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   control	   and	   function	   in	   a	  primarily	  ‘top-­‐down’	  fashion	  that	  assigns	  names	  and	  positions	  that	  can	  bear	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  lived	  experience,	  and	  moreover	  can	  work	  to	  alienate	  individuals	  from	  their	  lived	  surroundings	  and	  each	  other.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  operation	  of	  rights	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  can	  work	   in	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	  UN	   to	   reaffirm	   particular	   structural	   binaries	   and	   divisions	   of	  insider/outsider,	   Western/non-­‐Western.	   	   These	   divisions	   become	   self-­‐perpetuating	   and	   can	  further	  alienate	  subject	  from	  state,	  state	  from	  state,	  and	  person	  from	  ‘subjectivity’.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  rights	  discourse	  does	  not	  achieve	  this	  alone,	  but	  the	  law	  can	  play	  a	  very	  powerful	  role	  in	  affirming	  particular	  modes	  of	  visibility	  and	  articulation.	  	  	  Yet	   I	   have	   also	   suggested	   that	   there	   is	   a	   second	   side	   to	   rights	   –	   one	   that	   in	   conjunction	  with	  sexuality,	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   unactualised	   possibilities	   of	   particular	   laws	   and	   to	   the	   open	  ended	  nature	  of	  what	  is	  possible	  or	  impossible	  in	  any	  particular	  context.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  an	  attempt	   to	   situate	   rights	   and	   sexuality	  within	   a	  wider	   context	   both	   demands	   and	   brings	   into	  focus	  this	  second	  aspect	  of	  rights.	  	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  rights	  can	  be	  entirely	  ‘rescued’:	  the	  virtual	   and	  actual	  work	   together	   and	   rights	  operate	  both	   in	   terms	  of	  potestas	   and	  potentia.147	  	  Furthermore,	  any	  attempt	  to	  exploit	  this	  more	  open-­‐ended	  aspect	  of	  rights	  is	  not	  risk	  free	  –	  and	  the	   cost	   of	   deterritorialisation	   or	   the	   line	   of	   flight	  will	   be	   high.	   	   I	  would	   argue	   however,	   that	  despite	   these	   risks,	   it	   is	   this	   second,	   more	   open-­‐ended	   aspect	   of	   rights	   that	   offers	   the	   most	  interesting	  potential	  for	  action	  and	  activism.	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  explore	  both	   the	   context	   and	   dynamics	   of	   attempting	   to	   engage	   more	   closely	   with	   this	   second,	  demanding	  and	  open-­‐ended	  aspect	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  consequences	  that	  may	  follow	  from	  doing	  so.	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Chapter	  Four	  –	  Narratives	  of	  identity	  and	  inclusion:	  International	  LGBT	  advocacy	  and	  
Iran	  
Dynamics	  of	  naming	  and	  recognition:	  Activist	  responses	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  minors	  for	  
sexual	  crimes	  in	  Iran	  	  The	   previous	   chapter	   considered	   the	   circulation	   of	   sexuality	   through	   various	   instruments	   of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  current	  problematics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  A	  particular	  theme	  that	  emerges	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  considerations	  is	  the	  dualistic	  nature	  of	  the	  operation	   of	   rights:	   rights	   become	   a	   kind	   of	   abstract	   machine,	   at	   once	   breaking	   down	   and	  building	  up	  structures	  of	   law	  and	  normativity.	   	  This	  double	  movement,	  I	  would	  suggest,	   forms	  both	  the	  paradox	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  However,	  an	  examination	  of	  human	  rights	   instruments	   alone	   will	   only	   capture	   a	   partial	   picture	   of	   how	   such	   paradoxes	   and	  potentialities	   are	   played	   out;	   of	   equal	   importance	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   civil	   society	   groups,	  activists	  and	  more	  general	  discursive	  interactions	  also	  form	  a	  medium	  through	  which	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  circulate.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  begins	  to	  examine	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  might	  occur.	   	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  explore	  all	  interactions	  of	  all	  activist	  organisations	  or	  social	  movements	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	   and	  human	   rights	   in	   all	   locations	   or	   at	   all	   times.	   	   The	   scope	   of	   analysis	   is	   therefore	  necessarily	  limited	  –	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  attempt	  to	  draw	  themes	  from	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  events	  in	  order	  to	   conceptualise	   how	   issues	   surrounding	   rights	   and	   sexuality	  might	   interact.	   	   Thus	   sexuality	  here	  is	  understood	  as	  moving	  through	  multiple	  series,	  facilitating	  resonance,	  but	  not	  synthesis.	  	  The	   two	  questions	  under	  consideration	  concern	  what	  such	  resonances	  might	  or	  might	  not	  be,	  and	  how	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  sexuality	  can	  be	  translated	  into	  political	  action.	  	  	  Of	   key	   importance	   here	   are	   issues	   of	   power,	   recognition,	   visibility	   and	   voice	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	  these	  issues	  interact	  with	  processes	  of	  subjectivation	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  not	  fixed	  and	  stable	  but	  is	  instead	  an	  assemblage	  of	  heterogeneous	  elements.	  	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  try	  to	  analyse	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  tell	  ourselves	  particular	  stories	  about	  sexuality,	  or	  use	  particular	  narratives	  to	  render	  comprehensible	  political	  or	  legal	  actions	  around	  sexuality,	  anchored	  to	  a	  sexual	  subject.	  	  Of	  interest	  therefore	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  territorialise	  sexual	  becoming.	  	  This	  means	  that	  my	  focus	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  particularities	  of	  each	  individual	  story,	  but	  the	  dynamics	  through	  which	  such	  narratives	   are	   circulated.	   	   As	   such,	   I	   do	  not	   intend	   to	   apportion	  blame	   to	   one	  particular	  actor	  over	  another,	  or	  to	  valorise	  one	  particular	  mode	  of	  action,	  I	  am	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  way	  in	   which	   stories	   repeat	   and	   are	   repeated.	   	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   recall	   this	   repetition	   or	  reiteration	  in	  their	  image	  of	  a	  child	  singing	  to	  himself	  in	  the	  dark,	  repeating	  a	  song	  in	  order	  to	  orient	  himself	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   chaos	   around	  him.	   	  The	   refrain	   temporarily	   creates	  order,	   or	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particular	  stratifications,	  that	  grow	  stronger	  as	  they	  are	  repeated.	  	  We	  create	  ‘home’	  by	  drawing	  a	   centre	   around	   a	   fragile	   circle.1	  	   In	   this	   way,	   we	  might	   explore	   the	   way	   in	   which	   particular	  stratified	  ‘truths’	  of	  sexuality	  (or	  more	  accurately	  particular	  sexual	  identities	  or	  nomenclatures	  of	   sexual	   orientation)	   are	   constituted	   by	   their	   repetition	   in	   the	   face	   of	   chaos	   and	   conflicting	  information.	   	   In	   previous	   chapters,	   I	   have	   highlighted	   the	   way	   in	   which	   particular	   binary	  oppositions	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  entrenched	  with	  regards	  work	  within	  the	  UN	  in	  relation	  to	   sexuality;	   what	   is	   significant	   here	   however,	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   such	   binaries,	   or	   at	   least	  selections	  of	  coherent	  narratives	  and	  groupings,	  are	  necessary	  for	  political	  action.	   	  Of	  primary	  importance	   then,	   are	   epistemological	   conditions	   or	   the	   question	   of	   how	   we	   know	   what	   we	  know:	  which	   repetitions	   are	   taken	   as	   axiomatic,	  why	   they	  might	   be	   taken	   to	   be	   as	   such,	   and	  what	  impact	  this	  has	  on	  the	  possibility	  for	  action.	   	  In	  essence,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  here	  of	  what	  possibilities	   are	   being	   closed	   down	   by	   the	   ascription	   of	   a	   single	   form	   of	   knowledge	   or	  subjectivity	   to	   the	   singularities	   with	   which	   we	   are	   dealing	   and	   what	   power	   dynamics	   are	  working	  to	  contribute	  to	  this	  process.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  international	  legal	  institutions	  both	  contribute	  to,	  and	  are	  influenced	  by	  this	  process.	  	  	  Thus,	  this	  chapter	  is	  in	  large	  part	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	   refrain,	   and	  as	   such	   the	  key	  question	   is	  not	  which	   individual	   is	   saying	  what,	  but	  what	  does	  the	  act	  of	  articulation	  or	  visibilisation	  bring	  into	  proximity	  and	  how	  is	  this	  proximity	  viewed	  and	  understood?	  Obviously,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   explore	   all	   of	   the	   stories	  we	   tell	   ourselves	   about	   sexuality,	   or	  homosexuality.	   	   Different	   narratives	   circulate	   in	   different	   spaces	   and	   some	   themes	   resonate	  much	   more	   clearly	   at	   different	   times.	   	   Of	   particular	   interest	   to	   me	   however,	   is	   the	   spatial	  division	   of	   sexual	   subjectivities,	   or	   the	   association	   of	   same	   sex	   activity	   (and	   the	   identities	  attached	   to	   same	   sex	   activity)	   to	  particular	   regions,	   and	   the	   association	  of	   these	   regions	  with	  discourses	   of	   civilisation	   or	   barbarity.	   	   This	   regionalisation	   can	   be	   physical	   –	   for	   example,	  homosexuality	   becomes	   something	   ‘Western’	   -­‐	   or	   it	   can	   be	   enacted	   as	   belonging	   or	   not	  belonging	  to	  a	  particular	  grouping,	  culture	  or	  mode	  of	   living	  (whiteness,	  wealth,	  atheism	  etc.).	  	  This	   spatialisation	   brings	   into	   proximity	   certain	   subjectivities	   and	   tendencies	   in	   a	   mutually	  reinforcing	   dynamic.	   	   A	   process	   of	   ‘othering’	   along	   the	   line	   of	   sexuality,	   brings	   particular	  ‘identities’,	   which	   are	   accompanied	   by	   particular	   resonances,	   into	   clearer	   focus.	   These	  resonances	   can	   then	   be	   circulated	   through	   both	   official	   and	   unofficial	   channels.	   	   Thus	  ‘homosexuality	   is	   a	  white	  man’s	   disease’,	   ‘there	   are	   no	   homosexuals	   in	   Iran’,	   ‘Fundamentalist	  Islam	   poses	   a	   threat	   to	   all	   gay	   people’.	   	   Clearly	   all	   of	   these	   statements	   can	   be	   disputed	   or	  accused	  of	   lacking	   in	  nuance	  or	   accuracy,	   but	   at	   this	   level	   of	  political	  discourse,	   the	  narrative	  wholeness	  of	   such	  statements	  become	  compelling.	   	  We	  might	  accept	   that	  politics	  or	   law	  must	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proceed	  through	  the	  use	  of	  proper	  names,	  figures	  or	  ideas,	  and	  even	  through	  modes	  of	  political	  storytelling,	   yet	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   there	   are	   several	   levels	   of	   complexity	   at	  work	  within	  this	  operation.	  	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  each	  name	  or	  event	  is	  the	  actualisation	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  virtuality	  that	  haunts	  the	  materiality	  of	  what	  is	  actualised,	  we	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  linguistic	  tools	  to	  which	  we	  have	  access	  and	  the	  limitations	  that	  these	  tools	  place	  on	  us,	  however	  necessary	  they	  may	  be.	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  these	  limitations	  are	  the	  key	  concern	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  I	   have	   discussed	   the	   limits	   of	   ‘naming’	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   	   This	  argument	   can	   be	   extended	   through	   the	   suggestion	   that	   these	   linguistic	   inaccuracies	   indicate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  concept	  at	  work	  here.	   	  For	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  the	  concept	  is	  not	  a	  denotation	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  or	  a	  signification	  of	  the	  lived.	  	  Concepts	  are	  instead	  ‘fuzzy’	  multiplicities	   moving	   on	   the	   plane	   of	   immanence;2	  they	   are	   points	   of	   multiplicity	   that	   are	  occasioned	  by	  problems	  and	  apprehend	  the	  event.	  The	  concept	  is	  not	  a	  label	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  things,	  but	  a	  particular	  orientation	  that	  remains	  open	  and	  expansive:	  concepts	  force	  us	  to	  think.3	  	  For	  Grosz,	  ‘[c]oncepts	  are	  points	  of	  multiplicity,	  connections	  of	  components,	  which	  share	  "zones	  of	   proximity,"	   borders,	   with	   other	   concepts,	   marked	   by	   irregular	   contours,	   an	   improper	   or	  imperfect	  fit.’4	  	  The	  danger	  that	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  warn	  us	  of	  is	  the	  confusion	  of	  concept	  with	  function,	   and	  most	   particularly	   in	   this	   case	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   concept	   to	   opinon	   or	   doxa.5	  Thus:	   ‘Doxa	   is	   a	   type	   of	   proposition	   that	   arises	   in	   the	   following	  way:	   in	   a	   given	   perceptive-­‐affective	   lived	   situation…someone	  extracts	   a	  pure	  quality	   from	   it…but	   at	   the	   same	   time	  as	  he	  abstracts	   the	   quality,	   he	   identifies	   himself	   with	   a	   generic	   subject	   experiencing	   a	   common	  affection.	  	  “Discussion,”	  therefore,	  bears	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  abstract	  perceptual	  quality	  and	  on	  the	  power	  of	  the	  generic	  subject	  affected…opinion	  is	  an	  abstract	  thought…opinion	  expresses	  the	  general	   functions	   of	   particular	   states.	   	   It	   extracts	   an	   abstract	   quality	   from	   perception	   and	   a	  general	  power	  from	  affection:	  in	  this	  sense	  all	  opinion	  is	  already	  political.	  	  That	  is	  why	  so	  many	  discussions	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  this	  way:	  “as	  a	  man,	  I	  consider	  all	  women	  to	  be	  unfaithful”;	  “as	  a	  woman,	  I	  think	  men	  are	  liars.”’6	  To	  return	  to	  the	  three	  statements	  above:	  the	  complex	  enunciations	  of	  homosexuality,	  or	  Africa	  or	   Islam,	  which	  we	  might	  posit	   as	   actualisations	  of	   a	  multiplicitious	  virtuality,	   are	   reduced	   to	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  Grosz,	  Time	  Travels:	  Feminsim,	  Nature,	  Power	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  p159	  5	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  What	  Is	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  p145,	  p150.	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  Ibid.	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perceptions	  and	  to	  doxa.	   	  Perception	  becomes	  abstracted	  and	  used	  to	  express	  generality.	   	  The	  fuzziness	  or	  open-­‐ended	  nature	  of	  their	  existence	  is	  reduced	  as	  virtuality,	  or	  that	  which	  cannot	  be	  contained	  or	  thought	  within	  a	  particular	  milieu,	  is	  lost.	  	  	  This	   means	   that	   we	   must	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   emplacement	   and	   proximity	   of	   particular	  perceptions,	  enunciations	  and	  functions	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  circulate	  through	  official	  and	  unofficial	  channels	  of	  governance	  and	  communication.	   	  While	  part	  of	  this	  exercise	  involves	  the	  tracing	  of	  particular	  narratives	  to	  particular	  origins,	  I	  am	  also	  interested	  in	  the	  virtual	  aspects	  of	  such	   narratives:	   the	   different	   logics	   that	   are	   excluded	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   actualisation	   and	  reiteration	  of	  particular	  forms	  and	  moreover,	  the	  dynamic	  that	  makes	  this	  form	  of	  reiteration	  a	  particularly	  powerful	  mode	  of	  political	  action.7	  	  	  While	   there	  are	  numerous	  narratives	   that	  could	  be	  addressed	  through	  this	   lens,	   the	   increased	  proximity	   of	   ‘homophobia’	   and	   ‘Islam’	   has	   proved	   particularly	   controversial	   in	   much	   recent	  discourse	   and	   academic	   work.	   	   The	   proximity	   of	   these	   terms	   can	   be	   viewed	   in	   both	   official	  channels	  (for	  example	  in	  immigration	  policies	  or	  equality	  legislation	  that	  takes	  as	  axiomatic	  that	  Islam	   and	   homosexuality	   are	   mutually	   incompatible)	   and	   in	   more	   unofficial	   discourse	   and	  media	   that	   reproduce	   and	   re-­‐entrench	   particular	   perceptions.	   	   Puar	   notes	   the	   reductionist	  nature	  of	  such	  assumptions	  –	  in	  particular	  the	  way	  in	  which	  such	  circulations	  rely	  on	  notions	  of	  repressed	  Muslim	  sexuality	  and	  normative	  masculinity.8	  	  Specific,	  familiar	  perceptions	  of	  Islam	  are	  foregrounded	  and	  repeated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  replicate	  and	  authenticate	  themselves	   in	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  cycle.	   	  Thus,	   in	  operation,	   is	   the	  power	  dynamic	   identified	  by	  both	  Ahmed	  and	  Brown	   in	   which	   the	   stranger	   is	   the	   ‘known	   other’	   –	   that	   which	   is	   already	   recognised	   as	   not	  belonging.9	  	  Recognition	  and	  classification	  operate	  pre-­‐emptively,	  to	  position	  particular	  figures	  and	   others	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   self.	   	   Ahmed’s	   analysis	   here	   has	   a	   highly	   spatial	   dimension:	  strangers	  are	  integrated	  into	  a	   ‘cognitive	  map’	  that	  exists	  for	  the	  recognition	  and	  mediation	  of	  difference	   and	   its	   emplacement	   in	   a	   relational	   dynamic.	   	   Similarly,	   Brown	   notes	   the	   way	   in	  which	  power	  operates	  to	  dictate	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  tolerable	  in	  relation	  to	  otherness.	   	  Tolerance	  acts	   as	   a	   tool	   for	  managing	   otherness,	   but	   as	  with	  Ahmed,	   it	   is	   the	   centre	  which	   dictates	   the	  limits	  of	  the	  tolerable	  or	  the	  degree	  of	  otherness	  that	  can	  be	  permitted.	  	  As	  such,	  anything	  that	  falls	   outside	   such	   limits	   becomes	   both	   intolerant	   and	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   the	   centre,	  intolerable.	  	  These	  analyses	  of	  inside/outside	  dynamics	  seem	  particularly	  important	  here	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  eg	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Life	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2010).	  p7	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  active	  and	  passive	  vitalism.	  8	  Jasbir	  K.	  Puar,	  Terrorist	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  in	  Queer	  Times	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	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  Sara	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problematic	  proximity	  of	  Islam	  and	  homophobia	  seems	  to	  be	  bound	  up	  in	  similar	  dynamics	  of	  tolerance/intolerance,	  belonging/external	  and	  civilised/uncivilised.	  The	  problem	  therefore,	   is	  not	  necessarily	   the	  simple	  question	  of	  whether	  such	  statements	  are	  ‘true’	  or	  ‘untrue’	  but	  the	  way	  in	  which	  particular	  meanings	  are	  ‘fixed’.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  repetitive	  iteration	   and	   stabilisation	   of	   such	   positions	   creates	   a	   lack	   of	   space	   for	   addressing	   alternative	  proximities,	  alternative	  planes	  of	  meaning	  or	  alternative	  modes	  of	  being.	  	  Put	  more	  simply,	  the	  problem	  is	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  a	  dualistic	  narrative	  that	  fails	  to	  unpick	  the	  operation	  of	  power	  on	   either	   side	   of	   a	   binary	   division.	   	   In	   relation	   to	   gay	   rights,	   the	   effect	   can	   be	   a	   tendency	   to	  ‘teleologise’	   gay	   liberation	   and	   gay	   rights,	   particularly	   in	   an	   eventual	   movement	   towards	  equality	   legislation	  as	   the	  only	  direction	   in	  which	  we	  should	  move	  (and	   indeed	  are	  capable	  of	  progressing).10	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  gay	  rights	  are	  in	  themselves	  bad	  things,	  and	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  an	  exhortation	  to	  simply	  ignore	  suffering	  that	  is	  endured	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sexuality,	  however,	  it	  is	  a	  caution	  against	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  can	  be	  only	  one	  mode	  of	  sexual	  liberation	  or	  expression	  (or	  indeed	  one	  mode	  of	  opposition).	  	  	  Outside	   the	   realm	   of	   doxa,	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   multiple	   different	   modes	   of	   perception,	  expression	   and	   states	   of	   affairs	   quickly	   undermine	   simple	   binary	   expressions	   or	   teleological	  wholeness.	   	  Often	   these	   complications	   express	   paradoxical	   relationships	  with	   self	   and	   state	   –	  Long	  cites	  the	  example	  of	  one	  US	  soldier,	  who,	  on	  hearing	  of	  the	  hanging	  of	  two	  young	  men	  in	  Iran,	  wrote	  to	  the	  blogger	  Andrew	  Sullivan,	  stating	  that:	  ‘Your	  post	  on	  the	  Islamo-­‐fascist	  hanging/murder	  of	  the	  two	  gay	  men	  confirmed	  for	  me	  that	  my	  recent	  decision	  to	   join	   the	  U.S.	  military	  was	  correct.	   I	  have	  to	  stuff	  myself	  back	   in	   the	  closet	  [because	  of	  the	  US	  ban	  on	  gays	  in	  the	  armed	  services]	   .	   .	   .	  but	  our	  war	  on	  terror	  trumps	  my	  personal	  comfort	  at	  this	  point.’11	  The	  circumstances	  surrounding	   this	  quote	  should	  be	  directly	  addressed	  here,	  as	   they	  concern	  an	  event	  that	  demonstrates	  various	  dynamics	  with	  which	  I	  will	  engage	  and	  return	  to	  throughout	  this	  chapter.	  	  Long’s	  article	  focuses	  on	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  young	  man,	  Makwan	  Mouloudzadeh,	  in	  Iran	   in	   2007	   for	   an	   alleged	   rape	   committed	   when	   Mouloudzadeh	   was	   thirteen.	   	   Long	   also	  references	   the	   2005	   execution	   of	   two	   young	   men	   -­‐	   Mahmoud	   A.	   and	   Ayaz	   M	   –	   accused	   of	  sexually	  assaulting	  a	  thirteen-­‐year-­‐old	  boy.	   	  At	   least	  one	  of	  the	  accused	  young	  men	  was	  under	  eighteen	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  alleged	  assault.	  	  Photos	  of	  the	  2005	  execution	  were	  published	  on	  the	  website	   of	   ‘Outrage!’,	   a	   British	   gay	   rights	   campaigning	   group.	   	   These	   executions	   produced	   a	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  J	  Binnie,	  The	  Globalization	  of	  Sexuality	  (London:	  Sage,	  2004).	  11	  Cited	  in	  Scott	  Long,	  "Unbearable	  Witness:	  How	  Western	  Activists	  (Mis)Recognize	  Sexuality	  in	  Iran,"	  Contemporary	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  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	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great	   deal	   of	   action	   and	   activism	   –	   in	   the	   form	   of	   calls	   to	   action,	   articles,	   direct	   requests	   to	  Iranian	  authorities,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Mouloudzadeh,	  the	  sending	  of	  roses,	  either	  real	  or	  virtual	  (by	  email),	  to	  Ahmadinejad.12	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  activism,	  the	  boys	  were	  very	  clearly	  coded	  as	  gay.	  	  What	  is	  notable	  however,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  while	  there	  were	  pertinent	  questions	  to	  be	  asked	  about	   the	  validity	  of	   the	  young	  men’s	  convictions	  (in	  Mouloudzadeh’s	  case,	   for	  example,	   there	  appear	   to	   have	   been	   numerous	   irregularities	   with	   his	   conviction	   and	   his	   alleged	   victims	  recanted	  their	  accusations13),	  the	  charges	  laid	  were	  not	  for	  consensual	  homosexual	  sex	  but	  for	  sexual	  assault	  or	  rape	  -­‐	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  boys	  actually	   identified	  as	  gay.	   	  Long’s	  article	   is	  highly	  critical	  of	  certain	  groups	  and	  actors	  (referenced	  by	  name)	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  assumption	  of	   homosexual	   identities	   for	   the	   executed	  boys	   and	   this	   criticism	   itself	   caused	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  further	   animosity.14	  	   The	   fact	   that	   such	   controversy	   arose	   should	   not	   obscure	   the	   well-­‐documented	   suffering	   of	   LGBT	   people	   in	   Iran15,	   however,	   it	   does	   bring	   to	   light	   some	   of	   the	  problematics	   that	   can	   occur	   when	   LGBT	   identities	   are	   too	   readily	   ascribed	   and	   when	   the	  suffering	  of	  particular	  individuals	  is	  too	  easily	  subsumed	  into	  already	  coded	  narratives.	  	  	  To	  return	  to	  the	  quote	  from	  the	  US	  soldier	  above,	  while	  we	  cannot	  compare	  the	  Don’t	  Ask	  Don’t	  Tell	  (DADT)	  ban	  on	  openly	  gay	  US	  military	  personnel	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  death	  penalty	  for	  consensual	  homosexual	  sex,	  this	  statement	  seems	  to	  gloss	  over	  many	  of	  the	  complexities	  at	  hand	  –	   if	   the	  US	   is	   the	  bastion	  of	   tolerance	   and	   civilisation	   in	   relation	   to	  homosexuality,	  why	  would	   stuffing	   oneself	   back	   into	   the	   closet	   be	   necessary?	   	   In	   this	   instance,	   sexual	   otherness	  seems	   to	   occupy	   a	   space	   both	  within	   and	  without	   the	   national	   imaginary:	   it	   is	   tolerated	   but	  under	  limited	  conditions,	  yet	  it	  also	  becomes	  a	  marker	  of	  intolerance	  in	  others.	  	  	  Similarly	   the	   positioning	   of	   Islam	   and	   homophobia	   in	   a	   particular	   relationship	   allows	   the	  positing	  of	  other	  trajectories,	  groupings	  and	  stratifications	  –	  further	  discursive	  repetitions	  that	  create	  particular	  stratifications.	   	  In	  the	  UK	  for	  example,	  the	  construction	  of	  proximity	  between	  gay	  rights	  and	  far-­‐right	  or	  nationalist	  movements	  is	  emerging	  as	  a	  worrying	  possibility.	   	  While	  this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  all	   gay	  rights	  groups	  will	  necessarily	  be	  xenophobic	  or	   racist,	  we	  can	  point	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   English	   Defence	   League	   has	   established	   a	   LGBT	   defenders	  division,	  or	  the	  recent	  cancellation	  of	  an	  East	  End	  Pride	  March	  in	  London	  after	  it	  emerged	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ibid.	  p121	  13	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  "We	  Are	  a	  Buried	  Generation:	  Discrimination	  and	  Violence	  against	  Sexual	  Minorities	  in	  Iran,"	  (New	  York:	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2010).p28-­‐9	  14	  See	  eg	  –	  ‘Human	  Rights	  Watch	  apologies	  to	  Peter	  Tatchell’	  www.petertatchell.net/international/world_general/hrw-­‐apology-­‐to-­‐peter-­‐tatchell.htm	  accessed	  12/12/2011,	  ‘Gay	  Media’s	  Failure	  to	  Accurately	  Report	  Adds	  to	  Growing	  Hatred	  Towards	  Islamic	  World’	  www.ukgaynews.org.uk/Archive/2005aug/0102.htm	  accessed	  12/12/2011,	  ‘Did	  Peter	  Tatchell	  Use	  Libel	  Laws	  to	  Delegitimise	  Criticism?’	  www.socialistunity.com/?p=6218,	  accessed	  12/12/2011	  	  Long,	  Scott	  Debating	  Iran,	  Gay	  City	  News,	  Vol	  5	  No30	  July	  27-­‐	  Aug	  2	  2006	  15Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  "We	  Are	  a	  Buried	  Generation:	  Discrimination	  and	  Violence	  against	  Sexual	  Minorities	  in	  Iran.",	  Safra	  Project,	  "Country	  Information	  	  Report:	  Iran,"	  (London:	  Safra	  Project,	  2004).	  
	  	  96	  
the	  organisers	  had	  links	  to	  far	  right	  and	  anti-­‐Muslim	  groups,	  to	  highlight	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  fixing	  of	   Islam	  as	  a	  threat	  brings	  particular	   interests	   into	  proximity	  with	  each	  other.16	  	  Similar	  political	  proximities	  have	  arisen	  in	  some	  European	  political	  arenas:	  for	  example,	  in	  commenting	  on	   the	   Gay	   Dutch	   politician	   Pim	   Fortuyn,	   Furuhashi	   notes	   that	   ‘The	   rise	   of	   Pim	  Fortuyn…signalled	  a	  new	  era	  of	  white	  gay	  male	  politics.	   	  By	  promoting	  anti-­‐immigrant	  politics	  vigorously	   and	  marketing	   it	   with	   anti-­‐Muslim	   prejudice	   demagogically,	   Fortuyn	   showed	   that	  right-­‐wing	   populism	   can	   very	   well	   be	   gay	   and	   enormously	   popular	   to	   boot.’ 17 	  	   These	  problematic	  proximities	  might	  be	  linked	  to	  what	  Puar	  has	  identified	  as	  ‘homonationalism’	  –	  the	  complicity	   of	   particular	   gay	   groups	   with	   nationalist	   projects	   in	   order	   to	   sustain	   their	   own	  belonging	   and	   the	   sometimes	   violent	   and	   usually	   myopic	   imposition	   of	   one	   form	   of	   sexual	  politics	  on	  all	   individuals	  and	  communities.	   	  Such	  discourses	   line	  up	  with	  or	   feed	   into	  already	  existing	  fears	  surrounding	  the	  stranger	  and	  otherness	  and	  thus	  can	  pass	  unnoticed	  or	  accepted	  until	  they	  are,	  sometimes	  explosively,	  brought	  to	  light.	  	  Inclusion	  for	  some	  comes	  at	  the	  expense	  of	   others	   –	   those	   who	   are	   discursively	   repositioned	   by	   ‘homonormative	   rhetorical	  machinations’18	  as	  being	  ‘out	  of	  place’,	  ‘unacceptable’,	  not	  belonging.	  	  Thus	  again,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  civilised/uncivilised,	   insider/outsider	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   duality,	   but	   a	   condition	   of	   particular	  proximities	  that	  activate	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  in	  particular	  spaces	  and	  through	  particular	  named	  identities.	   	  Much	   of	   current	   human	   rights	   discourse	   surrounding	   sexuality	   seems	   to	   circulate	  through	   these	   identities	   (gay,	   lesbian,	   victim,	  activist)	   	   –	  even	  when	   it	   is	   recognised	   that	   such	  terminology	  is	  highly	  problematic.	  	  A	  key	  question	  perhaps	  concerns	  what	  happens	  when	  such	  identities	  are	   troubled	  or	  disturbed	  or	  how	   identities	  can	  be	  usefully,	   troubled,	  disturbed	  and	  critiqued	  in	  order	  to	  support	  sustainable	  counter-­‐narratives	  of	  belonging.	  	  	  Having	   outlined	   the	   particular	   dynamics	   in	   operation	   here,	   I	   should	   perhaps	   also	   address	   a	  particular	  methodological	  concern.	  	  In	  analysing	  these	  issues,	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  apportion	  blame	  to	  particular	  individuals	  for	  perpetuating	  particular	  narratives	  of	  sexual	  belonging	  or	  otherwise,	  nor	   am	   I	   primarily	   interested	   in	   creating	   new	   narratives	   of	   oppression	   or	   victim	   –	   I	   do	   not	  intend	   to	   attempt	   to	   ‘set	   the	   story	   straight’.	   	   This	   issue	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   my	   own	  proximity	  to	  LGBT	  politics	  and	  academic:	  my	  own	  particular	  ‘location’	  means	  that	  I	  cannot	  claim	  an	   objective	   neutrality	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   controversies.	   	   Given	   my	   particular	   outlook	   and	  theoretical	  frame	  of	  reference,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  ‘deterritorialisations’	  that	  have	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  critique	  or	  action	  against	  established	  stratifications	  of	  power	  or	  identity,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  See	  eg	  –	  ‘East	  End	  Pride	  cancelled	  over	  EDL	  claims’	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-­‐england-­‐london-­‐12569166	  accessed	  13/9/2012	  17	  Furuhashi	  2004,	  cited	  in	  Jasbir	  K.	  Puar,	  "Homonationalism	  and	  Biopolitics,"	  in	  Out	  of	  Place:	  Interrogating	  Silences	  in	  
Queerness/Raciality,	  ed.	  Adi	  Kuntsman	  and	  Esperanza	  Miyake	  (London:	  Raw	  Nerve	  Books,	  2008).p37	  18	  Martin	  F.	  Manalansan	  IV,	  "Race,	  Violence,	  and	  Neoliberal	  Spacial	  Politics	  in	  the	  Global	  City,"	  Social	  Text	  84-­‐85	  23,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2005).	  p144	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both	  within	  and	  without	  LGBT	  political	  institutions.	  	  My	  aim	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  an	  interrogation	  of	  identity	  politics	  based	  around	  rights	  claims	  and	  this	  focus	  already	  places	  me	  somewhat	  closer	  to	  Long’s	  position	  than	  that	  of	  groups	  such	  as	  Outrage!.	  	  Yet	  it	  would	  also	  be	  dishonest	  of	  me	  not	  to	  acknowledge	   my	   own	   identity	   and	   positionality	   in	   relation	   to	   these	   issues.	   	   I	   have	   already	  addressed	  the	  privilege	  of	  my	  educational	  background	  (a	  privilege	   furthered	  by	  the	   fact	   that	   I	  am	  white	   and	   relatively	  middle	   class).	   	   However,	   I	   am	   also	   a	   queer	  woman	   and	   as	   such,	   this	  colours	   both	   my	   understanding	   of,	   and	   access	   to	   questions	   of	   sexual	   orientation.	   	   This	   is	  significant	  because	  much	  of	  the	  theoretical	  work	  of	  my	  thesis	  begins	  from	  a	  critique	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  and	  the	  imperatives	  placed	  on	  those	  who	  do	  LGBT	  activism	  by	  their	  adherence	  to	  a	  human	   rights	   framework.	   	  While	   I	  believe	   that	   this	   critique	   is	  necessary	  and	   important	  –	   and	  one	   that	   someone	   of	  my	   academic	   background	   (particularly	   in	   terms	   of	   access	   to	   theoretical	  texts	  and	  the	  luxury	  of	  a	  relative	  removal	  from	  the	  immediacy	  of	  activist	  work)	  is	  well	  placed	  to	  undertake	  –	  it	  does	  leave	  me	  open	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  I	  am	  ignoring	  political	  imperatives	  or	  obscuring	  subaltern	  agency	  and	  voices	  by	  taking	  as	  my	  starting	  point	  the	  power	  differentials	  of	  human	  rights	  work.	  	  Ironically	  however,	  my	  ‘identity’	  as	  a	  lesbian	  can	  go	  some	  way	  to	  mediating	  this	   critique	   –	   or	   at	   least	   can	   afford	   me	   more	   space	   than	   might	   be	   granted	   to	   a	   white	  heterosexual	  man.	  	  Counter-­‐intuitively,	  the	  very	  overarching	  identities	  that	  form	  the	  bedrock	  of	  my	  critique	  also	  enable	  me	  to	  occupy	  a	  space	  from	  which	  I	  can	  make	  this	  critique.	  	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  in	  response	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  I	  am	  endorsing	  Long’s	  critiques	  while	  hiding	  behind	   my	   own	   ‘identity’,	   I	   can	   perhaps	   only	   suggest	   that	   in	   this	   case,	   and	   despite	   the	  antagonisms	  that	  are	  evident	  here,	  rigidly	  adhering	  to	  dualisms	  is	  perhaps	  not	  the	  best	  way	  to	  address	   these	   issues,	  and	  that	   identity	  and	  positionality	   is	  more	  complex	  than	  a	  closed	  binary	  might	   allow	   (for	   example,	   Long	   occupies	   a	   position	   of	   privilege	   relative	   to	   gender	   that	   I	   will	  never	   know).	   	   It	   is	   necessary	   for	   me	   to	   acknowledge	   my	   own	   emplacement	   and	   bias	   in	  addressing	  these	  issues,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  want	  to	  draw	  back	  from	  further	  contributing	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  antagonistic	  dualisms:	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  set	  up	  particular	  actors	  or	  personalities	  as	  a	  ‘new’	  opposition.	  	  Instead	  this	  chapter	  makes	  an	  attempt	  to	  open	  up	  or	  deterritorialise	  and	  reterritorialise	  current	  issues	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  visible	  some	  of	  the	  less	  recognised	  power	  dynamics	   and	   linguistic	   connections	   at	   play	   –	   as	   such	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   identifying	   the	  simultaneous	   expression	   of	   molar	   and	   molecular	   tendencies	   within	   a	   particular	   context	   or	  identity	  cluster	  rather	  than	  viewing	  the	  two	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  simple	  binary	  opposition.	   	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  done	  with	  an	  entirely	  detached,	  objective	  neutrality.	  	  	  Instead,	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  emplace	  myself	  within	  a	  particular	  disjuncture	  and	  follow	  particular	  reverberations	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	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Narratives	  of	  inside/outside,	  inclusion/exclusion	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  activist	  organisation	  	  The	  issue	  of	  emplacement	  within	  a	  particular	  combination	  of	  forces	  is	  significant	  here.	  	  Feminist	  engagements	  with	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  have	  noted	  the	  importance	  of	  situating	  oneself	  carefully	  in	   relation	   to	   the	  multiplicity	  with	  which	   one	   engages.19	  	  We	  might	   read	   Spivak’s	   criticism	   of	  Deleuze	  and	  Foucault	  for	  failing	  to	  recognise	  their	  own	  privilege	  as	  subjects	  able	  to	  speak,	  write	  and	  represent20,	   as	  a	  warning	  here:	  we	  must	  pay	  careful	  attention	   to	  our	  own	  situatedness	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   issues	   under	   consideration.	   	   The	   recognition	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   privilege	  operates	   is	   significant	   here,	   both	   in	   relation	   to	  Braidotti’s	   suggestion	   that	   how	  we	   appreciate	  Deleuzian	  notions	  of	  deterritorialisation	  and	  ‘becoming’	  will	  in	  large	  part	  be	  impacted	  upon	  by	  one’s	  own	  distance	  from	  or	  proximity	  to	  from	  an	  already	  stabilised	  identity	  or	  subject	  position21	  and	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   power	   relations	   that	   make	   some	   modes	   of	   living	   more	   easily	  representable	  or	   replicable	  as	   subject	  positions	   than	  others.	  This	   is	  of	   importance,	   as	   in	   large	  part,	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  currently	  arising	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  rights	  politics	  devolve	  in	  some	  way	  upon	  the	  question	  of	  representation.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  because	  LGBT	  rights	  form	  and	  contribute	   to	   a	   language	   that	   stabilises	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   sexual	   subject	   or	  subjectivity,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  identities	  around	  which	  this	  sexual	  subject	  can	  cohere,	  the	  narratives	  within	  which	  they	  can	  be	  articulated	  and	  understood,	  and	  more	  generally,	  the	  space	  which	  they	  are	  able	  to	  inhabit.	  	  Thus	  at	  issue	  is	  the	  question	  of	  what	  can	  or	  cannot	  exist,	  how	  resistance	  can	  be	  made	  visible	  and	  more	  generally,	  what	  constitutes	   the	   inside	  and	  the	  outside	   in	  relation	  to	  this	   frame	   of	   the	   possible.	   	   Thus	   LGBT	   rights	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   dualities	   of	  known/unknown,	  stranger/neighbour,	  belonging/non-­‐belonging.	  For	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  the	  notion	  of	  inside/outside	  is	  less	  a	  question	  of	  division,	  so	  much	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  proximity:	  'The	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  is	  not	  at	  all	  between	  exterior	  and	  interior,	  which	  are	  always	  relative,	   changing	   and	   reversible,	   but	   between	   different	   types	   of	   multiplicities	   that	   coexist,	  interpenetrate	  and	  change	  place’22	  Insider	  or	  outsider	  is	  not	  a	  permanent	  construction	  but	  the	  product	  of	  particular	  interactions	  in	  particular	  times	  and	  places.	  	  Inside/outside	  is	  a	  particular	  folding	  or	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2008).	  p84	  20	  Gayatri	  Chakravorty	  Spivak,	  ""Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?"	  Revised	  Edition,	  from	  The	  "History"	  Chapter	  of	  Critique	  of	  Postcolonial	  Reason,"	  in	  Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?	  Reflections	  on	  the	  History	  of	  an	  Idea,	  ed.	  Rosalind	  C.	  Morris	  (Chichester:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  21	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Becoming	  Woman:	  Or	  Sexual	  Difference	  Revisited,"	  Theory,	  Culture	  and	  Society	  20,	  no.	  3	  (2003).	  p12	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "A	  Critical	  Cartography	  of	  Feminist	  Post-­‐Postmodernism,"	  Australian	  Feminist	  Studies	  20,	  no.	  47	  (2005).	  22	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.p36	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machine,	  however	  this	  folding	  is	  not	  permanent	  and	  enduring	  but	  infinitely	  variable.23	  	  Thus,	  the	  space	  occupied	  by	  sexuality	  (as	  inside	  or	  outside	  or	  somewhere	  in	  between),	  or	  by	  LGBT	  rights	  is	  not	  fixed,	  and	  must	  be	  read	  as	  specific	  to	  the	  current,	  particular	  constitution	  of	  forces,	  matter	  and	   discourse.	   	   Yet,	  while	  what	   constitutes	   ‘outside’	   or	   ‘other’	  within	   a	   regime	  may	   vary,	   the	  structural	   position	   of	   this	   ‘outside’	   and	   those	   who	   occupy	   it	   (‘the	   collective	   figure	   of	   the	  Outsider’24)	  remains	  significant.	   	  Thus,	  I	  am	  interested	  here	  in	  not	  just	  the	  variable	  ‘content’	  of	  what	  is	  other	  or	  outside,	  but	  the	  role	  played	  by	  this	  collective	  figure	  as	  it	  demonstrates	  both	  the	  overcoding	  structure	  of	  a	  regime,	  the	  possibility	  of	  escape	  in	  a	  deterritorialised	  line	  of	  flight	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  power	  seeks	  to	  block	  such	  flight	  and	  reappropriate	  such	  flows.	  	  In	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  scapegoat	  for	  example,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  note	  that:	  ‘In	  the	  signifying	  regime,	  the	  scapegoat	  represents	  a	  new	  form	  of	  increasing	  entropy	  in	  the	   system	   of	   signs:	   it	   is	   charged	   with	   everything	   that	   was	   “bad”	   in	   a	   given	   period,	   that	   is,	  everything	   that	   resisted	   signifying	   signs,	   everything	   that	  eluded	   the	   referral	   from	  sign	   to	   sign	  through	   the	   different	   circles;	   it	   also	   assumes	   everything	   that	   was	   unable	   to	   recharge	   the	  signifier	  at	  its	  centre	  and	  carries	  off	  everything	  that	  spills	  beyond	  the	  outermost	  circle.	  	  Finally	  and	   especially,	   it	   incarnates	   that	   line	   of	   flight	   the	   signifying	   regime	   cannot	   tolerate,	   in	   other	  words	  an	  absolute	  deterritorialisation;	  the	  regime	  must	  block	  a	  line	  of	  this	  kind	  or	  define	  it	  in	  an	  entirely	  negative	   fashion	  precisely	  because	   it	   exceeds	   the	  degree	  of	  deterritorialisation	  of	   the	  signifying	  sign,	  however	  high	  it	  may	  be.’25	  A	  link	  can	  be	  made	  here	  to	  Hanafin’s	  application	  of	  Kristeva’s	  notion	  of	  ‘abjection’	  to	  questions	  of	  LGBT	  sexuality	  in	  Ireland.	  	  Abjection	  refers	  to	  that	  ‘which	  is	  rejected	  from	  which	  one	  does	  not	  part’26:	   the	   abject	   is	   that	   which	   is	   rejected	   but	   cannot	   be	   fully	   excluded.	   	   This	   process	   of	  abjection	  is	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  both	  individual	  subjectivity	  and	  social	  body.	  	  Thus	  in	   the	   context	   of	   Irish	   postcolonial	   identity,	   Hanafin	   argues	   that	   ‘the	   construction	   by	   the	  postcolonial	  elite	  of	  a	  subject	  of	  national	  self-­‐identification	  entailed	  the	  rejection	  or	  expulsion	  of	  certain	  groups	   from	  the	  national	   family.’27	  	   In	   this	  way,	   lesbians	  and	  gay	  men	  were	  marked	  as	  the	  socially	  abjected.28	  	  As	  such,	  we	  can	  view	  sexual	  orientation	  as	  occupying	  a	  highly	  complex	  position	   in	   the	   Irish	   postcolonial	   social	   body	   –	   as	   the	   abject	   it	   is	   that	   which	   is	   rejected	   but	  reclaimed	   before	   it	   can	   become	   a	   line	   of	   flight.	   	   Its	   contribution	   to	   the	   sustenance	   of	   the	  narrative	   of	   postcolonial	   Irish	   unity	   is	   in	   its	   negation	   and	   condemnation	   as	   that	   which	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Foucault,	  trans.	  S	  Hand	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2010).p86	  24	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  p496	  25	  Ibid.	  p128-­‐129	  26	  Kristeva	  cited	  in	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  Constituting	  Identity:	  Political	  Identity	  Formation	  and	  the	  Constitution	  in	  Post-­‐
Independence	  Ireland	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2001).p21	  27	  Ibid.	  p22	  28	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  "Rewriting	  Desire:	  The	  Construction	  of	  Sexual	  Identity	  in	  Literary	  and	  Legal	  Discourse	  in	  Postcolonial	  Ireland,"	  Social	  and	  Legal	  Studies	  7,	  no.	  3	  (1998).	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associated	  with	  the	  outsider	  and	  most	  particularly	  with	  the	  English	  coloniser.29	  	  However,	  this	  negation	  is	  complex:	  sexual	  orientation	  cannot	  simply	  be	  denied	  or	  positioned	  outside	  the	  social	  or	   legal	   body	   –	   to	   do	   so	   would	   allow	   the	   possibility	   of	   escape	   into	   a	   line	   of	   flight	   that	   is	  uncontrolled	   or	   unmediated	   by	   law	   or	   by	   the	   totalising	   narrative	   of	   the	   heterosexual,	  patriarchal	  Irish	  family.	  	  Instead,	  the	  escape	  is	  cut	  off	  and	  overcoded,	  LGBT	  sexuality	  is	  posited	  only	  in	  negative	  terms	  and	  the	  wholeness	  of	  the	  Irish	  social	  body	  is	  (narratively)	  retained.	  	  Thus,	   the	   question	   of	   inside	   and	   outside	   runs	   through	  questions	   of	   sexuality,	   law	   and	  nation.	  	  This	   complexity	   is	   illustrated	   in	   the	   1993	   Criminal	   Justice	   (Sexual	   Offences)	   Act,	   which	   was	  passed	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Case	  Norris	  v	  Ireland.30	  The	  ECtHR	  held	   that	   the	   criminalisation	   of	   same	   sex	   activity	   between	   men	   constituted	   an	   unjustified	  interference	  with	   the	   applicant’s	   right	   to	   privacy.	   	   The	   Act	   contains	   provisions	   related	   to	   the	  decriminalisation	   of	   same	   sex	   activity	   but	   also	   contains	   provisions	   pertaining	   to	   the	   tighter	  regulation	  and	  control	  of	  sex	  work.	   	  Hanafin	  argues	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  provisions	  restricting	  and	  controlling	  sex	  work	  in	  the	  same	  piece	  of	  legislation	  that	  concerned	  the	  decriminalisation	  of	  same	  sex	  activity	  was	  part	  of	  a	  ‘trade-­‐off’	  with	  the	  more	  conservative	  elements	  of	  Irish	  politics	  and	   society,	  which	   allowed	   the	   successful	   passage	   of	   the	   bill	   through	  parliament.31	  	   Put	  more	  simply,	  the	  price	  of	  increased	  freedom	  for	  men	  wishing	  to	  have	  sex	  with	  other	  men	  was	  tighter	  control	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  sex	  workers.	  	  He	  notes	  that	  	   ‘At	   a	   deeper	   level,	   it	   reflects	   a	   more	   worrying	   aspect	   of	   postcolonial	   Irish	   society.	   In	  order	  for	  one	  socially	  abjected	  group	  to	  win	  greater	  legal	  recognition	  another	  such	  group	  must	  suffer.	  	  Thus,	  while	  gay	  men	  have	  received	  greater	  legal	  acceptance,	  the	  status	  of	  sex-­‐workers	  as	  a	   socially	   abject	   group	   is	   heightened.	   	   Therefore,	   so-­‐called	   progressive	   Irish	   society	   must	  continue	  to	  have	  socially	  abjected	  groups	  against	  which	  the	  dominant	  group	  identity	  can	  define	  itself.’32	  Thus	   a	   situation	   arises	   in	  which	   even	   if	   the	   ‘content’	   of	   the	   abjected	   group,	   or	   the	   scapegoat	  changes,	  its	  structural	  role	  as	  Other	  that	  is	  both	  within	  and	  without	  remains.	  	  	  Thus,	   sexuality	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   occupy	   a	   highly	   complex	   position	  within	   the	   stratifications	   of	  particular	  societies	  and	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  international	  LGBT	  discourses.	  	  What	  is	  key	  here	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  modes	  of	  sexual	  expression	  might	  be	  seen	  to	  occupy	  the	  position	  of	  the	   collective	   Outsider	   or	   the	   abjected	   in	   different	   instances.	   	   For	   example,	   we	   can	   certainly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Ibid.	  30Norris	  v	  Ireland	  (App	  no	  10581/83)	  (1988)	  13	  EHRR	  149	  cited	  in	  Hanafin,	  Constituting	  Identity:	  Political	  Identity	  
Formation	  and	  the	  Constitution	  in	  Post-­‐Independence	  Ireland.	  p57	  31	  Ibid.	  p57	  32	  Ibid.	  p57	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point	  to	  instances	  in	  which	  LGBT	  sexuality	  is	  enunciated	  in	  negative	  terms	  as	  well	  as	  instances	  in	  which	   sexuality	   is	   aligned	  closely	  with	  deterritorialisation	  and	   the	   line	  of	   flight.	   	   Indeed,	   in	  some	  rhetorical	  constructions,	  homosexuality	  signifies	  (or	  appears	  to	  signify)	  the	  breakdown	  of	  family,	   state	   and	   the	   entirety	   of	   the	   social	   order.	   	  However,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   there	   exists	   an	  increasing	   number	   of	   situations	   in	   which	   sexual	   orientation	   has	   becomes	   somewhat	  ‘territorialised’	   within	   a	   particular	   signifying	   regime	   and	   as	   such	   –	   within	   homonationalist	  discourses	   for	  example	  –	   sexuality	  becomes	  part	  of	   a	   signifying	   regime	  by	  which	  an	  alternate	  scapegoat/Outsider	   is	   posited,	   or	   an	   alternate	   outside	   is	   folded.	   	   	   Thus	   sexuality	   can	   inhabit	  several	  different	  positions:	  either	  external	  to	  territorialised	  (usually	  state)	  power,	  or	  captured	  and	  territorialised	  in	  some	  way	  by	  power,	  and	  subsequently	  directed	  against	  a	  new	  ‘outside’.	  We	  could	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  identities	  -­‐	  in	  this	  instance	  in	  the	  codification	  of	  particular	  rights	  -­‐	   forms	  a	  machine	  of	  capture.33	  	  Rights	  become	  a	  means	  of	   identifying,	  and	  thus	   restricting,	   what	   kind	   of	   action	   is,	   or	   will	   be,	   possible.	   	   Identity	   or	   identification	   as	   a	  legitimate	   sexual	   subjectivity	   marks	   a	   threshold	   through	   which	   a	   particular	   assemblage	   of	  sexuality	  changes	  –	  the	  point	  at	  which	  sexual	  otherness	  becomes	  recognisable	  or	  speakable	  by	  power	  as	  something	  within	  rather	  than	  something	  abject.	  	  	  However,	  the	  productive	  inclusion	  by	  power	  that	  marks	  this	  form	  of	  capture	  does	  not	  occur	  only	  once.	   	   Birla	   uses	   Spivak	   to	   outline	   this	   dynamic	   in	   relation	   to	   gendered	   subalternity	   and	  suggests	  that	  for	  Spivak,	  subalternity	  marks	  both	  the	  inside	  and	  the	  outside	  ‘autonomous	  from	  hegemony,	  but	  simultaneously	   inside	  as	   its	  condition	  of	  possibility.’34	  	  The	  gendered	  subaltern	  extends	  and	  transforms	  the	  analysis	  of	  subalternity	  –	  remaining	  ‘deeply	  in	  shadow’	  even	  within	  the	   insider/outsider	  matrix	   that	   is	  already	   in	  operation.	   	  Thus,	   capture	  always	  exposes	  a	  new	  limit,	   a	  new	  unspeakable	  or	  unknown.	  A	  number	  of	   complex	  dynamics	   are	   in	  operation	  here:	  sexuality	  operates	  through	  particular	  assemblages	  in	  particular	  ways,	  such	  assemblages	  can	  be	  captured	   and	   productively	   included	   in	   the	   machine	   of	   the	   state,	   but	   this	   capture	   marks	   a	  threshold	   of	   change	   for	   the	   particular	   assemblage	   –	   as	   sexuality	   becomes	   stabilised	   or	  territorialised	  and	   therefore	   loses	  some	  of	   its	  nomadic,	  moving	  capacity.	   	  Once	   territorialised,	  this	  assemblage	  can	  become	  part	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  ‘new’	  outside	  or	  limit	  of	  tolerability,	  but	  it	  also	  points	  to	  a	  remaining	  limit	  in	  relation	  to	  sexuality	  –	  that	  which	  cannot	  yet	  be	  spoken	  and	  remains	  in	  the	  shadows.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid.	  p468	  34	  Ritu	  Birla,	  "Postcolonial	  Studies:	  Now	  That's	  History,"	  in	  Can	  the	  Subaltern	  Speak?	  Reflections	  on	  the	  History	  of	  an	  
Idea,	  ed.	  Rosalind	  C.	  Morris	  (Chichester:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010).p92	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In	  discussing	  capture,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  refer	  specifically	  to	  state	  power	  and	  the	  dual	  poles	  of	  the	  king	  and	  law	  maker	  who	  capture	  or	  stratify	  the	  war	  machine.35	  	  Yet	  if	  we	  temporarily	  read	  sexuality	  as	   that	  which	   is	  nomadic	  and	  outside	  (the	  war	  machine)	  we	  can	  see	  how	  capture	  by	  state	   power	   impacts	   beyond	   the	   interaction	   of	   sexuality	   and	   state.	   	   Recognition/capture	  territorialises	  and	   thus	  changes	   sexuality’s	   relationship	  with	   itself,	   reconstituting	   the	   limits	  of	  what	   is	   possible	   within	   the	   limits	   of	   state	   power.	   	   It	   is	   perhaps	   in	   this	   context	   that	   we	   can	  understand	   the	   particular	   legislative	   focus	   of	   many	   LGBT	   pressure	   groups	   and	   why	   this	  legislative	  focus	  is	  often	  exercised	  beyond	  the	  state	  borders	  within	  which	  such	  groups	  operate.36	  	  From	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  inclusion,	  the	  orientation	  towards	  power	  and	  transformation	  begins	  to	  change.	  	  This,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  marks	  a	  particular	  threshold	  in	  sexual	  activism	  –	  one	  in	  which	  forms	   of	   action	   transform	   from	  multiplicitous	   repetition	   of	   the	   virtual	   to	   specific	   reiteration	  through	  legal/political	  channels	  in	  particular	  states.	  	  	  There	   are	   both	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   reasons	   why	   this	   threshold	   is	   so	   easily	   crossed	   by	  activists	   working	   in	   this	   sphere.	   	   Practically,	   reiteration	   rather	   than	   repetition	   achieves	  identifiable	   results	   that	   can	   be	   worked	   and	   planned	   for	   through	   recognised	   channels.	  	  Reiteration	  of	  particular	  rights	  concerns	  forms	  a	  framework	  for	  action	  in	  the	  face	  of	  suffering	  -­‐	  and	   there	   are	   a	   large	   number	   of	   states	   in	   the	   world	   where,	   in	   legal	   or	   rights	   based	   terms,	  sexuality	  remains	  firmly	  outside.	  	  Such	  suffering	  forms	  a	  demand	  for	  action;	  rights	  form	  a	  path	  by	   which	   this	   action	   can	   progress.	   	   Furthermore,	   in	   an	   entirely	   practical	   sense,	   why	   should	  groups	  who	  have	   benefitted	   from	  productive	   inclusion	   or	   capture	   seek	   to	   entirely	   destabilise	  that	  which	  has	  been	  productive	   for	   them?	   	  Thus	   the	   limitations	   imposed	  on	   identity	  or	  action	  are	  accepted,	   increased	  recourse	  can	  be	  made	   to	   legal	  channels	  and	   the	   focus	  becomes	  not	  so	  much	  these	  limitations,	  but	  the	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  new	  ‘outside’,	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  seeking	  to	  repeat	  past	  successes	  elsewhere	  or	  constituting	  a	  new	  external	  other	  who	  poses	  a	  particular	  threat.	   	   That	   which	   remained	   in	   the	   shadows	   at	   the	   initial	  moment	   of	   capture	   is	   silenced	   or	  dismissed.	  I	  have	  sketched	  out	  how	  such	  a	  dynamic	  of	  capture	  might	  occur	  in	  very	  broad	  terms.	   	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  what	  must	  always	  occur	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  sexual	  rights	  groups	  with	  state	  power.	  	  Instead,	  this	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  use	  the	  idea	  of	  capture	  to	  think	  through	  some	  of	  the	  shifting	  positions	  that	  sexuality	  might	  occupy	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  applicability	  of	  such	  a	  dynamic	  will	  depend	  very	  much	  on	  location	  –	  state	  power	  and	  capture	  do	   not	   operate	   in	   a	   uniform	   fashion,	   nor	   does	   a	   dynamic	   of	   ‘othering’.	   	   What	   I	   think	   is	  particularly	  important	  however,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  mode	  of	  dealing	  with	  alterity	  tends	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  p468	  36	  This	  is	  not	  a	  denial	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  looking	  outwards	  as	  well	  as	  internally	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  activism,	  but	  is	  perhaps	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  non-­‐neutrality	  of	  the	  power	  dynamic	  in	  operation	  here.	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remain	  the	  same	  –	  the	  other	  is	  encountered	  by	  shifting	  it	  on	  to	  our	  own	  terms,	  or	  our	  own	  frame	  of	   reference.	   	   Thus	   in	   this	   case,	   sexuality	   becomes	   quickly	   bound	   up	   within	   a	   dynamic	   of	  recognition	  and	  misrecognition.	  	  	  This	  dynamic	  is	  particularly	  important	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  despite	  the	  conjunction	  of	  seeing	  with	  knowledge	  in	  Western	  thought,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  (and	  therefore	  the	  act	  of	  recognition)	   is	   less	   natural	   than	   is	   often	   assumed.	   	   At	   the	   level	   of	   active	   rather	   than	   passive	  synthesis	  a	  selection	  is	  taking	  place.37	  	  	  Puar	  cites	  Butler	  in	  order	  to	  suggest	  that	  seeing	  is	  not	  an	  act	   of	   direct	   perception	   but	   the	   racial	   production	   of	   the	   visible,	   the	   operation	   of	   certain	  constraints	  on	  what	   it	  means	   to	  see:	   	   '[t]herefore	   the	  act	  of	   seeing	   is	   simultaneously	  an	  act	  of	  reading,	  a	   specific	   interpretation	  of	   the	  visual.	   	  But	   this	   reading	  passes	   itself	  off	  as	   a	   seeing,	  a	  natural	   activity,	   hiding	   the	   "contestable	   construal"	   of	  what	   is	   seen.’38	  	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	  different	  strands	  to	  this	  argument,	   the	  first	  concerns	  perception:	  as	  Deleuze	  notes	   in	  his	  work	  on	   cinema,	   perception	   is	   always	   ‘less’	   –	   we	   perceive	   the	   ‘thing’	   minus	   that	   which	   does	   not	  interest	  us.39	  	  This	  act	  of	  perception	  is	  further	  complicated	  in	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  interact	  with	   alterity,	   is	   already	   constructed,	   already	   political	   but	   already	   always	   constituted	   as	  accepted.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  campaigning	  given	  the	   primacy	   that	   is	   given	   to	   the	   act	   of	   ‘coming	   out’,	   of	   making	   oneself	   visible	   (and	   thus	  perceivable)	   as	   LGBT,	  within	  mainstream	   sexuality	   rights	   campaigning.	   	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	  primacy	  of	   the	  visual,	   it	   is	  not	   surprising	   that	   this	   tactic	   should	  be	   so	  widespread,	  but	   it	  does	  perhaps	  bring	   into	  sharp	  relief	   the	  paradox	  of	  approaching	  and	  perceiving	  sexuality	  primarily	  through	  a	  mode	  of	  visibility,	  when	  sexuality	  itself	  is	  so	  often	  embodied	  and	  experienced	  through	  modes	  other	   than	  the	  visible.	   	  An	   interesting	   link	  can	  therefore	  be	  made	  here	   to	  visibility	  and	  power.	  	  Braidotti	  notes	  that	  the	  primacy	  of	  vision	  has	  been	  challenged	  by	  feminist	  theorists	  and	  highlights	   in	  particular	  Haraway’s	   critique	  of	   the	   logocentric	   culture	  of	  disembodied	  vision	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  more	  accountable	  and	  embodied	  form	  of	  seeing	  (or	  perhaps	  perceiving).	  	  Thus,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  clear	  link	  between	  a	  supposedly	  objective	  and	  detached	  form	  of	  vision,	  visibility	  and	  power	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   embodied	   and	   ‘invisible	   anonymity	   of	   the	  marginalized.’40	  	   Braidotti	  notes	  further	  that	  ‘power	  today	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  selection	  and	  control,	  entitlement	  and	  access:	  it	  is	  bio-­‐power,	   centred	   on	   the	   body	   in	   its	  material	   and	   immaterial	  manifestations.’41	  	   The	   visible,	  nameable	  sexual	  subject	   is	   infinitely	  more	  manageable	  and	   less	   threatening	  than	  the	  complex,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2006).	  p54-­‐56	  	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  
and	  Repetition,	  trans.	  P	  Patton	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011).	  	  38	  Puar,	  Terrorist	  Assemblages:	  Homonationalism	  in	  Queer	  Times.	  p183	  39	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Cinema	  1:	  The	  Movement	  Image,	  trans.	  Hugh	  Tomlinson	  and	  Barbara	  Habberjam	  (London:	  Athlone	  Press,	  1986).	  p63	  40	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Transpositions	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2006).p53	  41	  Ibid.	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changing	  material	  body	  through	  which	  sexuality	  is	  known	  and	  experienced	  in	  multiple	  different	  ways.	  Thus,	   the	   point	   of	   contention	   here	   is	   our	   uneven	   access	   to	   these	   modes	   of	   production	   of	  visibility	  and	  knowledge.	   	  This	  unevenness	  contributes	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  doxa,	  based	  on	  incomplete	   or	   impartial	   knowledge,	   experience	   or	   perception.	   	  Mohanty	   comments	   upon	   this	  dynamic,	  in	  relation	  to	  feminist	  struggles,	  tying	  it	  specifically	  to	  particular,	  naturalised	  forms	  of	  subjectivity,	   noting	   that	   perhaps	   due	   to	   this	   unevenness	   of	   not	   only	   subject	   production,	   but	  power	   relations,	   experience	   is	  written	   as	   simultaneously	   individual	   (body/psyche	   of	  woman)	  and	  general	  (collective	  women).	  	  She	  notes	  that:	  ‘There	  seems	  to	  be	  two	  problems	  with	  this	  definition.	  	  First,	  experience	  is	  seen	  as	  being	  immediately	  accessible,	  understood,	  and	  named.	  	  The	  complex	  relations	  between	  behaviour	  and	  its	  representation	  are	  either	  ignored	  or	  made	  irrelevant;	  experience	  is	  collapsed	  into	  discourse	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  Second,	  since	  experience	  has	  a	  fundamentally	  psychological	  status,	  questions	  of	  history	   and	   collectivity	   are	   formulated	   on	   the	   level	   of	   attitude	   and	   intention.	   	   In	   effect	   the	  sociality	   of	   collective	   struggles	   is	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   something	   like	   individual	   group	  relations,	  relations	  that	  are	  commonsensically	  seen	  as	  detached	  from	  history.’42	  	  Thus,	  experience	  is	  constituted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  devolve	  upon	  a	  limited	  notion	  of	  individual	  selfhood	   and	   is	   used	   to	   tie	   individual	  women	   to	   the	   collective	   sisterhood	   regardless	   of	   class,	  race,	   nation	   and	   sexualities.	   	   A	   particular	   social	   relation	   is	   privileged,	   depoliticised	   and	  dehistoricised	   and	  experience	   remains	   firmly	   anchored	   in	  particular	  notions	  of	   the	   individual	  self.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  Ahmed	  notes	  that	  the	  encounter	  between	  self	  and	  other	  always	  implicates	  broader	   systems	   of	   knowledge	   exchange. 43 	  	   The	   encounter	   has	   a	   spatial	   and	   temporal	  arrangement	  that	  Mohanty	  suggests	  is	  often	  unacknowledged.	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Puar	  suggests	  that	  identity	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  retrospective	  ordering.	   	  Identity	  codifies	   but	   then	   constructs	   itself	   as	   always	   already	   there.44	  	   In	   this	   way,	   we	   could	   perhaps	  suggest	  that	  the	  dimensions	  of	  past	  and	  future	  overcode	  the	  moment	  of	  encounter,	  smothering	  it.	  	  The	  encounter/alterity	  cannot	  be	  or	  become	  because	  it	  is	  always	  already	  implicated	  within	  a	  particular	  frame	  of	  seeing	  and	  knowing.	   	   In	  essence,	   there	   is	  a	   ‘colonisation	  of	  the	  timeline’	  or	  the	  operation	  of	  temporal	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  the	  constitution	  of	  some	  events	  as	  historically	  significant	   and	   others	   as	   meaningless.45	  	   As	   such	   what	   is	   significant	   is	   not	   the	   encounter	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Chandra	  Talpade	  Mohanty,	  Feminism	  without	  Borders:	  Decolonizing	  Theory,	  Practicing	  Solidarity	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  p114-­‐5	  43	  Ahmed,	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  Postcoloniality.	  p37	  p152	  	  44	  Puar,	  Terrorist	  Assemblages:	  Homonationalism	  in	  Queer	  Times.	  	  p215	  45	  Elizabeth	  Freeman,	  "Time	  Binds,	  or,	  Erotohistoriography,"	  Social	  Text	  84-­‐85	  23,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2005).	  p58	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alterity	  itself,	  but	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  encounter	  to	  be	  rendered	  within	  a	  socially	  coherent	  whole.	  	  Thus,	  a	  key	  vector	  of	  analysis	  might	  be	  the	  self-­‐maintenance	  of	  a	  system	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  one	  might	  go	  about	  making	  political	  demands.	  	  	  Such	  concerns	  are	  clear	   in	  many	  analyses	  of	  NGO	  operation	   in	  the	  sphere	  of	  sexuality	  politics.	  	  Swiebel	   notes	   for	   example,	   that	   the	   process	   of	   placing	   issues	   onto	   the	   agenda	   of	   a	   particular	  political	  or	  legal	  organisation	  is	  often	  simplified	  when	  activists	  ‘frame’	  their	  issue	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  it	  can	  be	  easily	  linked	  to	  issues	  that	  are	  already	  part	  of	  the	  accepted	  agenda.46	  	  For	  example,	  South	   Africa’s	   groundbreaking	   constitutional	   protection	   of	   sexual	   minorities	   was	   part	   of	   a	  broader	   framework	  of	   change.	   	   Similarly	   in	   the	  EU,	   there	  was	  both	   the	  possibility	   for	   framing	  sexual	  rights	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  subjectivity	  and	  of	  coat	  tailing	  on	  anti-­‐racist	  discrimination	  law.	  	  Moreover	  ‘[f]raming	  the	  issue	  in	  human	  rights	  terms	  touched	  the	  EU	  at	  the	  core	  of	  its	  soul,	  linking	   mythical	   concepts	   such	   as	   the	   ‘European	   identity’	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   credibility	   and	  popular	  support.’47	  	  However,	  if	  these	  concerns	  are	  articulated	  outside	  a	  recognisable	  frame,	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  accurately	  heard	  recedes:	  	  ‘if	   articulated	   outside	   a	   liberal	   democratic	   frame,	   the	   claim	   to	   human	   rights	   has	   little	  purchasing	  power.	  Deployment	  of	  political	  signifiers	  makes	  the	  most	  strategic	  sense	  when	  this	  happens	  within	   the	   frames	   that	  give	   them	  meaning.	  The	  gap	  between	   theorizing	  and	  activism	  can	   occasionally	   undermine	   the	   legibility	   of	   the	   frame;	   this	   is	   particularly	   risky	   when	   the	  readers	  are	  political	  elites.	  For	  example,	  rights	  claims	  in	  the	  streets	  of	  Soho	  became	  much	  more	  legible	  when	  the	  activist	  group	  Stonewall	  translated	  it	  into	  ‘equality’	  and	  ‘justice’	  in	  the	  halls	  of	  Parliament.’48	  	  	  The	   obvious	   observation	   here	   is	   that	   if	   rights	   claims	   between	   Soho	   and	  Westminster	   require	  mediation,	   then	  rights	  claims	  when	  the	  spatial,	   temporal,	   linguistic	  or	  experiential	  gap	   is	  even	  wider	   will	   require	   mediation	   to	   the	   point	   that	   they	   may	   become	   almost	   unrecognisably	  detached	  from	  their	  original	  ground.	  	  	  The	  question	  then,	  is	  not	  just	  who	  can	  speak,	  but	  who	  can	  speak	  or	  present	  themselves	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  be	  recognised	  and	  appropriately	  translated?	  	  Or	  how	  can	  activists	  control	  or	  influence	  the	  way	   in	  which	   they	  are	  perceived?	   	   In	  demonstrating	   this,	   Seckinelgin	  uses	  examples	   from	  research	  in	  both	  India	  and	  Africa	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  global	  process	  of	  constitution	  of	  identities	  in	  which	   particular	   categories	   become	   reference	   points	   for	   both	   policy	   actors	   and	   their	   target	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Joke	  Swiebel,	  "Lesbian,	  Gay,	  Bisexual	  and	  Transgender	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Search	  for	  an	  International	  Strategy,"	  
Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  p21	  47	  Ibid.	  p30	  48	  Angelia	  R.	  Wilson,	  "The	  ‘‘Neat	  Concept’’	  of	  Sexual	  Citizenship:	  A	  Cautionary	  Tale	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Discourse,"	  
Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).	  p82	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groups.	  	  Thus,	  one	  group	  in	  Africa	  uses	  the	  terminology	  LGBTI,	  while	  not	  actually	  being	  entirely	  sure	  that	  intersex	  people	  exist.	  	  One	  activist	  goes	  on	  to	  explain	  his	  choice	  of	  terminology:	  ‘G	   –	  Well	   I	   am	   using	   it	   because	   it	   is	   the	   international	   language.	   I	   have	   been	   going	   to	  regional	   meetings	   and	   it	   is	   their	   language.	   [the	   language]	   Makes	   us	   part	   of	   the	   larger	   group	  [international]	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  funding	  and	  support	  when	  we	  need	  it.	  But	  people,	  no,	  they	  don’t	   really	   use	   LGBTI,	   even	   men	   who	   are	   talking	   to	   us,	   it	   takes	   sometime	   before	   they	   call	  themselves	  gay.’49	  Terminology	   here	   is	   not	   just	   a	   question	   of	   using	   different	   nomenclature	   to	   address	   the	   same	  behaviours	  or	  identity	  as	  the	  way	  in	  which	  an	  issue	  is	  framed	  will	  shape	  the	  ‘solutions’	  that	  are	  offered	   to	   the	  particular	  problems	  experienced.	   	  One	  of	  Seckineglin’s	  Hijra	   interviewees	  made	  the	  point	  that	  in	  India	  ‘In	  the	  national	  HIV/AIDS	  plan	  we	  are	  included	  under	  MSM	  and	  there	  are	  no	  specific	  concerns	  or	  attention	  paid	  to	  Hijra-­‐tg	  issues.	  MSM	  is	  about	  behaviour	  and	  Hijra-­‐tg	  is	  a	   culture.	  We	  need	   the	   particular	   focus	   on	  Hijra	   and	   their	   social	   environment.	   The	   needs	   are	  different	  and	   the	   implementations,	   spaces	  will	  be	  different.’50	  	  The	  way	   in	  which	  something	   is	  made	  visible	  affects	  the	  way	  in	  which	  needs	  can	  be	  addressed.	  	  This	  dynamic	  also	  works	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction,	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   the	   framing	  of	   issues	   in	  particular	   terminology	  becomes	  both	  an	  expectation,	  but	  also	  more	  worryingly,	  a	  sign	  of	  ‘progress’	  along	  a	  particular	  teleological	  trajectory.	   	   As	   such,	   Hemmings	   notes	   the	   way	   in	   which	   bisexuality	   is	   viewed	   by	   some	  commentators	   as	   a	   stage	   prior	   to	   the	   formation	   and	   embracing	   of	   a	   particular	   homosexual	  identity.	  	  There	  is	  no	  space	  for	  bisexuality	  to	  exist	  as	  itself,	  rather	  in	  such	  (Western)	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  writings,	  bisexuality	   forms	  part	  of	  a	  pre-­‐modern	  stage	  of	  sexual	  orientation	   that	  precedes	  the	  visibility	  of	   lesbian	  and	  gay	  subjects	  and	  cultures.51	  	  Such	  interpretations	  both	   ‘teleologise’	  the	   possibility	   of	   sexual	   behaviour	   and	   draw	   attention	   from	   the	   particularities	   of	   identity	  formation	  specific	  to	  the	  ‘lesbian	  and	  gay’	  identities	  that	  now	  increasingly	  circulate	  in	  global	  gay	  formations.	  	  	  
Narratives	   of	   identity	   and	   injustice:	   position,	   personality	   and	   perceptions	   in	   sexual	  
orientation	  politics	  The	  problem	  I	  am	  engaging	  with	  here	  is	  the	  question	  of	  who	  can	  speak	  and	  how	  they	  do	  so,	  who	  has	  access,	  or	  even	  who	  makes	   the	  best	   test	   case	   for	  a	  particular	   issue.	   	  Most	   controversially,	  this	   dynamic	   leads	   Long	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   groundswell	   of	   activism	   and	   support	   for	   several	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Hakan	  Seckinelgin,	  "Global	  Activism	  and	  Sexualities	  in	  the	  Time	  of	  HIV/AIDS,"	  Contemporary	  Politics	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2009).p104	  50	  Ibid.	  51	  Clare	  Hemmings,	  "What's	  in	  a	  Name?	  Bisexuality,	  Transnational	  Sexuality	  Studies	  and	  Western	  Colonial	  Legacies,"	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights	  11,	  no.	  1-­‐2	  (2007).	  p25	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individuals	  who	  were	   hanged	   in	   Iran,	   could	   only	   happen	  because	   the	   boys	   and	  men	   involved	  were	   named	   and	   recognised	   (by	   others,	   not	   necessarily	   themselves)	   as	   gay	   –	   ‘sympathy	  depended	  on	  identity.’52	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  strong	  accusation	  against	  global	  gay	  rights	  activism	  and	  resulted	   in	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   controversy.	   	  Moreover,	   to	  acknowledge	   the	  complexity	  of	   the	  case	  that	   Long	   is	   examining	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	   suffering	   of	   LGBT	   identified	   individuals	   in	   Iran.53	  	  However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  step	  back	  somewhat	  from	  these	  controversies	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  slightly	  different	  point	  that	  Long	  is	  hinting	  at	  here:	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  injustice	  is	  recognised	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  events	  of	  injustice	  must	  attach	  to	  particular	  victims	  in	  particular	  ways.	  	  Miller	  makes	   this	   point	   in	   relation	   to	   women’s	   rights	   when	   she	   recounts	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	  deployment	  of	  the	  narratives	  of	  victims	  and	  of	  female	  suffering	  was	  central	  to	  the	  negotiations	  that	   resulted	   in	   the	   recognition	   of	   rape	   as	   a	   war	   crime.	   	   While	   the	   strategic	   aim	   of	   the	  achievement	   of	   a	   certain	   agreement	  was	   successful	   here,	   it	  was	  done	   so	   through	   the	  use	   and	  reinforcement	  of	  certain	  narratives	  –	  most	  pertinently	  the	  narrative	  of	  women	  as	  weak	  and	  in	  need	  of	  protection.	  	  The	  question	  Miller	  leaves	  us	  with	  is	  one	  of	  what	  sacrifices	  where	  made	  in	  terms	   of	   the	   recognition	   of	   female	   agency	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   more	   material	   legislative	  goal.54	  Miller’s	  point	  here	  is	  complex:	  as	  an	  activist	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  surrounding	  the	  push	  to	  convince	  mainstream	  human	  rights	  organisations	  to	  accept	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  as	  human	  rights	  issues,	  she	  is	  justifiably	  proud	  of	  what	  has	  been	  achieved.	  	  However,	  her	  pride	  is	  tinged	  with	   a	   note	   of	   caution	   –	  working	   against	   rape	   gave	   ‘credibility	   and	   respectability’	   and	  brought	   recognition	   of	   the	   harm	   done	   to	  women	   as	   a	   global	   human	   rights	   problem.	   	   But	   the	  repetition	  of	  particular	  narratives	  of	  womenhood,	  particularly	   those	  pertaining	   to	  victimhood,	  respectability	  and	  protection	  necessarily	  precludes	  a	  more	  nuanced	  consideration	  of	  women’s	  agency	   in	   human	   rights	   terms.55	  	   Thus,	   international	   human	   rights	   gains	   are	   achieved	   in	   part	  through	  the	  repetition	  of	  narratives	  of	  gendered	  stereotype.	   	  Nadj	  continues	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  removal	  of	  women’s	  agency	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  coding	  of	  violence	  against	  women	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  as	  ethnically	  marked:	   in	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY)	  and	  in	  some	  feminist	  commentaries,	  Bosnian	  Muslim	  women	  were	  raped	  because	  they	  were	  Muslim.56	  	  Crudely	  put,	  the	  rape	  is	  read	  as	  a	  crime	  against	  the	  collective	   identity	  of	  a	  group,	   culture,	   identity	  or	  nation.	   	  Thus	  a	  dual	  narrative	  of	  already	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Long,	  "Unbearable	  Witness:	  How	  Western	  Activists	  (Mis)Recognize	  Sexuality	  in	  Iran."	  p125	  53	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  "We	  Are	  a	  Buried	  Generation:	  Discrimination	  and	  Violence	  against	  Sexual	  Minorities	  in	  Iran."	  54	  Alice	  Miller,	  "Sexuality,	  Violence	  against	  Women	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Women	  Make	  Demands	  and	  Ladies	  Get	  Protection,"	  Health	  and	  Human	  Rights	  7,	  no.	  2	  (2004).	  55	  Ibid.	  56	  Daniela	  Nadj,	  "The	  Culturalisation	  of	  Identity	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  'Ethnic	  Conflict'	  -­‐	  Depoliticised	  Gender	  in	  Icty	  Wartime	  Sexual	  Violence	  Jurisprudence,"	  International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  Special	  Issue	  'Democracy,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
Power'	  15,	  no.	  5	  (2011).	  p656	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coded	  victimhood	  and	  ethnicity	   combine	  both	   to	  preclude	  any	  possibility	  of	   female	  agency	  or	  action	   and	   to	   displace	   the	   focus	   on	   individual	   harm	   experienced	   by	   the	   raped	   woman.	   	   The	  raped	   Bosnian	  woman	   is	   always	   and	   only	   a	   victim	  who	  must	   be	   saved.	   	   ‘The	  women	   in	   this	  scenario	  are	  represented	  as	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  abstract,	  rational	  subject	  of	  international	  law	  –	  they	  are	  passive	  bystanders	  utterly	  subjected	  to	  their	  fate	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  their	  male	  captors	  as	  the	  central	  protagonists	  of	  war.’57	  	  There	  are	  several	  levels	  to	  this	  deployment	  of	  narratives	  of	  identity	  and	  victimhood	  –	  the	  first	  is	  the	   language	   of	   identity	   through	  which	   the	   suffering	   victim	   is	   recognised	   and	   classified:	   gay,	  lesbian,	  woman,	  Muslim,	   etc.	   	   The	   second	   level	   constitutes	   the	  positionality	  of	   this	   identity	   in	  relation	   to	   particular	   spheres	   of	   centralised	   power	   –	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   is	   recognised	   and	  articulated	  and	  the	  way	   in	  which	   this	  recognition	   immediately	  emplaces	  an	   identity	  within	  an	  arborescent,	  hierarchical	  frame	  in	  which	  its	  position	  is	  predicated	  on	  its	  relative	  distance	  from	  a	  standardised	   ‘norm’.	   	   A	   third	   consideration	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   proximities	   and	  spatialisations	   relate	   to	   wider	   spatialised	   narratives	   of	   inside	   and	   outside	   or	   to	   what	   is	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  according	  to	  the	  hierarchical	  power	  relations	  which	  both	  recognise	  and	   emplace	   identities	   and	   shape	   the	   wider	   narrative	   and	   normative	   constructions	   through	  which	  such	  identities	  can	  interact.	  	  Thus,	  ‘women	  as	  victim’	  resonates	  strongly	  in	  considerations	  of	  women’s	  rights	  and	  Islam	  as	  ‘other’	  or	  Islam	  as	  homophobic	  is	  a	  narrative	  that	  activates	  very	  strongly	   in	   response	   to	   reports	   of	   state	   executions	   of	   minors	   for	   sexual	   crimes	   –	   identities,	  positionalities	   and	  narratives	   at	   play	   here	   are	   all	   assumed	   to	   be	   easily	   recognisable	   and	   thus	  easy	  to	  emplace	  and	  repeat.	  	  What	   this	   can	   contribute	   to	  however,	   is	   a	  politics	   that	   takes	  place	   through	  personalisation	  or	  through	   the	   representation	   and	   embodiment	  of	   injustices	  by	  particular	   cyphers	   rather	   than	   a	  politics	  which	  tries	  to	  engage	  with	  injustice.	  	  We	  already	  ‘know’	  that	  gay	  people	  face	  execution	  in	   Iran,	   we	   already	   ‘know’	   that	   Islam	   is	   homophobic	   and	   this	   becomes	   the	   starting	   point	   for	  action.	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  difficult	  dynamic	  to	  face	  –	  all	  action	  must	  make	  some	  kind	  of	  assumptions	  in	   order	   to	   facilitate	   any	  movement,	   yet	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   we	  must	   question	  why	   some	  stories	  resonate	  so	  forcefully.	  	  An	  affective	  response	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ‘what	  we	  already	  know’	  may	  not	  always	  be	  enough.	  	  	  This	  issue	  of	  personalisation	  of	  injustices	  has	  several	  dimensions.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  visibilisation	  or	   figuration	   of	   victims,	   Braidotti	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   the	   embodiment	   of	   female	   subjects	  occupies	  both	  the	  hypervisible	  and	  the	  faceless:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Ibid.	  p655	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‘This	  results	  in	  a	  positioning	  of	  embodied	  subjects,	  and	  especially	  the	  female	  ones,	  at	  the	  intersection	   of	   some	   formidable	   locations	   of	   power:	   visibility	   and	   media	   representations	  produced	   a	   consumeristic	   approach	   to	   images	   in	   a	   dissonant	   or	   internally	   differentiated	  manner.	   	   Female	   embodied	   subjects	   in	   process	   today	   include	   interchangeably	   the	   highly	  groomed	   body	   of	   Princess	   Diana	   (like	  Marilyn	  Monroe	   before	   her)	  and	   the	   highly	   disposable	  bodies	  of	  women,	  men	  and	  children	  in	  war	  torn	  lands’58	  Braidotti’s	   point	   highlights	   the	   movement	   between	   the	   highly	   visible	   icon	   that	   embodies	   a	  particular	   locus	   of	   power	   and	   the	   faceless,	   almost	   interchangeable,	   victim,	   refugee,	   asylum	  seeker.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  these	  two	  examples	  ‘represent	  for	  me	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin,	  which	  is	  the	  saturation	  of	  our	  social	  space	  by	  media	  images	  and	  representations.’59	  	  We	  could	  perhaps	  repeat	  Braidotti’s	  dynamic	  in	  relation	  to	  LGBT	  issues	  –	  the	  hyper	  visibility	  of	  Elton	  John	  or	  the	  more	   appropriately	   troubled	  George	  Michael,	   or	   even	   the	   named	   and	   commemorated	   victims	  such	   as	  Matthew	  Shepard,	   or	   the	   outspoken	   activist	   such	   as	  Peter	  Tatchell,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  myriad	   faceless	   refugees	   from	   homophobic	   regimes,	   lesbian	   victims	   of	   corrective	   rape	   in	  Southern	  Africa,	   or	   victimised	   suicidal	   teenagers	   in	   the	  Deep	  South	  of	   the	  United	   States.	   	   The	  point,	   however,	   is	   that	   these	   representations	   exist	  within	   a	   particular	   dynamic	   of	   knowledge	  construction	   founded	   upon	   a	   particular	   regime	   of	   signs.	   	   It	   is	   a	   similar	   dynamic	   that	  unproblematically	   reads	   Muslim	   society	   as	   homophobic	   and	   synthesises	   this	   reading	   into	   a	  ‘progressive’	  narrative.	  	  	  Yet	   this	   is	   not	   the	   only	  mode	   of	   ‘personalisation’	   of	   injustices.	   	   Representation	   of	   victimhood	  exists	  alongside	   representation	  of	   ‘activists’.	   	   In	  a	   roundtable	  discussion	  of	   this	   issue,	  Tamsila	  Tauqir,	  co-­‐founder	  and	  voluntary	  director	  of	  the	  Safra	  Project	  makes	  the	  point	  that:	  ‘We	  talk	  about	  issues	  and	  then	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  personalities,	  and	  that	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  Western	  culture,	  I	  believe.	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Global	  South	  because	  I	  don’t	  live	  there,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  west	  I	  do	  feel	  very	  much	  that	  arguments	  are	  made	  through	  personalities,	  on	  presentations	  and	  celebrity	  status,	  it’s	  not	  just	  done	  on	  issues	  anymore.’60	  	  Thus,	  certain	  personalities	  become	  both	  the	  overcoding	  ‘voice’	  of	  a	  gay	  liberatory	  human	  rights	  discourse	  and	  a	  point	  of	  critique	  for	  much	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  discourse	  itself.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  the	   issues	  that	  Tauqir	   is	  referencing	   in	  her	  statement,	  we	  might	  address	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  ‘event’	   of,	   for	   example,	   a	   prominent	   LGBT	   campaigner	   such	   as	   Peter	   Tatchell,	   becomes	   well	  recognised	   and	   identified	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   that	   goes	   beyond	   his	   own	   actions.	   	   We	   might	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.p17	  59	  Ibid.	  60	  Tamsila	  Tauqir	  et	  al.,	  "Queer	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Activism	  and	  Strategies	  of	  Critique:	  A	  Roundtable	  Discussion,"	  Feminist	  
Legal	  Studies	  19	  (2011).	  p180	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suggest	   that	   Tatchell	   represents	   the	   counter-­‐actualisation	   of	   a	   problematic	   in	   a	   particular	  instance	  at	  a	  particular	  time.	  Attempts	  to	  transfer	  this	  counter-­‐actualisation	  to	  different	  sets	  of	  circumstances	   or	   different	   moments	   leaves	   Tatchell	   open	   to	   particular	   critiques.61	  	   However,	  both	  Tatchell	  the	  individual,	  Tatchell	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  specific	  form	  of	  resistance,	  and	  the	  critiques	   to	   which	   he	   is	   exposed	   when	   engaging	   in	   this	   form	   of	   resistance,	   exist	   within	   a	  particular	   frame	   of	   knowledge	   production,	   and	   as	   such,	   productive	   discourse	   becomes	   lost	  within	  personalised,	   representational	   recriminations.	   	  To	  add	  a	   further	   layer	  of	   complexity	   to	  this	   issue,	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   partial	   representation	   ‘Tatchell’	   as	   a	   symbol	   for	   gay	   liberation	  struggles	  places	  further	  pressure	  on	  the	  individual	  Peter	  Tatchell	  to	  act	  and	  to	  comment	  when	  abuses	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  are	  uncovered.	  	  In	  the	  dualism	  of	  hypervisibility/facelessness	  posited	  by	  Braidotti,	  we	  can	  perhaps	  add	  that	  while	  facelessness	  becomes	  a	  silencing	  move,	  hypervisibility	  can	  bring	  with	   it	  a	   compulsion	   to	  speak.	   	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  Tatchell	  must	  always	  act	   in	  a	  certain	  way	  or	  must	  choose	  only	  one	  path	  of	  action,	  or	  that	  he	  has	  no	  agency	  in	  how	  and	  when	  he	  expresses	  his	  opinions,	  but	  perhaps	  that	  he	  no	  longer	  has	  the	  option	  of	  anonymity	  or	  silence	  in	   relation	   to	   these	   issues.	   	   As	   a	   symbol	   of	   UK	   gay	   rights	   work,	   Tatchell	   is,	   to	   some	   extent,	  enmeshed	   in	   networks	   that	   are	   extra-­‐individual	   –	   those	   of	   media,	   representation,	  communication	   -­‐	   and	   this	  may	  allow	  more	   effective	   action	   (or	   at	   least	   a	   larger	  platform	   from	  which	  to	  speak),	  but	  may	  also	  place	  a	  greater	  imperative	  to	  act,	  to	  speak,	  to	  be	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  both	   activism	   and	   critique,	   whether	   such	   attention	   is	  wanted	   or	   not.	   	   As	   Deleuze	   comments,	  ‘[t]he	  infamous	  man’s	  a	  particle	  caught	  in	  a	  shaft	  of	  light	  and	  a	  wave	  of	  sound.’62	  	  	  In	  a	  different	  context,	  Douglas	  references	  both	  Audrey	  Lourde	  and	  Sara	  Ahmed	  to	  note	  the	  way	  in	   which	   the	   highlighting	   of	   (unintended)	   racism	   in	   predominantly	   white	   feminist	  environments,	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  has	  raised	  the	  issue	  being	  treated	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	   ‘problem’	   rather	   than	   the	   problem	  of	   racism	   itself.63	  	   As	   such,	   Ahmed	  points	   out	   that	   ‘the	  exposure	   of	   violence	   becomes	   the	   origin	   of	   violence.’64	  	   In	   essence,	   I	   am	   suggesting	   that	   a	  discourse	  that	   is	  bound	  up	  in	  issues	  of	  representation	  (and	  thus	  recognition)	  will	  by	  necessity	  have	  to	  approach	  problematics	  at	  a	  degree	  of	  remove,	  as	  these	  problematics	  must	  be	  mediated	  to	  some	  extent,	  by	  our	  representations	  in	  order	  to	  assimilate	  them	  within	  particular	  frames	  of	  the	  visible	  and	  articulable.	   	  This	   impacts	  heavily	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  politics	  that	  can	  occur	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See	  eg	  Jin	  Haritaworn,	  Tamsila	  Tauqir,	  and	  Esra	  Erdem,	  "Gay	  Imperialism:	  Gender	  and	  Sexuality	  Discourse	  in	  the	  'War	  on	  Terror',"	  in	  Out	  of	  Place:	  Interrogating	  Silences	  in	  Queerness/Raciality,	  ed.	  Adi	  Kuntsman	  and	  Esperanza	  Miyake	  (London:	  Raw	  Nerve	  Books,	  2008).	  Stacy	  Douglas,	  Suhraiya	  Jivraj,	  and	  Sarah	  Lamble,	  "Liabilities	  of	  Queer	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Critique,"	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  19	  (2011).	  	  62Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Negotiations	  (Chichester:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  p108	  63	  Stacy	  Douglas,	  "On	  Defending	  Raw	  Nerve	  Books:	  Or,	  the	  Stuff	  of	  Good	  Feeling,"	  Upping	  the	  Anti:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Theory	  
and	  Action	  11	  (2010).	  64	  Ahmed,	  cited	  in	  Ibid.	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kind	   of	   engagements	   that	   can	   be	  made.	   	   Ahmed	   raises	   this	   point	   in	   relation	   to	   controversies	  surrounding	  responses	  that	  have	  been	  made	  to	  instances	  of	  queer	  anti-­‐racist	  critique:	  ‘Counter-­‐assertions	  are	  often	  stronger	  than	  countering	  the	  original	  assertion	  in	  the	  form	  of	   a	   negative	   claim	   (‘I	   am	  not	   racist’);	   they	   often	  make	   additional	   assertions	   in	   the	   form	  of	   a	  positive	  claim	  (‘I	  am	  anti-­‐racist’).	  These	  responses	  fail	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  actual	  critique	  of	  racism	  as	  they	  take	  the	   form	  of	  self	  recognition	  (‘I	  don’t	  recognise	  myself	   in	   the	  critique	  of	  racism’;	   ‘I	  recognise	  myself	  as	  anti-­‐racist’).	  To	  respond	  to	  a	  critique	  requires	  not	  referring	  to	  what	  is	  said	  or	  written	   back	   to	   oneself	   (self-­‐reference	  makes	   the	   object	   of	   a	   critique	   into	   the	   subject)	   but	  engaging	  more	   closely	  with	  what	   is	  being	  asserted.	   	  When	   self-­‐reference	  happens	   too	  quickly	  (when	  someone	  responds	  by	  defending	  themselves	  against	  a	  critique	  by	  hearing	  it	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  their	  credentials),	  the	  opportunity	  for	  an	  engagement	  is	  lost.’65	  	  The	   problem	   at	   play	   here	   is	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   personalisation	   of	   larger	   narratives	   through	  icons	   that	   become	   representations	   -­‐	   whether	   this	   representation	   is	   the	   oppressed	   Muslim	  lesbian	   or	   the	   embattled	   human	   rights	   campaigner.	   	   Each	   presentation	   rests	   at	   a	   point	   of	  visibility	  of	  power	  and	  discourse	  that	  shapes	  and	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  actors	  that	  participate	  in	  it.	  	  	  The	   issue	   arises	   when	   the	   positioning	   of	   these	   representations	   detach	   and	   replicate	   to	   the	  extent	  that	  they	  take	  up	  all	  available	  space	  for	  talking	  about	  domination	  and	  subordination.	  	  For	  example,	   it	   is	   natural	   that	   when	   faced	  with	   a	   victim/oppressor	   binary,	   Tatchell	   will	   emplace	  himself	  and	  identify	  with	  the	  victim	  side	  of	  the	  duality.	  	  And	  while	  this	  isn’t	  a	  false	  emplacement,	  the	   positioning	   of	   Tachell	   and	   all	   that	   he	   signifies	   within	   a	   highly	   reductive	   binary	   severely	  limits	  the	  possibilities	  for	  action.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  Tatchell	  or	  even	  critiques	  of	  his	  activism,	  but	  the	  binary	  itself	  –	  the	  dynamic	  of	  knowledge	  production	  that	  creates	  an	  either/or	  antagonism	   and	   limits	   agency	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   picking	   a	   side.	   	   This	   framework	   is	   at	   once	  reductive	   and	   abstracting	   and	   serves	   to	   obscure	   the	  many	   vectors	   through	  which	   power	   and	  injustice	  can	  circulate.	  	  This	  is	  why	  a	  methodological	  approach	  that	  seeks	  to	  go	  beyond	  binaries	  and	  explore	   the	  multiple	   flows	  and	  problematics	   in	  circulation	   is	  so	   important:	  a	  method	   that	  reduces	   questions	   to	   simple	   either/or	   divisions	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   create	   false	   solutions	   to	  false	   (or	   badly	   posed)	   questions.	   	   Though	   more	   complex	   and	   less	   clear	   cut,	   a	   ‘multi-­‐sided’	  method	  offers	  more	  long	  term	  possibilities	  for	  more	  effective	  analysis	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  issues	  that	  shape	  each	  problematic	  assemblage.	  	  This	   frame	   of	   representation,	   reduction	   and	   abstraction	   interacts	   with	   the	   particularities	   of	  experience.	   	   Thus	   Ahmed	   suggests	   that	   ‘white	   queer	   subjects	   might	   be	   very	   aware	   of	  heteronormativity	  because	  of	  being	  queer	   (queerness	  as	  estrangement	   from	  social	  and	  sexual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  "Problematic	  Proximities:	  Or	  Why	  Critiques	  of	  Gay	  Imperialism	  Matter	  "	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  19	  (2011).	  p122	  
	  	  112	  
norms)	  but	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  whiteness	  because	  of	  being	  white	  (whiteness	  as	  an	  alignment	  with	  social	  and	  racial	  norms).’66	  	  The	  final	  connection	  to	  make	  then,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  nature	  of	  injustice	  is	  specifically	  situated	  and	  emplaced	  –	  individuals	  experience	  violence,	  discrimination	  and	  inequality	  as	  emplaced,	  enfleshed	  persons.	  	  However,	  a	  regime	  of	  representation,	  reduction	  or	  abstraction	  as	  explored	  above	  reduces	  the	  possibility	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  particularities	  of	  what	  each	   individual	  experiences.	   	  We	  assume	  that	   the	  experience	  of	  suffering	   is	   immediately	  accessible	   and	   we	   want	   to	   empathise	   with	   the	   victim,	   but	   as	   Butler	   points	   out,	   we	   must	  recognise	   the	   factors	   that	   mediate	   our	   approach	   to	   both	   visibility	   and	   to	   the	   experience	   of	  suffering.	   	   I	   should	   note	   here	   that	   this	   is	   not	   a	   denial	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   agency,	   nor	   am	   I	  suggesting	  that	  LGBT	  activists	  and	  campaigners	  should	  not	  be	  critiqued	  or	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  actions;	  instead,	  I	  am	  viewing	  these	  interactions	  and	  individuals	  as	  events	  and	  attempting	  to	   sketch	   out	   which	   virtualities	   they	   actualise	   and	   how	   the	   fact	   of	   this	   actualisation	   and	   the	  language	  with	  which	  we	   talk	   about	   such	   acutalisations	   frame	   how	  we	   envisage	   and	   emplace	  ourselves	  within	  the	  world.	  	  	  
Problematising	  (narratives	  of)	  inclusion	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  withdrawal	  In	  multiple	  different	  ways	  then,	  to	  live	  sexual	  otherness,	  to	  engage	  in	  activism	  in	  this	  area	  or	  to	  attempt	  to	  engage	  in	  critique	  is	  to	  confront	  multiple	  vectors	  of	  power	  and	  identity.	  	  And	  one	  of	  the	  most	   important	  sites	  of	  engagement,	   I	  want	   to	  suggest,	   is	  with	   the	  self.	   	  Povinelli	  gives	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  this	  in	  her	  article	  Disturbing	  Sexuality:	  ‘”This	  is	  me,”	  I	  thought	  when	  I	  saw	  two	  women	  kissing	  in	  Santa	  Fe,	  New	  Mexico.	  	  “This	  is	  me,”	  I	  thought	  when	  I	  went	  hunting	  with	  a	  group	  of	  women	  and	  men	  from	  Belyuen.	  	  But	  what	  is	  “this”	  and	  “that”?	  –	  an	  identity,	  a	  mode	  of	  life,	  a	  form	  of	  association?	  	  Surely	  I	  was	  hailed	  in	  both.	  	  But	  as	  surely	  I	  was	  not	  hailed	  into	  an	  equivalent	  social	  form	  or	  mode	  of	  being.’67	  	  ‘Simply	  put’	  she	  goes	  on	  to	  argue,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  what	  she	  is	  seeing	  and	  experiencing	  here	  is	  not	  objectively	  what	  is	  there,	  and	  certainly	  not	  what	  her	  friends	  are	  seeing	  and	  experiencing.	   	  The	  danger	  that	  Povinelli	  highlights	  for	  me	  is	  one	  of	  forcing	  connection	  without	  being	  very	  aware	  of	  the	   different	   worlds	   that	   indviduals	   inhabit,	   forcing	   others	   to	   inhabit	   our	   own	   particular	  framework	   for	  understanding	  gayness.	   	  And	   this,	   I	  would	  argue,	   is	  made	  all	   the	  more	  difficult	  when	  one	  inhabits	  a	  group	  or	  a	  position	  that	  isn’t	  quite	  ‘respectable’	  or	  quite	  ‘mainstream’	  –	  the	  temptation	   is	   to	   look	   for	   ‘others-­‐like-­‐me’,	   to	   affirm	   one’s	   identity	   and	   celebrate	   this	   assumed	  connection.	   	   Through	   such	   identifications,	   new	   narratives	   of	   authenticity	   are	   constructed.	  	  However,	   to	   work	   in	   this	   way	   harks	   too	   closely	   to	   biological	   reductionism	   or	   even	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Ibid.	  p128	  67	  Elizabeth	  Povinelli,	  "Disturbing	  Sexuality,"	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  106,	  no.	  3	  (2007).	  p567	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outdated	  mode	  of	  anthropology	  that	  looks	  for	  the	  ‘modern	  primitive’	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  truth	  of	  our	  origins.	  	  The	  underlying	  assumption	  or	  logical	  conclusion	  to	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  teleology	  that	  assumes	  that	  sexual	  otherness	  is	  always	  heading	  in	  one	  particular	  direction.	  	  	  In	   relation	   to	   this	   recognition	   as	   ‘not-­‐quite-­‐mainstream’,	   Ahmed’s	   work	   on	   nomadism	   is	  interesting:	   she	   points	   out	   that	   certain	   conceptions	   of	   nomadism	   or	   migration	   presume	   a	  belonging	   or	   kinship	   based	   on	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   shared	   nomadic	   or	   displaced	   status.	  	  Essentially,	  what	   those	  who	  are	  nomads	   share	   in	   common	   is	   an	  uprootedness	   from	  whatever	  they	  conceive	  of	  as	  ‘home’:	  they	  share	  a	  negativity,	  a	  lack	  of	  something	  or	  a	  displacement	  from	  the	  norm.	   	   	   	   She	   argues	   that	   this	   is	   not	   enough;	   that	  migration	  needs	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   its	  specificity	   and	   that	   ‘estrangement	   is	   always	   estrangement	   in	   a	   particular	   time	   and	   place.	   	   To	  universalise	   estrangement	   as	   that	   which	   brings	   us	   together	   is	   to	   conceal	   how	   estrangement	  marks	  out	  communities.’68	  	  She	  calls	  instead	  for	  an	  ‘uncommon	  estrangement’	  –	  a	  process	  where	  people	   are	   known	   as	   not	   known	   -­‐	   	   and	   an	   attempt	   to	   know,	   to	   breach	   difference	   or	   to	  understand	  and	  find	  a	  way	  to	  negotiate	  this	  gap	  in	  order	  to	  consciously	  create	  a	  community.69	  While	  we	  should	  not	  simply	  lift	  Ahmed’s	  framework	  and	  apply	  it	  wholesale	  to	  understandings	  of	  identity,	   there	   are	   some	   interesting	   points	   here.	   	   First,	   creating	   similarity	   based	   on	   a	   shared	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  something	  –	  in	  her	  case	  ‘at	  home’	  or	  in	  our	  case	  perhaps	  ‘heterosexual’	  -­‐	  can	  be	   a	   false	   similarity,	   or	   a	   surface	   similarity	   that	   is	   liable	   to	   break	   down	   on	   first	   inspection.	  	  Related	   to	   this	   idea	   is	   a	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   specificity	   of	   difference,	   both	   as	   it	   is	   embodied	   by	  particular	   individuals	   and	   groups	   and	   the	   context	   from	   which	   such	   individuals	   might	   be	  estranged.70	  	  	  Furthermore,	  while	  Ahmed	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  perfectly	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  community	  based	  on	  the	   shared	  experience	  of	  not	  being	   fully	   ‘at	  home’,	   this	   community	   is	   something	   that	  must	  be	  negotiated,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   given,	   but	   a	   creation	   of	   constantly	   shifting	   boundaries	   that	   must	   be	  addressed	   and	   confronted.	   	   Community	   is	   created	   in	   this	   understanding,	   not	   through	   an	  insulation	  of	  those	  seen	  as	  a	  similar	  against	  what	  is	  percieved	  to	  be	  different,	  but	  by	  a	  deliberate	  reaching	  out	  to	  difference	  and	  forging	  of	  the	  gap	  in	  between,	  even	  if	  this	  process	  can	  never,	  or	  should	  never	  be	  completed.	  	  Drucilla	  Cornell	  calls	  this	  the	  disrupting	  of	  totality	  which	  ‘gives	  us	  a	  glimpse	  of	  what	   things	   in	   their	   interrelatedness	  might	  become	   if	   they	  were	  allowed	   to	   rest	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Ahmed,	  Strange	  Encounters:	  Embodied	  Others	  in	  Postcoloniality.	  p93	  69	  Ibid.	  p80-­‐93	  70	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  Ahmed	  through	  a	  paradigm	  that	  sees	  ‘home’	  as	  more	  than	  just	  a	  physical	  place	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  estrangement	  as	  being	  psychological	  rather	  than	  physical	  removal	  from	  what	  is	  known.	  	  In	  essence	  estrangement	  might	  occur	  because	  of	  sexual	  difference,	  but	  this	  makes	  it	  even	  more	  important	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  circumstances	  and	  particularity	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  such	  estrangement	  occurs.	  
	  	  114	  
their	   affinity,	   rather	   than	   forever	   being	   stuffed	   into	   a	   new	   system	   of	   identification'.71	  	   	   The	  totality	   to	   be	   disrupted	   includes	   the	   self	   and	   the	   discourses	   of	   knowledge	   production	   that	  produce	  both	  self	  and	  society	  as	  untroubled	  wholes.	  	  	  The	   use	   of	   such	   a	  model	   demands	   a	   degree	   of	   humility:	   	   it	   demands	   that	  we	   draw	   back	   and	  refrain	  from	  trying	  to	  immediately	  integrate	  ‘the	  other’	  into	  our	  own	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  that	  we	  conceive	  of	  the	  world	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  alterity	  has	  the	  space	  to	  remain	  as	  such.	   	  For	  Deleuze	   and	  Guatarri,	   this	  might	   be	   the	  moment	   of	   revolutionary	  withdrawal,	   the	  moment	   of	  movement	   away	   from	   the	   goal:	   ‘the	   revolutionary	   knows	   that	   escape	   is	   revolutionary	   -­‐
withdrawal,	  freaks	  –provided	  one	  sweeps	  away	  the	  social	  cover	  on	  leaving,	  or	  causes	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  system	  to	  get	  lost	  in	  the	  shuffle.	  What	  matters	  is	  to	  break	  through	  the	  wall.’72	  	  The	  question	  then	  might	  be,	  in	  a	  regime	  of	  visibility,	  representation	  and	  articulation,	  what	  is	  the	  potential	  of	  deliberately	   not	   responding?	   	   Tauqir	   notes	   that	   in	   response	   to	   controversy,	   she	   felt	   that	   the	  capacity	  to	  ‘not	  speak’	  and	  to	  disengage	  from	  particular	  discussions	  was	  particularly	  important:	  ‘In	   terms	  of	   responding	   to	   challenges,	   and	   this	   is	   a	   personal	   style,	   I	   feel	   very	   strongly	  about	  not	  speaking,	  about	  being	  silent	  in	  some	  circumstances…I	  think	  the	  right	  not	  to	  speak,	  not	  to	   engage	   in	   discussions	   and	   rhetoric	   that	   is	   going	   to	   damage	   us	   or	   be	   turned	   against	   our	  communities	  in	  the	  long	  term,	  is	  important,	  because	  we	  live	  in	  these	  communities,	  we	  go	  home	  and	  we	  eat	  with	  them.	  For	  us	  to	  then	  criticise	  on	  that	  platform,	  the	  homo-­‐nationalist	  wouldn’t	  have	  done	  us	  any	  favours	  or	  helped	  our	  stakeholders	  or	  the	  people	  that	  we	  try	  and	  work	  with	  every	  day.’73	  Yet,	  can	  refusing	  to	  speak	  also	  form	  a	  disavowal	  of	  responsibility?	  	  Silence	  or	  withdrawal	  here	  is	  not	   just	   a	   disengagement	   or	   removal,	   but	   a	   positive	   and	   potentially	   disruptive	   act	   with	  implications	  and	  consequences	  for	  more	  than	  the	  individual	  engaged	  in	  the	  act	  of	  not	  speaking	  	  -­‐with	   good	   reason,	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   refer	   to	   withdrawal	   as	   ‘breaking	   through	   the	   wall’.	  	  Thus,	  in	  a	  regime	  where	  the	  subaltern	  cannot	  speak	  at	  all,	  is	  not	  the	  pressing	  imperative	  to	  try	  and	  do	  something?	  	  Braidotti	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  ‘bond’	  between	  the	  ‘many	  and	  multi-­‐layered	  ‘others’	   of	   the	   former	   phallogocentric	   empire	   –	   women,	   natives,	   natural	   infantilized	   and	  criminalized	  others.’74	  	  If,	  following	  Spinoza	  and	  Deleuze,	  humans	  are	  defined	  by	  their	  conatus,	  their	   connectability,	   we	   must	   question	   how	   to	   withdraw	   in	   a	   responsible	   fashion	   –	   how	   to	  withdraw	  without	  simply	  engaging	  in	  a	  disavowal	  of	  this	  bond.	   	  Or	  on	  the	  opposite	  vector,	  we	  might	   question	   why	   some	   attempts	   to	   act	   fill	   us	   with	   unease	   -­‐	   why,	   for	   example,	   we	   might	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Drucilla	  Cornell,	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Limit	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1992).p31	  72	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  trans.	  Robert	  Hurley,	  Mark	  Seem,	  and	  Helen	  R.	  Lane	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011).	  p277	  73	  Tauqir	  et	  al.,	  "Queer	  Anti-­‐Racist	  Activism	  and	  Strategies	  of	  Critique:	  A	  Roundtable	  Discussion."	  p179	  74	  Braidotti,	  Transpositions.p130	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celebrate	  the	  release	  of	  two	  ‘gay’	  Malawian	  men,	  but	  feel	  repulsion	  at	  the	  knowledge	  that	  their	  release	  may	  have	  been	  connected	   to	   international	  pressures	  and	   threats	  of	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  aid	  money	   and	   fear	   that	   these	   international	  pressures	  might	   lead	   to	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	  more	  long	   term	   backlash	   for	   LGBT	  Malawians.75	  	   Similarly,	   while	   we	  may	   appreciate	   the	   efforts	   of	  those	   UK	   lawyers	   who	   are	   defending	   gay	   rights	   cases	   in	   courts	   outside	   the	   UK,	   seeking	  landmark	   rulings	   and	   legal	   change	   in	   countries	   that	   still	   criminalise	   homosexuality,	   once	   we	  shift	  to	  a	  view	  that	  encompasses	  not	  just	  the	  issue	  of	  legal	  recognition,	  but	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  change	  and	  of	  power	  imbalances	  between	  the	  global	  North	  and	  the	  global	  South,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  wholly	  endorse	  their	  actions	  or	  to	  agree	  that	  a	  solution	  that	  aims	  at	  top	  down	  legislative	  change	  is	   the	  most	  effective	  means	  of	   securing	   long	   term	  and	  safe	  progress	   for	  LGBT	   individuals.	   	  As	  such,	   while	   we	  might	   applaud	   the	   intentions	   and	   sincerity	   of	   individuals	   involved,	   we	  might	  simultaneously	   cringe	   away	   from	   the	   power	   relations	   in	   which	   their	   actions	   implicate	   us.	  	  Indeed	   I	  would	  argue	   that	  rights	  offer	  a	  very	  problematic	  redress	   for	   injustices	  on	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation,	   especially	  when	   they	  are	  deployed	  as	   the	  main	  or	  only	   strategy	  of	   change.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   strategy	   of	   litigating	   in	   overseas	   courts	   could	   easily	   lead	   to	   a	   painfully	   ironic	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  UK	  lawyer	  finds	  himself	  or	  herself	  arguing	  in	  the	  courts	  of	  a	  former	  colony	  for	   the	   overturning	   of	   a	   law	   that	   the	   Colonial	   British	   authorities	   were	   responsible	   for	   first	  introducing.	   	   Such	   an	   image	  would	   only	   feed	   in	   to	   arguments	   of	   homosexuality	   as	   a	  Western	  imposition	  and	  to	  accusations	  of	  neo-­‐imperialism.76	  	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  perhaps,	  that	  withdrawal	  involves	  a	  repudiation	  of	  particular	  systemic	  violence,	  but	   also	   throws	   us	   into	   unknown	   smooth	   space,	   or	   removes	   and	   destabilises	   our	   frame	   for	  operation.	  	  Remaining	  ‘within’	  maps	  a	  clearer	  path	  for	  action,	  but	  implicates	  us	  in	  the	  violence	  of	  the	   system.	   	   As	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   remind	   us	   however,	   within	   and	  without	   are	   not	   stable	  constructions,	  and	  as	  we	  confront	  these	  multiplicities,	  they	  may	  shift	  around	  us	  –	  to	  withdraw	  may	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   to	   abandon,	   as	   even	   the	   position	   of	   ‘outside’	   represents	   not	  unassailable	   difference	   but	   a	   refolding	   of	   multiplicities.	   	   Withdrawal	   is	   a	   complicated	   act,	  particularly	  when	   understood	   from	   a	   perspective	   of	   embodied	   connectivity.	   	  Withdrawal	   and	  destabilisation	  of	  a	  framework	  affects	  a	  break	  not	  just	  for	  those	  undertaking	  the	  withdrawal	  or	  refusing	  to	  speak,	  but	  also	  for	  others	  implicated	  within	  the	  same	  framework.	  	  Tauqir	  is	  correct	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  eg	  ‘Malawi	  Pardons	  Jailed	  Gay	  Couple’	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10190653	  accessed	  25/05/2012	  76	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  organisations	  who	  litigate	  these	  cases	  are	  simply	  a	  counter-­‐measure	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  (primarily)	  American	  evangelical	  groups	  who	  preach	  anti-­‐homosexuality	  and	  ‘gay	  therapy’	  particularly	  in	  Southern	  Africa.	  	  However,	  I	  find	  framing	  the	  debate	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  conflict	  or	  culture	  war	  between	  two	  different	  Western	  groupings,	  that	  is	  being	  played	  out	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  using	  the	  lives	  and	  safety	  of	  LGBT	  individuals	  as	  pawns,	  to	  be	  deeply	  troubling,	  racist,	  neo-­‐imperialist	  and	  a	  framing	  that	  works	  to	  effectively	  silence	  and	  disempower	  those	  who	  live	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  LGBT	  or	  otherwise.	  	  	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  intense	  problematics	  of	  differential	  power	  relations	  in	  discourses	  of	  LGBT/anti-­‐LGBT	  actions	  but	  refrain	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  from	  reinforcing	  them	  or	  endorsing	  a	  viewpoint	  that	  this	  is	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  secure	  meaningful	  gains	  for	  LGBT	  people	  in	  the	  global	  South.	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in	  highlighting	  the	  need	  to	  ‘not	  speak’	  but	  perhaps	  even	  more	  important	  is	  her	  recognition	  of	  the	  situated	  nature	  of	   this	  withdrawal	  and	  the	  relative	  consequences	  of	   the	  act.	   	  Thus	  Tauqir	  may	  withdraw	  but	  others	  may	  find	  themselves	  enmeshed	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  an	  act	  of	  withdrawal	  is	  potentially	   damaging.	   The	   question	   is	   not	   one	   of	   an	   act	   of	   withdrawal	   being	   always	   right	   or	  always	  wrong,	  but	  of	  recognising	  the	  multiple	  different	  connections	  and	   intensities	   implicated	  in	   each	   act	   of	   withdrawal	   and	   attempting	   to	   act	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   creatively	   repeat	   these	  connections	  and	  tendencies	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  exigencies	  of	  a	  particular,	  material	  situation.	  	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  site	  of	  withdrawal	  becomes	  unregulated	  space	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   it	  not	  only	  holds	  the	  possibility	  for	  not	  speaking	  or	  even	  not	  working	  towards	  legal	  regulation,	  but	  it	  also	  holds	  no	  imperative	  or	  prescription	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  mode	  in	  which	  a	  withdrawal	  might	  take	  place.	  
Beyond	  narratives	  of	  identity:	  Sexual	  orientation	  politics	  as	  haecceity	  and	  movement	  The	  issue	  of	  withdrawal	  and	  confrontation	  is	  a	  singularly	  difficult	  problematic.	  	  In	  particular,	  it	  should	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   is	   no	   single	  way	   to	   act	   in	   response	   to	   such	   ethical	   demands.	   	  We	  might	   begin	   to	   approach	   this	   problematic	   through	   Hemming’s	   consideration	   of	   feminist	  theorising	   of	   empathy.	   	   In	   a	   range	   of	   feminist	   epistemologies,	   empathy	   becomes	   a	   means	   of	  undoing	   representational	   violence,	   of	   approaching	   and	   appreciating	   the	   other.	   	   While	   this	   is	  admirable,	  Hemmings	  argues	  that	  although	  empathy	  may	  undo	  the	  subject/object	  relationship	  and	  replace	  it	  with	  a	  subject/subject	  relationship,	  the	  two	  subjects	  remain	  unequal	  as	  they	  are	  held	  apart	  by	  relations	  of	  recognition	  that	  are	  temporally	  as	  well	  as	  spatially	  managed.77	  	  There	  are	  still	  particular	  criteria	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  subjectivity	  in	  operation,	  even	  if	  these	  criteria	  are	  mediated	  through	  empathy.	  	  	  At	  issue,	  Hemmings	  suggests,	  is	  the	  need	  to	  question	  our	  own	  status	  as	  a	  subject.	  	  This	  critique	  is	   similar	   to	   that	   directed	   at	   Deleuze/Guattari	   and	   Foucault	   by	   Spivak,	   but	   also	   resonates	   in	  other	   feminist	   critiques	   of	   Deleuze	   in	   particular	   and	   more	   generally,	   with	   post-­‐structuralist	  activations	  of	  femininity	  or	  the	  feminine	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  rationality.	  As	  De	  Lauretis	  notes:	  	  ‘So	   it	   is,	   that	   by	   displacing	   the	   question	   of	   gender	   on	   to	   an	   ahistorical	   purely	   textual	  figure	   of	   femininity	   (Derrida);	   or	   by	   shifting	   the	   sexual	   basis	   of	   gender	   quite	   beyond	   sexual	  difference,	   onto	   a	   body	   of	   diffuse	   pleasures	   (Foucault)	   and	   libidinally	   invested	   surfaces	  (Lyotard),	   or	   a	   body-­‐site	   of	   undifferentiated	   affectvity,	   and	   hence	   a	   subject	   freed	   from	   (self)-­‐representation	  and	  the	  constraints	  of	  identity	  (Deleuze);	  and	  finally	  by	  displacing	  the	  ideology,	  but	  also	   the	  reality	  –	   the	  historicity	  –	  of	  gender	  onto	   this	  diffuse,	  decentred,	  or	  deconstructed	  (but	  certainly	  not	  female)	  subject	  –	  so	  that	  paradoxically	  again,	  these	  theories	  make	  their	  appeal	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  Clare	  Hemmings,	  Why	  Stories	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to	   women,	   naming	   the	   process	   of	   such	   displacing	   with	   the	   term	   becoming-­‐women	   (devenir-­‐
femme).’78	  The	  question	  of	  ‘becoming-­‐woman’	  is	  a	  particular	  point	  of	  tension.	  	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  make	  it	  clear	   that	   the	   deployment	   of	   the	   figure	   of	   becoming-­‐woman	   does	   not	   obviate	   the	   need	   or	  legitimacy	  of	  pursuing	   the	   ‘molar’	   aims	  of	   the	  women’s	  movement.	   	  Yet	   this	  does	  not	  entirely	  remove	  the	  contradiction	  at	  play	  here.	  	  To	  return	  to	  Hemming’s	  exploration	  of	  subject/object	  vs.	  unequal	   subject/unequal	   subject	   relationships	   we	   might	   note,	   with	   Braidotti,	   that	   Deleuze-­‐Guattarian	   ‘becoming-­‐woman’	   that	   disrupts	   and	   overcomes	   sexual	   difference,	   ‘suggests	   a	  symmetry	   between	   the	   sexes,	   which	   results	   in	   attributing	   the	   same	   psychic,	   conceptual	   and	  deconstructive	  itinerates	  to	  both.’79	  	  Becoming-­‐woman	  ignores	  the	  specificity	  of	  women’s	  efforts	  to	   overcome	   particular	   forms	   of	   sexual	   difference	   and	   the	   particular	   experiences	   of	   women	  (differently)	  situated	  within	  these	  regimes	  of	  difference.	   	  There	  is	  a	  danger	  here	  of	   ‘organising	  femininity	  without	  women’80	  or	   even	  of	   talking	  of	   the	   feminine	  without	   reference	   to	   the	   lived	  experience	   of	   womanhood.81	  	   Thus,	   becoming-­‐woman	   posits	   a	   revolutionary	   subjectivity	   by	  dissolving	   a	   feminist	   consciousness.	   	   For	   Braidotti,	   this	   is	   theoretically	   problematic	   as	   it	  suggests	  a	  symmetry	  between	  the	  sexes	  or	  an	  equivalence	  of	  positionality	  for	  both	  visibility	  and	  speech,	   that	   is	  by	  no	  means	  evident.	   	  Femininity	  here	  seems	  ambiguous	  and	  constructed	  with	  little	  attentiveness	  to	  the	  actuality	  of	  womanhood:	  when	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  contemplate	  the	  question	   ‘What	  might	  happen	  if	  a	  woman	  herself	  becomes	  a	  philosopher?’,	  Braidotti	  observes:	  ‘Might	  I	  be	  so	  bold	  as	  to	  venture	  that	  only	  a	  non-­‐woman	  would	  contemplate	  this	  possibility	  as	  a	  great	  novelty,	  an	  unprecedented	  event	  or	  a	  catastrophe	  internal	  to	  the	  philosophical	  order	  and	  capable	  of	  subverting	  it?’82	  There	   is	   then,	   a	   contradiction,	   or	   at	   least	   an	   ambiguity,	   at	   work	   here.	   	   However,	   an	  acknowledgement	  of	  this	  contradiction	  might	  allow	  us	  to	  unpick	  various	  useful	  strands	  that	  can	  be	   applied	   more	   generally	   to	   questions	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   becoming.	   	   Braidotti’s	   critique	  suggests	   that	   becoming-­‐woman	   is	   inadequate	   as	   a	   figure	   of	   thought	  when	   used	   in	   a	   sexually	  undifferentiated	  manner.	  	  The	  point	  to	  be	  made	  from	  this	  critique	  however,	  is	  one	  which	  draws	  us	  back	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  a	  ‘politics	  of	  location’:	   	  	   ‘Politics	   being	   no	   more	   than	   a	   theoretically	   informed	   map,	   Deleuze	   draws	   his	   own	  topology,	   and	   he	   is	   fully	   entitled	   to	   it.	   	   Speaking	   as	   a	   feminist	   I	   see	   this	   as	   confirming	   the	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  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  Unviersity	  Press,	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  Metamorphoses:	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  Materialist	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  of	  Becoming.	  p81	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  Rosi	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  Dissonance:	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  (Cambridge:	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importance	   of	   the	   ‘politics	   of	   location’	   and	   of	   sexual	   difference	   as	   marking	   asymmetrical	  positions	  between	   the	   sexes.	   	  The	  positioning	   that	   comes	   from	  our	  embodied	  and	  historically	  located	  subjectivities	  also	  determines	  the	  sort	  of	  political	  map	  and	  conceptual	  diagrams	  that	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  draw’83	  This	  focus	  on	  positionality	  and	  the	  particular	  topologies	  that	  are	  drawn	  depending	  upon	  these	  positions	   draws	   attention	   to	   the	   important	   double	   movement	   at	   play	   here:	   the	   figure	   of	  becoming-­‐woman	   (as	   a	   virtual	   movement)	   is	   not	   a	   psycho-­‐social	   type,	   but	   nor	   is	   it	   entirely	  independent	   from	   the	   actuality	   in	   which	   it	   is	   expressed.	   Actual	   and	   virtual	   operate	   co-­‐extensively	   and	   reciprocally	   in	   a	   process	   of	   becoming	   in	   a	   constant	   movement	   of	   locating,	  breaking	   and	   repositioning	   boundaries	   and	   thresholds.	   	   This	   point	   is	   discussed	   further	   in	  Chapter	   Six,	   but	   of	   is	   key	   relevance	   here	   as	   it	   provides	   a	   means	   by	   which	   we	  might	   further	  clarify	  and	  explore	  the	  points	  of	  tension	  at	  play.	  	  It	  is	  important	  here	  to	  avoid	  reading	  Deleuze	  as	  arguing	  that	  the	  ‘other’	  will	  be	  always	  nomadic	  or	  always	  an	  escape	  into	  an	  ungrounded	  smooth	  space	  of	  deterritorialisation	  or	  dissolution.	   	  This	  approach	  amounts	  to	  little	  more	  than	  a	  crude	  exoticisation	  of	  otherness,	  and	  although	  this	  is	  a	  critique	  that	  has	  been	  levelled	  at	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari84,	  Braidotti	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  a	  misreading	  that	  hinders	  serious	  conceptual	  criticisms	  that	  do	  need	  to	  be	  made.85	  Thus	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  questions	  of	  LGBT	  subjectivity,	  identity	  and	  withdrawal,	  I	  want	  to	  situate	  these	  problematics	  and	  points	  of	  tension	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  subjectivity.	   	  For	  Deleuze	  individuals	  are	  not	  subjects;	  instead	  haecceities	  –	  degrees	  of	  intensity	  –	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  haecceities,	  bring	  about	  individuals.86	  	   ‘Hacceity	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  identity	  as	  a	  hybrid	  collectivity	  that	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  individual	  but	  on	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  individual	  with	  other	  bodies	   in	   the	  broader	  sense	  of	   the	   term.	  Hacceity	   is	   the	  assemblage	  between	  one’s	  body,	   other	   bodies,	   the	   space	   in	  which	   one	   is	  moving,	   the	   body	   of	   law	   that	   determines	   one’s	  movement.’87	  	  Therefore	  to	  think	  haecceities	   is	  to	  think	  not	  of	  stable	   individual	  subjects	  but	  of	  interconnecting	  intensities	  situated	  upon	  or	  within	  a	  plane,	  moving	  in	  space,	  affecting	  and	  being	  affected	  in	  their	  turn.	  	  Becoming	  is	  the	  process	  of	  the	  encounter	  of	  haecceities,	  the	  merging	  and	  contagion	   of	   singularities	   along	   borders	   that	   are	   located	  within	   a	   dynamic	   and	  moving	   field.	  	  Thus	  what	  operates	  here	  is	  not	  identity,	  but	  rather	  pre-­‐individual	  singularities,	   intensities	  and	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flows	  that	  engage	  in	  moments	  of	  speed,	  slowness	  and	  rest.	   	  Haecceity	  demands	  that	  we	  do	  not	  isolate	  or	  remove	  individuals	  from	  their	  surroundings,	  but	  consider	  them	  instead	  as	  embodied,	  enmeshed	  and	  in	  a	  reciprocal	  interaction	  with	  their	  space	  and	  surroundings.	  	  Individuals	  as	  they	  emerge	  here	  must	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  connections	  and	  connectability.	  With	   this	   understanding,	   we	  might	   refine	   Hemming’s	   subject/subject	   relation	   yet	   further.	   	   If	  becoming	  and	  the	  encounter	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  meeting	  of	  haecceities,	  then	  this	  meeting	  must	  be	  understood	  and	  analysed	  as	  a	  material	  and	  situated	  occurrence.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  conceptual	  or	  transcendental	  rearrangement	  so	  much	  as	  an	  organisation	  and	  arrival	  on	  a	  plane	  of	  consistency	  in	  which	   the	  encounter	  marks	  a	   ‘change	  of	  space	  and	  speed’	   in	   the	   ‘experiential	   field’	  evoking	  new	   bodies	   and	   transformative	   becomings.	   	   Yet	   read	   in	   line	   with	   Braidotti’s	   critique	   of	  becoming	  woman,	  this	  encounter,	  this	  mode	  of	  being/becoming-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	   be	   read	   as	   neutral	   (that	   is	   non-­‐gendered,	   sexed,	   etc.).	   	   The	   entire	   movement	   here	   is	  profoundly	   spatialising	   and	   temporalising,	   at	   stake	   is	   not	   a	   relation	   of	   transcendental	   stable	  subjects,	  but	  material	  and	  actual	  encounters.	   	  This	  is	  not	  a	  prioritisation	  of	  the	  actual	  over	  the	  virtual,	   or	   vice	   versa,	   but	   a	   recognition	   of	   the	   activation	   of	   both	   in	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	  through	  simultaneous	  intensive	  differentiation	  and	  actual	  differenciation.88	  Thus,	   put	   as	   succinctly	   as	   possible:	   	   we	   are	   all	   differently	   in	   the	   world	   and	   this	   profoundly	  affects	  our	  encounters.	  	  What	  this	  approach	  emphasises	  however	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  potential	  for	  a	   myriad	   of	   different	   subject	   positions,	   but	   the	   necessity	   for	   an	   ‘enlarged	   sense	   of	  interconnection	   between	   self	   and	   others,	   including	   the	   non-­‐human	   or	   'earth'	   others,	   by	  removing	   the	   obstacle	   of	   self-­‐centred	   individualism.’89	  	   This	   differenciated	   being	   suggests	  differential	  responsibilities	  and	  power	  dynamics.	  	  ‘As	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue:	  the	  centre	  has	  to	  deconstruct	  its	  powers	  and	  let	  them	  lie,	  while	  the	  margins	  are	  the	  motor	  of	  active	  processes	  of	   becoming.’90	  	   As	   such,	   dissymmetrical	   positions	   and	   subjectivities	   demand	   dissymmetrical	  actions.	   	   Yet	   these	   actions	   must	   be	   understood	   through	   the	   complexity	   of	   haecceity	   and	  encounter	  rather	  than	  identity	  or	  stable	  subjectivity.	  	  What	  constitutes	  a	  centre	  or	  a	  margin	  in	  a	  particular	   time	   and	   place	   is	   subject	   to	   change.	   	   Asymmetrical	   relations	   may	   persist,	   but	   the	  content	  of	  these	  relations	  can	  and	  does	  change.	  	  In	  exploring	  this	  point,	  Braidotti	  cites	  Massumi,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘the	  boundaries	  of	  identity	  in	  advanced	  capitalism	  are	  shifting	  rapidly.	  	  So	  fast	  in	  fact,	  that	  any	  crystallization	  of	  specific	  identities,	  even	  by	  marginal	  groups	  is	  at	  best	  an	  oasis	  of	  relative	   stasis	   in	   the	   global	   capitalist	   time:	   a	   local	   reterritorialization,	   guarded	   frontiers	   in	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  For	  Deleuze,	  differentiation	  happens	  only	  in	  the	  virtual:	  it	  is	  the	  divergence	  and	  division	  of	  intensities	  and	  heterogeneous	  qualities.	  	  Differenciation	  involves	  the	  actual	  movement	  of	  heterogenous	  series	  –	  ‘differenciation	  is	  an	  actualisation	  of	  the	  virtual’	  Adrian	  Parr	  “Differentiation/Differenciation”	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p78	  89	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Affirming	  the	  Affirmative:	  On	  Nomadic	  Affectivity,"	  Rhizomes	  11/12	  (2005).	  90	  Braidotti,	  "A	  Critical	  Cartography	  of	  Feminist	  Post-­‐Postmodernism."	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uncertain	   landscape.’91	  	   Sedimentations	   of	   identity	   remain	   one	   step	   behind	   what	   is	   actually	  happening	  and	  furthermore,	  these	  sedimentations	  can	  actually	  block	  processes	  of	  becoming.	  	  If	  we	  understand	  the	  coagulation	  of	   identities	   in	  relation	  to	  processes	  of	  naming,	  we	  can	  extend	  this	   line	   of	   reasoning,	   as	   for	   Deleuze,	   language	   exists	   as	   a	   dominant	   and	   prescriptive	   order	  rather	   than	   a	   communicative	   process. 92 	  	   Thus,	   even	   if	   we	   pay	   close	   attention	   to	   our	  emplacement	  and	  use	  this	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  responsible	  action,	  we	  are	  still	  subject	  to	  a	  language	  that	  is	  the	  ‘centre	  that	  invents	  the	  margins’93	  The	  centre,	  and	  the	  language	  at	  the	  centre,	  plays	  a	  profoundly	   spatialising	   role,	   our	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   centre	   dictates	   what	   is	   possible.	  	  Becoming,	  we	  might	  argue,	  occurs	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  transcode	  this	  margin/centre	  dynamic	  into	  a	  (rhizo)morphous	  rather	  than	  arborescent	  structure	  –	  when	  we	  look	  for	  multiple	  centres	  and	  multiple	   margins	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   problematics	   that	   this	   brings	   into	   play.	   	   Our	   aim	  Massumi	   suggests,	   must	   be	   to	   complicate	   this	   process	   of	   identity	   and	   identification	   –	   and	   in	  doing	  so,	  to	  inject	  movement	  into	  politics.94	  	  It	   is	  perhaps	  at	   this	  point	   that	  we	  can	  attempt	   to	   ‘re-­‐problematise’	   the	  position	  of	   the	  activist	  political	  actor	  as	  haecceity	  or	  as	  body	  in	  space.	   	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  recent	  movement	   in	   relation	   to	   sexuality	   in	   various	  different	   arenas	  both	  global	   and	   local.	   	  An	  overt	  form	   of	   this	   movement	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   recognition	   in	   law	   of	   sexual	   rights	   and	   thus	   the	  movement	   from	  margin	   to	  centre	  of	   ‘sexual	  subjects’	  as	   they	  are	  currently	  understood.	   	  Again	  however,	  this	  process	  of	  naming	  captures	  only	  part	  of	  the	  movement	  taking	  place.95	  	  Complete	  incorporation	  into	  a	  social	  machine	  for	  these	  sexual	  others	  remains	  deferred,	  identity	  is	  always	  not	  quite	  captured	  and	  named	  identities	  remain	   limited	  and	  restrictive	   in	  relation	  to	  a	   flow	  of	  becoming	  or	  a	  line	  of	  flight.	  	  	  This	   is	  why	  we	  need	  to	  extend	  beyond	  bodily	   identities	  to	  haecceity,	  movement	  and	   intensity.	  	  Singularities	  moving	  at	  speed	  and	  affecting	  each	  other	  in	  space	  and	  time,	  folding	  and	  refolding	  themselves	  upon	  a	  plane	  of	   consistency,	  must	   complement	  our	  understandings	  of	   subjectivity	  and	   subjectification:	   the	  bodies,	   identities	   and	   subjects	  which	  populate	   our	  political	   and	   legal	  processes	   are	   intersected	   by	   pre-­‐individual	   singularities,	   objects	   and	   perceptions.	   	   I	   have	  already	  emphasised	   the	  spatialised	  nature	  of	   this	  process,	  but	   to	   return	   to	  Braidotti’s	   critique	  once	  again,	  this	  spatiality	  also	  highlights	  the	  significance	  of	  positionality	  and	  location.	  	  To	  move	  from	  identity	  bearing	  subjects	  to	  haecceities	  encountering	  each	  other	  on	  a	  plane	  of	  consistency	  does	   not	   necessarily	   neutralise	   asymmetries	   or	   power	   dynamics;	   instead,	   it	   may	   actually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Massumi	  in	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.	  p168	  92	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Desert	  Islands	  and	  Other	  Texts	  1953-­‐1974	  (Semiotext(e),	  2004).	  p286	  93	  Ibid.	  	  	  94	  Cited	  in	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.	  p169	  95	  Ibid.	  p169	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complicate	   them.	   	   In	   this	   way	   we	   can	   situate	   Tatchell’s	   compulsion	   to	   speak	   and	   Tauqir’s	  demand	  for	  silence	  not	  just	  as	  individual	  decisions	  but	  also	  as	  interactions	  with	  flows	  of	  affect,	  bodies	  and	  power	  within	  particular	  spaces,	  producing	  different	  effects	  in	  different	  locations.	  	  As	  such,	   flows	   and	   encounters	   change	   and	   contest	   conditions	   for	   action,	   rendering	   previous	  schemas	   of	   thought,	   action	   and	   identity	   problematic.	   	   Boundaries	   become	   thresholds	   for	  qualitative	   change,	   resulting	   in	   new	   assemblages	   that	   cannot	   be	   easily	   be	   integrated	   into	   an	  established	  pattern	  of	  meaning.	  	  	  	  	  	  These	   problematic	   changes	   and	   encounters	   recall	   Spivak’s	   ‘line	   of	   the	   unspeakable’	   or	   the	  feeling	  of	  horror	   at	   the	  encounter	  with	   that	  which	   cannot	  be	   incorporated.96	  	   I	  would	   suggest	  that	  we	  might	  understand	  this	  line	  as	  an	  encounter	  in	  a	  Deleuzian	  sense	  –	  as	  the	  moment	  which	  makes	  us	  pause	  and	  stutter,	  the	  moment	  of	  openness	  to	  both	  alterity	  and	  virtuality.97	  	  It	  is	  this	  point	  of	  challenge	  that	  is	  significant.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  executions	  of	  the	  three	  young	  men	  in	  Iran	  –	  the	  topic	  with	  which	  I	  have	  been	  obliquely	  engaging	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  we	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  executions	  are	  horrific	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	   	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	  overcode	  the	   boys’	   deaths	   with	   the	   language	   of	   LGBT	   suffering	   to	   drive	   home	   the	   suffering	   of	   the	  individuals	  involved	  and	  in	  moving	  too	  quickly	  to	  institute	  this	  overcoding,	  we	  perhaps	  do	  the	  boys	  a	  disservice.	   	  In	  the	  final	  instance	  then,	  we	  can	  unpick	  and	  understand	  what	  happened	  in	  terms	  of	  activist	  discourse,	  but	  to	  assimilate	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  LGBT	  politics	  is	  to	  act	   too	   hastily	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   complexities	   of	   different	   affects	   and	   forces	   that	   are	   in	  circulation.	   	  The	  responsibility	  here	  was	  not	   to	  not	  act,	  but	   to	  allow	  for	  a	  space	  of	  withdrawal	  before	  taking	  action	  and	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  affects,	  bodies	  and	  intensities	  at	  play	  rather	  than	  turning	  immediately	  to	  a	  narrative	  of	  identities	  and	  injustices.	  	  This	  is	  easy	  to	  write	  from	  the	  point	  of	  academic	  remove,	  but	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  do	  in	  practice.	   	   In	  this	  instance	  however,	   faced	   with	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	   issues	   at	   hand,	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	  admonishment	  to	  withdraw	  in	  a	  revolutionary	  way	  seems	  to	  resonate.	  	  	  In	  attempting	  to	  address	  this	  issue,	  Hawley	  suggests	  that:	  'If	   we	   are	   to	   expand	   Gayati	   Spivak's	   question	   and	   ask	   whether	   the	   gay	   and	   lesbian	  subaltern	  can	  speak,	  perhaps	  the	  best	  path	  to	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  investigation	  would	  be	  a	  postcolonialism	  that	  humbly	  stays	  a	  bit	  out	  of	  kilter,	  a	  bit	  queer,	  and	  for	  Westerners	  a	  bit	   less	  garrulous'98	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Cited	  in	  Hemmings,	  Why	  Stories	  Matter:	  The	  Political	  Grammar	  of	  Feminist	  Theory.	  p217	  97	  Simon	  O'Sullivan,	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I	   have	   already	   commented	  upon	   the	  way	   in	  which	   this	  may	  be	  more	  difficult	   than	   this	   quote	  suggests:	  that	  individuals	  can	  become	  consumed	  or	  subsumed	  by	  the	  discourses	  of	  LGBT	  rights	  that	   they	  come	  to	  represent,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  ability	   to	  speak	  becomes	  an	   imperative	   to	  do	  so.	  	  This	   formulation	   is	   yet	   another	   twist	   on	   the	   dual	   sidedness	   of	   identity	   based	   rights	   –	   just	   as	  rights	   can	  go	   from	  being	  empowering	   to	  being	  prescriptive,	   the	   identities	   and	   the	   individuals	  who	  embodied	  these	  identities	  in	  order	  to	  make	  rights	  demands	  may	  find	  themselves	  bound	  to,	  rather	  than	  liberated	  by	  a	  particular	  mode	  of	  recognition	  and	  identity.	  	  	  However,	  even	  when	  not	  speaking	  at	  all	  is	  an	  impossibility,	  withdrawal	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  one	  is	  more	   aware	   of	   the	   power	   dynamics	   of	   identity	   at	   play	   is	   not.	   	   To	   fail	   to	   do	   this	   is	   to	   remain	  trapped	   within	   restrictive	   binary	   structures	   of	   identity	   politics.	   	   In	   essence,	   to	   resist	   these	  restrictive	  binaries,	  we	  must	  attempt	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  to	  withdraw,	  pause	  before	  we	  speak	  and	  most	   importantly	  to	  decentre	  the	  power	  structures	  with	  which	  we	  are	  faced	  –	  especially	   if	  we	  ourselves	  are	  implicated	  within	  those	  structures	  –	  and	  as	  such,	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  act	  of	  disruptive	  speech.	   	  We	  must	  find	  the	   ‘vacuoles	  of	  non-­‐communication’99,	  or	  circuit	  breakers	  and	  switches	  through	  which	  we	  can	  attempt	  to	  elude	  these	  controls	  and	  compunctions.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  complex	  process,	  particularly	  given	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  issues	  of	  rights	  and	  law	  –	  a	  system	   that	   is	   decidedly	   logocentric.	   	   However,	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   this	   logocentricity	   if	  anything,	  makes	  the	  identification	  of	  ‘the	  unutterable’100	  even	  more	  significant.	  	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  here	   is	   not	   just	   the	   act	   of	   not	   speaking	   or	   silence	   as	   an	   absence	   of	   language	   but	   instead	   the	  silence	  of	  the	  unutterable,	  the	  non-­‐logos	  of	  law	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  language	  to	  which	  our	  LGBT	  constructs	  are	  inevitably	  subject.	  	  The	  unutterable,	  or	  these	  vacuoles	  of	  non-­‐communication,	  are	  then	  not	   just	  unspoken	  words	  or	  even	  words	  that	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  how	  to	  speak,	   they	  are	  instead	   the	   presence	   in	   the	   system	   of	   ignorance,	   incomprehensibility	   and	   uncertainty101,	   the	  other-­‐than-­‐language	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   communication	   without	   words.	   	   As	   such	   these	  moments	   function	  as	  a	  bringing	   into	   legibility	  of	   the	   logocentric	  system:	   to	   ‘bring	  what’s	  been	  established	   back	   into	   question.’102 	  This	   is	   perhaps	   what	   Cigarini	   envisages	   in	   calling	   for	  ‘legislative	   voids’.	   	   Hanafin	   notes	   that	   for	   Cigarini,	   this	   creates	   a	   space	   ‘above	   the	   law’	   that	  ‘interrupts	  the…legal	  symbolic.’103	  At	  issue	  here	  is	  the	  space	  of	  the	  unregulated,	  smooth	  space	  of	  nomadic	  distribution,	  unmediated	  by	   identity	   (-­‐politics).	   It	   is	  potentially	   a	  pause	   in	  which	  we	  might	  bring	  into	  illumination	  those	  circumstances	  which	  are	  unstratified	  by	  speech	  and	  identity	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–	   the	   body	  without	   organs	   or	   the	   emplaced	  haecceity.	   	   At	   stake	   is	   the	   chance	   to	   contemplate	  unstructured	  becoming	  and	  transversal	  connectivities.	  	  	  	  This	  contemplation	  cannot	  be	  uniform:	   it	   is	   instead	  engaged	  differently	  depending	  upon	  one’s	  location,	  which	  is	  why	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  differential	  responsibilities	  of	  margin(s)	  and	  centre(s)	  is	  so	  important.	   	  Nor	   is	   such	  contemplation	  necessarily	   comfortable,	  particularly	   for	   those	  who	  are	  used	  to	  action,	  unitary	  subjectivity	  or	  privilege.	  	  As	  Douglas	  suggests	  however,	  some	  discomfort	  may	  be	  necessary	   in	   the	  pursuit	  of	  political	  change	  –	   ‘good	   feeling’	   should	  not	  be	   the	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  activist:104	  it	  is	  instead	  important	  to	  question	  those	  institutions	  which	  maintain	  and	  legitimate	  the	  unitary	  stability	  on	  which	  our	  comfort	  and	  the	  cohesion	  of	  both	  disciplinary	  fields	  and	  social	   imaginaries	  rely.105	  	   	  Most	   importantly,	  such	  speaking	  comes	  from	  an	  emplaced	  and	  immanent	   knowledge	   of	   the	   self.	   	   The	   complexities	   of	   this	   emplacement	   are	   discussed	   in	   the	  following	  two	  chapters.	  	  Thus,	   one	   response	   to	   the	   encounter	   might	   be	   to	   accept	   the	   moment	   of	   disorientation	   that	  makes	  us	  pause,	  to	  stutter	  into	  silence,	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  productive	  withdrawal.	   	  The	  privilege	  at	  play	   here	   means	   that	   this	   pause	   need	   not	   be	   permanent,	   but	   can	   act	   as	   a	   mode	   of	   knowing	  (in)action.	   	  In	  seeking	  to	  refrain	  from	  rushing	  to	  overcode	  the	  issue	  at	  hand	  with	  the	  linguistic	  tools	   already	   available	   to	   us,	  we	  might	   also	   begin	   to	   depersonalise	   or	   situate	   the	   issues	  with	  which	  we	   are	   faced.	   	   Instead	   of	   resorting	   to	   our	   already	   coded	   rights	   or	   identities,	  we	  might	  withdraw	   enough	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   what	   Andreas	   Philippopoulos-­‐Mihalopoulos	  calls	  a	  space	  of	  ‘a	  different,	  second	  legality:	  the	  lawless	  legality	  of	  justice.’106	  In	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  chapter,	  I	  suggest	  that	  rights	  are	  abstract	  machines	  that	  both	  build	  up	  and	  break	  down	  our	  social	  stratifications.	  	  We	  might	  argue	  that	  a	  focus	  or	  investment	  in	  only	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  dynamic	  impacts	  upon	  the	  form	  which	  social	  struggle	  and	  resistance	  is	  able	  to	  take.	  	  Of	  equal	  significance	  is	  the	  moment	  of	  breakdown	  and	  the	  time	  of	  withdrawal.	  	  This	  is,	  the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  pause,	  stutter	  and	  engage	  creatively	  with	  what	  we	  thought	  we	  already	  knew.	  	  This	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  movement,	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  guarantee	  of	  positive	  change.	  	  However,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  creative	  re-­‐engagement	  is	  necessary	  if	  we	  are	  to	  move	  beyond	  some	  of	  the	  problematic	  binaries	  and	  representations	  that	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  discuss	  how	  we	  might	  theorise	  these	  moments	  of	  breakdown	  and	  withdrawal.	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Chapter	  Five	  	  -­‐	  The	  politics	  of	  paradoxical	  rights	  and	  multiple	  histories	  in	  LGBT	  activism	  
and	  in	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  
The	  (false)	  problem	  of	  representation	  and	  negativity	  in	  sexuality	  rights	  politics	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  a	  key	  issue	  with	  which	  gay	  rights	  activism	  must	  engage	  is	  the	  question	  of	  misrepresentation	  in	  relation	  to	  political	  activism,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  what	  the	  practical	  and	  organisational	  consequences	  of	  such	  misrepresentation	  might	  be.	  	  However,	  this	  issue	  also	  has	  a	  significant	  theoretical	  dimension	  which	  relates	  directly	  to	  the	  methodological	  problem	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  frame	  and	  address	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  In	  Deleuze	  we	  find	  an	  overarching	   critique	   of	   ‘representation’	   and	   the	   perils	   of	   ‘doxa’	   in	   approaching	   problems	   and	  questions.	   	   This	   critique	   suggests	   that	   a	   theoretical	   engagement	  with	   the	   issues	   raised	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter	  might	   involve	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  perils	  of	   those	   illusions	  that	  bind	  us	  to	   false	  problems	   or	   representations	   and	   facilitate	   the	   grasping	   of	   a	   problem	   in	   such	   a	  way	   as	   to	   be	  trapped	  by	  false	  structures	  that	  make	  a	  solution	  an	  impossibility.	  	  As	  Olkowski	  suggests:	  	   ‘This	  is	  the	  dark	  thought	  I	  have	  had	  about	  representation	  for	  so	  long:	  we	  are	  immersed	  in	  it	  and	  it	  has	  become	  inseparable	  from	  our	  condition.	  	  It	  has	  created	  a	  world,	  a	  cosmos	  even,	  of	  false	  problems	  such	  that	  we	  have	  lost	  our	  true	  freedom:	  that	  of	  invention.’1	  	  	  The	   framing	   of	   the	   problem	   limits	   it	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   we	   become	   unable	   to	   find	   creative	  solutions	  –	  we	  remain	  trapped	  in	  unhelpful	  binaries,	  or	  tied	  to	  particular	  identity	  categories	  that	  hold	  particular	  ethical	  demands	  for	  action.	   	  These	  representational	   images	  can	  encompass	  not	  only	  a	  practical	  but	  also	  an	  affective	  dimension,	  as	  we	  invest	  in	  particular	  images	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  create	  relations	  of	  desire	  and	  affect	  between	  images	  and	  bodies.	  	  Such	  investments	  produce	  not	   only	   relations	   between	   self	   and	   image,	   but	   also	   relations	   between	   and	   within	   collective	  bodies.2	  	   Singular	   and	   collective	   investment	   in	   an	   image	   reinforces	   and	   reiterates	   particular	  flows	  and	  connections,	  based	  within	  or	  upon	  the	  image.	  	  My	  interest	  here	  is	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  operation	  of	  representation	  colours	  the	  operation	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	   	  More	  specifically,	  at	   issue	  here	   is	   the	   functioning	  of	  a	  particular	  political	  and	  legal	  system	  within	  a	  particular	  context	  in	  order	  to	  close	  down	  the	  circulation	  of	  difference	  in	  relation	  to	  identity.	   	  The	  definition	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  according	  to	  particular	  categories	  and	  cartographies	  works	   to	  situate	   them	  as	  stable	  blocks	   in	   relation	   to	  each	  other	  and	  within	  the	   framework	   of	   an	   always	   already	   existing	   structure.	   	   Thus,	   we	   can	   argue	   that	   identities,	  behaviours	  and	  actions	  can	  exist	  most	  easily	  when	  subsumed	  into	  a	  particular	  image	  of	  law.	  	  It	  is	  through	  recognition	  in	  an	  already	  existing	  frame	  that	  political	  ends	  can	  be	  stated.	  	  As	  this	  frame	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Dorothea	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation	  (Berkely:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999).	  p91	  2	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2006).	  p55-­‐56	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is	   essentially	   subsumptive,	   resting	   on	   binaries	   of	   identificatory	   classification	   –	   either/other,	  self/other,	  within/without	  -­‐	  it	  is	  perhaps	  of	  little	  surprise	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  gay	  rights	  politics	  has	  a	  strong	  tendency	  towards	  the	  operation	  of	  exclusionary	  disjunctions	  in	  which	  we	  are	  expected	  to	   line	   up	   behind	   particular,	   exclusive	   and	   excluding	   signifiers,	   to	   adhere	   to	   particular	   pre-­‐conceived	  representations	  and	  to	  view	  self	  and	  other	  through	  simple	  binaries	  of	  identity,	  based	  on	   singular	   characteristics	  of	   sexuality.	   	   Indeed	   in	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  warn	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  such	  exclusive	  disjunctions	  and	  while	  they	  do	  not	  dismiss	  the	  need	  for	  a	  molar	  politics	   of	   identity	   (particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   women’s	   rights)	   they	   do	   warn	   that	   ‘no	   “gay	  liberation	  movement”	  is	  possible	  as	  long	  as	  homosexuality	  is	  caught	  up	  in	  a	  relation	  of	  exclusive	  disjunction	  with	  heterosexuality,	  a	   relation	   that	  ascribes	   them	  both	   to	  a	  common	  Oedipal	  and	  castrating	   stock,	   charged	   with	   ensuring	   only	   their	   differentiation	   in	   two	   non	   communicating	  series.’3	  	  I	  am	  suggesting	  then,	  that	  the	  dominant	  frame	  at	  play	  within	  the	  field	  of	  rights	  is	  one	  in	  which	  humanity	   has	   been	   produced	   as	   ‘relatively	   stable	   moving	   wholes.’ 4 	  	   These	   wholes	   are	  identifiable	  and	  nameable	  –	  they	  are	  a	  form	  of	  organisation	  against	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  virtuality	  and	   contribute	   to	   the	   production	   of	   what	   we	   recognise	   as	   the	   ‘human’	   of	   human	   rights.	  	  However,	   problematic	   encounters	   –	   particularly	   those	   that	   demand	   that	   we	   think	   outside	   a	  dualism	  of	  identity	  and	  its	  negation	  -­‐	  throw	  into	  sharp	  relief	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  framings.	  	  Here,	  the	  question	  of	  humanity	   is	  not	  only	  reduced	   to	  stable	  dualities,	  but	   further	  grounded	  upon	  a	  singular	   and	   reductive	   image	   of	   man.	   	   Most	   significantly,	   Man	   –	   that	   is	   man	   as	   white,	   male,	  rational,	   heterosexual	   etc.	   	   –	   becomes	   ‘the	   privileged	   referent	   of	   subjectivity,	   the	   standard-­‐bearer	  of	  the	  norm/law/logos.’5	  	  Man	  is	  the	  majority,	  ‘the	  dead	  heart	  of	  the	  system’6	  the	  ‘molar	  entity	  par	  excellence.’7	  	  Or,	  as	  Colebrook	  notes,	   ‘man’	  has	  become	  the	  foundation	  (or	  image)	  of	  all	  reason,	  thought,	  representation	  and	  action,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  flow	  of	  life’s	  images	  has	  become	  centred	   upon	   this	   single	   image.8	  	   We	   exist	   in	   a	   hierarchical	   relationship	   with	   one	   particular	  privileged	  image	  of	  humanity	  as	  man.	  	  Of	  key	  significance	  here	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  rights	  often	  reflects	  this	  sole,	  privileged	  flow	  of	  images.	  	  The	  image	  of	  man	  has	  become	  a	  habit	  that	  restricts	  us	  but	  has	  also	  become	  essential	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  our	  institutions.	  	  We	  operate	  under	  a	  particular	  regime	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  our	  laws	  and	  politics	  unfold	  from	  this	  singular	   position.	   	   Braidotti	   calls	   this	   singularity	   of	   focus	   ‘the	   philosophy	   of	   priests,	   judges,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  Anti-­‐Oedipus,	  trans.	  Robert	  Hurley,	  Mark	  Seem,	  and	  Helen	  R.	  Lane	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011).	  p384	  4	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed.	  p13	  5	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2008).p78-­‐9	  6	  Ibid.	  7	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus,	  trans.	  B	  Massumi	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).p322	  8	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed.	  p141	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censors,	   confessors	  and	  pornographers’	   all	   relying	  on	   ‘negative,	   resentful,	  disavowed	  affects.’9	  	  Such	   a	   position	   creates	   artificial	   clarity	   and	   ignores	   or	   denies	   multiple	   connections	   along	  horizontal	  rather	  than	  hierarchical	  (arborescent)	  axes.	  	  In	  essence,	  man	  becomes	  the	  centre	  and	  a	   hierarchy	   is	   determined	  on	   our	   distance	   from	   this	   image	   of	  man	   –	   or	   our	   distance	   from	  an	  assumed	   normality.	   	   In	   terms	   of	   rights	   then,	   we	   exist	   in	   a	   system	   of	   hierarchies	   within	  hierarchies.	   	   ‘Man’	  forms	  the	  centre,	  the	  subject,	  truth	  and	  foundation	  of	  being.	  Man	  is	  also	  the	  subject	   of	   legal	   systems;	   rights	   emerge	   through	   a	   history	   of	   ‘his’	   needs	   and	   struggles.	   	   This	  system	  of	   legality	  both	  hides	  and	  naturalises	   its	  own	  power	  and	  ultimately	   feeds	  back	   to	  us	  a	  truth	   both	   of	   Man,	   rights	   and	   the	   system	   that	   sustains	   them	   as	   images.	   	   However,	   I	   would	  suggest	   that	  a	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  sexual	  rights	  politics	  can	  work	  to	   form	  part	  of	  a	   flow	  that	  exposes	   such	   images	   as	   false	   foundations,	   as	   limited	   and	   as	   dependent	   upon	   our	   own	  investment	   in	   truth,	   foundation,	   hierarchy	   and	   arborescence.	   	   Rights	   act	   as	   one	   striation	   or	  cartography,	  based	  on	  particular	  images	  of	  Man	  and	  society,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  only	  striation	  that	  could	  exist.	  	  	  	  
Refiguring	  false	  problems	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  as	  Deleuzian	  paradox	  and	  
encounter	  	  The	  positioning	  of	  one	  particular	  foundation	  or	  image	  of	  rationality/logos	  lays	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  politics	   that	  proceeds	   through	   contradiction,	   opposition	  and	  negations	   in	  which	   identities	   are	  defined	  through	  othering	  rather	  than	  connectivity/conatus.	  	  For	  Deleuze	  however,	  such	  a	  frame	  is	   unsatisfactory:	   he	   suggests	   that	   ‘[t]he	   combination	   of	   opposites	   forms	   a	   net	   so	   slack	   that	  everything	  slips	  through.’10	  	  Our	  starting	  point	  should	  not	  be	  from	  identity	  and	  its	  negation,	  but	  from	   the	   play	   and	   connection	   of	   difference,	   the	   virtual	   and	   the	   actual.	   	   Contradictions,	   he	  suggests,	   reflect	   only	   the	   shadow	   of	   the	   problem,	   the	   incorrectly	   grasped	   problem	   through	  which	  we	  will	  fail	  to	  find	  a	  solution.	  	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  refigure	  the	  problem	  as	  the	  play	  of	  difference,	  as	   the	   question	   beyond	   representation	   in	   order	   to	   grasp	   not	   the	   correct	   solution,	   but	   the	  solution	  outside	  the	  limited	  play	  of	  closed	  and	  negative	  binary	  oppositions:	  the	  re-­‐actualisation	  of	  the	  virtual;	  or	  the	  frame	  not	  of	  identity	  and	  negation	  but	  being	  and	  ?being.11	  My	   particular	   focus	   is	   the	   use	   of	   rights	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   process	   of	   re-­‐actualisation.	   I	   have	  already	  noted	   the	  way	   in	  which	  Deleuze	   is	  highly	  critical	  of	  what	  we	  might	  call	   rights	   in	   their	  abstract	   or	   universal	   form:	   rights	   which	   subsume	   singularities	   under	   a	   particular	   dogmatic	  image	  of	  law,	  or	  rights	  which	  force	  an	  illegitimate	  use	  of	  the	  disjunctive	  synthesis	  and	  compel	  us	  to	   line	  up	  behind	  particular	   identities	   and	   signifiers.	   	   There	   are	  numerous	   examples	  of	   rights	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  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming.	  p72	  10	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Bergsonism,	  trans.	  Hugh	  Tomlinson	  and	  Barbara	  Habberjam	  (New	  York:	  Zone	  Books,	  2006).	  p44-­‐45	  11	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition,	  trans.	  P	  Patton	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2011).	  p254	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operating	  in	  this	  way	  –	  as	  D’Souza	  argues,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  generally	  implemented	  is,	  if	  not	  overtly	  oppositional	  or	  negatively	  dialectical,	   then	  at	   least	  mired	   in	  contradiction:	   it	   is	  a	  system	   which	   sets	   groups	   against	   each	   other	   in	   an	   endless	   process	   of	   contestation	   and	  opposition.	   	  Rights	  engender	  an	  ‘epistemological	  economism’	  which	  erodes	  the	  intrinsic	  worth	  of	   the	   self,	   posting	   an	   abstract	   Human	   of	   human	   rights	   against	   the	   empirical	   human	   who	   is	  valued	  only	  according	  to	  economic	  worth.12	  	  Rights	  become	  a	  zero	  sum	  game	  of	  competition	  and	  exclusion	  with	  no	  room	  for	  the	  play	  of	  differences	  or	  the	  mutation	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  problems	  of	  this	  approach	  are	  highlighted	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  	  	  However,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  paradoxical	  element	  at	  play	  here.	  	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  rights	  structure	  the	  frame	  through	  which	  we	  make	  claims.	   	  Rights	  have,	   in	  some	  contexts,	  become	  a	  habit:	  a	  shorthand	  for	  articulating	  desire	  or	  injustice.	  	  However,	  to	  analyse	  this	  aspect	  of	  rights	  –	  to	  read	  rights	  only	  in	  their	  ‘transcendental’	  mode,	  is	  to	  miss	  a	  second	  mode	  in	  which	  rights	  operate:	   this	  might	  be	  termed	  the	   ‘immanent’	  operation	  of	  rights.	   	   In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  articulate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  act	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  abstract	  machine,	  or	  a	  key	  that	  both	  organises	  and	  disorganises	  our	  claims	   to	   justice.	   	  Guattari	  writes	   that	   ‘machines	  connect	   flows’13	  and	  by	  thinking	   of	   rights	   as	   facilitators	   of	   connection,	   we	   might	   view	   them	   as	   tools	   that	   both	   chart	  particular	  paths	  and	  striate	  the	  social	  world	  that	  we	  inhabit	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  act	  as	  agents	  of	  disruption	  of	  these	  same	  pathways.	  Rights	  code	  and	  articulate	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  approach	  justice,	  but	  under	  or	  alongside	  this	  coding,	  there	  remains	  a	  virtual	  element	  to	  justice,	  an	  element	  that	  is	  unactualised,	  or	  a	  surplus	  that	  rights	  may	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐capture	  and	  re-­‐articulate	  but	  fail	  to	   adequately	   express.	   	   This	   failure	   marks	   a	   moment	   of	   deterritorialisation,	   a	   moment	   of	  disruption	   to	   the	   code.	   	   Rights	   are	   simultaneously	   encased	   within,	   organising	   forces	   of,	   and	  disruptive	   elements	   moving	   about	   particular	   planes	   of	   consistency.14	  	   Patton	   suggests	   that	  societies	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  process	  of	  breaking	  down	  and	  building	  up,15	  in	  this	  instance,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  rights	  in	  their	  immanent	  mode	  form	  a	  key	  part	  of	  this	  movement.	  	  	  This	  means	  however,	  that	  rights	  themselves	  remain	  paradoxical	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  	  On	   the	   level	   of	   the	   actual,	   the	  deployment	  of	   rights	   can	   lead	   to	   impasse	  or	   to	   rights	   language	  being	   used	   to	   hold	   and	   support	   two	   entirely	   contradictory	   positions.16	  	   Furthermore,	   on	   the	  level	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  actual	  and	  virtual,	  rights	  perform	  a	  number	  of	  different	  functions	  at	  the	  same	   time:	   they	   are	   captured,	   agents	   of	   capture	   and	   agents	   of	   escape	   depending	   upon	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Radha	  D'Souza,	  "The	  Rights	  Conundrum:	  The	  Poverty	  of	  Philosophy	  Amidst	  Poverty,"	  in	  Rights	  in	  Context:	  Law	  and	  
Justice	  in	  Late	  Modern	  Society	  (Ashgate,	  2010).	  p10-­‐11	  13	  Cited	  in	  Mark	  Halsey,	  "Deleuze	  and	  Deliverance:	  Body,	  Wildness,	  Ethics,"	  in	  Deleuze/Guattari	  and	  Ecology,	  ed.	  B	  Herzogenrath	  (London:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008).	  p233	  14	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  p159	  15	  Paul	  Patton,	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Political	  (Oxon:	  Routeledge,	  2000).	  p107-­‐8	  16Deleuze,	  Bergsonism.	  p45.	  Deleuze,	  Gilles,	  On	  Human	  Rights	  L'Abécédaire	  de	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  avec	  Claire	  Parnet,	  Vidéo	  Éd.	  Montparnasse,	  1996	  at	  www.generation-­‐online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm	  accessed	  12/12/2011	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incarnation	   through	  which	   one	   approaches	   them.	   	   Rights	   cannot	   easily	   be	   categorised	   as	   one	  particular	  thing,	  and	  in	  this	  way,	  they	  express	  paradox.	  What	   this	   approach	   brings	   to	   light	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   rights	   forge	   connections	   –	   between	  identities,	   between	   groupings,	   between	   legality	   and	   belonging	   and	   on	   a	   more	   abstract	   level,	  between	   the	   different	   categories	   we	   use	   to	   characterise	   relevant	   and	   irrelevant	   forms	   of	  identification	   and	   belongings	   in	   our	   societies.	   	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   rights	   themselves	   are	  always	  the	  cause	  of	  such	  connections,	  but	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  such	  flows	  and	  connectivities	  work	   can	  highlight,	   for	   example,	   the	   growing	   relationship	  between	   sexual	   identity	   as	   a	   stable	  form,	  sexual	  behaviour	  and	  subjectivity	  within	  certain	  societies.	   	  As	  such,	   the	  key	   issue	  under	  consideration	  is	  perhaps	  not	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  what	  rights	  are,	  nor	  even	  a	  secure	  foundation	  upon	  which	  we	  can	  posit	  a	  clear	  basis	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  human	  rights	  language,	  but	  is	  instead	  the	  wider	  question	  of	  what	  rights	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  when	  pushed	  to	  their	  limits.	  	  Our	  line	  of	  questioning	  should	  therefore	  concern	  what	  connections	  rights	  are	  able	  to	  make,	  what	  pathways	  they	   chart	   and	   which	   mappings	   they	   upset	   or	   disrupt.	   	   Deleuze	   suggests	   that	   ‘all	   our	   false	  problems	  derive	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  go	  beyond	  experience	   toward	   the	  conditions	  of	  experience,	  toward	  the	  articulations	  of	  the	  real	  and	  rediscover	  what	  differs	  in	  kind	  in	   the	  composites	   that	  are	  given	   to	  us	  and	  on	  which	  we	   live.’17	  	   In	   this	  context,	   I	   read	   this	  not	  solely	  as	  a	  question	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  this	  or	  that	  rights	  demand,	  but	  the	  meaning	  or	  essence	  of	  rights	   that	   are	   able	   to	   work	   in	   a	   particular	   way	   at	   a	   particular	   time	   to	   make	   particular	  connections	  and	  catalyse	  a	  particular	  connectivity.	  	  The	  question	  is	  not	  one	  of	  the	  foundation	  or	  legitimacy	   of	   a	   rights	   demand,	   but	   what	   it	   means	   that	   a	   rights	   demand	   has	   been	   made	   in	   a	  specific	  way	  at	  a	  specific	   time	  –	  what	  makes	  possible	  the	  set	  of	  connections	  or	  disconnections	  that	  rights	  are	  speaking	  to	  in	  each	  singularity	  or	  singular	  instance.	  	  	  This	  I	  would	  argue,	   is	   the	  moment	  of	  paradox.	   	  However,	   for	  Deleuze,	  paradox	  need	  not	  be	  an	  impasse:	  	  	  	   ‘The	   force	   of	   paradox	   is	   not	   that	   they	   are	   contradictory;	   rather	   they	   allow	   us	   to	   be	  present	  at	   the	  genesis	  of	   the	  contradiction.	   	  The	  principle	  of	  contradiction	   is	  applicable	   to	   the	  real	  and	  the	  possible,	  but	  not	   to	   the	   impossible	   from	  which	   it	  derives,	   that	   is,	   to	  paradoxes	  or	  rather	   to	   what	   paradoxes	   represent.	   	   They	   always	   have	   the	   characteristic	   of	   going	   in	   both	  directions	  at	  once	  and	  of	  rendering	  identification	  impossible	  as	  they	  emphasize	  sometimes	  the	  first,	  sometimes	  the	  second	  of	  these	  effects.’18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.	  p26	  18	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sense,	  ed.	  Constantin	  V.	  Boundas,	  trans.	  M.	  Lester	  and	  C.	  Stivale	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  p86-­‐7	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Paradoxes	   allow	   us	   to	   go	   in	   both	   directions	   at	   once;	   their	   value	   is	   in	   their	   openness	   to	  heterogeneous	  positionings	  and	  engagements.	  	  They	  can	  mark	  the	  ethical	  moment,	  the	  moment	  of	  movement	  beyond	  teleology	  or	  trajectory.	  	  What	  is	  present	  is	  not	  inertia,	  but	  new	  becomings	  and	   new	   movements.	   	   Here,	   there	   is	   potential	   for	   new	   entanglements	   and	   resonances,	   new	  creations	  of	  multiplicities	  and	  assemblages,	  new	  mappings	  on	  the	  plane	  of	  immanence.	  	  Flieger	  suggests	   that	   the	  disjunctive	   synthesis	   is	   the	   ‘greatest	  paradox.’	   	  Disjunction	   (in	   its	   legitimate	  form)	   and	   paradox	   suggest	   the	   linkage	   of	   infinite,	   maintained	   difference,	   ‘a	   conjunction	   that	  does	  not	  imply	  genealogy	  but	  alliance.’19	  Furthermore,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  moment	  of	  paradox	  is	  also	  the	  moment	  when	  rights	  fail;	  that	  is,	  the	  moment	  when	  rights	  cannot	  easily	  speak	  to	  a	  situation,	  but	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  anyway.	  	  Rights,	  which	  now	  act	  as	  our	  language	  to	  address	  wrongs,	  express	  paradox	  when	  they	  have	  no	  words	  or	  combinations	  to	  articulate	  our	  sense	  of	  deeply	  felt	  injustice.	  	  My	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  in	   expressing	   injustice	   as	   a	   rights	   demand,	   we	  make	   a	   selection,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   draw	   upon	  particular	   connections,	   particular	   conditions	   and	   particular	   identities.	   	   Paradox	   marks	   our	  attempt	  to	  engage	  these	  selections	  occurring	  at	  the	  same	  moment	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  need	  for	  new	  connections,	  flows	  or	  striations.	  	  Lefebvre	  makes	  this	  point	  more	  generally	  in	  relation	  to	  law	  and	  judgment:	  	   ‘What	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  activity	  of	  any	  judge	  or	  lawyer?	  	  Is	  it	  not	  to	  select	  a	  few	  relevant	  points	  of	  a	  case	  and	  coordinate	  these	  into	  arguments	  and	  judgments?	  	  Any	  case	  has	  an	  infinity	  of	  points	   and	   sides	   that	   go	   neglected,	   facts	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   interest	   at	   hand	   that	   exceed	   its	  eventual	  legal	  construction…The	  perception	  of	  a	  case	  -­‐	  that	  is,	  its	  representation	  as	  a	  legal	  case	  -­‐	  is	   limiting	  and	   subtractive;	  only	  certain	  crucial	  points	  are	  advanced	  and	  constructed	   into	   legal	  argument,	  but	  underlying	  these	  points	  is	  the	  case	  in	  itself,	  unperceived,	  or	  given	  to	  perception	  that	  part	  that	  interests	  the	  perceiving	  parties.’20	  Deleuze	   makes	   a	   similar	   point	   in	   relation	   to	   smoking	   in	   taxis	   in	   France	   –	   through	   different	  selections	  of	  what	  is	  or	  isn’t	  relevant	  to	  a	  case,	  the	  judge	  constructs	  the	  law	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  In	  its	  first	  incarnation	  or	  assemblage,	  the	  passenger	  in	  the	  taxi	  is	  a	  tenant	  and	  subject	  of	  rights	  of	  use	  and	  support	  while	  travelling	  in	  the	  taxi	  and	  thus	  permitted	  to	  smoke,	  but	  in	  a	  second	  folding	  of	   the	   assemblage,	   the	   taxi	   becomes	   a	   public	   service,	   the	   individual	   in	   the	   taxi	   the	   user	   of	   a	  public	  service,	  and	  thus	  subject	  to	  laws	  forbidding	  smoking	  in	  public	  buildings.21	  	  There	  are	  two	  related	  points	   at	  work	  here:	   the	   first	   relates	   simply	   to	   the	  process	  of	   the	   selection	  of	  what	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19Jerry	  Aline	  Flieger,	  "Becoming-­‐Woman:	  Deleuze,	  Schreber	  and	  Molecular	  Identification,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Feminist	  
Theory,	  ed.	  Claire	  Colebrook	  and	  Ian	  Buchanan	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  p56	  20	  Alexandre	  Lefebvre,	  The	  Image	  of	  Law:	  Deleuze,	  Bergson,	  Spinoza	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press	  2008).	  p123	  21	  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  “On	  Human	  Rights”	  at	  http://www.generation-­‐online.org/p/fpdeleuze10.htm	  accessed	  19/01/2012	  
	  130	  
relevant	   in	   relation	   to	   rights,	   but	   the	   second	   is	   the	   issue	   of	   when	   this	   process	   of	   selection	  becomes	   necessary	   –	   when	   our	   pre-­‐selected	   rights	   language,	   or	   our	   pre-­‐identified	   images	   of	  thought,	   law	   and	   identity	   are	   unable	   to	   adequately	   capture	   (actualise)	   the	   demands	   of	   a	  particular	   case.	   	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   the	   moment	   of	   openness	   to	   the	   event,	   to	   the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  virtual	  and	  to	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  new.	  	  We	  could	  argue,	  with	  Mussawir,	  that	  at	  issue	  here	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  expression	  rather	  than	  the	  representation	  of	  law.22	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  every	   failure	  of	  rights	  heralds	  an	  event	   in	   the	  Deleuzian	  sense	  –	  events	  are	  not	  something	   that	  we	  can	  necessarily	  anticipate,	  but	  are	   rather	   something	   that	  we	  must	  become	  worthy	  of.	  	  However,	  the	  stuttering	  of	  rights	  can	  form	  an	  encounter:	  a	  moment	  which	  forces	  us	  to	  think	  rather	  than	  to	  act	  according	  to	  pre-­‐ordained	  habits.	   	  This	  stuttering	   is	   the	  moment	   in	  which	  we	  might	  potentially	  see	  the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  virtual	  in	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  actual,	   or	   the	   moment	   when	   the	   image	   of	   thought	   is	   disrupted	   or	   destabilised.	   	   Thus,	   the	  encounter,	   or	  moment	   of	   disruption	  might	   act	   as	   the	   actual	   side	  of	   the	   two-­‐sided	   event.	   	   The	  event	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  however	  it	  bears	  repeating	  here	  that	  for	  Deleuze,	  the	  event	  is	  the	  virtual	   transformative	  effect,	  existing	  on	   the	  plane	  of	   immanence,	  and	   through	   the	  event’s	  actualisation	  we	   experience	   a	   transformation.	   	   An	   event	   is	   always	   transcendental,	   immanent	  and	  expressed	  as	  a	  verb.	  	  ‘It	  can	  never	  come	  about	  but	  produces	  and	  conditions	  that	  which	  does	  come	  about.’23	  	  Events	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  synthesis	  of	  forces	  and	  signify	  the	  dynamic	  of	  their	  interactions.24	  	  This	  means	   that	  an	  event	   is	  not	  a	  happening	   itself	  but	   the	  potential	   immanent	  within	  a	  confluence	  of	  forces.	  	  ‘The	  event	  is	  not	  a	  disruption	  of	  some	  continuous	  state,	  but	  rather	  the	   state	   is	   constituted	   by	   events	   “underlying”	   it,	   in	   that	   when	   actualised,	   they	   mark	   every	  moment	   of	   the	   state	   as	   a	   transformation.’25	  	  What	   is	   key	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   event	   is	   not	  necessarily	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  new	  beginning.	  	  Instead	  Williams	  suggests	  that	  ‘[a]s	  an	  event,	  a	  beginning	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   novel	   selection	   in	   an	   ongoing	   and	   continually	   altering	  series.’26	  	   As	   such,	   ‘an	   event	   is	   a	   release	   of	   connections.’27	  	   Here	   then,	   I	   am	   not	   suggesting	   a	  simple	  causal	  relation	  between	  encounter	  and	  new	  conditions,	  but	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  two	  series	  of	   actual	  and	  virtual	   that	   is	  mediated	  by	   the	  event.	   	  The	  actual	   (encounter)	  determines	  new	  relations	  among	  virtual	  conditions,	  which	  are	  then	  actualised	  through	  the	  event.28	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Edward	  Mussawir,	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Deleuze:	  The	  expression	  and	  representation	  of	  law.	  (Abingdon:Routledge,	  2011).	  p10	  23	  Jack	  Reynolds,	  "Wounds	  and	  Scars:	  Deleuze	  on	  the	  Time	  of	  the	  Event,"	  Deleuze	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  2	  (2007).	  24	  Cliff	  Stagoll,	  "Event,"	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p90-­‐91	  25	  Ibid.	  26	  James	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  p2	  27	  Ibid.	  p141	  28	  Rodrigo	  Nunes,	  "Politics	  in	  the	  Middle:	  For	  a	  Political	  Interpretation	  of	  Dualisms	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,"	  Deleuze	  
Studies	  4,	  no.	  Supplementary	  Issue:	  Deleuze	  and	  Political	  Activism	  (2010).	  p119	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Fracturing	  identities	  and	  rights:	  The	  three	  syntheses	  of	  time	  and	  the	  eternal	  return	  In	   addressing	   the	   event,	   Deleuze	   revisits	   and	   rewrites	   Kant’s	   three	   syntheses	   focusing	   in	  particular	   on	   the	   way	   in	   which	   time,	   as	   that	   which	   is	   outside	   the	   domain	   of	   representation,	  escaped	   Kant’s	   grasp.29	  	   Drawing	   on	   Hume	   and	   Bergson,	   Deleuze	   offers	   an	   alternative,	   non-­‐representational,	   synthesis	  of	   time.	   	  Very	  briefly,	  Deleuze’s	   first	   synthesis	  of	   time	   is	  passive	   –	  that	  of	  contraction	  of	  elements	  and	  the	  formation	  and	  foundation	  of	  habit	  memory.	   	  Following	  Hume,	   we	   contract	   our	   impressions,	   bringing	   the	   external	   internal.	   	   This	  means	   that	   we	   are	  formed	   of	   contractions,	   associations	   and	   habits.	   	   Ideas	   are	   derived	   from	   impressions,	   which	  ‘return	   upon	   the	   soul’	   and	   are	   connected	   to	   other	   impressions	   that	   they	   resemble.	   	   Thus	   the	  faculties	  of	  the	  mind	  are	  impressions	  of	  reflection	  and	  conjugations	  –	  or	  the	  formation	  of	  habit.	  	  The	   ‘self’	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   enfolding	   and	   repetition	   of	   several	   impressions.	   	   This	   passive	  synthesis/contraction	  is	  the	  past	  synthesised	  in	  present	  behaviour,	  looking	  towards	  the	  future.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  gives	  time	  a	  forward	  direction	  and	  is	  what	  makes	  expectation	  possible.30	  For	  Deleuze,	  this	  passive	  habit	  memory	  forms	  the	  foundation	  and	  basis	  of	  time	  by	  constituting	  time	  as	  present:	   for	  expectation	   in	   the	  present,	  we	  must	  presuppose	  a	  passive	  synthesis.	   	   It	   is	  memory	  however,	  which	  makes	  the	  present	  pass.	  	  ‘Contraction	  or	  passive	  synthesis	  constitutes	  time	   as	   a	   living	  present	  whose	  dimensions	   are	   the	  past	   and	   future…This	  means	   that	   the	  past	  does	  not	  function	  as	  the	  old	  present	  –	  custom	  or	  habit	  are	  the	  present	  and	  never	  cease	  to	  be	  the	  present	  –	  yet	  at	  every	  present,	  past	   images	  mingle	  with	  the	  present,	  completing	  and	  enriching	  present	  experience.’31	  	  Thus	  the	  second	  and	  active	  synthesis,	  or	  active	  recollection	  of	  time	  takes	  place	  in	  the	  active	  recollection	  of	  the	  old	  present	  occurring	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  contraction	  of	   the	  actual	  present.32	  	  Here,	   for	  Deleuze	   (following	  Bergson)	   the	  past	  exists	  as	  virtual	  and	   is	  actualised	   by	   perception.	   	   Memory	   is	   a	   ‘virtual	   object’	   that	   is	   actualised	   or	   differenciated33	  according	   to	   present	   perception.34	  	   Each	   plane	   of	   memory	   then,	   is	   contracted	   according	   the	  present	   perception.	   	   	   Thus	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   syntheses	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  interacting:	  	   ‘Habit	   is	   the	   foundation	  of	   time,	   the	  moving	  soil	  occupied	  by	  the	  passing	  present.	   	  The	  claim	  of	  the	  present	  is	  precisely	  that	  it	  passes.	   	  However,	  it	  is	  what	  causes	  the	  present	  to	  pass,	  that	  to	  which	  the	  present	  and	  habit	  belong,	  which	  must	  be	  considered	  the	  ground	  of	  time.	  	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Keith	  W.	  Faulkner,	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Three	  Synthesis	  of	  Time	  (New	  York:	  Peter	  Lang	  Publishing,	  2006).	  p3	  30	  James	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Difference	  and	  Repetition:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  p87	  31	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation.	  p110	  32	  Ibid.	  	  33	  Adrian	  Parr	  “Differentiation/Differenciation”	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  p78	  34	  This	  is	  Bergson’s	  cone	  of	  memory.	  	  See	  Alia	  Al-­‐Saji,	  "The	  Memory	  of	  Another	  Past:	  Bergson,	  Deleuze	  and	  a	  New	  Theory	  of	  Time,"	  Continental	  Philosophy	  Review	  37	  (2004).	  p211	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memory	   that	   grounds	   time.	   	   We	   have	   seen	   how	   memory,	   as	   a	   derived	   active	   synthesis,	  depended	  upon	  habit:	  in	  effect,	  everything	  depends	  upon	  foundation…The	  passive	  synthesis	  of	  habit	   in	   return	   refers	   to	   this	   more	   profound	   passive	   synthesis	   of	   memory:	   Habitus	   and	  Mnemonsyne,	  the	  alliance	  of	  the	  sky	  and	  ground.’35	  However,	  at	  this	  point,	  Deleuze	  argues	  the	  second	  synthesis	  of	  time	  points	  to	  a	  third	  synthesis	  by	  which	  we	  can	  think	  temporality.	  	  In	  the	  second	  synthesis,	  we	  see	  Bergson’s	  ‘virtual	  memory’	  –	  the	  cone-­‐shaped	  diagram	  that	  visualises	  the	  way	  in	  which	  memory	  is	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  whole,	  in	  which	   different	   ‘planes’	   are	   contracted	   at	   different	   levels,	   dependent	   upon	   the	  way	   in	   which	  memory	   is	   actualised.	   	   Deleuze	   wishes	   to	   push	   beyond	   this,	   to	   enter	   the	   whole	   of	   time	   and	  duration,	  without	  memory	  or	  present	  perception.	   	   ‘He	  wishes	   to	   live	   the	  being	   in	   itself	   of	   the	  past,	   to	  enter	  the	   in-­‐itself	  of	  memory	  without	  realizing	   it	   in	  the	  present	   for	  action.’36	  	  This	   is	  a	  second	  passive	  synthesis	  –	   the	   time	  of	  memory	  –	   the	  extracting	  of	  a	  past	   that	  has	  never	  been	  lived.	  	  For	  Deleuze,	  this	  is	  Proust’s	  Combray.37	  To	   achieve	   this,	   Deleuze	   returns	   to	   Kant’s	   critique	   of	   Descartes’	   Cogito.	   	   Descartes	   ‘I	   think	  therefore	  I	  am’	  implies	  a	  determination	  (I	  think)	  which	  itself	  implies	  an	  undetermined	  existence	  (I	  am):	  the	  undetermined	  is	  determined	  as	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  thinking	  subject.	  	  Kant	  argues	  that	  it	   is	   impossible	   for	   determination	   to	   bear	   directly	   on	   the	   undetermined.38	  	   The	   determined	  implies	  the	  undetermined,	  but	  nothing	  tells	  us	  how	  the	  undetermined	  is	  determinable	  by	  the	  ‘I	  think’.	   	   Thus	   Kant	   adds	   a	   third	   value	   –	   that	   of	   the	   determinable	   or	   the	   form	   in	   which	   the	  undetermined	  is	  determinable	  by	  the	  determination.	  	  For	  Deleuze	  ‘[t]his	  third	  value	  suffices	  to	  make	   logic	   a	   transcendental	   instance’39	  it	   represents	   the	   discovery	   of	   transcendental	   inner	  difference,	  in	  which	  the	  ‘I	  think’	  and	  the	  ‘I	  am’	  –	  thought	  and	  being	  -­‐	  are	  a	  priori	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  This	  is	  why	  Deleuze	  refers	  to	  the	  subject	  as	  the	  ‘cracked	  I’.40	  	  The	  receptive	  ego	  (undetermined	  existence)	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  in	  time	  as	  a	  passive	  ego	  which	  is	  constantly	  changing	  and	  the	  ‘I’	  is	  an	  act	  that	  carries	  out	  the	  synthesis	  of	  time	  and	  of	  what	  takes	  place	  in	  time.	  	  The	  ‘I	  think’,	  is	  not	  an	  attribute	  of	  a	   ‘substantial	  and	  spontaneous’	  being,	  but	   the	   ‘affection’	  of	   the	  passive	  self	  experiencing	   its	  own	   thought	  exercised	  upon	   it	   and	   in	   it	  but	  not	  by	   it.	   	  This	   is	   the	  paradox	  of	  inner	  sense:	  the	  I	  and	  the	  ego	  are	  split,	  the	  I	  is	  an	  ‘Other’	  lived	  like	  an	  Other	  ‘within	  the	  subject’,	  it	  is	  the	  force	  of	  internal	  difference	  that	  emerges	  in	  the	  present	  and	  divides	  all	  time	  into	  past	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  p101	  36	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation.p135	  37	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  p107	  38	  Ibid.	  p108	  39	  Ibid.	  p108	  	  40	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation.	  p138	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future	  at	  each	  instant.	  	  Time	  then,	  signifies	  the	  inner	  difference	  between	  ego	  and	  I	  or	  the	  passive	  and	  active	  selves:	  	   ‘It	  is	  thought	  the	  I	  were	  fractured	  from	  one	  end	  to	  the	  other:	  fractured	  by	  the	  pure	  and	  empty	   form	  of	   time.	   	   In	   this	   form	   it	   is	   the	  correlate	  of	   the	  passive	  self	  which	  appears	   in	   time.	  	  Time	  signifies	  a	  fault	  or	  fracture	  in	  the	  I	  and	  a	  passivity	  in	  the	  self	  and	  the	  correlation	  between	  passive	  self	  and	  the	  fractured	  I	  constitutes	  the	  discovery	  of	  the	  transcendental,	   the	  element	  of	  the	  Copernican	  Revolution.’41	  	  In	   this	   third	   articulation,	   time	   is	   pure	   or	   empty,	   distinct	   from	  empirical	   time.	   	   Empty	   time	   is	  internal	  and	  independent	  of	  actual	  objects.	  	  The	  future	  and	  past	  here	  are	  not	  dynamic	  empirical	  determinations	   of	   time	   but	   formal	   and	   fixed	   characteristics	   distributed	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	  crack	  or	  ‘caesura’.	   	  Time	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  series	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  caesura	  –	  ‘there	  are	  forms	  that	   cannot	   return	   and	   that	   are	   consigned	   to	   remain	   past	   forever	   and	   there	   are	   forms	   that	  return	  with	   the	  cut	   that	  are	   relived	  with	   it.’42	  	  Where	   or	  when	   something	  occurs	   in	   relation	   to	  linear	  time	  is	  not	  at	  issue	  here	  so	  much	  as	  its	  distribution	  according	  to	  the	  cut.	  From	  here,	   Deleuze	   questions	  what	   images	   call	   up	   the	   a	   priori/formal	   past	  without	  memory.	  	  His	  answer	   is	   the	  event	   that	   seems	   too	  big,	  or	   the	  untimely.	   	  The	  examples	  drawn	  upon	  most	  often	   here	   are	   that	   of	  Hamlet	   and	  Oedipus,	   both	   of	  whom	  back	   away	   from	   the	   tasks	   pressed	  upon	   or	   predicted	   for	   them	   –	   the	   side	   of	   the	   caesura	   in	   which	   the	   symbolic	   image	   that	  constitutes	  an	  image	  of	  action	  that	  is	  too	  great,	  too	  unbeatable.43	  	  Here,	  it	  is	  of	  little	  consequence	  whether	  the	  event	  has	  actually	  happened	  or	  not	  (as	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  understanding	  of	  time,	  rather	   than	   the	   pure/formal	   criteria	   to	   which	   Deleuze	   is	   now	   working)	   what	   matters	   is	   the	  response	  to	  image	  of	  action	  out	  of	  the	  a	  priori	  past	  –	  it	  is	  held	  as	  too	  great.	  However,	   the	   second	   experience	   or	   repetition	   of	   time	   is	   the	   repetition	   of	   the	   past	   in	   the	  casesura.	  	  It	  is	  the	  drawing	  of	  action	  from	  memory	  and	  its	  contemplation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  facilitates	  the	  becoming-­‐capable	  and	  becoming-­‐equal	  to	  action.	  	  ‘If	  the	  whole	  of	  memory	  can	  be	  contracted	  into	  an	  image	  for	  action	  and	  into	  the	  interval	  between	  receptivity	  and	  responsiveness,	  then	  we	  have	  arrived	  at	  the	  present	  as	  it	  moves	  to	  the	  future,	  the	  interval	  that	  is	  the	  capability	  for	  action,	  the	   “becoming”	  capable,	  which	   is	  only	  an	   instant.’44	  	  Thus	   there	   is	  a	  doubling	  of	   the	  self	  and	  a	  ‘projection	   on	   an	   ideal	   self	   into	   the	   image	   of	   the	   act.’45	  	   In	   this	   becoming	   capable	   there	   is	   the	  third	  synthesis,	  the	  future	  is	  ‘discovered’,	  the	  I	  is	  cracked	  and	  time	  surges	  forth	  between	  the	  ego	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  p108-­‐9	  42	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Difference	  and	  Repetition:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide.	  p103	  43	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  p111-­‐2	  44	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation.	  p140	  45	  Deleuze,	  Difference	  and	  Repetition.	  p112	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and	  I.	  	  This	  is	  the	  third	  experience	  of	  time	  –	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  future.	  	  As	  it	  occurs,	  event	  and	  act	  (virtual	  memory	  and	  present	  perception)	  conspire	  and	  the	  self	  is	  swept	  away	  –	  the	  surging	  forth	  of	  time	  does	  not	  give	  birth	  to	  identity,	  but	  to	  dispersion	  and	  multiplicity.	   	  This	  becoming	  equal	  and	  contraction	  and	  repetition	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  ontological	  memory	  heralds	  a	  surging	  forth	  of	  the	  new	  and	  a	  shattering	  of	  identity.	  	  The	  present	  moves	  to	  the	  future.	  This	   is	  why	  Deleuze	  finds	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  eternal	  return	  so	  important.	   	  What	  returns	   is	  not	  identities,	  but	  singularities	  or	  elements,	  which	  repeat	  in	  all	  different	  possible	  combinations.	  	  Repetition	  exceeds	  the	  virtual	  past	  it	  repeats	  and	  the	  present	  in	  which	  it	  emerges,	  producing	  the	  future	  as	  a	  new	  combination.	  	  Here,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  notion	  of	  ‘becoming’	  is	  vital.46	  	  Seen	  in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   three	   syntheses	   of	   time	   and	   the	   eternal	   return,	   becoming	   involves	   the	  extraction,	   contemplation	   and	   repetition	   of	   these	   singularities	   in	   new	   modalities	   and	  combinations,	  new	  lines	  of	  flight.	   	  The	  third	  synthesis	  expels	  the	  restrictive,	  identitarian	  forms	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  present	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  new,	  the	  imperceptible	  and	  the	  becoming.	  	  As	  such,	  referring	  to	  ‘becoming-­‐woman’,	  Burchill	  argues:	  	   ‘Put	  as	  succinctly	  as	  possible,	  becoming-­‐woman	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  repetition	  constitutive	  of	  the	  future	  is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  repetition	  or	  reproduction	  of	  feminine	  gender	  traits,	  in	  that,	  instead	  of	  contenting	  itself	  with	  including	  difference	  as	  a	  variant	  with	  (an	  enlarged	  field	  of)	  the	  Same,	  it	  extracts	  from	  the	  sedimentation	  of	  the	  past,	  elements	  ‘pertaining	  to	  difference’,	  which	  it	  then	   enfolds	   –	   or	   reiterates	   in	   new	   configurations	   that	   no	   longer	   take	   their	   bearing	   from	   the	  past	  as	   it	   is	   congealed,	  nor	   from	   the	  present	  as	   the	  deployment	  of	  variations	   informed	  by	   the	  past.’47	  This	  is	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  future,	  the	  reiteration	  of	  the	  new.	  	  Key	  to	  the	  third	  synthesis	  is	  the	  extraction	   of	   new	   movement,	   the	   movement	   of	   difference	   that	   haunts	   all	   movements	   and	  resonates	  through	  all	  series.48	  	  This	  is	  the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  virtual	   in	  new	  figurations,	   forms	  and	  counterpoints.	   	  What	  occurs	   is	  not	  a	   lining	  up	  along	  already	  cut	  vectors,	  but	  a	  return	  that	  shatters	   identity.	   	   In	   relation	   to	  sexuality,	   the	  return	  would	  not	  simply	  bring	  gay	  rights	   to	   the	  fore,	  but	  resonate	  along	  all	  series,	  along	  all	  political	  channels,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  re-­‐figure	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  and	  embody	  social	  justice	  and	  belonging.	  	  The	  event	  refigures	  the	  plane	   upon	  which	  we	   are	   able	   to	  work,	   it	   enacts	   a	   change	   in	   self	   and	   social	  machine;	   in	   our	  particular	  area	  of	  concern,	  it	  reorients	  questions	  of	  what	  rights	  are,	  what	  they	  can	  be	  and	  what	  connections	  they	  can	  make.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.Eg	  p261-­‐263	  and	  Cliff	  Stagoll,	  "Becoming,"	  in	  The	  Deleuze	  Dictionary:	  
Revised	  Edition,	  ed.	  Adrian	  Parr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  47	  Louise	  Burchill,	  "Becoming-­‐Woman:	  A	  Metamorphosis	  in	  the	  Present	  Relegating	  Repetition	  of	  Gendered	  Time	  to	  the	  Past,"	  Time	  and	  society	  19,	  no.	  1	  (2010).	  p94	  48	  Williams,	  Gilles	  Deleuze's	  Logic	  of	  Sense:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  and	  Guide.	  p2	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The	  consequences	  of	  this	  for	  the	  individual	  activist	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  However,	  before	   coming	   to	   the	  question	  of	   the	   event	   in	   relation	   to	  particular	   singularities	   or	  particular	  instances,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   consider	  what	   the	   theory	   of	   event	   as	   the	   actualisation	   of	   the	   virtual	  might	   mean	   for	   how	  we	   think	   about	   activism	   in	   general.	   	   I	   intend	   to	   approach	   this	   through	  further	  consideration	  of	  how	  Deleuze	  approached	  the	  question	  of	  time	  and	  memory.	  	  	  
The	  politics	  of	  multiple	  histories	  and	  minor	  memories	  Colebrook	  notes	  that	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  follow	  Nietzsche	  in	  viewing	  violence	  as	  the	  motor	  of	  human	  memory.49	  	  Indeed,	  they	  note	  that	  cruelty	  is	  the	  inscription	  of	  culture	  on	  bodies50:	  society	  marks	  bodies	   through	  a	   ‘savage	   inscription’,	  creating	  man	  and	  memory	   from	  chaotic,	  uncoded	  flows	  of	  desire.51	  	  This	  is	  relevant,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  as	  it	  recalls	  a	  similar	  argument,	  made	  by	  Das,	  who	  suggests	  that:	  	   ‘In	  my	  own	  analysis,	  however	  I	  am	  led	  to	  conclude	  that	  as	  political	  actors,	  communities	  redefine	  themselves	  and	  are	  defined	  by	  others	  not	  by	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  relations	  but	  by	  (a)	  their	  right	  to	   define	   a	   collective	   past,	   a	   definition	   which	   homogenizes	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	   memories	  preserved	   in	   different	   visions	   of	   the	   community;	   (b)	   their	   right	   to	   regulate	   the	   body	   and	  sexuality	  by	   the	  codification	  of	  custom;	  and	  (c)	   the	  consubstantiality	  between	  acts	  of	  violence	  and	  acts	  of	  moral	  solidarity.’52	  Das’s	  argument	  requires	  some	  unpicking,	  but	  of	  key	  significance	  at	  this	  point	  is	  the	  interlinkage	  of	  violence,	  solidarity,	  community	  and	  social	  codification	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  collective	  past.	   	   As	   such,	   Das	   politicises	   the	   relationship	   between	   time	   and	   history,	   and	   the	   violence	  through	  which	  control	  over	  history	  can	  come	  to	  be	  asserted.	  	  Memory	  is	  not	  simply	  recollection,	  but	   a	   politically	   contested	   productive	   act	   through	   which	   societies	   and	   bodies	   are	   coded	   and	  constructed.	   	   In	   essence,	   through	   Das,	   we	   can	   read	   Deleuzian	   understandings	   of	   memory	   as	  immediately	  in	  tension.	  	  	  For	   Deleuze,	   memory	   exists	   as	   a	   virtual	   whole.	   	   Past	   and	   present	   do	   not	   constitute	   two	  successive	  moments	  ‘but	  two	  elements	  which	  coexist:	  One	  is	  the	  present,	  which	  does	  not	  cease	  to	  pass,	   and	   the	  other	   is	   the	  past,	  which	  does	  not	   cease	   to	  be	  but	   through	  which	   all	   presents	  pass.53	  	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  there	  is	  not	  a	  succession	  from	  past	  to	  present,	  but	  a	  ‘past	  in	  general’,	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  Deleuze:	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  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed.	  p145	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  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­‐Oedipus.	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which	  is	  presupposed	  by	  the	  present	  and	  without	  which	  the	  present	  could	  not	  pass.54	  	  The	  past	  coexists	   in	   each	  present:	   indeed	   the	  present	   exists	   already	  as	  memory	  at	   its	  most	   contracted.	  	  This	   is	   ‘virtual	  memory’	   and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   it	   is	   accessed	  depends	  upon	   the	  position	   from	  which	  it	  is	  approached.	  	   ‘The	  present	  makes	  an	  appeal	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  or	  needs	  of	   the	  present	   situation’55	  and	   from	   this	   appeal	  we	  place	  ourselves	   at	   a	  particular	   level	   of	   the	  past,	   a	   particular	   level	   of	   tension.	   	   Thus	   ‘virtual	   memories	   are	   made	   usable	   by	   present	  actuality.’56	  	   Actual	   present	   and	   virtual	  memory	   coexist	   according	   to	   the	  needs	   of	   the	  present	  and	  the	  actualisation	  of	  virtual	  memory	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  allows	  for	  the	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  virtual	  elements	  actualised.	   	   ‘The	  pure	  past	   is	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  amenable	  to	  change	  through	  the	  occurrence	  of	  any	  new	  present.’57	  	  Thus	  past	  and	  present	  form	  a	  mutually	  dependent	  coexisting	  whole	  of	  past/present,	  actual/virtual.	  	  	  This	  conceptualisation	  of	  virtual	  memory	  is	  central	  to	  Lefebvre’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  a	  virtual	  memory	  of	  law:	  a	  ‘pure	  past	  of	  law	  [that]	  designates	  the	  virtual	  whole	  of	  past	  law	  that	  coexists	  alongside	   the	   present	   that	   actualises	   it.’58	  	   This	   is	  why	   he	   suggests	   that	   judgment	   is	   an	   act	   of	  combination	  of	  perception	  and	  recollection	   in	  relation	  to	   the	  virtual	  past	  of	   law.	   	  We	  perceive	  the	   case	   at	   hand	   and	   through	   this	   perception,	   we	   actualise	   the	   virtual	   memory	   of	   law	   at	   a	  particular	   level	   of	   tension.	   	   There	   is	   a	   contraction	   of	   memory	   and	   a	   rotation	   towards	   the	  situation	  at	  hand.59	  	  	  This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   every	   case	   will	   automatically	   involve	   this	   actualisation	   of	   virtual	  memory.	   	  Lefebvre	  highlights	  Bergson’s	  distinction	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  memory	  –	  habit	  memory	  and	  recollection	  memory;	  inattentive	  perception	  and	  attentive	  perception;	  inattentive	  recognition	   and	   attentive	   recognition;	   and	   action-­‐image	   and	   time-­‐image.60	  	   In	   this	   schema,	  habit-­‐memory	   is	   the	   much	   more	   commonly	   found,	   it	   is	   sufficiently	   general	   to	   be	   constantly	  inserted	   into	   perception	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   it	   makes	   the	   actualisation	   of	   a	   more	   detailed	  recollection	  unnecessary.	   	   Following	   this,	  Lefebvre	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  what	  he	   calls	  the	  problematic	  and	  unproblematic	  encounter.61	  	  He	  suggests,	  with	  Deleuze	  and	  Bergson,	  that	  in	  general	   the	   actualisation	  of	   the	  past	   goes	  unnoticed:	  we	   recognise	  what	   is	   familiar	   and	   select	  appropriate	   habits	   and	   recollections.	   	   In	   this	   way,	   we	   can	   understand	   how	   a	   process	   of	  inattentive	   judgment	  might	  work	   in	   law	  –	  a	  particular	   instant	   is	  perceived	  (inattentively)	  as	  a	  representation	  or	  reiteration	  of	  something	  that	  has	  already	  been	  encountered	  (a	  recollection).	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Thus	  a	  stock	  of	  habit	  memories	  and	  judgments	  are	  taken	  as	  already	  existing	  and	  able	  to	  respond	  to	   the	   situation	   at	   hand.	   	   ‘In	   this	   sense,	   the	   question	   or	   problem	   posed	   by	   the	   image	   is	  suppressed	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  recognition	  and	  activity	  supplied	  by	  a	  recollection.’62	  Just	   as	   Bergson	   and	   Deleuze	   recognise	   the	   need	   for	   inattentive	   perception,	   Lefebvre	  acknowledges	  that	  inattentive	  judgment	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  regularising	  the	  legal	  process	  –	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  treat	  each	  case	  as	  the	  actualisation	  of	  a	  virtual	  memory	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  singularity	  and	  thus	  judges	  must	  have	  a	  set	  of	  codes	  that	  can	  be	  unhesitatingly	  actualised.	  	  The	  key	  danger	  in	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  confusion	  of	  judgment	  (the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  past	  in	  relation	  to	  perception	  and	  recollection)	  with	  subsumption	  of	  the	  particular	  under	  a	  general	  set	  of	  rules	  (based,	  we	  might	  assume,	  upon	  a	  particular	  reductive	  and	  centralised	  image	  of	  Man).	  	  	  Moreover,	  inattentive	  judgment	  forms	  only	  one	  side	  of	  judgment.	  	  In	  a	  small	  minority	  of	  cases,	  he	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  true	  encounter	  –	  a	  moment	  of	  uncertainty	  to	  which	  the	  rules	  cannot	  easily	  attach.	   	  What	  occurs	  here	   is	  a	  pause	   in	  which	  we	   fail	   to	  unconsciously	  and	   immediately	  act	  out	  the	   future.63	  	  This	  pause	  begins	  with	  a	   failure	  of	  recognition	   in	  which	  the	   encounter	   suspends	   spontaneous	   linkages	   between	   perceptions	   and	   recollections.	   	   This	  pause	  demands	  that	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  singularity	  at	  hand,	  and	  as	  such	  it	  reveals	  the	  virtual	  past	  as	  the	  condition	  and	  element	  of	  judgment,	  the	  need	  to	  leap	  into	  the	  virtual	  past	  at	  its	  more	  distant	  extensions	  in	  response	  to	  the	  encounter,	  and	  to	  experiment	  with	  recollections	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  situation	  at	  hand.64	  	  What	  is	  required	  is	  a	  creative	  re-­‐working	  of	  memory,	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  unthought-­‐of	  and	  unsaid	  in	  response	  to	  the	  new.65	  	  Attentive	  judgment,	  or	  the	  active	  actualisation	  of	  memory,	  is	  this	  pause	  and	  leap	  into	  the	  past	  in	  response	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  new.	  	  	  	  This	  analysis	  leads	  us	  back	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  limits	  of	  rights	  that	  we	  see	  their	  true	  creative	   potential.	   	  When	   that	   which	   we	   are	   demanding	   of	   rights	   is	   difficult	   to	   articulate,	   or	  forces	   us	   to	   pause	   and	   experiment	  with	   how	  we	   express	   injustice	   or	   desire,	  we	   open	   up	   the	  potential	   for	   attentive	   judgment,	   for	   creative	   reworking	   of	   the	   past	   and	   the	   repetition	   of	   the	  future	  in	  a	  new	  form.	  	  Judgement	  here	  is	  active,	  particular	  and	  enactive,	  it	  calls	  for	  the	  creative	  repetition	   of	   law	   rather	   than	   an	   unconscious	   or	   inattentive	   process	   of	   recognition	   and	  representation	  of	  an	  encounter	  into	  an	  overarching	  framework	  of	  law.66	  	  	  	  What	   remains	   therefore	   is	   to	   return	   to	   Veena	   Das’s	   argument	   about	   violence,	   memory	   and	  history	  in	  light	  of	  notions	  of	  attentive	  judgment,	  rights	  and	  the	  event.	  	  The	  habitual	  use	  of	  rights	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creates	   particular	   representations,	   particular	   selections	   and	   particular	   possibilities	   for	   action	  that	  can	  occur	  more	  easily	  than	  others.	   	  Moreover,	  these	  habit	  memories	  are	  communal	  rather	  than	  individual	  –	  control	  over	  how	  memory	  is	  actualised	  is	  a	  political	  act	  and	  constitutes	  part	  of	  the	  violence	  that	  marks	  bodies	  as	  human	  or	   inhuman.	   	  The	  ability	   to	  say	  what	   is	   important	   in	  memory	   and	   what	   counts	   as	   history	   plays	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   power	   and	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  social	  machine.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  capacity	  to	  dictate	  and	  to	  judge	  becomes	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing	  vector	  of	  power	  and	  control:	  every	  inattentive	  judgment,	  every	  actualisation	  of	  habit	  memory	  reinforces	  the	  connections	  that	  create	  particular	  striations	  and	  strata	  within	  each	  social	  body.	  	  	  However,	  an	  understanding	  of	  memory	  and	  judgment	  that	  functions	  in	  this	  way	  also	  opens	  up	  possibilities	   for	   resistance.	   	   An	   understanding	   of	   memory	   as	   virtual	   means	   that	   we	   must	  acknowledge	  the	  possibility	  of	  multiple	  histories,	  multiple	  selections	  and	  multiple	  actualisations	  at	   different	   levels	   of	   tension:	   ‘the	   past	   always	   and	   essentially	   gives	   rise	   to	  multiple	   histories,	  histories	   undertaken	   from	   different	   perspectives	   of	   the	   present…such	   a	   picture	   is	   rendered	  more	  complex	   through	   the	  necessity	  of	   recognising	  what	   the	   fissured	  and	   latent	  past	  enables,	  for	   the	  past	   is	   uncontainable	  within	   any	  one	  history	  or	   even	   cumulative	  histories.’67	  	  As	   such,	  Grosz	   suggests	   that	   we	   must	   bring	   out	   the	   ‘latencies,	   the	   potentiality	   of	   the	   future	   to	   be	  otherwise	  than	  the	  present.’68	  	  We	  must	  be	  open	  and	  attentive	  to	  the	  pauses	  and	  the	  tensions	  in	  the	   present	   through	   which	   we	   can	   seek	   to	   creatively	   re-­‐actualise	   memory,	   to	   open	   up	   old	  histories	  and	  concepts	  and	  to	  actively	  think.	  	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  at	   the	  moment	  of	   failure	  of	  rights,	  at	   their	   limit	  or	  at	   the	  moment	  when	  they	  struggle	  to	  encompass	  the	  enormity	  of	  demands	  made	  or	  injustices	  felt,	  we	  may	  experience	  the	  encounter	  –	  the	  moment	  at	  which	  we	  stutter	  and	  pause.	   	  This	  stutter	  however,	  occurs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  dimensions;	  it	  interrupts	  the	  habitual	  flow	  of	  memory	  and	  recollection,	  but	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  emergence	  or	  engagement	  of	  minor	  practices	  within	  the	  major	  in	  which	  the	  ‘untimely’69	  is	   thought	  and	  known.70	  	   Stuttering	   is	   a	  double	  movement	  –	  not	   just	   a	  moment	  of	  critique	  or	  of	  refusal	  of	   the	   ‘molar’,	  but	  simultaneously,	  a	  moment	  of	  affirmation	  of	  difference,	  an	  act	  of	  creation	  and	  creativity.	  	  The	  unfolding	  of	  the	  encounter	  is	  something	  that	  ‘forces	  us	  to	  think’71	  something	  unrecognised,	  or	  inassimilable	  to	  the	  established	  doxa.	  	  Encounters	  are	  those	  things	   for	   which	   we	   have	   no	   directions	   for	   action,	   no	   pre-­‐ordained	   structure	   for	   their	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contemplation.	  	  They	  are	  characterised	  by	  an	  ‘unlimited	  qualitative’	  	  ‘mad’	  becoming.72	  	  This,	  for	  Braidotti,	   is	  an	  affirmative	  process,	  against	   the	  binary	  thinking	  of	  Western	  traditions	   in	  which	  difference	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  difference	  is	  affirmed	  as	  positive.	  	  We	  must	  look	  to	  express	  not	  negativity,	  but	  a	  ‘different	  difference.’73	  	  
‘Imperceptible	  politics’	  and	  activism	  in	  Somos,	  Stonewall	  and	  the	  GLF	  A	  key	  question	  at	  this	  point	   is	  how	  we	  might	  approach	  this	  expression	  of	  different	  differences	  through	   the	   actualisation	   of	   the	   event.	   	   The	   failure	   of	   rights	   makes	   a	   demand	   that	   we	   think	  differently,	   through	   new	   concepts,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   creatively	   repeat	   the	   future	   in	   new	   and	  unanticipated	  ways.	   	  By	  leaping	  into	  the	  virtual	  past,	  we	  create	  the	  possibility	  for	  action	  along	  unforeseen	   lines	   in	   unmapped	   territories,	   uncontained	   by	   current	   striations	   of	   identity	   and	  memory.	  	  As	  such,	  Flieger	  has	  argued	  that	  what	  occurs	  is	  the	  making	  of	  history	  by	  those	  who	  are	  out	  of	  line,	  those	  who	  ‘play	  the	  game	  wittily’74	  or	  those	  who	  create	  a	  new	  game	  by	  dissolving	  the	  rules	   and	   bringing	   new	   conjunctions	   to	   bear.	   	   What	   is	   inherent	   here,	   I	   would	   suggest,	   is	   a	  becoming-­‐equal	   to	   the	   event,	   a	  playing	  out	  of	   the	  break	  of	   linear	   time	  and	  a	   repetition	   in	   the	  mode	  of	   the	   future.	   	  This	   is	   a	  mode	  of	  political	   action	   that	  works	  by	   following	   intensities	  and	  articulating	  moments	  of	  rupture	  in	  a	  process	  of	  remaking	  history,	  not	  to	  create	  a	  history	  that	  is	  ‘true’	  but	  to	  attempt	  to	  work	  within	  a	   frame	  that	  acknowledges	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  history,	   the	  virtuality	  of	  memory	  and	  the	  myriad	  contractions	  and	  rotations	  through	  which	  we	  can	  leap	  into	  the	  past.	  	  	  The	  goal	  then	  is	  an	  affirmative	  ethics	  that	  repeats	  the	  future	  instead	  of	  mimicking	  the	  past.	   	   It	  seeks	   the	   actualisation	   of	   virtual	   events	   or	   the	   ‘memory	   of	   another	   past’75	  in	   which	   the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  non-­‐actualised	  lines,	  the	  excluded	  and	  forgotten	  planes,	  are	  rethought.	  	  Such	  micro-­‐politics	   and	   linkages	  between	   forces	  will	   be	   constantly	  unstable,	   habitually	  unseen	  and	  ever	  changing.	   	  We	  could	  argue	  that	  many	  political	  movements	  might	  begin	  by	  displaying	  this	  radical	  potential	  for	  becoming	  and	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  lines	  of	  flight.	  	  But	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  untimely	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task	  and	  too	  often,	  it	  is	  too	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  –	  the	  image	  of	  action	  or	  the	  event	  in	  need	  of	  actualisation	  is	  too	  big	  and	  politics	  falls	  back	  into	  the	  idea,	  representation	  and	  identity.	  	  	  However,	  Hutta	  has	  argued	  that	  even	  when	  the	  politics	  of	   identity	  and	  representation	   is	  at	   its	  height,	   causing	   clashes,	   negations	   and	   seemingly	   impassable	   aporias,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   identify	  potential	   micro-­‐movements,	   partly	   hidden	   and	   reverberating	   below	   and	   around	   larger	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representations.	   	   Using	   the	   example	   of	   the	   LGBT	   movements	   in	   Brazil	   in	   the	   late	   1970s,	   he	  sketches	   the	  history	  of	  Somos	  –	  a	  gay	  activist	  organisation	  based	   in	  Sao	  Paolo,	  and	  notes	   that	  paradoxically,	   during	   the	   biggest	   crisis	   and	   factionalism	   of	   Somos,	   its	   fragmented	   and	  fragmenting	  parts	  succeeding	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  ‘best	  proof’	  of	  its	  presence	  and	  demands.	  	  In	  a	   fragmented	   coexistence,	   the	   factions	   of	   Somos	   were	   capable	   of	   positively	   engaging	   and	  articulating	  a	  number	  of	  different	  positions.76	  	  	  In	   Hutta’s	   analysis,	   it	   was	   not	   through	   coordination	   and	   coherence	   that	   Somos	   was	   able	   to	  achieve	  the	  most	  interesting	  results.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  only	  instance	  in	  which	  unanticipated	  results	  are	  achieved	  through	  moments	  of	  incoherence	  or	  even	  breakdown.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  modern	  symbols	  of	  gay	  liberation	  began	  not	  with	  coherent	  political	  action	  but	  with	  drag	  queens	  rioting	  in	  New	  York	  Streets.77	  	  Such	  moments	  –	  or	  events	  –	  can	  function	  as	  outpourings	  of	  intensity	  through	  which	  the	  machinic	  connections	  that	  striate	  our	  society	  are	  re-­‐worked	  or	  called	  into	  question.	  	  In	  the	  UK	  for	  example,	  we	  might	  point	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Gay	  Liberation	  Front	   (GLF)	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  older	  Campaign	   for	  Homosexual	  Equality	   (CHE).	  	  Unlike	  the	  CHE,	  the	  GLF	  marked	  a	  moment	  of	  radicalism,	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  gay	  people	  began	  publicly	   to	   speak	   for	   themselves	  and	  demand	  more	   than	  pity	  or	   tolerance:	   ‘it	   taught	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  not	  to	  be	  fearful	  to	  ask	  for	  what	  they	  wanted.’78	  	  As	  such,	  the	  GLF	  marked	  a	  point	  of	  rupture,	   a	   point	   in	   which	   LGBT	   individuals	   began	   to	   articulate	   their	   demands	   through	   their	  public	  identification	  as	  gay.79	  	  	  What	  is	  significant	  about	  these	  events	  is	  that	  they	  feature	  a	  challenge	  to,	  or	  even	  an	  overturning	  of	  previously	  articulated	  categorisations	  and	  normative	  standards	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  (or	  even	  by	  means	  of)	  an	  intensity	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  extend	  into	  the	  progression	  of	  linear	  time.	  	  The	  GLF	  had	  huge	   influence	  but	   lasted	  only	  4	   years	   –	   as	  with	  Somos,	   cracks	  began	   to	   appear	  between	  members	  and	  a	  process	  of	  disintegration	  began.80	  	  Similarly	  in	  later	  decades,	  other	  incarnations	  of	   radical	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   political	   groupings	   experienced	   moments	   of	   intensity	   followed	   by	  disagreements,	  movement	  and	  change.81	  	  The	   intensity	  or	  radical	  potential	  of	   the	  cut	  does	  not	  exist	  easily	  in	  linear	  time,	  although	  moments	  of	  its	  emergence	  can	  be	  traced	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  event.	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Such	   breakdowns	   highlight	   the	   problematic	   nature	   of	   thinking	   activism,	   time	   and	   events.	  	  Becoming	  worthy	  of	  the	  event	  demands	  that	  we	  repeat	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  the	  future,	  that	  we	  accept	  the	  possibility	  of	  undoing	  of	   old	   identities,	   old	   connections	   and	  old	   flows.	   	  This	  however,	   is	   a	  precarious	   position	   from	  which	   to	   implement	   sustainable	   political	   action.	   	   In	   exploring	   these	  intensities	  and	  attempting	  to	  move	  beyond	  or	  outside	  a	  politics	  of	  representation	  and	  identity,	  both	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari,	   and	   Elizabeth	   Grosz	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	   a	   politics	   of	  imperceptibility	  –	  a	  politics	  of	  intensities	  and	  movements:	  	   ‘Such	   a	   politics	   does	   not	   seek	   visibility	   and	   recognition	   as	   its	   goals;	   rather	   it	   seeks	  actions,	   effects,	   consequences,	   forces	   which	   generate	   transformation	   without	   directing	   that	  transformation	  to	  other	  subjects	  who	  acknowledge	  its	  force.	  	  	  The	  imperceptible	  harnesses	  the	  forces	   that	   make	   up	   subjects,	   not	   by	   confirming	   them	   but	   by	   making	   them	   larger	   and	  more	  effective	  than	  subjectivity,	  by	  linking	  them	  to	  the	  inhuman,	  to	  forces	  below	  and	  above	  the	  level	  of	   the	   subject's	   control,	  which	   generate	   the	   real.	   	   Political	   struggles	   on	   such	   a	  model	   are	   not	  directed	  to	  affirming	  categories	  or	  classes	  of	  subject,	  but	  categories	  or	  classes	  of	  action.'82	  The	   Stonewall	   riots,	   Somos,	   and	   the	   GLF	  were	   all,	   we	  might	   argue,	   engaged	   in	   some	   form	   of	  imperceptible	   politics.	   	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   they	  were	   not	   also	   engaged	   in	  wide	   ranging	  debates	   about	   nomenclature	   and	   about	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   from	   state	   bodies;	   but	   their	  effects	  can	  also	  be	  measured	  on	  another	  level:	  that	  of	  impact	  and	  movement.	  	  Such	  events	  saw	  a	  refiguring	  of	  what	  was	  possible	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  actual,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  flows	  and	  intensities	  of	  virtual	  objects	  and	  actualised	  histories.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  such	  events	  resonates	  not	  just	  in	  their	  actualised	  forms,	  but	  through	  multiple	  series,	  connections	  and	  virtualities.	  	  	  However,	   the	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   imperceptibility	   must	   be	   approached	   with	  some	  caution.	   	  Braidotti	  suggests,	   for	  example,	  that	  Grosz’s	  (and	  Deleuze’s)	  approach	  does	  not	  pay	  sufficient	  attention	  to	  the	  material,	  embedded	  context	  of	  geo-­‐politics	  and	  power	  relations.83	  	  We	  must	  take	  care	  not	  to	  posit	  the	  minoritarian	  and	  the	  marginal	  as	  the	  ‘future’,	  or	  as	  that	  which	  reveals	  the	  micro	  and	  molecular,	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  specific,	  embodied	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  particular	  minoritarian	  groups.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  must	  abandon	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  politics	   of	   fragmentation,	   movement	   and	   change	   –	   indeed	   the	   examples	   above	   suggest	   that	  when	  there	  is	  movement,	  change	  and	  even	  legal	  reform,	  the	  impetus	  and	  impact	  of	  this	  reform	  does	  not	  always	  come	  from	  well-­‐organised	  or	  stable	  campaigning	  platforms.	   	  Even	  as	  changes	  are	  demanded,	   those	  doing	   the	  demanding	  are	   themselves	  negotiating	  questions	  of	  belonging,	  identity	   and	   positionality.	   	   However,	   care	   must	   be	   taken	   with	   the	   particularities	   of	   each	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Elizabeth	  Grosz,	  Time	  Travels:	  Feminsim,	  Nature,	  Power	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  p168	  83	  Braidotti,	  R.	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  p106	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situation	  in	  which	  this	  occurs.	  	  We	  should	  not	  reify	  a	  politics	  of	  flow	  and	  flux	  as	  a	  ‘solution’	  any	  more	  than	  we	  should	  look	  to	  a	  politics	  of	  essentialised	  identity	  and	  transcendent	  rights.	  	  	  
Multiple	  histories	  and	  fractured	  identities	  in	  the	  case	  of	  South	  African	  LGBT	  organising	  One	  of	  the	  clearest	  and	  most	  interesting	  examples	  of	  the	  complexities	  at	  play	  here	  concerns	  the	  history	   of	   LGBT	   organising,	   campaigning	   and	   legal	   reform	   in	   South	   Africa.84	  	   To	   discuss	   this	  topic	   in	  detail	  would	  require	  more	  space	   than	   is	  available;	   instead,	   I	  want	   to	  draw	  on	  a	   small	  number	   of	   examples	   from	   South	   African	   history	   in	   order	   to	   consider	   questions	   of	   identity,	  movement	   and	   imperceptibility	   in	   more	   detail.	   	   The	   most	   important	   point	   to	   note	   is	   the	  multiplicitous,	   fractured	   nature	   of	   South	   African	   gay	   rights	   groupings.	   	   A	   number	   of	  commentators	   have	   highlighted	   how	   problematic	   it	   is	   to	   even	   identify	   a	   gay	   community,	   or	  coherent	   South	   African	   LGBT	   movement. 85 	  	   Indeed,	   De	   Vos	   suggests,	   ‘[w]hether	   we	   call	  ourselves	   homosexuals,	   gay	   men,	   lesbians,	   moffies,	   dykes,	   queers,	   bisexuals,	   drag	   queens	   or	  even	  refuse	  altogether	   to	   label	  ourselves	  any	  of	   the	  above,	  we	  are	   less	  of	  a	  happy	   family	   than	  most	   theorists	   would	   like	   to	   imagine.’86	  	   Others	   have	   noted	   the	   difficulties	   posed	   by	   this	  fragmentation	  when	  attempting	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  more	  accessible	  histories	  of	  white	  gay	  South	  African	   communities.87	  What	   is	   equally	   clear	   is	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   particular	   and	   unique	  circumstances	  within	  which	  LGBT	  organising	  has	  occurred	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  South	  African	  LGBT	  structures	  have	  developed	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  influence	  of	  powerful	  European	  and	  North	  American	  cultural	  and	  organisational	  factors	  are	  clear:	  	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  identity	  and	  nomenclature88	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  interaction	  of	  exiled	  ANC	  leaders	  with	  gay	   rights	   groups	   affiliated	   with	   anti	   apartheid	   causes89	  there	   is	   an	   identifiable	   interaction	  between	  the	  specifics	  of	  South	  African	  politics	  and	  wider	  transnational	  movements	  which	  called	  both	  for	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid	  and	  for	  gay	  rights.	   	  Despite	  this	  however,	  we	  cannot	  assume	  that	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  that	  here	  I	  am	  using	  LGBT	  as	  shorthand,	  but	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  that	  this	  shorthand	  creates	  certain	  problematic	  assumptions.	  	  These	  problematics	  are	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  three	  and	  four	  	  	  85	  Mark	  Gervisser	  and	  Edwin	  Cameron,	  "Defiant	  Desire:	  An	  Introduction,"	  in	  Defiant	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  in	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gay	  rights	  groups	  in	  South	  Africa	  have	  a	  similar	  or	  even	  a	  comparable	  structure	  or	  history	  to	  gay	  rights	  groups	  in	  Europe	  or	  gay	  rights	  groups	  in	  America.90	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  vital	  to	  read	  South	  African	  LGBT	  organising	  in	  the	  context	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  wider	  history.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  texts	  concerning	  LGBT	  issues	  written	  about	  or	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  apartheid	  regime,	  resonate	  very	  clearly	  with	  the	  broader	  questions	  faced	  by	  a	  society	  that	  was	  drastically	  reforming.	  	  In	  particular,	  many	  commentators	  appear	  to	  be	  asking	  not	  just	  what	  gay	  rights	  groups	  were	  doing,	  but	  what	  these	  groups	  wanted	  to	  be	  and	  how	  they	  were	  trying	  to	  achieve	   this	   in	   the	  context	  of	  a	   radically	  rupturing	  social	   frame.91	  	  Pertinent	  questions	   include	  not	  just	  the	  issue	  of	  legal	  reform,	  but	  also	  the	  wider	  question	  of	  how	  to	  engage,	  who	  to	  include	  and	  how	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  gay	  members	  of	  South	  African	  society.92	  	  Such	  texts	  reflect	  the	  messy	  borders	  and	  complex	  questions	  of	  what	  ‘gayness’	  is.	  	  While	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  with	  which	  all	  gay	  rights	  groups	  must	  engage	  to	  some	  extent	  or	  another,	  the	  South	  African	  example	  is	  striking	  because	  it	  is	  presented	  so	  starkly.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  although	  there	  were	  numerous	  debates	  and	  rifts	  over	  the	  issue,	  gay	  rights	  groups	  in	  South	  Africa	  were	  unable	  to	  avoid	  engaging	  with	  questions	  of	  race	  and	  apartheid.	  	  The	  Gay	  Association	  of	  South	  Africa	  (GASA)	  was	  founded	  in	  1982	  and	  while	  it	  was	  not	  the	  first	  gay	  group	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Gevisser	  notes	  that	  it	  was	  the	  first	  national	  organisation	  that	  constituted	  some	  kind	  of	  grassroots	  movement	  as	  might	  be	  found	  in	  Europe	  or	  North	  America.93	  	  	  However,	  while	   GASA	   did	   enjoy	   success	   and	   support,	   it	   remained	   very	  much	   a	  movement	   of	  white	   gay	  men.	   	   It	   was	   also	   staunchly	   apolitical,	   that	   is,	   unaligned	   to	   South	   African	   politics	   and	   more	  generally,	  committed	  to	  a	  non-­‐confrontational,	  accommodationist	  strategy.	   	  Gervisser	  suggests	  that	  this	  apolitical	  stance	  cemented	  GASA’s	  popularity	  in	  certain	  circles,	  but	  also	  contributed	  to	  its	  downfall:	  ‘it	  attempted	  to	  remain	  outside	  the	  political	  fray	  at	  a	  time	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  history	  in	  which	  this	  was	  untenable.	   	  It	  was	  thus	  ousted	  by	  the	  world	  gay	  community	  and	  destabilised	  by	  a	  growing	  anti-­‐apartheid	  and	  black	  gay	  movement	  within	  South	  Africa.’94	  White	  middle	  class	  members	  of	  GASA	  showed	  little	  interest	  in	  recruitment	  of	  black	  members,	  or	  tolerance	  for	  those	  black	   men	   who	   did	   join.95	  	   Writing	   about	   his	   experiences	   as	   a	   black	   gay	   student	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	  Kleinbooi	  highlights	  how	  problematic	  this	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  racial	  issues	  could	  be:	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   ‘Certainly,	   when	   it	   came	   to	   issues	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality,	   the	   nationalist	   liberation	  movements	   do	   not	   have	   proud	   track	   records.	   	   But	   the	   same	   holds	   true	   for	   gay	   and	   feminist	  movements	  with	  regard	  to	  anti-­‐apartheid	  struggles.	   	  This	  has	  brought	  about	  a	  situation	  where	  accusations	   of	   being	   ‘oppressive’,	   ‘uncivilised’,	   ‘Euro-­‐centric’,	   ‘African	   macho’	   are	   endlessly	  thrown	  around.	  	  The	  gay	  activists	  are	  forever	  fighting	  the	  homophobia	  of	  those	  in	  ‘progressive’	  organisations,	  who	  often	  argue	  that	  the	  gays	  are	  not	  ‘oppressed’	  at	  all.	  	  All	  this	  leaves	  those	  of	  us	  who	  are	  black	  and	  gay	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  an	  extremely	  unpleasant	  crossfire.	  	  What	  do	  we	  do?	  	  Who	  do	  we	  side	  with?	  	  Is	  there	  any	  way	  out?’96	  More	  generally,	  racism	  remained	  a	  problem	  within	  the	   ‘gay	  community’	  such	  as	   it	  was:	  nearly	  20	   years	   after	   the	   formation	   of	   GASA	   (and	   GASA’s	   subsequent	   collapse)	   Leatt	   and	  Hendricks	  note	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  gay	  people	  visiting	  the	  Cape	  Town	  gay	  village	  are	  white	  men	  and	  that	  there	  have	  been	  repeated	  claims	  of	  racism	  made	  against	  the	  door	  policies	  of	  some	  bars	  and	  clubs	   in	   the	   area.97	  This	  makes	   the	   question	   of	   belonging	   and	   solidarity	   an	   extremely	   fraught	  one.	  	  	  Even	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   founding,	   GASA’s	   political	   conservatism	   hindered	   their	   ability	   to	   act	  publicly	  on	  issues	  concerning	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  contributed	  to	  a	  growing	  internal	  rift.	  	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  is	  perhaps	  demonstrated	  by	  GASA’s	  response	  to	  the	  arrest	  and	  trial	  for	  treason	  of	  Simon	   Nkoli,	   a	   black	   gay	  member	   of	   GASA	   who	   had	   a	   background	   in	   anti-­‐apartheid	   politics.	  	  GASA	  maintained	   that	   Nkoli	   had	   been	   a	  minor	   player	   in	   GASA	   and	   that	   they	  were	   unable	   to	  support	  him	  because	  of	  their	  apolitical	  stance.98	  	  However,	  Nkoli	  became	  a	  major	  rallying	  point	  among	   international	   anti-­‐apartheid	   and	   gay	   groups.	   	   Writing	   about	   his	   time	   in	   prison,	   Nkoli	  recalled	  receiving	  over	  150	  Christmas	  cards	  from	  overseas	  in	  December	  1986.99	  	  GASA’s	  lack	  of	  support	   left	   it	   open	   to	   a	   huge	   amount	   of	   criticism	   both	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   As	   this	   critique	  mounted,	   progressive	   gay	   South	   Africans	   began	   to	   form	   explicitly	   political	   organisations	   in	  direct	  response	  to	  GASA.100	  This	   is	  not	   an	  argument	   that	  Nkoli	   alone	   caused	   the	  dissolution	  of	  GASA	  or	   the	  emergence	  of	  new,	   political	   gay	   rights	   groups	   in	   South	   Africa.	   	   Gervisser	   notes	   for	   example,	   that	   by	   1986,	  GASA’s	   national	   committee	   was	   reporting	   that	   it	   had	   overreached	   itself	   and	   was	   in	   deep	  financial	  difficulties.101	  	  However,	  Nkoli	  does	  act	  as	  an	  important	  marker	  or	  catalyst	  for	  many	  of	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the	  tensions	  that	  those	  in	  gay	  politics	  were	  required	  to	  deal	  with,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  liberationist	  gay	  politics	  that	  resonated	  with	  wider	  society	  and	  the	  changing	  political	  climate.	  	  	  What	  this	  suggests	  is	  that	  South	  African	  LGBT	  movements	  must	  be	  located	  in	  relation	  to	  South	  African	   politics	   and	   anti	   apartheid	   struggles	   as	  well	   as	   burgeoning	   international	   gay	   politics.	  	  Gay	  rights	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  outside	  the	  wider	  political	  climate	  and	  power	  structures.	   	  The	  organisation	   that	  sought	  relative	  stability	   found	  that	   it	  could	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	   the	  changing	  demands	   of	   a	   political	   climate	   that	  was	   being	   shaken	   to	   its	   roots.	   	   This	   rupture	   reverberated	  back	  through	  gay	  communities,	  interacting	  with	  the	  profound	  questions	  that	  were	  being	  asked	  about	  how	  to	  understand	  sexuality	  and	  belonging.	  	  McLean	  and	  Ncgobo	  point	  to	  the	  significance	  of	   the	   1976	   uprisings	   in	   Soweto	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   gay	   movements	   in	   black	  townships:	  	  	   ‘South	  Africa’s	  massive	  youthful	  majority	  questioned	  the	  authority	  not	  only	  of	  the	  state,	  but	  of	  the	  teachers	  and	  parents	  and	  pushed	  its	  own	  agenda	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  Suddenly,	  young	  people	  found	   themselves	   in	   opposition	   to	   many	   things	   their	   parents	   stood	   for,	   and	   this	   meant	  challenging	  not	  only	  conservative	  politics	  but	  all	  conservative	  mores.’102	  It	   is	   against	   this	   history	   of	   rupture,	   questioning	   and	   politicisation	   that	   the	   South	   African	  constitutional	  protection	  against	  discrimination	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  emerged.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  means	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  the	  equality	  clause	  of	  Section	  9	  of	  the	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution	  came	  about	  as	  if	  by	  chance,	  or	  only	  because	   of	   a	   chaotic	   coming	   together	   of	   particular	   extra-­‐individual	   forces	   in	   a	   moment	   of	  rupture	   and	   change.	   	   The	   strategy	   used	   by	   activists	   –	   in	   taking	   advantage	   of	   a	   particular	  moment,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   involvement	   of	   certain	   key	   personalities,	   legal	   elites	   and	   political	  activists	  -­‐	  is	  hugely	  significant.103	  	  Stychin	  highlights	  the	  return	  of	  ANC	  leadership,	  bringing	  with	  them	   a	   sensitivity	   to	   gay	   rights	   issues,	   as	   well	   as	   personal	   contacts	   between	   activist	   law	  professor	  (and	  now	  judge)	  Edwin	  Cameron	  and	  members	  of	  the	  ANC	  constitutional	  committee	  as	   being	   key	   factors	   in	   the	   inclusion	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   the	   clause.104	  	   Fine	   and	  Nicol	   draw	  attention	   to	   the	   extensive	   submissions	   made	   by	   Organisation	   of	   Lesbian	   and	   Gay	   Activists	  (OLGA)	   to	   the	   ANC’s	   Constitutional	   Committee	   in	   September	   1990	   as	   well	   as	   the	   meetings	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between	  OLGA	  and	  ANC	  members,	  particularly	  Frene	  Ginwala,	  Albie	  Sachs	  and	  Kader	  Asmal.105	  	  Furthermore,	   key	   figures	   such	   as	   Desmond	   Tutu	  were	   on	   record	   supporting	   the	   inclusion	   of	  sexual	  orientation	  in	  the	  equality	  clause.106	  I	  would	  argue	  therefore,	  that	  what	  the	  South	  African	  context	  brings	  so	  clearly	  to	  the	  fore	  is	  the	  relationship	   between	   wider	   climate,	   political	   groupings	   and	   iconic	   individuals,	   both	   within	  South	  Africa	   and	   abroad.	   	   All	   of	   these	   factors	   are	   significant	   here	   and	   their	   interaction	   is	   not	  uniform	   or	   predictable.	   	   Instead	   there	   is	   an	   uneasy	   multiplicity	   of	   flows,	   resonance	   and	  interactions;	   a	   complex	   coexistence	   of	   particular	   movements,	   which	   produced	   particular	  crystallisations	  of	  action,	   law	  and	   identification.	   	  What	   is	  clear	  however,	   is	   that	   the	  attempt	  to	  maintain	   a	   limited,	   stratified	   (and	   sometimes	   shamefully	   self-­‐interested)	   stability	   for	   gay	  groups,	  rooted	  in	  apolitical	  conservatism,	  could	  neither	  herald	  nor	  survive	  the	  seismic	  changes	  that	  were	  taking	  place	  in	  South	  Africa	  at	  that	  time.	  	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  fact	  that	  South	  African	  gay	  rights	  groups	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  history	  as	  those	  found	  in	  Europe	  or	  America	  brings	  the	  problematics	  of	  representation,	  identity	  and	  community	  even	  more	  clearly	  to	  the	  forefront.	  	  Despite	  the	  equality	  clause	  –	  a	  clause	  which	  is	  on	  the	  surface,	  immediately	  recognisable	  and	  translatable	  into	  other	  legal	  contexts	  -­‐	   it	   is	  very	  difficult	  to	  read	  even	  a	  small	  part	  of	  the	  history	  of	  South	  African	  organising	  around	  sexuality	  without	  grasping	  the	  highly	  situated	  nature	  of	   the	  struggle	  and	  the	  extreme	  inappropriateness	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  a	  single	  sexual	  subject	  to	  which	  equality	  rights	  might	  attach	  (and	  indeed	  we	  could	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	   this	  misrecognition	   and	  misrepresentation	   of	   such	   a	   subject	   that	   feeds	   into	   the	   rhetoric	   of	  homosexuality	  as	  un-­‐African).	   	   Instead,	  we	  see	  particular	  movements	  and	  particular	  moments	  grounded	  in	  particular	  circumstances.	   	   	  The	  key	  point	  here	  concerns	  the	  relationship	  between	  moments	   of	   rupture,	   wider	   social	   contexts	   and	   the	   placement	   of	   particular	   individuals	   and	  groups	  –	  in	  essence,	  the	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  any	  event	  as	  it	  unfolds	  as	  an	  actual	  occurrence.	   	   Thus,	   we	  must	   adopt	   a	   notion	   of	   ‘immanent	   rights’,	   which	   are	   grounded	   in	   and	  speak	  to	  specific	  situations.	  	  This	  is	  the	  place	  where	  rights	  are	  most	  needed,	  but	  ironically,	  often	  most	  unable	  to	  reach.	  	  	  This	  formulation	  sits	  interestingly	  alongside	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  the	  imperceptible.	  	  What	  occurred	   in	   South	   Africa	   could	   easily	   be	   characterised	   as	   a	   politics	   of	   movement	   and	   flow;	  however	  this	  flow	  and	  movement	  was	  not	  random,	  but	  done	  knowingly,	  informed	  by	  key	  actors	  and	  specific	  judgments	  relating	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  political	  situation	  at	  hand.	  	  Therefore,	  while	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imperceptibility	  suggests	  a	  lack	  of	  presence,	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  entirely	  grounded	  and	  real	  approach	  to	  the	  event	  that	  holds	  in	  tension	  (or	  paradox)	  the	  multiple	  histories,	  oppositions	  and	   ambiguities	   that	   don’t	   particularly	   fit.	   	   These	   tensions	   are	   not	   resolvable	   in	   the	   actual	  movement	  of	   the	  event,	  but	   through	  extending	   into	  the	  virtual	  we	  are	  able	  to	  see	  the	   linkages	  between	  them	  or	  the	  possibility	  of	  their	  coexistence	  and	  re-­‐composition.	  	  Thus,	  Flieger	  suggests	  that	  imperceptibility	  can	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  a	  function	  of	  invisibility	  but	  a	  function	  of	  radical	  change	  in	  consistency.107	  	   	   Imperceptibility	  demands	   that	  we	  re-­‐frame	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  approach	  and	  view	  the	  singularities	  at	  play	  in	  any	  particular	  circumstance,	  in	  order	  to	  think	  not	  in	  terms	  of	   a	   singular	   identity	   but	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   relations	   of	   movements,	   flows,	   forces,	   affects	   and	  individuals	  that	  are	  singular	  to	  that	  particular	  locale.	  	  Most	   significant	   here	   however,	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   actual	   expressions	   of	   the	   virtual	  must	   be	  grounded	   in	   actuality	   and	   as	   such,	   occur	   differently	   at	   each	   location	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  carrying	  with	  them	  the	  virtual	  shadow	  of	  all	  of	  their	  different	  repetitions.	   	  Thus	  it	   is	   in	  virtual	  memory	  that	  we	  can	  trace	  the	  connection	  of	  different	  histories.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  here	  that	  we	  can	  address	   the	   power	   dynamics	   of	   such	   histories.	   	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   write	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	  history	  but	  of	   the	  majority,	  or	  minorities	  as	  defined	   in	  relation	   to	   the	  majority.’108	  	  The	  centre	  (defined	  by	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	   as	  Man)	   forms	  a	   ‘gigantic	  memory’109,	   the	   reproduction	  and	  resonance	  of	   this	   centre	   conditions	  and	  produces	  an	  arborescent	   system	  of	  memory	   in	  which	  everything	   is	   defined	   through	   binary	   opposition	   to	   a	   centralised	   point.110	  	   All	   memories,	  including	   those	   of	   ‘the	   child,	   the	   woman,	   the	   black’111,	   are	   conjugated	   or	   colonised	   by	   this	  arborescent	   schema	   of	  memory.	   	   Centralised,	   arborescent	  memory	   controls	   the	   conditions	   in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  understood.	   	  Imperceptibility	  then,	  forms	  an	  attempt	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  form	  of	  movement	   outside	   the	   schema	   constituted	   by	   a	   dominant	   history.	   	   Simply	   privileging	   one	  history	  or	   story	  over	   another	  will	   not	  undo	   the	   structures	   that	  bind	  us	   to	  particular	   forms	  of	  thinking	   and	   action.	   	   Instead	   an	   approach	   is	   needed	   in	   which	   the	   way	   we	   connect	   across	  difference	  and	  virtual	  memory	  is	  brought	  into	  question.	  	  	  The	  task	  is	  not	  to	  represent	  the	  world,	  or	  history	  more	  accurately	  -­‐	  such	  a	  representation	  will	  remain	  within	  or	  return	  to	  the	  ‘punctual	  systems’	  of	  history-­‐as-­‐representation.	  	  Imperceptibility	  problematises	  these	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  trigger	  new	  perspectives,	  new	  creative	  lines,	  new	  actualisations	  of	  history	  and	  new	  repetitions	  of	  familiar	  themes.	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The	   South	   African	   Constitution	   and	   the	   dangers	   of	   ‘grand	   narratives’	   and	   ‘blocked	  
memories’	  Even	  a	  brief	  examination	  of	  groups	  such	  as	  GASA,	  Outrage	  or	  Somos	  brings	  the	  issue	  of	  memory	  and	  the	  imperceptible	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  To	  some	  extent,	  the	  issue	  faced	  by	  such	  groups	  is	  one	  of	  their	  relationship	   to	  arborescent	   schemas	  of	  memory	  or	   identity	  –	  do	   they	   try	   to	   remain	  within	  an	  hierarchical	   systems	   based	   on	   subjectivity	   and	   a	   binary	   relationship	   with	   a	   central	   image	   of	  man,	  or	  should	  some	  other	  mode	  of	  action	  be	  sought?	  	  The	  first	  point	  to	  make	  in	  response	  to	  this	  is	   that	   groups	   may	   not	   necessarily	   face	   a	   free	   choice	   in	   such	   matters:	   the	   way	   in	   which	   an	  organisation	   is	   able	   to	   act	   will	   be	   limited	   by	   circumstance.	   	   GASA’s	   apolitical	   stance	   made	  possible	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   limited	   gay	   community	   so	   long	   as	   that	   community	  was	  willing	   to	  submit	   to	   the	   dictates	   of	   an	   arborescent	   power	   structure.	   	   However,	  when	   other	   factors	   and	  forces	   brought	   these	   structures	   into	   question,	   GASA’s	   position	   became	   untenable	   –	   the	  submission	   to	  a	  particular	   regime	  made	   the	  organisation	  dependent	  upon	   the	   continuation	  of	  that	  regime.	  	  Other	  relationships	  are	  yet	  more	  complex:	  Outrage!	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  able	  to	  retain	  a	  relatively	   radical	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   state	   powers	   and	   schemas.	   	   However,	   Outrage!	   was	  complemented	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  Stonewall	  –	  the	  more	  respectable	  face	  of	  gay	  rights	  activism	  in	   the	  UK.	   	  Moreover,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   Four,	   Outrage!’s	   position	   on	   issues	   involving	   the	  oppression	   of	   same	   sex	   sexuality	   outside	   the	   UK	   has	   seen	   it	   implicated	   in	   complex	   global	  hierarchies	  of	  power	  and	  dominance.	   	  Thus,	  while	  we	  can	  use	  a	  schema	  of	   imperceptibility	   to	  approach	   issues	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   micro-­‐history,	   once	   we	   begin	   to	   seek	   an	   emplaced	  imperceptibility,	   the	   complex	   micro-­‐politics	   at	   play	   become	   clear.	   	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   criticise	   the	  arborescent	   system,	   and	   to	   demand	   non-­‐hierarchical	   transversal	   becoming	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  structures	  of	  power	  in	  operation,	  but	  what	  once	  may	  have	  been	  a	  new	  line	  of	  flight	  or	  becoming	  can,	   from	   a	   new	  perspective	   or	   articulation,	   become	   re-­‐territorialised.	   	   As	   Patton	   reminds	   us	  ‘societies	  are	  constantly	  building	  up	  and	  breaking	  down.’112	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  we	  must	  be	  constantly	   open	   to	   the	   actualisation	   of	   new	  histories	   and	   new	   connections.	   	   This	   can	   only	   be	  done	   through	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	   relationship	  of	   the	   virtual	   and	   the	   actual,	   in	  which	   the	  virtual	  must	  be	  actualised	  in	  the	  actual	  but	  carries	  with	  it	  multiple	  repetitions.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	   we	   approach	   both	   the	   specificity	   of	   each	   grounded	   locale	   and	   the	   connectedness	   of	   the	  intensities	  that	  are	  played	  out	  differently	  in	  each	  actualisation.	  	  	  What	  this	  attentiveness	  to	  virtuality	  highlights	  is	  the	  limits	  of	  repeating	  in	  the	  actual	  without	  a	  simultaneous	  virtual	  repetition	  or	  reordering	  of	  intensities	  that	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  event.	  	  This	  failure	  of	   reordering	   can	   be	   contrasted	   with	   Lefebvre’s	   ‘inattentive’	   recognition	   and	   judgment	   –	   or	  more	   accurately	   in	   this	   case	   ‘inattentive’	   repetition.	   	   In	   some	   cases,	   this	   inattention	   is	   easily	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identifiable.	  	  A	  clear	  example	  of	  this	  might	  be	  the	  growth	  of	  ‘Pride’	  events	  or	  marches.	  	  In	  Pride,	  we	  can	  trace	  a	  direct	  link	  to	  the	  event	  of	  the	  Stonewall	  riots:	  a	  hugely	  significant	  moment,	  which	  heralded	  a	  seismic	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  gay	  activism	  formulated	  itself.	  	  Pride	  marches	  and	  events	  are	  now	  held	  in	  many	  different	  countries,	  symbols	  of	  Pride,	  particularly	  the	  rainbow	  flag,	  have	  substantial	  international	  traction.	  	  	  The	  danger	  that	  inattentive	  repetition	  poses	  here,	  is	  that	  Pride	  becomes	  a	  fixed	  representation	  or	  a	  ‘blocked	  memory’113	  bound	  to	  hierarchical	  understandings	  of	  sexuality	  that	  risk	  overcoding	  and	  obscuring	  the	  complexity	  of	  sexual	  difference.114	  	  There	  are	  increasingly	  regular	  critiques	  of	  Pride	   as	   a	   depoliticised	   and	   commercial	   exercise	   rather	   than	   one	   that	   is	   political	   or	  transgressive.	   	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  all	  Pride	  marches	  are	  necessarily	  bad:	   as	   I	  have	  been	  arguing	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  a	  Pride	  march	  must	  be	  contextualised	  and	  emplaced	  within	  the	  (micro)	   histories	   and	   politics	   of	   a	   particular	   locale.	   	   The	   risk	   is	   that	   devices	   such	   as	   Pride	  become	   modes	   of	   territorialisation	   that	   reinforce	   particular	   power	   dynamics	   and	   identity	  categories	  thus	  losing	  the	  sense	  of	  radical	  reorientation	  that	  we	  might	  identify	  in	  Stonewall.	  	  In	  analysing	   the	   Sydney	  Mardi	   Gras,	   Mason	   and	   Lo	   note	   that	   ‘Just	   as	   a	   ‘mirror	   inverts	   but	   also	  reflects	  an	  object’	   (Turner,	  1982:	  40),	   the	  parade	   fleetingly	   turns	  established	  sexual	  mores	  on	  their	  heads	   yet	  ultimately	   justifies	   and	  buttresses	   these	   same	  mores.’115	  	   I	  would	   suggest	   that	  the	   dynamic	   they	   identify	   here	   is	   one	   in	   which	   the	   celebration	   of	   gay	   rights	   becomes	   a	  controlling	   refrain	   rather	   than	   a	   line	   of	   flight.	   	   Pride	   comes	   to	   represent	   a	   status	   of	   partial	  inclusion	  that	  devolves	  upon	  the	  maintenance	  of	  particular	  norms,	  binaries	  and	  social	  controls	  that	  operate	  both	  within	   the	  gay	   community	  and	  along	  wider	   social	   frames.	   	  As	   such,	  what	   is	  repeated	  or	  returned	  to	  is	  an	  actual	  occurrence	  without	  a	  corresponding	  shift	   in	  intensities	  or	  movement	   of	   the	   virtual.	   	   The	   repetition	   is	   of	   the	   past	   rather	   than	   of	   the	   future	   and	   in	   this	  context,	  action	  becomes	  bound	  to	  what	  Hanafin	  has	  termed	  (albeit	  in	  the	  context	  of	  postcolonial	  Irish	   identity	   rather	   than	   sexual	   rights)	   an	   ‘equilibrium	   maintaining	   obsessive	   ritual	   of	  repetition.’116	  The	  event	  of	  Stonewall	  was	  double	  sided	  –	  the	  refiguration	  of	  virtual	  objects	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  change	  in	  what	  was	  possible	  in	  actual	  occurrences.	  	  In	  celebrating	  Pride,	  the	  risk	  is	  that	  action	  occurs	  only	  in	  the	  dimension	  of	  actual	  occurrences,	  there	  is	  an	  inattentive	  repetition	  of	  the	  identities,	  subjectivities	  and	  communities,	  corresponding	  with	  a	  molar	  narrative	  of	  social	  inclusion	  and	  cohesion.	   	  The	  virtual	  repetition	  of	  different	  differences	  remains	  incomplete	  and	  the	  line	  of	  flight	  is	  re-­‐coded.	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I	  return	  to	  this	   issue	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	   	  What	   is	   important	  at	  this	  point	  however,	   is	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  virtual	  from	  actual	  politics.	  	  By	  focusing	  only	  on	  the	  actual	  –	  on	  the	  actuality	   of	   the	  march,	   the	   strategy	   of	   coming	   out	   or	   occupation	   of	   space	   -­‐	   and	   ignoring	   the	  virtualities	   at	   play,	   or	   even	   simply	   by	   excluding	   troublesome	   micro-­‐politics	   and	   multiple	  histories	  in	  pursuit	  of	  a	  more	  simplified	  political	  narrative,	  we	  territorialise	  our	  history	  into	  one	  overcoding	  formulation.	  	  	  I	   do	   not	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   this	   overcoding	   of	   Pride	   is	   an	   operation	   of	   ideology	   or	   false	  consciousness.	  	  Instead,	  the	  situation	  at	  play	  here	  relates	  to	  the	  danger	  of	  the	  event	  and	  thinking	  in	  the	  untimely.	  	  By	  repeating	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  actual	  –	  repeating	  history	  in	  a	  way	  that	  that	  sees	  no	  change	  in	  intensities	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  virtual	  –	  we	  repeat	  a	  code.	  	  The	  draw	  of	  this	  code	  is	  its	  certainty:	  Pride	  and	  ‘mainstream’	  gay	  rights	  politics	  give	  us	  a	  frame	  in	  which	  we	  can	  act	  and	  in	  which	  we	  can	  anticipate	  certain	  outcomes.	  	  Deleuze	  notes	  that	  the	  initial	  reaction	  to	  the	  event	  is	  that	   it	   is	   too	   big,	   or	   too	   difficult	   to	   become	   worthy	   of	   the	   event.	   	   It	   is	   in	   this	   context	   that	  Braidotti’s	  argument	  for	  a	  located	  politics	  resonates	  most	  forcefully	  –	  why	  should	  those	  who	  are	  distanced	   from	   the	   privileged	   centre	   give	   up	   what	   little	   they	   have	   achieved	   in	   order	   to	   ‘be	  worthy’	  of	  a	  virtual	  event,	  or	  to	  embrace	  an	  uncertain	  and	  unknowable	  future	  repetition?	  	  	  And	  we	  should	  note	  here,	  that	  while	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  may	  privilege	  the	  line	  of	  flight,	  nothing	  in	  their	  writing	   is	  unambiguously	  good	  or	  bad.	   	  A	   limited	   freedom,	  or	   at	   least	   a	  plan	   for	  how	   to	  fight	   in	   registers	   and	   languages	   that	   are	   known,	   is	   surely	   much	   safer	   than	   freedom	   in	   an	  uncertain,	  unknowable	  register.	  	  Faced	  with	  this	  uncertainty,	  it	  is	  small	  wonder	  that	  many	  might	  prefer	   or	   even	   desire	   heternormativity	   over	   becoming-­‐other	   and	  might	   actually	   prefer	   to	   do	  exactly	  what	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	  warn	   against	   in	  Anti-­‐Oedipus	   and	   form	  a	  movement	  which	  works	  for	  gay	  rights	  within	  the	  arborescent	  binaries	  constructed	  by	  the	  dominant	  system.	  	  	  The	   situation	   is	   even	   more	   complicated	   when	   we	   add	   the	   consideration	   of	   a	   rights	   based	  politics.	   	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Constitution,	   De	   Vos	   has	   argued	   that	   both	  Constitution	  and	   judges	  actively	  engage	  with	  recent	  South	  African	  history.	   	  This	   is	  reflected	   in	  both	  the	  postamble	  to	  the	  1993	  interim	  constitution	  and	  the	  preamble	  to	  the	  1996	  constitution,	  in	  which	   the	   recognition	   of	   past	   injustices	   and	   the	   struggles	   of	   those	  who	   have	   ‘suffered	   for	  justice	  and	  freedom	  in	  our	  land’	  are	  explicitly	  referenced.117	  	  De	  Vos	  explores	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  references	  contribute	   to	   the	  construction	  of	  a	   ‘grand	  narrative’	  of	  South	  African	  history,	  which	   emphasises	   one	   particular	   ‘truth’	   of	   progress	   from	   a	   dark	   apartheid	   past	   to	   an	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enlightened	   future	   of	   freedom	   and	   human	   rights.	   	   This	   history	   is	   enunciated,	   reinforced	   and	  legitimated	  in	  constitutional	  text	  and	  judicial	  practice.118	  	  	  The	   problem	   with	   this	   approach	   lies	   with	   the	   argument	   that	   there	   is	   no	   singular	   version	   of	  history.	  	  A	  grand	  narrative	  must	  necessarily	  privilege	  some	  views	  and	  voices	  over	  others	  and	  it	  tends	   to	   do	   so	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   vector	   of	   power	   and	   through	   the	   construction	   of	   particular	  representations	  and	  identities.	  	  Thus	  history	  becomes	  a	  mirror	  of	  society.119	  	  This	  is	  problematic	  because	   the	  grand	  narrative	  becomes	  a	   tool	  of	  constitutional	   interpretation:	  a	  mode	  by	  which	  judges	   attempt	   to	   separate	   law	   and	   politics	   and	   to	   apply	   an	   ‘objective’	   standard	   to	   their	  judgments	   rather	   than	   face	   questions	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   thus	   arbitrariness,	   politicisation	   or	  bias.120	  	  Thus	  Kentridge	  J	  notes:	  ‘I	   am	  well	   aware	   of	   the	   fallacy	   of	   supposing	   that	   general	   language	  must	   have	   a	   single	  'objective'	  meaning.	  Nor	  is	  it	  easy	  to	  avoid	  the	  influence	  of	  one's	  personal	  intellectual	  and	  moral	  preconceptions.	   But	   it	   cannot	   be	   too	   strongly	   stressed	   that	   the	   Constitution	   does	   not	   mean	  whatever	  we	  might	  wish	  it	  to	  mean.'121	  In	   this	   context	   the	   ‘grand	   narrative’	   is	   the	   device	   by	   which	   this	   issue	   can	   be	   overturned.	  	  ‘History’	   as	   legitimated	   in	   the	   constitutional	   grand	   narrative	   provides	   ‘objective’	   criteria	   for	  judicial	   decision-­‐making.	   	   However,	   De	  Vos	   argues	   that	   history,	   even	   the	  widely	   agreed-­‐upon	  constitutional	   version	   of	   history,	   is	   always	   highly	   political	   and	   by	   choosing	   which	   history	   to	  enunciate,	   judges	   are	   making	   a	   political	   and	   ideological	   decision.	   	   ‘[H]istory	   is	   inevitably	   a	  product	  of	  the	  present	  and	  reflects	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  present…	  Any	  rendition	  of	  the	  past	  that	  we	  call	  history	  is	  therefore	  a	  reflection	  of	  how	  we	  see	  ourselves	  in	  the	  present.’122	  	  We	  can	  highlight	  the	  danger	  in	  operation	  here	  through	  Hanafin’s	  exploration	  of	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  context	   of	   the	   1937	   Irish	   constitution	   and	   the	   postcolonial	   drive	   to	   create	   a	   new	  history	   and	  mythology	   of	   a	   unitary	   and	   pure	   Ireland.123	  	   He	   argues	   that	   any	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   unified	  national	  essence	  or	  history	  within	  a	  legal	  text	  will	  always	  be	  incomplete	  ‘because	  there	  always	  remains	   something	   beyond	   representation,	   a	   real	   which	   can	   never	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   mere	  symbolisation.’124	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Irish	  constitutional	  history,	  the	  1937	  Constitution	  was	  based	  in	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  national	  unity	  and	  patriarchal,	  heterosexual	  values.	  	  It	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  Hanafin	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argues,	   less	   a	   ‘neutral	   legal	   document	   for	   a	   post-­‐colonial	   pluralist	   democracy’	   than	   an	  expression	   of	   the	   values	   of	   a	   ‘deeply	   conservative	   ruling	   class.’125	  	   These	   values	   became	   the	  ‘history’	  to	  which	  judges	  returned,	  in	  judgments	  that	  made	  appeals	  to	  ‘traditional’	  constitutional	  values.	   	   This,	   Hanafin	   argues,	   prevented	   the	   development	   of	   the	   constitution	   ‘in	   line	   with	  paradigmatic	   shifts	   in	   society’	   and	   instead	   ‘imposes	   a	   particular	   moral	   view	   on	   individual	  citizens.’126	  The	  constitution	  of	  1937	  was	  not	  be	  and	  could	  not	   the	   last	  word	  on	   Irish	  national	  identity.	  	  Instead,	  constitutional	  reinterpretation	  was	  necessary	  to	  include	  those	  who	  had	  been	  previously	  excluded	  or	  silenced.127	  	  The	  narrative	  of	  the	  Irish	  constitution	  has	  been	  substantially	  ‘reauthored’,	   and	   the	   dominant	   form	   of	   constitutional	   nationalism	   has	   been	   substantially	  reformed	  through	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  need	  for	  unity	  and	  closure.128	  Thus,	   while	   the	   ‘founding	   narratives’	   of	   the	   1937	   Irish	   Constitution	   and	   South	   African	  Constitution	   are	   very	   different,	   the	   struggle	   of	   the	   Irish	   Constitution	   either	   to	   maintain	   a	  coherent	  narrative	  of	   Irish	   identity	   or	   to	   adapt	   to	   changing	   societal	   conditions,	   illustrates	   the	  problem	  faced	  by	  South	  African	  judges.	  	  The	  ‘official	  history’	  of	  a	  move	  into	  a	  bright	  and	  diverse	  new	   future	   as	   a	   result	   of	   great	   struggle	   and	   sacrifice	   is	   an	   important	   narrative	   and	   a	   valid	  history,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  only	  story	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  told.	   	  The	  ‘plasticity	  of	  legal	  language’	   in	   the	   constitutional	   text	   must	   allow	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   its	   ‘subversion	   from	  within’129	  and	  the	  histories	  of	  nation	  and	   identity	  written	   into	  a	  constitutional	  document	  must	  be	   open	   to	   a	   process	   of	   disruption	   by	   new	   and	   contrary	   notions	   of	   state	   and	   selfhood.130	  	   By	  choosing	  only	  one	  ‘closed’	  version	  of	  history,	  South	  African	  judges	  risk	  rendering	  themselves	  ill-­‐equipped	   to	   acknowledge	   new	   injustices	   or	   violations	   of	   citizens’	   rights.	   	   This	   is	   because	   the	  supposedly	  objective	  history	  has	  a	  stabilising	  but	  also	  a	  masking	  effect:	  ‘As	   South	   African	   society	   changes	   and	   as	   conditions	   change,	   new	   threats	   to	   freedom,	  liberty	   and	   equality	   will	   require	   courts	   to	   find	   new	   understandings	   of	   the	   Bill	   of	   Rights,	  something	   that	  will	   be	   difficult	   to	   do	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   grand	   narrative	   strategy.	   Given	   South	  Africa's	  recent	  past,	  and	  given	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  power	  relations	  in	  society,	  the	  grand	  narrative	  is	  a	  powerful	  rhetorical	  tool	  that	  could	  be	  used	  by	  politically	  conservative	  or	  executive-­‐minded	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judges	   to	  silence	   those	  who	   fail	   to	   see	   justice	  only	  or	  exclusively	  as	   rectifying	   the	   'mischief	  of	  apartheid.’131	  De	  Vos	   argues	   instead	   for	   a	   self-­‐conscious	   and	   continually	   produced	   history.	   	   In	   this	  way	  we	  move	   away	   from	   the	   idea	   of	   history	   as	   objectively	   knowable.	   	   This	   does	   not	   prevent	   the	  implication	   or	   enunciation	   of	   South	   African	   history	   within	   its	   constitutional	   document,	   but	  instead	   reads	   the	   history	   of	   South	   Africa	   as	   open	   ended	   and	   changing,	   and	   as	   such	   the	  Constitution	   becomes	   a	   ‘transformative	   document,	   one	   that	   requires	   continual	   reinvention	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   changing	   world	   and	   country	   we	   live	   in	   -­‐	   a	   contingent	   product	   of	   human	  agency.’132	  	  A	   further	   level	   of	   complexity	   is	   found	   in	   consideration	   of	   sexual	   orientation	   and	   the	   anti-­‐discrimination	  clause.	   	   	   I	  have	  argued	  above	   that	   rights	  are	  paradoxically	  double	   sided	  –	   they	  contain	   movements	   of	   both	   territorialisation	   and	   openness	   to	   deterritorialisation.	   	   In	   this	  instance,	  this	  paradox	  is	  expressed	  in	  several	  different	  ways.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  equality	  clause	  contributes	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  what	  van	  Zyl	  calls	  a	   ‘holding	  space’	   for	  those	  who	  practice	  same	  sex	  relationships	  and	  identify	  as	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  in	  that	  it	  legitimises	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  discursive	  spaces	  for	  talking	  and	  thinking	  about	  sexuality.133	  	  Thus,	  in	  engaging	  with	  the	  law,	  activists	  have	  succeeded	  in	  changing	  the	  way	  in	  which	  sexuality	  can	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  South	  African	  context:	  a	   rupture	  has	  occurred,	  and	  as	  a	   consequence	  what	  was	  not	  possible	  or	   speakable	  before	  has	  become	  so	  now.	  	  However	  in	  opening	  space	  for	  this	  vocabulary,	  a	  vector	  of	  shaping,	  control	  and	  even	  exclusion	   is	  simultaneously	  activated:	   the	   freedom	  to	  name	  oneself	  as	   lesbian	  or	  gay	  can	  easily	   become	   a	   compulsion	   to	   do	   so	   through	   this	   terminology	   alone.	   	   	   	   Put	   differently,	   this	  constitutional	   holding	   space	   works	   in	   two	   directions	   at	   once	   –	   it	   is	   both	   regulatory	   and	  empowering,	  territorialising	  and	  deterritorialising:	  ‘If	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   homosexual	   in	   this	   arena	  makes	   possible	   the	   advance	   of	   social	  controls,	  it	  also	  makes	  possible	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  'reverse'	  discourse;	  homosexuality	  can	  begin	  to	  speak	  in	  its	  own	  behalf,	  to	  demand	  that	  its	  legitimacy	  of	  'naturality'	  be	  acknowledged,	  often	  in	  the	  same	  vocabulary,	  using	  the	  same	  categories	  by	  which	  it	  was	  medically	  disqualified.'134	  This	   is	   not	   the	  only	  operation	  of	   paradox	   at	  work	  here.	   	  Also	  of	   concern	   are	   the	   limits	   to	   the	  correlation	  between	  legal	  re-­‐configuration	  and	  social	  change.	  	  Both	  legal	  and	  social	  dimensions	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underwent	  a	  reordering	  and	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  resonance	  between	  these	  legal,	  social	  and	  political	  dimensions,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  same	  sex	  sexuality,	  legal	  rights	  did	  not	  lead	  immediately	  to	  social	  acceptance.	   	   The	   two	  dimensions	   are	   related	   but	   are	   not	   a	  mirror	   of	   each	   other	   and	   as	   such,	  there	   are	   limits	   to	   the	   impact	   that	   constitutional	   change	   has	   had	   on	   gay	   and	   lesbian	   lives.135	  	  Instances	  of	  violence,	  condemnation	  and	  discrimination	  still	  occur	  and	  more	  significantly,	  there	  is	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  equality	  clause	  in	  addressing	  these	  violations.	  	  Equality	  or	  anti-­‐discrimination	   must	   instead	   be	   read	   through	   a	   contextualisation	   of	   the	   social	   and	   economic	  conditions	   in	  which	   LGBT	   lives	   are	   lived.	   	   	   Thus,	  while	  we	  might	   read	   the	   equality	   clause	   as	  victory,	  we	  must	  also	  contextualise	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  these	  rights	  are	  experienced	  or	  demanded,	  in	  particular	  we	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  uneven	  impact	  that	  such	  rights	  gains	  will	  have.	  	  Of	  key	  significance	  here	  is	  Stychin’s	  argument	  that	  the	  social	  realities	  of	  rights	  must	  always	  be	  at	  the	  forefront:	  	   ‘For	   the	   majority	   of	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   South	   Africans,	   rights	   claims	   must	   be	   grounded	  within	   that	   overriding	   socio-­‐	   economic	   reality.	   For	   example,	   a	   'right	   to	   privacy',	   frequently	   a	  central	   tenet	   of	   lesbian	   and	   gay	  politics,	   is	  meaningful	   for	  many	  only	  when	   it	   is	   linked	   to	   the	  availability	  of	  affordable	  housing.	  So	  too,	  an	  argument	  for	  equal	  spousal	  benefits	  for	  employees	  must	   be	   connected	   to	   the	   urgent	   need	   for	   employment	   opportunities.	   Thus,	   socio-­‐economic	  reform	   must	   be	   central	   to	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   politics	   in	   order	   to	   create	   a	   credible	   agenda	  nationally.’	  136	  	  	  	  Overarching	   protections	   are	   therefore	   of	   little	   use	   without	   emplacement	   within	   a	   particular	  location.	  	  	  The	  final	  paradox	  in	  operation	  here	  concerns	  the	  reverberation	  of	  the	  event	  through	  wider	  legal	  and	   social	   norms	   –	   that	   is,	   the	   event	   that	   heralds	   ‘becoming’,	   unanticipated	   change	   and	  refiguration	   in	  several	  directions	  at	  once.	   	   In	  relation	   to	  sexuality	  we	  might	  suggest	   that	  what	  occurs	  is	  not	  so	  much	  paradox,	  as	  a	  double	  layer	  of	  effects	  or	  transformation	  through	  the	  event.	  	  The	   first	   layer	   concerns	   identifiable	   legal	   changes	   –	   the	   equality	   clause	   and	   cases	   that	   are	  argued	  in	  relation	  to	  this	  clause.	   	  The	  second	  concerns	  the	  wider	  reconsideration	  of	  social	  and	  legal	   norms	   of	   family,	   relationships,	   sexuality	   and	   citizenship.	   	   De	   Vos	   argues	   that	   the	   early	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jurisprudence	   of	   the	   court	   suggested	   that	   there	  was	   some	  movement	   on	   this	   second	   level	   of	  change;	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  court	  seemed	  to	  demand	  scrutiny	  of	  traditional	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  nuclear	  family	  and	  marriage.137	  	  However,	  rhetoric	  has	  not	  matched	  actuality	  and	  the	  courts	  have	   tended	   to	   remain	   within	   a	   framework	   of	   sameness	   and	   identity	   which	   centralises	   a	  normative	   standard	   of	   the	   traditional	   heterosexual	   family,	   despite	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	  heterogeneity	  of	  family	  forms	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  	  Thus,	  though	  groundbreaking,	  the	  Constitution	  goes	  so	  far	  and	  no	  further.	  	  It	  remains	  situated	  in	  a	  frame	  of	  a	  singular	  history	  and	  arborescent	  normative	  structures	  of	  family	  life:	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  other	  families	  can	  be	  judged	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  equality	  and	  discrimination.	  	  We	  can	   argue	   therefore,	   that	   judgment	   here	   may	   be	   emplaced	   and	   located	   within	   a	   social	   and	  historical	   terrain,	   but	   it	   remains	   enmeshed	   within	   an	   ontology	   of	   sameness	   rather	   than	  difference,	  and	  thus	  the	  scope	  for	  attentive	  judgment	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  open-­‐ended	  conception	  of	  a	  (virtual)	  history	  of	  difference,	  is	  limited.	  We	  might	  therefore	  remain	  with	  Das	  in	  arguing	  that	  we	  must	  recognise	  the	  politics	  of	  histories	  as	   contingent	  pluralities	   rather	   than	  closed,	   explanatory	  wholes,	   and	   in	   this	   case,	   the	  political	  role	  that	  rights	  might	  play	  in	  these	  historical	  and	  political	  processes.	  	  Rights	  must	  be	  consciously	  situated	  within	  a	  place,	  a	  time	  and	  a	  genealogy	  in	  order	  to	  precipitate	  particular	  actualisations,	  particular	   memories	   and	   particular	   judgments.	   	   It	   is	   in	   this	   way	   that	   we	   can	   make	   the	   link	  between	  attentive	  judgment	  in	  response	  to	  the	  event,	  politics	  of	  location	  and	  multiple	  histories.	  	  The	  expression	  of	  rights	   forms	  the	   link	  between	  the	  virtual	  memory	  of	   law	  and	  the	  particular	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  has	  led	  to	  the	  making	  of	  a	  rights	  based	  claim.	  	  There	  is	  a	  complex	  connectivity	  here	  that	  relies	  not	  on	  the	  positing	  of	  an	  abstract	  subject	  of	  rights,	  but	  on	  the	  continuing	  differential	  expression	  of	  a	  response	  to	  injustice	  that	  currently	  takes	  its	  form	  in	  various	  different	  articulations	  of	  rights.	  	  Thus	  of	  interest	  is	  not	  transcendental	  static	  rights,	  but	  instead	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  are	  used	  to	  actualise	  and	  creatively	  express	  the	  intensities	  of	  the	  virtual.	   	   Lefebvre	   writes	   that	   ‘Law…can	   be	   defined	   by	   its	   lines	   of	   flight	   –	   it	   is	   a	   plane	   of	  immanence	  constituted	  by	  a	  ceaseless	  lifting	  up	  and	  setting	  down	  of	  its	  parts.’	  	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  in	  the	  event,	  the	  lines	  of	  flight	  of	  rights	  can	  escape	  and	  be	  actualised	  in	  new	  formulations.	  	  What	  remains	   therefore,	   is	   the	  question	  of	   the	  best	  response	  to	   this	   intersection	  of	  rights	  and	  event	  –	  or	  more	  accurately	  the	  way	  in	  which	  activists	  might	  use	  an	  understanding	  of	  attentive	  judgment,	  encounter	  and	  event	  as	  a	  political	   tool,	  while	  embedded	  within	  particular	   locations.	  	  This	  discussion	  is	  continued	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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Sexual	   orientation	   rights	   as	   paradox	   and	   encounter	   in	   the	   context	   of	   uneven	   locations	  
and	  multiple	  histories	  In	  relation	  to	  rights	  and	  gay	  rights	  politics,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  rights	  to	  articulate	  injustice	  signals	  the	  encounter.	   	   I	  would	  further	  suggest	   that	  through	  an	  engagement	  with	  gay	  rights	  politics,	  we	  can	  trace	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  such	  encounters.	  	  This	  is	  in	  part	  due	   to	   the	  open,	  desiring	  nature	  of	   sexuality	  and	   its	   tendency	   to	  escape	  coding	  and	  seek	  new	  forms	  of	  flow	  and	  expression.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  note	  that:	  ‘Sexuality	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  molar	  determination	  that	  is	  representable	  in	  a	  familial	  whole;	  it	  is	  the	  molecular	  underdetermination	  functioning	  within	  social	  and	  secondarily	  familial	  aggregates	  that	  trace	  desire’s	  field	  of	  presence	  and	   its	   field	  of	  production.’138	  	  The	   interaction	  of	  a	  discourse	  of	  rights	   that	   founds	   itself	   in	   the	  image	   of	   molar	   man	   with	   the	   desiring	   production	   of	   sexuality	   almost	   demands	   a	   failure	   of	  communication,	  a	  moment	  of	  ‘ethical	  weight’	  or	  of	  thinking	  the	  untimely.	  	  	  Most	  significantly,	  we	  may	  use	  gay	  rights	  to	  speak	  a	  molar	  language,	  but	  such	  molarity	  cannot	  silence	  minor	  practice,	  microproductions,	  escapes	  or	   lines	  of	   flight.	   I	  would	  suggest	   that	   these	  minor	  practices	   are	   the	  elements	  of	  which	  Das	   is	   speaking	  when	   she	   refers	   to	   the	   struggle	   to	  control	   memory	   and	   history.	   	   They	   are	   the	   moments	   that	   work	   outside	   or	   against	   what	   is	  constituted	   as	   molar	   history,	   the	   history	   of	   man.	   	   As	   such	   they	   are	   molecular	   movements,	  ‘memories	  of	  another	  past’139,	  ‘the	  small	  voice	  of	  history’140,	  or	  the	  ‘outlaw	  narratives	  within	  the	  [legal]	   text.’141	  	   They	   are	   what	   lead	   Eduardo	   Nierras	   to	   comment:	   ‘When	   we	   say	   to	   straight	  people,	   or,	  more	   rarely,	   to	  Western	   gay	  people,	   “we	   are	   like	   you”	  we	  must	   remember	   to	   add,	  “only	  different.”’142	  Of	  key	  importance	  however,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  molecular	  forces	  are	  immanent,	  shifting	  and	  specifically	  located.	  	  Rights	  and	  sexuality	  are	  connections	  of	  particular	  striations	  and	  flows	  over	   a	   particular	   social	   body.	   	   They	   form	   a	   cartography	   of	   how	   to	   embody	   desire	   within	  particular	  social	  imaginaries.	   	  However,	  such	  social	  terrains	  must	  always	  be	  uneven	  –	  they	  are	  striated	   and	   mapped	   in	   ways	   that	   impact	   differently	   in	   different	   biological	   and	   physical	  locations.	  	  If	  in	  this	  terrain	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  constituted	  as	  a	  set	  of	  spatio-­‐temporal	  co-­‐ordinates143,	  then	  what	  Povinelli	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  ‘uneven	  distribution	  of	  the	  flesh’144,	  or	  what	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Braidotti	   identifies	  as	   the	  unequal	   subjectification	   to	  biopower145	  -­‐	   the	  spaces	  of	  ordinary	  and	  extra-­‐ordinary	  bodies	  in	  space	  and	  time	  -­‐	  become	  hugely	  significant.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  knowledge	  of	   these	   uneven	   or	   unequal	   distributions	  must	   be	   understood	   not	   as	   a	   secondary	   point,	   or	   a	  problematic	   aside,	   to	   engaging	   in	   representational	   ‘mainstream’	   politics,	   but	   instead	   as	  absolutely	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   topography	   that	   limits	   any	   approach	   to	   our	   political	  endeavours	   –	   be	   it	   rights	   based	   or	   otherwise.	   	   As	   such,	   any	   attempt	   to	   map	   our	   political	  struggles	  in	  this	  way	  leads	  to	  and	  demands	  a	  responsible	  politics	  of	  location,	  for	  once	  we	  have	  mapped	  such	  a	  terrain,	  the	  ethical	  imperative	  is	  that	  we	  situate	  ourselves	  within	  it	  and	  attempt	  to	  become	  aware	  of	  its	  blind	  spots	  and	  hidden	  histories.	  	  Politics	  of	  location	  and	  of	  emplacement	  becomes	  key	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  understand	   the	   social	   terrains	   and	  political	   imaginaries	  within	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves.	  	  	  We	  might	  conclude	  then,	  by	  arguing	  with	  Deleuze,	  that	  the	  paradox	  represents	  not	  an	  impasse	  but	   an	   unfolding	   of	   lines	   in	   several	   different	   directions.	   	   Such	   an	   unfolding	   begins	   (in	   the	  middle)	  with	   a	   stuttering,	   a	   failure	   of	   habit	   and	   of	   inattentive	  memory	   and	   perception.	   	   This	  stuttering	  can	  constitute	  an	  encounter.	  	  Here,	  I	  read	  the	  encounter	  as	  the	  actual	  side	  of	  the	  event	  in	  which	  the	  event	  is	  the	  virtual	  transformation	  that	  is	  actualised	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  rupture	  or	  the	  cut.	  	  	  	  This	  rupture	  constitutes	  an	  upheaval	  that	  is	  not	  a	  new	  beginning	  but	  a	  reconfiguration,	  a	  new	  selection	  that	  in	  selecting	  affirms	  chaos	  and	  chance.	  	  This	  affirmation	  resonates	  through	  all	   series,	   through	   all	   past	   and	  memory.	   	   This	   is	  why	   a	   rights	  politics	   that	   simply	   adds	   to	   the	  existing	   body	   of	   accepted	   citizens	   will	   never,	   alone,	   be	   sufficient.	   	   As	   the	   event	   resonates,	   it	  refigures	  how	  we	  constitute	  our	  social	  machines,	  not	  just	  for	  non-­‐heteronormative	  citizens	  and	  their	  specific	  institutions,	  but	  for	  all	  elements	  of	  the	  social	  body.	  	  	  However,	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  activism	  and	  rights,	  the	  event	  signals	  a	  micro-­‐politics	  and	  a	  fleeting	  intensity	   that	   is	  easily	  overcoded	  or	   territorialised	   into	  new	  cartographies	  of	  struggle.	   	  This	   is	  why	   while	   we	   can	   approach	   sexuality	   through	   rights,	   universal	   gay	   rights	   that	   will	   remain	  always	   and	   eternal	   and	   unsubjected	   to	   challenge	   and	   modification	   are	   highly	   problematic.	  	  There	   is	   not	   one	   single	   encounter,	   or	   failure:	   the	   paradox	   as	   a	   material	   event	   provokes	  Deleuzian	   repetition.	   	   This	   is	   why	   Nierras	   makes	   the	   claim	   for	   sameness	   in	   difference.	   	   The	  intensity	   of	   events	   may	   be	   familiar	   but	   the	   actual	   is	   not	   –	   the	   actual	   does	   not	   resemble	   the	  virtual	   event	   that	   it	   actualises.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   repetition	  of	   actual	   events	  alone	   constitutes	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  over-­‐coding:	  an	  exercise	  of	  power	  that	  ignores	  materiality	  and	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politics.	   	  A	  focus	  on	  the	  material	  is	  key,	  but	  a	  material	  that	  ignores	  the	  virtual	  results	  only	  in	  a	  new	   transcendental	   disjunction	   rather	   than	   an	   immanent	   use	   of	   the	   disjunctive	   synthesis	   in	  which	   the	   paradox	   of	   connection	   across	   difference	   and	   alliance,	   rather	   than	   genealogy	   or	  teleology,	  can	  be	  sustained.	  	  	  We	  can	  frame	  this	  problematic	  in	  terms	  of	  Lefebvre’s	  analysis	  of	  judgment	  as	  the	  selection	  and	  exclusion	  of	  particulars.	   	  If	  each	  attentive	  judgment	  or	  each	  new	  articulation	  of	  rights	  is	  a	  leap	  into	  the	  virtual	  memory	  of	  law,	  we	  must	  accept	  that	  one	  leap	  will	  never	  be	  enough.	   	  We	  might	  accept	  Deleuze	   and	  Bergson’s	   argument	   that	  without	  habit	  memory	  and	  habit	  perception	  our	  institutions	   cannot	   function,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	  we	  must	   recognise	   that	   each	  new	  attentive	  leap,	   each	   new	   refiguration,	   holds	   the	   potential	   to	   become	   habit,	   and	   thereby	  may	   in	   future	  require	   new	   leaps	   and	   new	   figurations.	   	   As	   such,	   no	   identity	   is	   constant	   and	   no	   solution	   is	  permanent.	   	   The	   law	   forms	   a	   virtual	   memory	   that	   we	   actualise	   creatively	   multiple	   times	   in	  response	   to	   multiple	   different	   occasions	   –	   it	   requires	   grounded	   particularity	   or	   local	  dramatisation	  rather	  than	  transcendental	  wholeness.146	  	  	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  a	  key	  part	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  virtual	  in	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  past	  that	  bears	  the	  potential	  to	  open	  itself	  again.147	  	  Events	  do	  not	  mark	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  truth	  of	  social	  relations	  from	  chaos,	  so	  much	  as	  a	  refiguring	  of	  the	  flows	   through	  which	  our	   social	  machines	   connect	   and	  arrange	   themselves.	   	   The	   challenge	   for	  the	  activist	  is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  become	  worthy	  of	  the	  event.	   	   	  The	  relationship	  between	  activist	  and	  event	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Mussawir,	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Deleuze:	  The	  expression	  and	  representation	  of	  law	  147	  Colebrook,	  Deleuze:	  A	  Guide	  for	  the	  Perplexed.	  p83	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Chapter	  6	  –	  Spatialising	  Rights:	  Emplacing	  and	  embodying	  the	  potential	  and	  the	  limit	  of	  
sexuality	  rights	  claims	  
Pride	  as	  location,	  Pride	  as	  affect:	  Uneven	  embodiment	  in	  gay	  rights	  politics	  The	   previous	   chapter	   addressed	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	   event	   and	   time	   in	   which	   the	   event	  becomes	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	   intensities	  that	  disrupts	   linear	  time	  and	  instead	  plunges	  into	  the	  pure	  past	  in	  order	  to	  return	  a	  new	  present.	  	  However,	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  event	  presents	  certain	  practical	  problems.	  I	  have	  already	  discussed	  the	  difficulty	  of	  sustaining	  the	  energy	  of	  an	  event;	  but	  this	  difficulty	  points	  to	  a	  further	  question	  –	  that	  of	  how	  to	  act	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  event.	  	  Put	  simply,	  what	  does	  being	  worthy	  of	  the	  event	  entail?	   	  We	  are	   left,	   it	  seems,	  with	  a	  mode	  of	  becoming	  that	  reconfigures	  or	  selects	  from	  pure	  virtualities,	  but	  cannot	  be	  sustained,	  repeated	  or	  predicted.	  	  We	  cannot	  even	  necessarily	  be	  sure	  that	  a	  re-­‐configuration	  will	  produce	  a	  better	  set	  of	   circumstances.	   	  And	  even	   if	   it	  does,	   the	  change	  produced	  will	  not	  be	  permanent.	   	  Given	  these	  restrictions,	  the	  pressing	  question	  is	  of	  whether	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  useful	  at	  all,	  and	  if	  it	  is,	  how	  we	  should	  act	  in	  relation	  to	  it:	  how	  should	  we	  orient	  ourselves	  to	  a	  progression	  of	  time	  that	  contains	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  event	  and	  radical	  reorientation?	  	  In	  essence,	  thus	  far	  we	  have	  critiqued	   the	   abstracted	   sexual	   subject,	   the	   identities	   upon	   which	   this	   subject	   is	   reliant,	   and	  engaged	   with	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   event	   and	   eternal	   return	   explodes	   these	   identities.	   	   The	  question	  however,	  is	  what	  is	  left	  once	  this	  critique	  has	  been	  made:	  can	  we	  return	  to	  a	  materially	  embedded	  person	   as	   a	   frame	   for	   action	   and	   if	   so,	   how	  do	  we	  become	  worthy	  of	   the	   event	   as	  material	   individual?	   	  Furthermore,	  what	   impact	  does	  an	  understanding	  of	   law	  as	  a	  differently	  repeated	  virtual	  memory	  have	  upon	  how	  this	  action	  might	  progress?	  It	   is	   important	   to	  recognise	   that	   the	  starting	  point	  here	   is	  not	   the	  relationship	  between	  rights	  and	  a	  transcendental	  subject,	  but	  that	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  embedded	  individual.	  	  To	  highlight	  this	  distinction	   we	   can	   return	   to	   the	   question	   of	   Stonewall	   as	   an	   event	   that	   has	   been	   somewhat	  overcoded	  and	  reterritorialised	  and	  thus	  neutralised.	  	  They	  key	  point	  here	  however,	  is	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  event	  ‘Stonewall’	  is	  unfixed	  –	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  complex	  archive	  of	  feeling,	  intensity	  and	  action	  that	  is	  engaged	  and	  actualised	  with	  various	  different	  levels	  of	  intensity	  and	  attentiveness.	  	  I	   am	   suggesting	   therefore,	   that	   we	   might	   read	   Stonewall	   as	   a	   moment	   of	   rupture	   and	   re-­‐configuration	   of	   gay	   rights	   politics	   (particularly	   Western	   gay	   rights	   politics)	   that	   has	   had	  multiple	  reverberations	   through	  various	  social	  and	  political	  strata.	   	  What	   is	  significant	  here	   is	  the	  two-­‐sidedness	  that	  we	  can	  find	  in	  Stonewall:	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  encompassed	  both	  a	  virtual	  rearrangement	   of	   intensities	   and	   an	   actual	   embodiment	   of	   this	   in	   the	   days	   of	   rioting.	   I	   have	  already	   noted	   the	  way	   in	  which	   a	   return	   or	   repetition	   of	   the	   actual	  without	   a	   corresponding	  virtual	   repetition	   can	   become	   a	   matter	   of	   habit	   or	   a	   blocked	   memory	   that	   facilitates	   a	   new	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territorialisation	  of	  the	  line	  of	  flight.	   	  The	  point	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  chapter	  however,	   is	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  return	  to	  events	  such	  as	  Stonewall	  –	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  look	  back	  depends	  upon	  our	  vantage	  point	  and	  is	  thus	  a	  question	  of	  subjective	  perception.	  	  	  The	  dynamics	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  can	  have	  more	  or	  less	  radical	  outcomes.	  	  Thus,	  of	  key	  importance	  is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   an	   event	   which,	   at	   least	   on	   the	   surface,	   holds	   increasingly	   ‘global’	  recognition	  (or	  at	  least,	  increasingly	  global	  resonance	  in	  terms	  of	  visibility,	  impact,	  politics	  etc.)	  is	  something	  that	  is	  experienced	  and	  lived	  very	  differently	  in	  different	  locales.	   	  The	  virtualities	  at	  play	  may	  be	  similar,	  but	   their	   intensities	  and	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	  connect	  at	   each	  actual	  point	  of	  reference	  is	  very	  different,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  experiences	  this	  differs	  yet	  more.	  	  	  As	  Braidotti	  notes:	  ‘”We”	  may	  be	  in	  this	  together,	  but	  we	  differ	  quite	  radically	  in	  terms	  of	  locations	   and	   allocations	   of	   power.’1	  Individuals	   are	   unevenly	   distributed	   and	   thus	   differently	  implicated	  within	  frameworks	  of	  law,	  rights	  and	  power.	  	  Uneven	  subjection	  to	  biopower	  means	  that	   once	   we	   return	   to	   a	   consideration	   of	   materially	   embedded	   individuals	   –	   the	   ‘human’	   of	  human	  rights	  –	  we	  can	  expect	  very	  different	  outcomes	  from	  each	  articulation	  of	  intensities.	  	  	  This	  uneven	  subjection	  occurs	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  want	  to	  begin	  by	  highlighting	  its	  effects	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ‘event’	  of	  Pride	  through	  variations	  in	  the	  inhabitation	  of	  space	  and	  the	  circulation	  of	  affect.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  Western-­‐influenced	  gay	  rights	  politics	  is	  filled	  with	   questions	   of	   claiming	   and	   carving	   out	   spaces	   –	   marches	   through	   previously	   ‘straight’	  streets,	   the	  creation	  of	  gay	  districts	  and	  gay	  bars,	   the	  coding	  of	   certain	  bodies	  as	  gay	   through	  patterns	   of	   speech,	   movement	   and	   dress.	   	   This	   is	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   space	   in	  question	  –	  the	  space	  that	  is	  undergoing	  this	  territorialisation	  -­‐	  is	  not	  neutral	  or	  unoccupied,	  but	  complex,	   multilayered,	   and	   significantly	   for	   our	   purposes,	   informed	   by	   long	   and	   continuing	  histories	  of	  Western	  dominance	  and	  colonisation.	   	  The	  queering	  of	  space	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  tactic	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  applied	  in	  all	  contexts.	  	  Nor	  can	  we	  see	  space	  as	  equally	  occupied	  by	  all	  ‘queer’	  people,	   or	   even	   assume	   that	   all	   queer	   people	  would	   seek	   to	   occupy	   space	   in	   the	   same	  way.2	  	  Instead,	  we	  must	  recognise	  that	  Pride	  and	  other	  gay	  spaces	  may	  be	  ambiguously	  understood	  by	  those	  participating,3	  or	  experienced	  as	  ‘not	  really	  my	  scene’	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  race,	  class,4	  bodily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Locating	  Deleuze’s	  Eco-­‐Philosophy	  between	  Bio/Zoe-­‐Power	  and	  Necro-­‐Politics,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Law:	  
Forensic	  Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).	  p97	  2	  Judith	  Halberstam,	  In	  a	  Queer	  Time	  and	  Place:	  Transgender	  Bodies,	  Subcultural	  Lives	  (London:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  p43-­‐45	  3	  Stephen	  M.	  Kates	  and	  Russel	  W.	  Belk,	  "The	  Meaning	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Pride	  Day:	  Resistance	  through	  Consumption	  and	  Resistance	  to	  Consumption,"	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  Ethnography	  30,	  no.	  4	  (2001).	  p419	  4	  Yvette	  Taylor,	  "'That's	  Not	  Really	  My	  Scene':	  Working-­‐Class	  Lesbians	  in	  (and	  out	  of)	  Place,"	  Sexualities	  11,	  no.	  5	  (2008),	  Nina	  Held	  and	  Tara	  Leach,	  ""What	  Are	  You	  Doing	  Here?":	  The	  'Look'	  and	  (Non)	  Belongings	  of	  Racialised	  Bodies	  in	  Sexualised	  Spaces,"	  in	  Out	  of	  Place:	  Interrogating	  Silences	  in	  Queerness/Raciality,	  ed.	  Adi	  Kuntsman	  and	  Esperanza	  Miyake	  (York:	  Raw	  Nerve	  Books,	  2008).	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aesthetic	  or	  wealth.5	  	  What	  may	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  solidarity	  and	  protest	  in	  one	  locale	  may	  be	  a	  performance	  of	  exclusivity	  or	  commerciality	  in	  another.	  	  	  Broadening	   this	   analysis,	   we	   can	   question	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   spatialise	   concepts	   such	   as	  Western/non-­‐Western	  without	  also	  considering	  notions	  of	  gender,	  class	  and	  ethnicity.	  Thus,	  in	  viewing	  Pride	  as	  a	  recognisable	  global	  symbol,	  we	  risk	  overcoding	  a	  line	  of	  flight	  and	  even	  more	  worryingly,	   ignoring	   other	   vectors	   of	   oppression	   or	   embodiment	   as	   they	   are	   experienced	   in	  different	   national	   and	   local	   arenas.	   	   As	   such,	   we	   might	   agree	   with	   Puar,	   that	   ‘while	   it	   is	  predictable	  that	  the	  claiming	  of	  queer	  space	   is	   lauded	  as	  the	  disruption	  of	  heterosexual	  space,	  rarely	   is	   that	  disruption	   interrogated	  also	   as	   a	  disruption	  of	   racialised,	   gendered,	   and	   classed	  spaces.	   Nor	   are	   such	   disruptions	   understood	   in	   tandem	  with	   a	   claiming	   of	   class,	   gender	   and	  racial	  privilege	  as	  well.’6	  	   Furthermore,	   the	  disruption	  of	   space	  works	   in	   relation	   to	  particular	  understandings	  of	   sexuality,	  which	   can	   function	   to	   create	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  both	   ‘good’	   and	   ‘bad’	  homosexuality,	  and	   ‘good’	  and	   ‘bad’	  homosexual	  space,	   that	   is	  often	  much	  more	  complex	   than	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  political	  situation	  at	  hand	  might	   lead	  us	  to	  believe.7	  	  The	  shaping	  of	  space	  according	  to	  a	  particular	  regime	  of	  visibility	  quickly	  hardens	   into	  socio-­‐political	  demands	  that	  risks	   leaving	   little	   room	   for	  multiplicity	   and	   diversity	   of	   affect	   and	   approach.	   	   As	   Vidal-­‐Ortiz	  notes,	   ‘whites	   ‘teach’	   liberation	   strategies	   to	   non-­‐Whites,	   so	   that	   ‘coming	   out’	   is	   not	   a	   failed	  attempt	   in	   the	  service	  of	  hegemonic	  gayness.	   In	   the	  end,	  gayness	  must	  be	  spoken;	   there	   is	  no	  room	   for	   any	   other	   expression	   of	   non-­‐heteronormative	   identity	   or	   positionality	   within	   this	  paradigm	  of	  gayness/the	  closet/homophobia.’8	  Thus	   the	   power	   dynamics	   of	   queer	   occupancy	   of	   space	   (and	   time)	   must	   be	   understood	   as	  complex	  and	  ambiguous.	   	  The	  spectacle	  of	  grand	  scale	  occupations	  of	  space	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  multiple	  other	  stories	  of	  queer	  resistances,	  queer	  life,	  or	  perhaps	  just	  life	  itself,	  existing	  and	  flowing	   outside	   the	   spectacular	   or	   markedly	   queer.9	  	   Occupation,	   embodiment	   and	   even	   a	  welcome	   in	   space	   is	   not	   a	   simple	   construction	   and	   this	   complexity	   lurks	   beneath	   our	   visible	  spectacles	  of	  political	  action.	  	  	  What	   is	  key,	   I	  would	  argue,	   is	   that	  space	  does	  not	  pre-­‐exist	  our	  occupancy	  of	   it	  –	   through	  our	  actions,	  we	  create	  both	  queer	  and	  heterosexual	  space:	  we	  locate	  and	  embody	  what	  such	  spaces	  mean.	  	  The	  event	  that	  was	  ‘Stonewall’	  reconfigured	  space	  in	  a	  particular	  way,	  but	  its	  repetition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gordon	  Waitt,	  "The	  Sydney	  2002	  Gay	  Games	  and	  Querying	  Australian	  National	  Space,"	  Environment	  and	  Planning	  D:	  
Society	  and	  Space	  23	  (2005).	  p448-­‐9	  6	  Jasbir	  K.	  Puar,	  "A	  Transnational	  Feminist	  Critique	  of	  Queer	  Tourism,"	  Antipode	  34,	  no.	  5	  (2002).	  7	  David	  A.	  B.	  Murray,	  "The	  Civilized	  Homosexual:	  Travel	  Talk	  and	  the	  Project	  of	  Gay	  Identity,"	  Sexualities	  10,	  no.	  1	  (2007).	  8	  Salvador	  Vidal-­‐Ortiz,	  "The	  Puerto	  Rican	  Way	  Is	  More	  Tolerant’:	  Constructions	  and	  Uses	  of	  ‘Homophobia’	  among	  Santería	  Practitioners	  across	  Ethno-­‐Racial	  and	  National	  Identification	  "	  Sexualities	  11,	  no.	  4	  (2008).	  p480	  9	  Rosie	  Harding,	  Regulating	  Sexuality:	  Legal	  Consciousness	  in	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Lives	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2011).	  p181	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in	  multiple	  different	  forms	  contributes,	  sometimes,	  but	  not	  always,	  to	  the	  neutralisation	  of	  the	  creative	  force	  that	  erupted	  at	  Stonewall.	   	  This	  is	  why,	  despite	  its	  perhaps	  clichéd	  aspect	  in	  the	  face	   of	   queer	   critiques,	   Pride	   is	   so	   interesting	   a	   phenomenon	   –	   it	   foregrounds	   spatiality,	   but	  beyond	  this,	  it	  foregrounds	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  not	  just	  beings	  in	  space,	  but	  agents	  who	  create	  and	  are	  created	  by	  the	  spaces	  that	  we	  occupy.	  	  This	  occupation	  can	  easily	  encompass	  a	  mode	  of	  territorialisation	  and	  stratification	  that	  attaches	  to	  both	  space	  and	  body.	  	  	  The	  second	  mode	  of	  uneven	  embodiment	  under	  consideration	  relates	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  affect	  or	   emotion	   through	   and	   around	   bodies.	   	   The	   question	   of	   Pride	   as	   a	   political	   movement	   also	  brings	  questions	  of	  its	  flipside	  –	  shame	  –	  to	  the	  fore.10	  	  Most	  pertinent	  here	  is	  the	  role	  of	  shame	  not	   as	   a	   static,	   stable	   object	   but	   as	   a	   social	   force	   that	   operates	   as	   both	   a	   spatialising	   and	  codifying	  process.	  	  Shame	  is	  ‘contagious’	  in	  that	  it	  moves	  between	  and	  ‘infects’	  bodies;	  it	  is	  that	  which	   ‘puts	   us	   in	   our	   place’11	  and	   significantly,	   that	   acts	   as	   a	   flow	   of	   communication	   and	  contact.12	  Interestingly	  then,	   the	  assertion	  of	  pride	  as	  a	  political	  dynamic	  and	  politicised	  space	  begs	  questions	  of	  the	  affects	  of	  shame	  as	  a	  structuring	  flow	  within	  discourses	  of	  sexuality	  and	  sexual	   identity.	   	   Even	  more	   significant	   however,	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   as	   shame	   and	   sexuality	  become	  a	  key	  discourse	  within	  queer	  thought,	  shame	  itself	  becomes	  a	  contested	  affect.	  	  Shame	  is	  not	  experienced	  in	  the	  same	  way	  by	  all	  individuals:	  both	  gay	  women,	  and	  non-­‐white	  gay	  people	  may	  have	  a	  very	  different	  relationship	  towards	  or	  with	  particular	  emotions	  -­‐	  including	  shame	  –	  than	  those	  of	  their	  white	  male	  counterparts.13	  	  Again	  therefore,	  while	  it	  might	  be	  interesting	  to	  view	   shame,	   or	   pride	   and	   affect	   as	   free	   flowing,	   such	   flows	   touch	   and	   are	   felt	   by	   subjects	   in	  significantly	  different	  ways	  –	  either	  due	  to	  a	  simple	  idiosyncratic	  refusal	  of	  ‘normal’	  affect14	  or,	  more	  often,	  due	  to	  our	  differently	  embodied	  existence	  in	  space,	  place	  and	  time.	  	  If	  shame	  can	  be	  constituted	  as	  a	   feminising,	  emasculating	  emotion15,	  what	   impact	  will	   it	  have	  upon	   those	  who	  are	  differently	  situated	  in	  relation	  to	  dominant	  or	  subordinated	  masculinities?	  	  	  Thus,	   notions	   of	   power	   and	   hierarchy	   are	   never	   very	   far	   away	   from	   any	   analysis	   of	   LGBT	  discourses.	   	   	   Halberstam	  notes,	   ‘[a]s	   Eve	  Kosofsky	   Sedgwick’s	  work	   has	   shown	   in	   compelling	  detail	   the	   history	   of	   twentieth-­‐century	   literature	   in	   an	   Anglo	   American	   context	   has	   been	  indelibly	  marked	  and	  influenced	  by	  the	  contributions	  of	  white	  gay	  men;	  consequently,	  literature	  has	   been	   a	   powerful	   vehicle	   for	   the	   production	   and	   consolidation	   of	   gay	   identity	   (Sedgwick	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Eve	  Kosofsky	  Sedgwick,	  "Shame,	  Theatricality	  and	  Queer	  Performativity:	  Henry	  Jame's	  the	  Art	  of	  the	  Novel,"	  in	  Gay	  
Shame,	  ed.	  David	  M.	  Halperin	  and	  Valerie	  Traub	  (London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2009).	  p59	  11	  Sally	  R.	  Munt,	  Queer	  Attachments:	  The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Shame	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2007).	  p103	  12	  Sedgwick,	  "Shame,	  Theatricality	  and	  Queer	  Performativity:	  Henry	  Jame's	  the	  Art	  of	  the	  Novel."	  p50	  13	  Judith	  Halberstam,	  "Shame	  and	  White	  Gay	  Masculinity,"	  Social	  Text	  84-­‐85	  23,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2005).	  	  Hiram	  Perez,	  "You	  Can	  Have	  My	  Brown	  Body	  and	  Eat	  It	  Too,"	  Social	  Text	  84-­‐85	  23,	  no.	  3-­‐4	  (2005).	  14	  Eg	  Phil	  Hutchinson,	  Shame	  and	  Philosophy:	  An	  Investigation	  in	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Emotions	  and	  Ethics	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2008).	  p108	  15	  Halberstam,	  "Shame	  and	  White	  Gay	  Masculinity."p226	  
	  163	  
1986,	  1990).’16	  	  But,	  she	  continues,	  this	  production	  of	  identity	  has	  taken	  particular	  forms	  –	  it	  has	  spoken	  to	  and	  about	  particular	  concerns,	  but	  occluded	  others.	   	  As	  Ahmed	  argues,	   ‘the	  world	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  directions	  taken	  by	  some	  bodies	  more	  than	  others.’17	  	  Some	  gay	  bodies	  are	  much	  more	  able	  than	  others	  to	  shape	  the	  world	  –	  both	  gay	  and	  straight	  –	  and	  to	  consider	  locatedness	  through	   a	   vector	   of	   sexuality	   alone	   is	   to	   miss	   the	   complicated	   assemblage	   (haecceity)	   that	  makes	  up	  each	  individual	  at	  different	  points	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  In	  essence,	  I	  am	  returning	  to	  the	  issue	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  –	  what	  we	  might	  broadly	  term	  a	  power	  differential	   that	  ensures	  that	  even	  within	  discourses	  of	  resistance,	   the	  ability	  to	  engage	  with	   notions	   of	   resistance	   and	   to	   communicate	   injustice	   is	   profoundly	   asymmetrical.	   	   Those	  closer	  to	  the	  ‘centre’	  are	  better	  placed	  to	  explain	  the	  unfairness	  or	  injustice	  perpetrated	  by	  this	  centre	  and	  thus	  ironically,	  an	  ability	  to	  articulate	  depends	  upon	  the	  hierarchical	  dominance	  of	  a	  centre	  over	  a	  dominated	  periphery.	   	  As	  such,	  while	   it	  would	  be	  perhaps	   too	  simplistic	   (not	   to	  mention	   reductive)	   to	   claim	   simply	   that	   the	   ‘gay’	   world	   is	   shaped	   more	   by	   white	   gay	   male	  bodies	   that	   others	   in	   all	   circumstances,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   even	   under	   the	  most	   apparently	   clear	  symbols	  or	  emotions	  are	  multilayered	  strata	  of	  complexities,	  embodiments	  and	  actions.	   	  Even	  before	   the	   law	   divides	   or	   consolidates	   affect,	   flow	   or	   movement	   of	   queerness,	   alternative	  sexualities	  are	  both	  shared	  and	  not	  shared.	  	  Sexuality	  exists	  as	  a	  complex	  multiplicity	  –	  neither	  a	  single	   entity,	   nor	   a	   collection	   of	   unconnected	   singularities.	   	   The	   question	   is	   whether	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  embody	  and	  engage	  with	  this	  contradiction	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  
Mapping	  sexuality	  rights:	  extra-­‐representational	  communication	  as	  resonance	  and	  
reverberation	  	  My	  starting	  point	   in	   relation	   to	   these	  uneven	  embodiments	   is	   the	  question	  of	   connection	   that	  retains	   difference,	   or	   connection	   that	   can	   maintain	   ambiguity	   and	   change	   outside	   of	  representation.	   	  This	   is	  key	  because	  gay	  rights	  politics	  has	  a	  paradoxical	  structure:	   the	   ‘global	  gay’	  both	  exists	  and	  does	  not	  exist	  –	  it	  needs	  ambiguity	  and	  lack	  of	  definition,	  which	  are	  the	  very	  things	   that	   gay	   rights	   politics,	   if	   not	   used	   very	   carefully,	   will	   occlude.	   	   This	   issue	   has	   been	  explored	  in	  previous	  chapters:	  in	  essence	  rights	  rely	  on	  some	  form	  of	  representation	  and	  these	  representations	  facilitate	  an	  act	  of	  gathering	  together,	  grouping	  and	  analogising.	  	  My	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  rights	  that	  can	  operate	  while	  foregrounding	  a	  selection	  or	  connectivity	  that	  sustains	   difference	   even	   as	   it	   connects	   singularities.	  What	   occurs	   here	   is	   not	   representation,	  synthesis	   or	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   new	   community	   that	   can	   be	   easily	   represented	   (in	   either	   the	  sense	   of	   representation	   or	   re-­‐presentation)	   but	   a	   mutual	   vibration	   of	   particular	   series	   and	  singularities	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  	  I	  have	  previously	  suggested	  that	  in	  this	  context,	  sexuality	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Halberstam,	  In	  a	  Queer	  Time	  and	  Place:	  Transgender	  Bodies,	  Subcultural	  Lives	  p41	  17	  Sara	  Ahmed,	  Queer	  Phenomenology:	  Orientations,	  Objects,	  Others	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  p159	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might	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  aleatory	  point	  or	  the	  invisible	  square	  that	  moves	  along	  series,	  causing	  them	  to	  reverberate	  and	  vibrate	   together	  without	  demanding	  their	  merging	  or	  synthesis.	   	  Thus,	   the	  aleatory	  point	  is	  communicative,	  but	  through	  communication	  (resonance)	  it	  affirms	  divergence.	  	  ‘Everything	   happens	   through	   the	   resonance	   of	   disparates,	   points	   of	   view	   on	   a	   point	   of	   view,	  displacement	   of	   perspective,	   differentiation	   of	   difference,	   and	   not	   through	   the	   identity	   of	  contraries.’18	  	  Here	  I	  read	  Deleuze	  as	  suggesting	  a	  communication	  that	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  identity	  or	   upon	   representation	   and	   that	   through	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   virtual	   connectivities	   and	  multiple	   histories,	   we	   can	   hold	   differences	   both	   in	   tension	   and	   in	   communication	   with	   each	  other.	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   sexual	   politics,	  we	  might	   read	   this	   extra-­‐representational	   communication	   as	  ‘reverberation’.	   	  Reverberation	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  much	  more	  useful	   term	  than	  representation	  not	  only	  because	  it	  hints	  at	  the	  preservation	  of	  difference,	  but	  because	  it	  highlights	  movement,	  flow	  and	   contact	   between	   bodies,	   affects	   and	   forces.	   	   It	   suggests	   zones	   of	   change	   and	   even	  contamination,	   without	   reducing	   these	   changes	   to	   a	   single,	   predictable	   direction.	   	   Rather	  reverberation	   suggests	   multiplicitous	   divergence	   into	   new	   and	   unexpected	   ways	   of	   being.	  	  Reverberation,	  hints	  at	  becoming	  over	  being	  –	  at	   flow	  rather	  than	  blocks	  of	  space-­‐time	  and	   in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis,	  of	  sexuality	  as	  a	  flow	  of	  connection	  and	  becoming	  rather	  than	  an	  object	  that	  can	  be	  defined	  or	  possessed.	  Adi	  Kuntsman	  repeatedly	  employs	  reverberation	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  analysis	  in	  her	  work	  on	  sexuality.	  	  She	  draws	  the	  term	  from	  work	  on	  ‘soundscapes’	  in	  urban	  settings	  in	  which	  sound	  can	  become	  distorted,	  muffled,	  combined	  with	  others,	  but	  can	  also	  form	  a	  musical	  expression	  of	  difference	  against	   the	  dominant	  and	  uncontrollable	   flow	  of	  urban	   life.19	  	  Reflecting	  on	  reverberation,	  she	  notes	  that:	  	  	   ‘Reverberation	   is	   a	   concept	   that	  makes	   us	   attentive	   to	   speed	   and	   stillness,	   distortions	  and	  resonance,	  intensification	  and	  dissolution;	  as	  such,	  it	  also	  allows	  the	  tracing	  and	  opening	  up	  processes	  of	   refiguration.	  Reverberation	   also	   takes	  us	   away	   from	   the	  questions	  of	   ontological	  origins:	   even	   though	   its	   definition	   in	   acoustics	   assumes	   one	   single	   origin	   of	   each	   sound,	   the	  description	  of	   the	  urban	  musical	  soundscape,	  which	  predominantly	   inspires	  me	  here,	   is	  about	  
multiple	  movements	  of	  multiple	  sounds,	  coming	  from	  multiple	  origins	  and	  bouncing	  off	  multiple	  surfaces,	  often	  simultaneously	  and	  in	  contradiction	  to	  each	  other.	  In	  that	  sense,	  reverberation	  is	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  Gilles	  Deleuze,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Sense,	  ed.	  Constantin	  V.	  Boundas,	  trans.	  M.	  Lester	  and	  C.	  Stivale	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  p200	  19	  Phillip	  Tagg,	  "Subjectivity	  and	  Soundscape,	  Motorbikes	  and	  Music,"	  in	  The	  Popular	  Music	  Studies	  Reader,	  ed.	  A.	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  B.	  	  Shank,	  and	  J.	  	  Toynbee	  (London:	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multi-­‐nodal	  and	  has	  its	  own	  agency;	  its	  effects	  are	  unpredictable,	  and	  as	  such,	  can	  never	  be	  fully	  known.	  ‘20	  	  	  Reverberation	   forces	  us	   to	   think	  multiplicity,	  or	  more	  accurately,	   to	   think	  multiple,	   a-­‐centred	  movements	   territorialisations,	   deterritorialisations	   and	   transpositions.	   	   If	   we	   employ	  reverberation	  as	  a	  device	  for	  thinking	  sexuality	  and	  thinking	  rights,	  we	  must	  discard	  notions	  of	  foundational	  events	  that	  remain	  fixed	  in	  space	  and	  time	  just	  as	  we	  must	  discard	  notions	  of	  fixed	  and	  concrete	  ways	  of	  being.	  	  Reverberation	  recalls	  the	  resonance	  of	  the	  empty	  square	  through	  a	  series,	  creating	  movements	  and	  divergent	  connections.	  	  	  	  	  However,	  the	  question	  of	  reverberation	  can	  be	  pushed	  in	  another	  direction	  –	  that	  of	  music	  and	  the	  refrain.	  	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  image	  of	  the	  child	  singing	  to	  itself	  in	  the	  dark	  is	  again	  useful	  here.	   	   In	   this	   image,	   the	   child	   sings	   a	   song	   in	   order	   to	   reassure	   itself;	   he	   repeats	   a	   phrase	   in	  order	  to	  orient	  himself	  to	  the	  darkness	  and	  chaos	  around	  him.21	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  song	  becomes	  a	  territory,	   a	   rendering	   of	   order	   and	   even	   predictability	   upon	   the	   unknown.	   	   Thus,	   the	   refrain	  stabilises:	  we	  repeat	  what	  is	  known	  and	  familiar	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  we	  bring	  both	  space	  and	  time	  into	   our	   control,	   the	   world	   is	   mapped	   and	   to	   a	   degree,	   ordered.	   	   This	   observation	   chimes	  interestingly	  with	  Sara	  Ahmed’s	  suggestion	  that	  compulsory	  heterosexuality	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  RSI	  –	  	  	   ‘Compulsory	  heterosexuality	  shapes	  what	  bodies	  can	  do.	  Bodies	  take	  the	  shape	  of	  norms	  that	  are	  repeated	  over	  time	  and	  with	  force.	  Through	  repeating	  some	  gestures	  and	  not	  others,	  or	  through	  being	  orientated	  in	  some	  directions	  and	  not	  others,	  bodies	  become	  contorted:	  they	  get	  twisted	   into	   shapes	   that	   enable	   some	   action	  only	   insofar	  as	   they	  restrict	   the	  capacity	   for	  other	  
kinds	  of	  action.’22	  	  Repetitions	  of	  particular	  refrains	  become	  second	  nature:	  predictable	  representations	  of	  how	  the	  world	   is	   and	  what	   it	   should	  be.	   	  However,	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	   suggest	   that	   ‘in	  order	   to	   join	  with	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  future’	  one	  ‘ventures	  from	  home	  on	  the	  thread	  of	  a	  tune.’23	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	  can	  do	  and	  what	  connections	  can	  be	  made	  changes.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  refrain	  can	  encircle	  and	  enclose,	  new	  rhythms	  and	  speeds	  emerge	  in	  which	  there	  is	  movement	  towards	  new	  milieus,	  new	  becomings.	   	  We	  are	   in	  a	  milieu	  of	   space-­‐time	   that	  vibrates	  at	  a	  particular	   speed,	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  here	  however,	  are	  the	  ‘sounds’	  that	  diverge,	  the	  new	  rhythms	  and	  patterns	  that	  sound	  a	  different	  note	  to	  dominant	  forces.24	  	  Sound,	  for	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  is	  a	  both	  ‘cutting	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  Figurations	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  Violence	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  Belonging:	  Queerness,	  Migranthood	  and	  Nationalism	  in	  Cyberspace	  and	  
Beyond	  (Oxford:	  Peter	  Lang,	  2009).	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  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus,	  trans.	  B	  Massumi	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  22	  Ahmed,	  Queer	  Phenomenology:	  Orientations,	  Objects,	  Others.	  p91	  	  23	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus.	  p344	  24	  Ibid	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edge	   of	   deterritorialisation’	   and	   that	   which	   is	   capable	   of	   ‘the	   most	   massive	   of	  reterritorialisations.’25	  	  The	  question	  here	   is	  one	  of	  variation	  (reverberation)	  that	   finds	  shared	  levels	  of	  intensity,	  points	  of	  convergence	  (resonance),	  disjunction,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  this.	  	  In	  this	  context,	  rhythmic	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  norm	  has	  a	  boundary	  marking	  or	  locating	  purpose	  –	   a	   drawing	   (or	   verbalising)	   of	   difference	   against	   a	   background	   of	   sameness.	   	   And	   these	  reverberations	  are	  always	  present	  –	  as	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	   suggest,	  history	   is	   the	  history	  of	  perception	  –	  how	  we	  perceive	  (or	  hear	  in	  this	  case)	  particular	  assemblages,	  reverberations	  and	  multiplicities	  depends	  upon	  our	   ‘thresholds	  of	  perception.’	   	  New	  conditions	  make	  possible	  the	  perception	  of	  that	  which	  was	  previously	  overlooked	  or	  buried.26	  	  	  In	   this	  way,	  we	  can	   think	  a	   trajectory	  of	  movement	  and	  connection	   that	   is	  passive	  –	   in	   that	   it	  does	  not	  depend	  primarily	  on	  representation	  or	  a	  synthesising	  subject,	  but	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  aleatory	   point.	   	   This	   resonance	   creates	   the	   conditions	   for	   selection,	   connection	   and	   the	  ascription	  of	  meaning	  among	  multiple	  movements	  and	  reverberations.	  	  On	  innumerable	  planes,	  there	   are	   innumerable	   concepts	   that	   ‘resonate	   and	   connect	  up	  with	  mobile	  bridges.’27	  	   In	   this	  mode,	   events	   reverberate	   through	   each	   series	   and	   each	   plane,	   through	   language	   and	   bodies.	  	  Events	   mark	   changes	   in	   intensities	   that	   are	   not	   predictable,	   nor	   evenly	   played	   out,	   yet	   they	  cannot	   be	   thought	   of	   simply	   in	   terms	   of	   actual	   adjustments	   –	   to	   do	   so	   is	   to	  miss	   the	   virtual	  element	   of	   each	   actualisation	   and	   thus	   the	   connectedness	   of	   virtual	   objects	   in	   the	   pure	   past,	  which	   themselves	   are	   set	   in	  motion	   in	   the	   resonance	   of	   the	   event.	   Such	   an	   understanding	   of	  reverberations,	  becoming	  and	  radical	  movements	   leaves	  us	   in	  uncertain	  political	   terrain.	   	  Our	  mappings	   of	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   are	   refrains	   –	   and	   one	   aspect	   of	   the	   refrain	   is	   its	  deterritorialisation.	  	  Thus	  we	  cannot	  demand	  the	  repetition	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  in	  a	  specific,	  permanent	  form.	  	  How	  then	  do	  we	  distinguish	  between	  useful	  political	  action	  and	  either	  inertia	  in	   the	   face	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  options	  or	  a	   fetishisation	  of	   radical	   change	   just	  as	  others	  might	  fetishise	  clarity?28	  	  Braidotti	  notes	  that	  –	  	  	   ‘Deleuze	  sets	   the	  desire	   for	   transformations	  or	  becomings	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  agenda.	  	  Politics	   is	  ultimately	  a	  matter	  of	  existential	   temperature,	  of	  passions	  and	  yearning.	   	   It	   is	  about	  engendering	  and	  sustaining	  processes	  of	  'becoming'	  -­‐	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  central	  to	  philosophical	  nomadism.	   	   This	   specific	   sensibility	   combines	   a	   strong	  historical	  memory	  with	   consciousness	  and	   the	   desire	   for	   resistance.	   	   It	   rejects	   the	   sanctimonious,	   dogmatic	   tone	   of	   dominant	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  27	  Gilles	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  trans.	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  and	  Hugh	  Tomlinson	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  in	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ideologies,	   Left	   or	   Right	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum,	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   production	   of	   joyful	   acts	   of	  transformation.'29	  For	  Deleuze,	  Braidotti	   argues,	   there	  are	   two	   forms	  of	  power	  –	  power	  as	   restrictive	   (potestas)	  and	  power	  as	  productive	  (potentia).	  	  Political	  action	  should	  be	  a	  focus	  or	  pursuit	  of	  the	  second.	  	  However,	   in	  Braidotti’s	  reading	  of	  Deleuze	  she	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  a	  politics	  of	   location,	  an	  embedded,	   material	   foundation	   for	   our	   understandings	   of	   change	   and	   transposition.30	  	   	   This	  focus	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   second	   point	   regarding	   reverberation	   and	   political	   action:	   that	  reverberation	   may	   be	   a	   form	   of	   deterritorialisation,	   or	   a	   form	   by	   which	   an	   assemblage	   is	  constituted	  –	  a	  hub	  by	  which	  series	  can	  resonate	  in	  tune	  with	  each	  other	  -­‐	  but	  this	  reverberation	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   all	   bodies	   and	  matter	   occupy	   the	   same	   location	  within	   a	   soundscape.	   	   As	  Ferguson	   notes,	   sexuality	   is	   not	   an	   object	   that	   can	   be	   owned,	   but	   a	   discourse	   that	   is	   also	  racialised,	   classed	   or	   gendered.31 	  In	   essence,	   sexuality	   is	   unevenly	   embodied,	   identity	   is	  unevenly	  produced,	  power	  and	  resistance	  operate	  in	  different	  ways	  at	  different	  points.	  	  What	  at	  one	  node	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  disruptive	  vibration,	  at	  others	  is	  a	  mode	  of	  territorialisation.	  	  	  Thus,	   the	   flow	   of	   sexuality	   is	   uneven,	   or	   at	   least,	   unevenly	   recognised.	   	   This	   unevenness	   is	  problematic	   because,	   ironically,	   any	   attempt	   to	  map	   the	   contours	   of	   sexuality	   or	   to	  map	   the	  differential	   embodiment	   of	   sexuality,	   risks	   obscuring	   as	  much	   as	   it	   reveals.	   	   Therefore	   if	   we	  draw	  again	  on	  Sedgwick’s	  argument	  that	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  closet	  and	  coming	  out	  has	  been	  the	  overarching	  structure	  of	  gay	  oppression	  this	  century32,	  we	  must	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  for	  every	  location	  in	  which	  this	  framework	  is	  true	  or	  partially	  true,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  location	  in	  which	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  closet/coming	  out/visibility	  operates	  differently,	  or	  doesn’t	  operate	  at	  all.33	  	  	  This	  is	  why	  we	  must	  attempt	  to	  think	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  representation	  but	  of	  movement	  both	  in	  and	  out	  of	   tune	  with	  other	  series,	   through	  and	  around	  an	  uneven	  and	  shifting	  terrain.	   	  Such	  a	  mode	  captures	  the	  unevenness	  of	  the	  actual,	  the	  embeddedness	  of	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  thus	   the	   particularity	   in	   which	   the	   virtual	   is	   played	   out.	   	   In	   this	   way	   we	   can	   capture	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   disjunctions	   without	   demanding	   that	   they	   cohere	   accurately	   around	   a	   single	  representational	  hub.	  	  Thus,	  when	  Eduardo	  Nierras	  reminds	  us	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  gay	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Rosi	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  p27	  30	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rights	  politics	  ‘we	  are	  like	  you…only	  different’34	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  unpick	  the	  complexity	  of	  what	  he	  means	  by	  this.	  	  	  
Tracing	   the	   site	   and	   limits	   of	   rights	   claims:	   Figurations,	   conceptual	   personae	   and	  
becoming-­‐other	  What	  is	  significant	  when	  discussing	  uneven	  sexual-­‐scapes	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  rights	  are	  also	  subject	  to	   an	   uneven	   distribution	   –	   their	   reach,	   hold	   and	   impact	   is	   neither	   uniform,	   nor	   necessarily	  predictable.	  	  Rights	  too,	  we	  might	  argue,	  can	  be	  envisaged	  as	  a	  shaping,	  structuring	  flow	  rather	  than	   as	   objects	   that	   can	   be	   possessed.	   	   Part	   of	   this	   is	   clearly	   due	   to	   the	   historical	   location	   of	  rights	  –	  as	  the	  preserve	  of	  the	  universal	  male	  white	  subject,	  the	  questioning	  of	  which	  has	  led,	  as	  Wendy	  Brown	  argues,	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which,	  '[j]ust	  when	  polite	  liberal	  (not	  to	  mention	  correct	  leftist)	  discourse	   ceased	   speaking	  of	  us	   as	  dykes,	   faggots,	   coloured	  girls,	   or	  natives,	  we	  began	  speaking	  of	  ourselves	  this	  way.'35	  	  From	  this	  speaking,	  rights	  demands	  soon	  followed	  –	  demands	  for	  recognition	  of	  subjectivity	  were	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  difference	  rather	  than	  sameness.	  	  	  Rights	  then,	  are	  a	  shifting	  unevenly	  embedded	  discourse	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  point	  of	  struggle	  rather	   than	   in	   terms	  of	  simple	  subjectivity.	   	  Rights	   touch	  and	  select	  bodies	  unevenly;	  depending	  on	  circumstance,	  they	  will	  fit	  or	  fail	  to	  fit.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  more	  we	  try	  to	  universalise	  rights	  (perhaps	  the	  more	  we	  try	  to	  view	  rights	  in	  an	  abstract	  rather	  than	  immanent,	  embedded	  frame)	  the	  more	  they	  are	  apt	  to	  fail.	  	  In	  asking	  what	  rights	  are	  capable	  of,	  we	  must	  view	  multiple	  potentialities	  and	  trajectories,	  relative	  to	   location	  and	  temporal	   facets.	   	  Or	  –	   the	  way	   in	  which	  rights	  are	  currently	  actualised	  is	  only	  one	  small	  articulation	  of	  what	  they	  can	  do.	  	  	  	  	  These	   problematics	   must	   be	   explored	   in	   relation	   to	   embodied	   materiality.	   	   The	   question	  therefore	   is	   of	   how	   to	   engage	   with	   Braidotti’s	   call	   for	   the	   production	   of	   joyful	   acts	   of	  transformation	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  complex	  movements,	  reverberations	  and	  resonances	  of	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  as	  material	  as	  well	  as	  virtual	  assemblages.	  	  Put	  more	  succinctly,	  what	  is	  required	  is	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   site	   of	   enunciation	   of	   rights	   claims,	   or	   more	   significantly	   for	   our	  purposes,	   the	  site	  of	   the	   failure	  of	  rights,	  as	  potential	  sites	  of	  emergence	  of	  new	  figurations	  of	  alternative	  sexualities	  –	  new	  materially	  embedded	  points	  of	  disruption	  that	  are	  both	  productive	  and	   dangerous.	   Following	  Harraway	   and	  Braidotti,	  we	   can	   view	   such	   figurations	   as	   personae	  through	  which	  we	   can	   think	   differently	   and	   illuminate	   previously	   unseen	   blindspots,	   or	  map	  previously	  neutral	  power	  relations:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Eduardo	  R.	  Nierras,	  "The	  Risky	  Buisiness	  of	  Desire:	  Theoretical	  Notes	  for	  and	  against	  Filipino	  Gay	  Male	  Identity	  Politics	  "	  in	  Ladlad:	  An	  Anthropology	  of	  Phillipine	  Gay	  Writing,	  ed.	  J.	  Neil	  C.	  Garcia	  and	  Danton	  Remoto	  (Manila:	  Anvil,	  1996).	  p199	   	  35	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	  Injury:	  Power	  and	  Freedom	  in	  Late	  Modernity	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  p53	  
	  169	  
	   ‘Figurations	  are	  not	  merely	  metaphors,	  but	  rather	  markers	  of	  more	  concretely	  situated	  historic	   positions.	   	   A	   figuration	   is	   the	   expression	   one’s	   specific	   positioning	   in	   both	   space	   and	  time.	  	  It	  marks	  certain	  territorial	  or	  geopolitical	  co-­‐ordinates,	  but	  also	  points	  out	  one’s	  sense	  of	  geneaology,	  of	  historical	  inscription.’36	  In	   this	   sense	   then,	   the	   figuration	   of	   new	   sexual	   subjectivities	   verges	   towards	   the	  monstrous	  other	  –	  the	  critical	  disruptive	  merging	  of	  what	  was	  previously	  separate,	  or	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  impure	  or	  the	  previously	  unseen	  or	  unseeable.	  	  Monsters	  or	  the	  monstrous	  for	  Harraway	  are	  ‘boundary	  creatures’,	  creatures	  that	  have	  a	  destabilising	  effect.37	  	  	  For	  Braidotti,	  the	  monster	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  monster-­‐as-­‐woman)	  is	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  in	  between,	  the	  indefinite,	  the	  ambiguous.38	  	  Tellingly,	  the	  places	  off	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  map	  are	  marked	  by	  mermaids	  and	  monsters39	  and	  thus	  the	   figuration-­‐as-­‐monster	   is	   something	   that	   resists	   taxonomy	  or	  permanent	  emplacement,	  yet	  recalls	  the	  specificity	  and	  locatedness	  of	  its	  emergence.	  	  Instead,	  monsters	  are	  that	  which	  move	  at	   particular	   disruptive	   speeds,	   they	   are	   ‘bands	   or	   inflections	   of	   intensities’.40	  Or,	   to	   continue	  with	   the	   cartographic	   language:	   monsters	   constitute	   a	   new,	   unknown	   selection	   or	   bringing	  together	  of	  co-­‐ordinates,	  but	   in	  doing	  so	  they	  constitute	   less	  a	  new	  map	  as	  an	  exposure	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  old.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  figuration	  is	  less	  a	  stable	  marker	  of	  a	  position,	  than	  a	  way	  of	  re-­‐opening	  and	  re-­‐inscribing	  the	  co-­‐ordinates	  of	  subjectivity,	  self	  and	  legitimacy.	  	  Figurations	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  problematics,	  or	  to	  think	  the	  structures	  in	  which	  we	  are	  embedded.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  they	  are	  similar	  to	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  conceptual	  personae	  –	  the	  usually	  nameless	  and	  subterranean	  persona	  who	   must	   be	   reconstituted	   by	   the	   reader.41	  	   The	   conceptual	   persona,	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	  argue,	   is	   not	   the	   representation	   of	   the	   philosopher,	   but	   the	   philosopher’s	   heteronym,	   or	   that	  which	   produces	   selection	   and	  movement	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   constitutes	   a	   new	   style	   of	   living.42	  	  ‘Possibilities	  of	   life	  or	  modes	  of	  existence	  can	  be	   invented	  only	  on	  a	  plane	  of	   immanence	   that	  develops	   the	   power	   of	   conceptual	   personae.’ 43 	  	   As	   with	   figurations	   however,	   conceptual	  personae	  are	  not	  psycho-­‐social	   types	  or	  even	  aesthetic	   figures;	   they	  are	   that	  which	  constitute	  ‘points	  of	  view	  according	  to	  which	  planes	  of	  immanence	  are	  distinguished	  from	  one	  another	  or	  brought	   together,	   but	   they	   also	   constitute	   the	   conditions	   under	  which	   each	   plane	   finds	   itself	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  Theory,	  ed.	  Chrysanthi	  Nigianni	  and	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  Storr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	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  p141	  	  41	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  and	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  42	  D.	  N.	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  "Unthinkable	  Sex:	  Conceptual	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filled	   with	   concepts	   of	   the	   same	   group.’ 44 	  	   Conceptual	   personae	   are	   modes	   of	   rupture,	  orientation	  and	  selection	  on	  a	  plane	  of	  immanence,	  always	  situated	  between	  multiple	  points	  of	  enunciation.45	  	  Thinking	  figurations	  and	  conceptual	  personae	  highlights	  two	  key	  points.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  creative	  force	   that	  comes	   from	  the	  constitution	  of	  different	  points	  of	  view	  or	  different	  branchings	   that	  are	   facilitated	  by	   conceptual	  personae:	  Rodowick	   suggests	   that	   conceptual	  personae	  populate	  philosophies	   and	  minor	   arts	  where	   they	   function	   as	   a	   constituting	   an	   ethos	   that	   does	   not	   yet	  exist.46	  	   Conceptual	  personae	   are	   an	   illumination	  of	  what	   the	   centre	  may	  not	  want	   seen	  –	   the	  ‘actualisation	  of	  monstrosity.’47	  However,	  key	  to	  this	  monstrosity	  is	  its	  immanence:	  neither	  the	  conceptual	   personae	   nor	   the	   figuration	   is	   a	   metaphor,	   but	   an	   embedded	   stage	   of	  metamorphoses. 48 	  The	   second	   point	   of	   relevance	   here	   is	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   virtual	  dimension	   to	   the	   functioning	  of	  conceptual	  personae	  –	   though	   immanent	  and	  embedded,	   they	  exist	  not	  as	  psycho-­‐social	  types	  but	  as	  selecting	  forces,	  bridges	  between	  concepts,	  or	  ways	  of	  re-­‐figuring	   already	   figured	   relations.	   	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   there	   is	   no	   relationship	   between	  conceptual	  personae	  and	  psycho-­‐social	  types.	   	   	  Indeed	  it	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  psycho-­‐social	  types	   that	   enables	   an	   embeddedness	   and	  materiality	   of	   thinking:	   ‘The	   features	   of	   conceptual	  personae	   have	   relationships	  with	   the	   epoch	   of	   or	   historical	  milieu	   in	  which	   they	   appear	   that	  only	   psychosocial	   types	   enable	   us	   to	   assess.’49	  But	  we	   cannot	   stop	   at	   this	   point	   –	   it	   is	   in	   the	  extraction	   of	   particular	   features	   of	   psycho-­‐social	   types	   and	   their	   ‘determination	   purely	   of	  thinking	   and	   of	   thought’	   beyond	   the	   actuality	   of	   a	   particular	   historical	   or	   social	   strata	   that	  permits	   the	   thinking	   of	   conceptual	   personae	   as	   ‘thought-­‐events’	   on	   a	   plane	   of	   immanence.50	  ‘Conceptual	   personae	   and	   psychosocial	   types	   refer	   to	   each	   other	   and	   combine	   without	  merging.’51	  	   Thus,	   a	   conceptual	   persona	   is	   a	   selection,	   a	   diagram	   or	   a	  mode	   of	   reconstituting	  elements	  in	  the	  pure	  past	  rather	  than	  remaining	  bound	  simply	  to	  linear	  time.	  	  They	  act	  not	  just	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  deconstruction,	  but	  a	  mode	  of	  distancing	  and	  re-­‐constitution.	  	  	  Burchill	  addresses	  these	   issues	  through	  analysis	  of	   the	  conceptual	  persona	   ‘becoming-­‐woman’	  or	  ‘girl'52,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  past,	  present	  and	  future	  repetitions	  of	  time	  that	  operate	  in	  a	  Deleuzian	  schema.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  becoming-­‐woman	  is	  not	  the	  repetition	  of	  a	  stereotype,	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  Ibid.	  p8	  47	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Terratologies,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Feminist	  Theory,	  ed.	  Claire	  Colebrook	  and	  Ian	  Buchanan	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  p171	  48	  Ibid.	  49	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  What	  Is	  Philosophy?	  	  p70	  50	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even	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ironic	  mimesis.	  	  As	  such,	  what	  is	  occurring	  here	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  re-­‐casting	  or	  even	  a	  problematisation	  of	  normalised	  gender	  roles,	  but	  a	  mode	  of	   individuation	  that	  releases	  elements	  from	  the	  norms,	  historical	  structures	  and	  flow	  of	  time	  in	  which	  they	  cohere	  and	  their	  repetition	  ‘free	  from	  subjective	  over-­‐coding’	  in	  a	  mode	  of	  time	  ‘equally	  unbound	  by	  any	  form	  of	  transcendental	   standpoint	   serving	   to	   link	  memories	   and	   hopes	   together	   in	   a	   single	   knowing	  story.’ 53 	  	   In	   this	   understanding,	   conceptual	   persona	   as	   becoming	   woman	   operates	   with	  knowledge	  of,	  and	  closely	  linked	  to,	  present	  conceptualisations	  of	  feminine	  gender	  traits,	  but	  it	  is	  not	   restricted	  by	   them,	   instead	  extracting	   elements	  of	   these	   traits	   ‘pertaining	   to	  difference’	  and	  repeating	  and	  reiterating	   them	  anew	  outside	   the	  structures	  of	   currently	  coded	  narratives	  and	  memories.	   	  Thus	   the	  conceptual	  persona	   is	  wholly	   ‘there’,	  but	  also	   ‘not-­‐there’	   in	   that	   it	   is	  bound	  neither	  by	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  actual	  or	  of	  linear	  time.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  conceptual	  persona	  or	  figuration	  is	  not	  a	  new	  symbol	  that	  can	  be	  captured	  and	  coded	  into	  law,	  but	  an	  opening	  of	  law	  or	  norms	  or	  social	  strata.	  	  It	  is	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  difference.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  conceptual	  personae	  or	  figurations	  create	  not	  a	  solution,	  but	  a	  means	  of	  seeing,	  viewing	  and	  creating	  differently	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plane	  on	  which	  we	  currently	  find	  ourselves.	  	  I	  would	   contend	   that	   moments	   of	   failure	   in	   relation	   to	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   constitute	   actual	  instants	   in	   which	   we	   might	   approach	   these	   figurations	   –	   in	   which	   we	   might	   illuminate	   the	  monstrous	  as	  monstrous	  and	  unknown	  rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  integrate	  that	  which	  is	  other	  into	  an	  already	  existing	  schema.	   	  This	   then,	  might	  be	  seen	  as	   ‘the	  disruption	  of	   totality’	  which	  Cornell	   has	   argued	   can	   give	   us	   a	   glimpse	   of	   elements	   in	   their	   interrelatedness,	   outside	   an	  overcoding	  system	  of	  identification.54	  	  However,	  the	  question	  remains	  as	  to	  how	  we	  as	  activists	  or	   lawyers	   should	   act	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   illumination.	   	  We	   can	   use	   a	   feminist	   deployment	   of	  Deleuze	   to	   forward	   a	   complex	   critique	   of	   the	   relationship	  between	   sexuality	   and	   rights,	   but	   I	  want	   to	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   not	   all	   that	   the	   interaction	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   is	   capable	   of.	  	  Instead,	   there	   remains	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   there	   is	   an	   ethical	   dimension	   to	   Deleuze’s	  writing	  through	  which	  we	  might	  constitute	  a	  means	  of	  action.	  
Immanent	   rights,	   embodiment	   and	   counter-­‐actualisation	   at	   the	   fault	   lines	   of	   sexuality	  
and	  law	  James	  Williams	  argues	  that	  Deleuze’s	  philosophy	  does	  make	  these	  ethical	  demands,	  but	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  does	  so	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  	  The	  centralisation	  of	  pure	  difference	  in	  a	  Deleuzian	  ontology	  means	  that	  all	  identity	  and	  representation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  these	  identities	  and	  representations	  as	  permanent,	   is	  an	  illusion:	   ‘identity	  is	  only	  a	  cloak	  thrown	  over	  deeper	  pure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Burchill,	  "Becoming-­‐Woman:	  A	  Metamorphosis	  in	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differences.’55	  	  The	  suggestion	  that	  underlying	  everything	  is	  motion	  and	  difference	  encompasses	  an	   extreme	   anti-­‐foundationalism	   –	   there	   can	   be	   no	   fixed	   morality,	   sexuality	   or	   law	   as	   such	  conceptualisations	  work	  through	  representations	  that	  are	  always	  open	  to	  reconstitution	  and	  re-­‐configuration.	  	  	  In	  one	  sense	  however,	   this	   lack	  of	  solid	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  base	  an	  analysis	  of	  sexuality	  does	  not	  hinder	  us.	   	  We	  could	  argue	  for	  example,	  that	  rights	  too,	  lack	  any	  legitimate	  foundations,	  or	  more	  accurately,	  any	  attempt	  to	  ascertain	  solid	  theoretical	  foundations	  for	  our	  rights	  claims	  are	  either	  problematic,	  highly	  Western-­‐centric	  or	  simply	  blind	  to	  the	  violence	  through	  which	  such	  foundations	  were	  constituted	  and	  normalised.56	  	  This	  means	   that	  we	  can	  shift	  both	  rights	  and	  sexuality	   into	   a	   schema	  of	   flow	  and	   flux.	   	   Sexuality	   is	   that	  which	  moves,	   flows	   and	  desires;	   it	  resists	   classification	   and	   can	   always	   be	   repeated	   in	   a	   different	   combination,	   or	   can	   set	   new	  series	  into	  resonance	  –	  or	  reverberation.	  	  Rights,	  in	  a	  double	  sided,	  immanent	  articulation,	  act	  as	  Deleuzian	   machines	   in	   that	   they	   code,	   connect	   and	   break	   down	   flows	   depending	   upon	   the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  are	  deployed.	  	  	  We	  begin	  then,	  from	  the	  intersection	  of	  multiple	  flows	  or	  series	  that	  are	  by	  their	  nature,	  unfixed	  and	  changing.	  	  There	  is	  no	  truth	  of	  sexuality	  and	  no	  truth	  of	  rights.	  	  A	  politics	  that	  assumes	  that	  there	  is,	  must	  necessarily	  ‘throw	  a	  cloak’	  over	  deeper	  differences	  and	  movements.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  this,	  I	  have	  already	  discussed	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  imperceptible	  –	  the	  politics	  of	  movement	   and	   flow	   rather	   than	   identities.57	  	   What	   such	   a	   politics	   asks	   however,	   is	   how	   we	  might	   emplace	   ourselves	   within	   such	   imperceptibility:	   how	   can	   we,	   as	   individuals,	   act	   in	  relation	  to	  uncertain	  connections?	  	  Ahmed	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  point	  should	  not	  be	  to	  find	  a	  ‘queer	   line’	   but	   rather	   should	   ask	   ‘what	   our	   orientation	   towards	  queer	  moments	   of	   deviation	  will	  be.’58	  	  As	  such,	  we	  must	  seek	  to	  assert	  not	  a	  particular,	  already	  established	  viewpoint,	  but	  to	  orient	  ourselves	  to	  particular	  flows	  and	  shifts.	  Thus	  we	  are	  not	  just	  subjects	  of	  discourses	  that	  shape	  and	  embed	  us.	   	  We	  are	  also	  agents	  who	  can	   resist	   and	   shape	   the	   flows	   around	   us	   in	   turn.	   	   And	   our	   embodiment	   is	   central	   to	   this;	  Braidotti	  for	  example,	  works	  through	  the	  Spinozist	  understanding	  that	  bodies	  are	  not	  neutral	  –	  knowledge	  and	  ideas	  are	  mediated	  through	  the	  body59,	  thus	  as	  Gatens	  argues,	  consciousness	  is	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not	  socially	  constructed	  on	  a	  neutral	  body.60	  	  As	  such,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  experience,	  embody	  or	  understand	  the	  contradictions	  outlined	  above	  will	  be	  highly	  contingent	  and	  contextualised.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  body,	  or	  the	  individual,	  is	  connected	  not	  just	  socially,	  but	  virtually:	  ‘[A]ll	   things	   are	   individuals	   or	   incomplete	   parts	   of	   individuals	   defined	   as	   reciprocal	  relations	   between	   Ideas,	   intensities,	   sensations	   and	   actual	   identities.	   	   Any	   individual	   is	   an	  expression	   of	   all	   Ideas,	   though	  more	   or	   less	   clearly	   and	   obscurely.	   	   It	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   all	  intensities	   though	   in	  different	   configurations	  of	   envelopment.	   	  Through	   the	   Ideas	   it	   expresses	  and	   the	   intensities	   that	   envelop	   it,	   an	   individual's	   actual	   side	   is	   connected	   to	   all	   other	   actual	  things.’61	  Each	  individual	  expresses	  the	  world,	  or	  the	  intensities	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  a	  singularity	  that	  changes	  over	   time.	   	   The	   ‘other’	   experiences	   and	   expresses	   such	   intensities	   differently,	   making	  encounters	  with	   the	   other	   not	   a	  mode	   for	   knowing	   the	  world	   better	   or	  more	   simply,	   but	   an	  increase	   of	   intensity62 	  or	   perhaps	   even	   disjunction.	   	   Connection	   here	   is	   not	   simple,	   but	  troubling:	  a	  moment	  of	  encounter	  and	  change.	  	  As	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue	  ‘the	  other	  appears	  as	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   possible.	   	   The	   other	   is	   a	   possible	   world	   as	   it	   exists	   in	   the	   face	   that	  expresses	   it	   and	   takes	   shape	   in	   a	   language	   that	   gives	   it	   a	   reality.’63	  	   The	   concept	   of	   the	  Other	  Person	   becomes	   the	   condition	   under	   which	   the	   perceptual	   field	   is	   reconsidered	   and	  redistributed.	   	   	   The	   other	   defines	   and	   limits	   the	   perceptual	   field	   and	   the	   field	   of	   the	   possible	  through	   her	   presumed	   ability	   to	   see	   what	   the	   self	   cannot.	   	   ‘The	   other	   appears	   here	   as	   the	  normative	  frame	  that	  determines	  what	  I	  see,	  where	  I	  move,	  what	  I	  can	  touch.	  	  The	  Other	  is	  the	  authority	  that	  subsumes	  my	  perception	  into	  a	  specific	  perspective.’64	  	  The	  presence	  of	  the	  other	  fulfils	   a	   structuring	   role	   here,	   rendering	   certain	   things	   visible,	   proximate	   and	   possible	   and	  others	  distant	  or	  unknowable.	  ‘The	  other	  is	  a	  matrix	  of	  becoming	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  right	  and	  it	  generates	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   becoming	   on	   which	   the	   same	   actually	   depends	   for	   their	   own	   self	  definition.	  	  What	  matters	  is	  what	  occurs	  in	  the	  in-­‐between	  spaces,	  the	  intervals,	  the	  transitions	  between	  their	  respective	  differences.’65	  	  This	  configuration	  exposes	  the	  individual’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  virtual	  (individual	  as	  expression	  of	   intensities).	   	  The	   face	  of	   the	  other	  exposes	  not	  a	  clearer	  or	   fuller	  view	  of	   the	  world,	  virtual	  objects	   or	   intensities,	   but	   their	   expression	   in	   different	   forms.	   ‘[T]he	   Other	   person	   does	   not	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restore	  transcendence	  to	  an	  other	  self	  but	  returns	  every	  other	  self	  to	  the	  immanence	  of	  the	  field	  surveyed.’66	  	  The	  other	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  truth,	  a	  community	  or	  a	  transcendent	  objectivity,	  but	  a	  becoming.	  Otherness	  is	  the	  subversive	  presence	  that	  disrupts	  self	  and	  communal	  identity.	  	  	  It	   is	   through	   this	   understanding	   that	  we	  must	   address	   the	  possibility	   of	   an	   individual’s	   being	  worthy	   of	   the	   event.	   	   Deleuze	   argues	   that	   we	   must	   respond	   to	   the	   event	   through	   counter-­‐actualisation	   or	   vice-­‐diction:	   	   the	   actor	   replays	   the	   event	   as	   a	   singularity,	   but	   this	   singularity	  captures	  the	  idea,	  the	  depth	  or	  the	  virtual,	  of	  which	  the	  counter-­‐actualisation	  is	  just	  one	  single	  expression.67	  	  In	  counter-­‐actualising	  the	  event	  ‘an	  individual	  must	  learn	  to	  create	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  express	  how	  it	  is	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  whole	  of	  reality,	  but	  also	  how	  its	  sensations	  express	  an	  intense	  and	  singular	  transformation	  of	  that	  reality.’68	  	  A	  counter-­‐actualisation	  captures	  what	  is	  singular	  and	  universal	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  be	  worthy	  of	  the	  event;	  in	  doing	  so,	   what	   we	   counter-­‐actualise	   or	   repeat	   is	   not	   truth	   or	   something	   that	   is	   objective	   or	  transcendent,	   but	   is	   a	   becoming:	   a	   reiteration	   of	   reality	   in	   forms	   that	   were	   not	   previously	  possible.	  	  	  This	   formulation	   rests	   on	   a	   Deleuzian	   conception	   of	   the	   Idea	   that	   must	   be	   very	   carefully	  approached.	  	  Ideas	  are	  ‘the	  relations	  between	  things	  in	  the	  virtual	  that	  are	  the	  condition	  for	  the	  evolution	   of	   actual	   things’69,	   they	   are	   the	   condition	   for	   changes	   in	   actual	   ideas,	   but	   are	   not	  themselves	  actual.	   	  Williams	  notes	  that	  the	  Idea	  can	  only	  be	  known	  partially	  as	  it	  is	  expressed:	  the	  Idea	  does	  not	  have	  a	  fixed	  identity	  as	  its	  elements	  are	  pure	  differences.70	  	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  Idea	  as	  expressed	  in	  an	  actual	  situation	  is	  incomplete	  until	  it	  is	  given	  sensation,	  and	  this	  sensation	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  individual.	  	  The	  Idea	  must	  be	  expressed	  through	  spatio-­‐temporal	  actuality	  even	  though	  this	  actuality	  can	  only	  express	  one	  side	  or	  one	  particular	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Idea.	  	  ‘The	  Idea	  and	  an	  objective	  situation	  have	  to	  be	  articulated	  through	  the	  individuation	  of	  a	  thing	  for	  which	  the	  Idea	  is	  a	  problem	  and	  for	  which	  the	  situation	  is	  a	  spatio-­‐temporal	  given.’71	  	  As	   such	  we	  require	  embeddedness,	  agency,	   situation,	   cases	  and	  spaces	   to	  express	   the	   Idea,	   to	  connect	   across	   the	   virtual	   and	   across	   different	   levels,	   or	   contractions	   of	   history.	   	   These	  connections	   are	   more	   than	   actual	   –	   they	   involve	   the	   reconstitution	   of	   intensities	   of	   virtual	  objects	  –	  but	  they	  can	  only	  be	  played	  out	  in	  the	  particular,	  which	  acts	  not	  as	  a	  closing	  down	  of	  possibilities	  but	  as	  an	  opening	  up,	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   the	  myriad	  potentialities	   in	  circulation.	  	  Thus	  the	  individual	  will	  determine	  a	  particular	  series	  of	  problems	  and	  intensities.	  	  Through	  the	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connections	   an	   actor	   makes	   and	   the	   vice-­‐diction	   in	   which	   she	   engages,	   as	   she	   plays	   out	   the	  event,	  different	  aspects	  are	  brought	  into	  more	  or	  less	  clarity.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  that	  virtual	  and	  actual	  interact	  and	  complement	  each	  other,	  in	  that	  the	  virtual	  must	  be	  expressed	  in	  the	  actual,	  but	  the	  virtual	   inheres	  in	  and	  goes	  beyond	  the	  actual,	   forging	  connectivity	  and	  change	  across	  time	  and	  difference.	  	  Our	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  at	  play	  must	  therefore	  refer	  firstly	  to	  that	  situation,	  not	  a	  set	  of	  rules.	  	  Counter-­‐actualisation	  is	  the	  capturing	  of	   the	   virtual	   and	   expressing	   it	   as	  what	   is	   unique	   to	   the	   socio-­‐historical	   terrain	   in	  which	   it	   is	  played	   out.	   	   What	   is	   required	   is	   an	   experimental	   moving	   of	   series	   that	   runs	   through	   all	  boundaries.	  	  It	  is	  a	  creative	  expression	  of	  not	  just	  the	  actual	  situation	  at	  hand	  but	  the	  virtualities	  which	   are	   expressed	   in	   the	   actual	   and	   are	   refigured	   in	   the	   event.	   	   Through	   figurations	   or	  conceptual	  personae	  we	  may	  open	  up	  or	   think	  differences,	   but	   this	  must	  be	   connected	   to	   the	  material	   life	   at	   hand.	   	   It	   is	   through	   the	   actor	   that	  we	  do	   this	   –	   and	   to	   return	   to	  Braidotti	   and	  Gatens’	   point	   above,	   the	   actor	   here	   is	   perhaps	   better	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   socially	  mediated	   body	  moving	  in	  space	  with	  other	  bodies.	  	  	  This	  understanding	  allows	  us	  to	  refine	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  imperceptible	  discussed	  in	  the	   previous	   chapter.	   	   What	   is	   required	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   person	   who	   is	   not	   identifiable	   in	  identitarian	   or	   representational	   terms	   (if	   such	   a	   thing	   is	   possible),	   but	   an	   individual	   who	   is	  enmeshed	  within	  an	  encounter,	   connected	   to	  both	   the	  virtual	   flows	  and	  actual	  occurrences	  at	  play.	   	   This	   is	   a	   position	   of	   simultaneous	   presence	   and	   distance.	   	   We	   are	   determined	   by	   the	  situation	   that	   we	   counter-­‐actualise,	   but	   we	   are	   not	   defined	   by	   it,	   nor	   must	   it	   necessarily	  constitute	  our	  identity.	   	   It	  bears	  repeating	  then,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  single	  expression	  of	  sexuality,	  only	   flows	   of	   desire	   that	   interact	   and	   are	   expressed	   in	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   forms	   and	   are	   coded	  more	  or	   less	  directly	  according	   to	   the	  social	  strata	   in	  which	  we	   find	  ourselves.	   	  Each	  counter-­‐actualisation	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   questions	   and	   problems	   posed	   by	   the	  movement	   of	   the	  virtual	   objects	   and	   actual	   happenings	  with	  which	   ‘sexuality’	   reverberates	   as	   it	   surrounds	   and	  orients	   bodies,	   capturing	   particular	   crystallisations	   and	   formulations	   alongside	   larger	   virtual	  fluxes	  of	  connection,	  desire,	  belonging	  etc.,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  expressed	  at	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  level	  of	   intensity	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   combinations	   and	   levels	   of	   memory.	   	   Moreover,	   new	  resonances	   and	   reverberations,	   connections	   and	   flows	   bring	   new	   problems	   that	   require	   new	  counter-­‐actualisations	  and	  responses	  constantly	  to	  the	  fore.	   	  Thus,	  the	  most	  significant	  feature	  of	   what	   is	   being	   addressed	   here	   is	   not	   fixity	   but	   change,	   flow,	   connection	   and	   the	   spaces	   in	  between.	  	  	  This	   then	   is	   a	   politics	   that	   takes	   place	   both	   above	   and	   below	   the	   level	   of	   law	   and	   subject.	  Counter-­‐actualisation	   occurs	   in	   relation	   to	   problems	   and	   events,	   but	   crucially	   works	   as	   a	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repetition	  of	  the	  pre-­‐individual,	  creating	  new	  connections	  and	  possibilities,	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  opposition	  or	  mimicry	  of	  enunciated	  identities.	  	  	  As	  such,	  Colebrook	  notes	  that:	  	   ‘We	  could	  see	  marriage	  in	  its	  current	  bourgeois	  normative	  and	  heterosexual	  form	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  a	  certain	  problem	  or	  question:	  how	  the	  self	  forms	  its	  gender,	  manages	  its	  desires	  and	  property,	   and	   organises	   its	   child-­‐rearing.	   	   But	   the	   queer	   self	  would	   repeat	   the	   problems	   that	  compose	   the	   self:	   counter	   actualising	   it	   in	   the	   present	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   pure	   past	   of	   the	  questions	  from	  which	  we	  have	  emerged.	  	  How	  might	  a	  self	  desire,	  what	  might	  count	  as	  an	  object	  of	  one’s	  desire,	  what	  relations	  or	  events	  might	  the	  couplings	  of	  bodies	  produce	  and	  enable?’72	  	  	  Problems	  and	  practices	  can	  therefore	  be	  interrogated	  according	  to	  the	  potential	  and	  positivity	  of	  situated	  encounters73:	  what	  relations	  are	  established?	  	  What	  openings	  are	  detectable?	  	  What	  connections	  are	  being	  made	  and	  how	  can	  they	  be	  thought	  outside	  the	  restrictions	  of	  habit	  and	  recognition?	  It	   is	   at	   the	   ‘fault	   lines’	   of	   an	   ethical	   situation	   that	   these	   questions	   resonate	  most	   strongly.	   	   I	  would	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   also	   the	   point	  when	   it	   is	  most	   vital	   to	  widen	   one’s	   analysis	   to	   the	  ‘intensities	   pulsing	   through	   a	   person’	   who	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   as	   the	   actualisation	   of	   pre-­‐individual	   singularities.74	  	   It	   is	   also	   at	   these	   fault	   lines	   that	   we	   are	   most	   exposed	   to	   the	  complexity	  of	  the	  power	  relations	  that	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  in	  relation	  to	  corporeal	  and	  incorporeal	  events.	   	   Thus	   as	   Braidotti,	   Colebrook	   and	   Hanafin	   argue,	   corporeal	   events	   (such	   as	   the	   state	  restriction	  of	  access	  to	  abortion)	  can	  produce	  incorporeal	  change	  (a	  women	  becomes	  a	  mother).	  	  The	   designation	   of	   motherhood	   is	   not	   just	   a	   bodily	   change	   but	   dependent	   upon	   particular	  relations	   and	   actualisations	   relating	   to	   gender	   roles,	   motherhood,	   and	   the	   bourgeois	  heteronormative	  family.75	  	  Virtual	  relations	  encompass	  and	  change	  the	  bodies	  in	  which	  they	  find	  actualisation.	   	   I	   am	   suggesting	   then,	   that	   at	   moments	   of	   conflict,	   at	   times	   when	   attentive	  judgment	   is	  most	  relevant,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  partially	   locate	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  virtual	  multiplicity	  that	  resonates	  in	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  at	  hand.	  	  	  	  Thus,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  question	  of	  rights,	  we	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  that	  rights	   cannot	   name	   must	   be	   not	   an	   immediate	   attempt	   to	   find	   the	   rights	   which	   best	   fit	   the	  situation	  at	  hand	  (right	  to	  privacy,	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  etc.)	  but	  an	  attempt	  at	   immersion	  –	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  intensities	  that	  are	  actualised,	  the	  connections	  and	  connectives	  that	  resonate	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at	   a	   particular	   moment	   and	   in	   a	   particular	   place.	   	   The	   law	   here	   offers	   not	   a	   transcendent	  resolution	   in	  which	  we	   can	   subsume	  our	   claims	  but	   an	   immanent	   tool	   through	  which	  we	   can	  open	  up	  the	  situation	  at	  hand	  and	  perhaps	  the	  law	  itself.	  	  Indeed	  in	  this	  vein,	  Deleuze	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  works	  by	  advancing	  from	  singularities.	  	  The	  law	  is	  territorialising,	  but	  there	  remain	  gaps	  through	  which	  questions	  emerge.	  	  What	  exists	  is	  a	  tension,	  and	  as	  Hanafin	  argues	  –	  	  	   ‘What	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  very	  tension,	  to	  paraphrase	  Deleuze,	  is	  not	  the	  ritual	  application	  of	  human	  rights	  principles	  but	  the	  possibility	  of	  ‘inventing	  jurisprudences’.	  As	  Deleuze	  observes,	  ‘There	  are	  no	  human	  rights,	  there	  is	  life,	  and	  there	  are	  life	  rights.	  .	  .	  .	  That’s	  what	  being	  on	  the	  left	  is	  about.	  It’s	  creating	  the	  right’	  (Deleuze,	  1996,	  p.	  40).’76	  	  Or	  as	  Lefebvre	  suggests	  –	  	  	   ‘…	  legal	  scholarship	  must	  maintain	  an	  appreciation	  for	  the	  growth	  and	  becoming	  of	  law	  –	  which	  proceeds	  from	  particular	  situations	  and	  cases	  unfamiliar	  with	  later	  ordering	  principles	  and	   generalisations	   –	   without	   subjecting	   these	   to	   a	   scheme	   of	   ends	   or	   final	   causes.	   An	  awareness	  of	  the	  becoming	  of	  law	  makes	  us	  sensitive	  to	  the	  new	  in	  law’77	  Lefebvre’s	   analysis	   rests	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   ‘[w]ith	   a	   difficult	   case	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   neither	  rule	   nor	   situation	   can	   intelligibly	   be	   said	   to	   exist	   outside	   the	   context	   of	  mutual	   encounter.’78	  	  Rights	  code	  bodies	  and	  flows	  and	  we	  perceive	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  do	  this	  most	  acutely	  at	  the	  moments	   in	  which	   this	   coding	   is	   imperfect:	   ‘only	   in	   an	   extraordinary	   ethical	   situation,	   living	  along	  the	  fault	  line	  between	  organic	  –	  bare	  –	  life	  and	  personhood,	  does	  one	  feel	  the	  intensities	  pulsing	   through	   a	   person	   and	   revealing	   the	   impersonal	   individuations	   and	   pre-­‐individual	  singularities	   that	   the	   person	   actualises.’79	  	   It	   is	   in	   these	   awkward	   bodies,	   the	   monstrous	  figurations	  and	  the	  places	  where	  the	  law	  cannot	  go,	  or	  has	  not	  yet	  gone,	  that	  there	  is	  the	  need	  for	  attentive	  judgment	  as	  actualisation	  of	  virtual	  memory	  and	  the	  repetition	  of	  a	  new,	  complex	  multiplicity.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  what	  is	  required	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  enunciation	  of	  another	  law	  or	  right,	  but	  an	  exploration	  and	  questioning	  of	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  particular	  assemblage	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  what	  connections	  are	  in	  place,	  what	  connections	  are	  needed,	  what	  wider	  scopes	  law	  connects	  to,	  which	   narratives	   and	   histories	   are	   most	   strongly	   activated	   and	   why	   this	   might	   be.	   	   In	   this	  articulation,	  rights	  are	  immanent,	  double	  sided	  tools.	  	  In	  actuality,	  they	  are	  that	  which	  make	  us	  pause,	  stutter	  and	  seek	  to	  re-­‐connect.	  	  In	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  virtual,	  law	  acts	  as	  memory	  that	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is	  rotated	  and	  actualised	  according	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  actual.	  	  Rights	  are	  one	  mode	  through	  which	  we	  perceive	  the	  situation	  in	  order	  to	  repeat	  anew.	  	  	  Lefebvre	   stresses	   that	   judges	   –	   his	  mode	   of	   approaching	   attentive	   judgment	   –	  must	   exercise	  caution	   in	   their	   actualisations	   of	   virtual	   memory:	   ‘the	   call	   to	   prudence	   is	   found	   in	   several	  chapters	  of	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus	  (most	  notably	  the	  political	  ones),	  where	  experimentation	  risks	  turning	  into	  alternative	  twin	  terrors;	  either	  toward	  fascism	  and	  the	  dangerous	  self-­‐assurance	  of	  "marginals"	  (TP	  227-­‐229),	  or	  toward	  a	  morbid	  abolition,	  a	  line	  of	  death	  (TP,	  160-­‐161,	  229-­‐231,	  250,	  270).’80	  	  Creativity	  and	  experimentation	  must	  be	  approached	  carefully	  as	  the	  line	  of	  flight	  does	  not	  guarantee	  a	  better	  outcome,	  just	  a	  different	  one.	  	  While	  Lefebvre’s	  caution	  is	  justified,	  it	  is	  most	  interesting	  if	  we	  read	  the	  need	  for	  judicial	  prudence	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  politics	  of	  location.	  	  Judge	  and	  (for	  example)	  activist,	  are	  differently	  situated	  (as	  are	  activists	  connected	  to	  powerful	  NGOS	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  working	  for	  small	  organisations	  with	  little	  access	  to	  frameworks	  of	   law	   and	   governance).	   	   These	   different	   locations	   impact	   upon	   the	  way	   in	  which	   justice	   and	  injustice,	   law	   and	   rights	   are	   perceived	   at	   each	   instance	   –	   even	   if	   the	   situation	   through	  which	  they	  are	  being	  perceived	  is	  exactly	  the	  same,	  the	  plane	  of	  law	  that	  is	  actualised	  differs	  radically	  depending	  upon	  how	   the	  actor	   is	   situated	   in	   relation	   to	  an	  occurrence.	   	  This	   interpretation	   is	  further	  complicated	  if	  we	  recall	  here	  that	  the	  actor	  here	  is	  the	  actualised	  body	  moving	  within	  a	  social	   space	   that	   mediates	   the	   way	   in	   which	   ideas	   and	   experiences	   can	   be	   approached	   or	  perceived.	   	  Different	  locations	  allow	  different	  perceptions	  and	  actualisations	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  or	   less	   restricted	   freedom	  of	   action.	   	   Our	   responsibility,	   I	  would	   suggest,	   is	   to	  make	   as	  many	  connections	  as	  possible	  –	  to	  view	  rights	  not	  as	  a	  monolithic	  body	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  if	  the	  ‘right’	  enunciation	  of	  rights	  and	  law	  is	  found,	  but	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  can	  make	  various	  different	  connections	  and	  set	  in	  resonance	  multiple	  different	  series.	  	  The	  conceptual	  persona	  finds	  a	  reflection	  in	  the	  actor	  worthy	  of	  the	  event,	  who	  leaps	  into	  virtual	  memory	  and	  actualises	  monstrosity.	  	  The	  actor	  moves	   or	   emplaces	   herself	  where	   the	   law	   has	   not	   yet	   been,	   creatively	   actualising	   the	   virtual	  memory	  of	  law	  into	  new	  formulations	  and	  articulations.	  	  	  The	  operation	  of	  attentive	  judgment	  speaks	  directly	  to	  questions	  of	  space	  and	  location.	  	  Rights	  here	  might	   be	   viewed	   not	   as	   an	   abstract	   discourse,	   but	   as	   an	   immanent	   operation	   of	   power,	  memory	  and	  movement	  resulting	  in	  multiple	  connections	  and	  missed	  connections.	  	  Thus,	  rights	  become	  a	  question	  of	  space	  or	  the	  distribution	  of	  bodies	  in	  space.	  	  There	  are	  several	  interrelated	  points	   to	  be	  unpicked	  here.	   	  The	   first	   concerns	   the	  operation	  of	   rights	   in	   relation	   to	  both	   the	  distribution	   and	   relationality	   of	   corporeal	   bodies	   in	   space.	   	   Rights-­‐as-­‐machines	   function	   as	   a	  mode	  or	  a	  diagram	  of	  distribution,	  connection,	  and	  distancing.	  	  Thus	  rights	  are	  a	  framework	  of	  emplacing	  and	  spacing;	  however	  rights	  in	  their	  ‘attentive’	  form	  entail	  a	  constant	  movement	  and	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reorientation	   in	   the	   face	  of	  new	  encounters	  and	  problematics.	   	  This	   is	  a	  movement	   that	  shifts	  not	  just	  the	  framework	  of	  rights,	  but	  the	  distribution	  and	  relations	  of	  bodies	  in	  space,	  with	  each	  actualisation	  reorienting	  the	  shape	  and	  connections	  of	  the	  whole.	  	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  second	  issue:	   that	  of	   the	  question	  of	   the	  multiple	  and	  different	  bodies	  that	  move	  in	  space.	   	  Each	  body	  actualises	  rights	   in	  a	  singular	  particularity	  and	  more	  significantly	  for	  the	  argument	  here,	   ‘each	  
position	  is	  necessarily	  occupied	  by	  one	  person,	  where	  each	  body	  can	  only	  stand	  where	  other	  bodies	  
do	  not.’81	  	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  rights	  play	  a	  role	  of	  machinic	  distribution	  –	  if	  we	  think	  of	  rights	  as	  process	  rather	  than	  fact,	  the	  point	  of	  conflict	  occurs	  when	  the	  process	  of	  distribution	  contends	  with	  the	  impossibility	  of	  simultaneous	  emplacement.	   	  This	  can	  in	  part	  be	  read	  as	  a	  paradox	  of	  the	   universal	   and	   particular	   in	   law:	   rights	   make	   a	   claim	   to	   a	   universal	   relevance	   and	  distribution,	   yet	   they	   are	   unequally	   embodied,	   experienced	   and	   actualised	   dependent	   upon	  context.	   	   If	   the	   universality	   of	   rights	   can	   only	   be	   expressed	   in	   the	   particularly	   of	   each	   body,	  which	  itself	  exists	  in	  relation	  with	  other	  bodies	  in	  space,	  one	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  the	  encounter,	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  immanent	  understanding	  of	  rights,	  might	  be	  that	  moment	  at	  which,	  actualised	  bodies	   or	   haecceities	   (in	   whatever	   form	   this	   actualisation	  might	   take),	   embodying	   particular	  rights,	  contest	  a	  location	  –	  whether	  that	  location	  be	  geographical82	  (the	  right	  to	  occupy	  land	  or	  a	  street),	  political	  (a	  citizen	  body),	  social	  (a	  bar,	  public	  transport	  etc.),	  physical,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  all	  of	  these.	  	  It	   is	   important	  not	   to	  move	   to	  quickly	   to	   try	   to	   respond	   to	   this	  apparent	   impasse.	  By	  viewing	  rights	  as	  a	  process	  of	  spatialisation,	  we	  open	  up	  the	  law	  to	  uncertainty.	  	  This	  approach	  demands	  that	  we	  view	  the	   law	   through	   the	  particularities	  of	  bodies	  as	  singularities	  circulating	   in	  space	  with	  other	  bodies	   in	  a	  process	  of	   simultaneous	  (and	  sometimes	  conflictual)	  emplacement	  and	  withdrawal.	  	  As	  such,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  not	  a	  closing	  down	  or	  short	  circuiting	  of	  rights	  or	  law,	  but	  a	  process	  of	  calling	  rights’	  certainties	   into	  question,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  opening	  up	  rights	  to	  new	  connections,	  orientations	  and	  replays	  of	  virtualities.	  What	   is	   required	   here	   is	   an	   openness	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   radical	   potential	   and	   creative	  destruction.	  	  To	  read	  this	  point	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  connectedness	  of	  individuals	  and	  individual	  bodies	   highlights	   the	  way	   in	  which	   an	   understanding	   as	   self	   or	   subject	   as	   socially	   embedded	  must	  be	  complemented	  by	  an	  understanding	  that	  this	  embeddedness	  exists	  with	  others	  whose	  experience	  and	  actualisation	  varies	  from	  our	  own.	  	  To	  return	  to	  Gatens’	  point,	  what	  is	  required	  is	   both	   a	   radical	   openness	   and	   an	   emplacement	   within	   a	   sociality	   that	   includes	   not	   only	  immediate	   location	   but	   also	   global	   locatedness	   in	   both	   an	   actual	   and	   virtual	   sense.	   	   Human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	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  a	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  Fear	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  Law,	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beings	  belong	   to	   ‘a	   complex	  multiplicity	  of	  potentially	   conflicting	   communities.’83	  	  Thus,	  while	  we	  are	  differently	  emplaced,	  we	  are	  also	  connected	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  pure	  past:	  ‘Each	  present,	   each	   life,	   is	   connected	   to	  all	  others	  but	   to	  greater	  and	   lesser	  degrees	  of	  contraction.	   	   The	   way	   in	   which	   any	   life	   presupposes	   all	   the	   past	   brings	   very	   different	   lives	  together,	  against	  the	  Aristotelian	  desire	  to	  categorise	  lives...This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  actual	  lives	  of	  pigs	  and	  philosophers	  must	  have	  causal	  effects	  on	  one	  another	  -­‐	  though,	  of	  course,	  they	  may.	   	   It	  means	   that,	   despite	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   actual	   connections,	   there	  will	   necessarily	   be	  connections	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  pure	  past	  and,	  through	  that	  change,	  they	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  point	  where	  we	  may	  say	  that	  one	  can	  replay	  another	  or	  touch	  another	  past	  in	  similar	  ways.’84	  Differential	   locations	  and	  connections	  across	  the	  pure	  past	  shift	   the	   frame	  in	  which	  rights	  can	  operate.	   	   If	   rights	   are	  Deleuzian	  machines	   that	   connect	   and	   arrange	   flows,	   the	   best	   and	  most	  challenging	  use	  of	  rights	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  encounter	  is	  one	  that	  forges	  multiple	  connections	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  location	  and	  micro	  histories	  at	  hand,	  rather	  than	  one	  that	  imposes	  an	  artificial	  clarity	  upon	  the	  encounter	  with	  reference	  to	  an	  already	  established	  framework.	  	  	  Of	  interest	  are	  points	  of	  shared	  resonance	  or	  intensity,	  new	  movements	  and	  openings,	  new	  emplacements	  that	  can	  be	  embodied	  but	  not	  (yet)	  articulated	  in	  law.	  	  In	   this	   orientation,	   the	   human	   is	   defined	   by	   conatus	   or	   potential	   for	   action	   and	   by	  connectability/sociability,	  and	  thus	  Braidotti	  argues,	   the	  social	  and	  political	  are	   inbuilt	  human	  capacities.	   	   Socio-­‐political	   factors	  are	   inherent	   to	   the	   structure	  of	   subjectivity.85	  	   It	   is	   this	  way	  that	  we	  move	  away	   from	   the	  disembodied	   subject,	   towards	  what	  Hanafin,	   following	  Cavarero	  calls	  ‘the	  who’	  of	  ‘actually	  existing	  human	  beings	  who	  come	  into	  being	  via	  a	  web	  of	  relations	  and	  socio	  symbolic	  ties.’86	  	  	  My	  argument	  therefore,	  is	  that	  a	  radical	  openness	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  law	  and	  identity	  for	  self	  and	  others	  moves	  us	  towards	  a	  connection	  across	  difference	  that	  may	  not	  solve	  the	  inherent	  contradiction	  of	  law	  and	  sexuality,	  but	  may	  move	  towards	  their	  reorientation.	  	  Further,	  this	  radical	  openness	  must	  be	  to	  the	  otherness	  of	  other	  individuals,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  non-­‐human	  or	  infra-­‐human.	  	  Particularly	  significant	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  gay	  rights,	  I	  would	  argue,	  is	  a	  sensitivity	   to	   movements	   in	   space	   and	   time	   –	   or	   to	   chaos	   and	   chance.	   	   D’Emilio	   notes	   for	  example	  that	  leaps	  forward	  in	  gay	  rights	  gains	  ‘cannot	  solely	  –	  or	  even	  primarily	  –	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  will,	  the	  grit,	  or	  the	  savvy	  of	  activists	  themselves.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  provoked	  by	  social	  or	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political	   turmoil	   that	   creates	   new	   openings	   for	   change,	   or	   new	   motivations	   to	   act.’87	  	   Wider	  movements	  and	  flows,	  and	  our	   interactions	  with	  such	  currents	  are	  also	  necessary	   for	  political	  change.	   	   A	   situated	   knowledge	   involves	   the	   acknowledgement	   of	   that	   which	   is	   above	   and	  beyond	   us	   as	   individuals	   and	   an	   awareness	   of	   our	   incorporation	   into	   larger	   flows,	  which	  we	  might	   influence	   but	   not,	   ultimately,	   direct.	   	   This	   is	   what	   I	   read	   Flieger	   as	   arguing	   when	   she	  suggests	  that	  we	  must	  play	  the	  game	  wittily.88	  	  We	  cannot	  escape	  our	  social	  strata,	  but	  we	  can	  move	  with	   an	   awareness	   of	  what	   has	   brought	   this	   strata	   into	   being	   and	  what	   connections	   it	  facilitates.	   	   	   Away	   from	   the	   sphere	   of	   sexuality	   activism	   Connell	   cites	   Nandy,	   to	   argue	   that	  Gandhi	  exemplifies	   this	   form	  of	   resistance:	   in	   realising	   that	  he	   could	  not	   fight	  British	   colonial	  power	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  he	  instead	  ‘cracked	  the	  code	  of	  colonialism.’89	  	  Gandhi’s	  success,	  Connell	  argues,	  came	  from	  the	  exposure	  and	  delegitimisation	  of	  the	  colonial	  regime,	  through	  the	  pursuit	  of	   a	   mode	   of	   behaviour	   which	   both	   stepped	   outside	   the	   system,	   but	   functioned	   with	   a	   keen	  awareness	   of	   the	   system’s	  mode	   of	   operation.90	  	   Playing	   the	   game	  knowingly	   is	   to	  work	   both	  inside	  and	  outside	  –	  enmeshed	  in	  a	  particular	  situation,	  but	  aware	  of	  the	  virtual	  possibility	  for	  other	  articulations	  and	  actualisations	  that	  are	  possible	  through	  a	  repetition	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  the	  future.	  	  	  This	   suggests	   that	  we	   can	   read	  neither	   injustice	   nor	   resistance	   as	   the	   simple	   application	   of	   a	  universal	  rule	  or	  law	  that	  designates	  particular	  behaviours	  as	  good	  or	  bad.	  	  Instead	  I	  am	  arguing	  for	  an	  opening	  up	  or	  spatialisation	  of	  rights	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  subversion	  of	  the	  logos	  of	  law	  as	  a	   single	   narrative	   or	   interpretation	   and	   instead	   views	   rights	   as	   an	   actualised	   virtuality.	   	   This	  allows	  for	  the	  entry	  of	  uncertainty	  into	  law:	  	   ‘This	   is	   what	   space	   brings	   to	   law.	   Space	   is	   not	   just	   the	   question	   ‘how	   would	   this	  judgment/legal	   text/legal	   act	   be	   formed	   over	   there?’,	   but	   significantly,	   ‘why	   is	   the	  judgment/legal	  text/legal	  act	  expected	  to	  be	  formed	  in	  this	  way	  here?’	  The	  result	   is	  a	  law	  that	  keeps	  on	  questioning	  itself,	  not	  in	  eternal	  undecidability	  but	  in	  continuous	  acknowledgement	  of	  its	  own	  limitations:	  the	   law	  can	  only	  do	  that	  much,	  and	  even	  that	   is	  not	  certain.	  Space	  is	   law’s	  mirror	  on	  which	  the	   irresolvable	  paradox	  between	   its	  universality	  and	  particularity	   is	   thrown	  into	  relief.	  Spatiality	  is	  an	  ethical	  position.’	  91	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At	   issue	   then	   is	   questioning	   that	   leads	   to	  movement,	   or	   better	   oscillation	   –	   between	   striated	  (coded/knowable)	  and	  smooth	  (unknown,	  nomadic)	  space,	  between	  law	  and	  justice.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  movement	   recognises	   the	   complex	   interaction	  of	   the	   two.	   	  Rights	  are	  not	  necessarily	  one	  thing	  or	  the	  other,	  but	  instead	  are	  in	  a	  process	  of	  continually	  interrupting	  themselves.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  is	  both	  an	  expression	  and	  a	  result	  of	  the	  paradoxical	  nature	  of	  rights’	  tendency	  to	  go	  in	  two	  directions	  at	  once.	  	  As	  Hanafin	  argues,	  ‘law	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  contradictions	  which	  lie	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   its	   discourse.	   	   Legal	   discourse	   reveals	   a	   space	   in	   which	   power	   and	  transgression	   are	   at	   play.	   	   It	   is	   these	   infinitesimal	  moments	   of	   interruption	  which	   expose	   the	  limits	  of	   legal	  discourse,	  which	  display	   fleetingly	   the	   law	  of	  another	  community	  not	  bound	  by	  law’s	  word.’92	  	   	   	   Perhaps	   counter-­‐intuitively	  when	   considered	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   role	   that	   law	  usually	  plays,	  this	  movement	  demands	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  certainty	  and	  orientation	  –	  an	  unutterability,	  or	  a	  ‘legislative	  void’93	  that	  interrupts	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  legal	  whole.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  certainty	  however,	  is	  what	  emplaces	  or	  spatialises	  rights	  –	  it	  is	  what	  calls	  into	  question	  not	  only	  their	  operation,	  but	  also	  the	  position	  from	  which	  they	  operate.	  	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  holds	  true	  for	  the	  courts	  or	  legal	  chambers	  and	  for	  those	  who	  activate	  rights	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  resistance.	  	  If	   we	   return	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   Pride	   above	   for	   example,	   a	   further	   spatialisation	   of	   the	   initial	  occupation	  of	  space	  subverts	  and	  reorients	  how	  we	  might	  think	  about	  rights,	  sexuality,	  class	  and	  race.	   	   We	   thus	   remain	   within	   a	   pendulum	   swing	   of	   questioning,	   expectation,	   possibility	   and	  withdrawal.	  	  	  	  As	  such,	   I	  would	  suggest	   that	   law	  or	  activist	  practice	   that	   is	  unmediated	  by	   this	  movement	   in	  relation	   to	   uncertainty	   can	   give	   us	   only	   false	   expressions	   and	   false	   problems.	   	   The	   job	   of	   the	  activist	  or	  activist-­‐lawyer	  is	  to	  attempt	  to	  counter-­‐actualise	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reorients	  both	  self	  and	  world	   in	   order	   to	   address	   this	   injustice	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   to	   speak	   to	   an	   audience	   and	   an	  orientation	   that	   is	   thinkable,	   if	   not	   necessarily	   nameable.	   	   This	   is	   why	   conceptual	  personae/figurations	  are	  so	  important.	  	  As	  Burchill’s	  analysis	  shows,	  figurations	  are	  that	  which	  are	  not	  caught	  within	  dominant	  frameworks	  of	  knowledge	  or	  understanding.94	  	  They	  are	  modes	  of	  creative	  selection	  and	  expression	  that	  bring	  dominant	  hegemonies	  into	  focus	  by	  exposing	  and	  subverting	  the	  terms,	  codes	  and	  constructions	  in	  which	  these	  hegemonic	  forms	  (of	  expression,	  law,	  discourse	  etc.)	  express	  themselves.	  	  However,	  just	  as	  conceptual	  personae	  are	  not	  the	  same	  as	   psycho-­‐social	   types,	   the	   activist	   cannot	   be	   the	   figuration,	   but	   must	   instead	   think	   the	  figuration	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  particular	  relationships,	  changes	  and	  configurations	  within	  which	  she	  is	  enmeshed.	  	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  just	  as	  the	  conceptual	  personae	  and	  psycho-­‐social	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type	   are	   implicated	   and	   overlap	   with	   one	   another,	   the	   activist	   cannot	   act	   outside	   the	   social	  conditions	  and	  matrix	  of	  social	  connections	  in	  which	  she	  inheres.	  	  What	  the	  figuration	  does	  do	  is	  allow	   a	   consideration	   of	   which	   modes	   of	   thinking,	   experimentation	   and	   actions	   subvert	   the	  hegemonic	  coding	  at	  play.	   	  Thus,	  the	  figuration	  offers	  a	  possible	  opening	  into	  a	  mode	  of	  action	  that,	  rather	  than	  posing	  as	  negative	  resistance	  to	  social	  structures	  in	  the	  terms	  already	  dictated	  and	   colonised	  by	   those	   same	   social	   structures,	   seeks	   creative	   resistance	   and	   experimentation	  that	   allows	   resistance	   as	   the	   production	   of	   new	   modes	   of	   thinking,	   being	   and	   saying.	   	   Of	  particular	   relevance	   here	   is	   Olkowski’s	   argument	   that	   how	   we	   conceive	   of	   the	   world	   is	  absolutely	   relevant	   to	   how	   we	   live	   (in)	   it.95	  	   At	   issue	   is	   both	   the	   material	   existence	   and	  organisation	  of	  life	  and	  the	  concepts	  by	  which	  we	  understand	  life’s	  existence	  and	  embodiment.	  	  Here	  we	  think	  not	  a	  disembodied	  universal	  Other	  but	   ‘another’	   through	  which	  we	  move	   ‘from	  the	  universal	   to	   the	  unique.’96	  	  Thus	  resistance	  here	  takes	  place	  through	  creative	  material	  and	  conceptual	  production:	  through	  creating	  new	  concepts	  for	  the	  problems	  that	  we	  are	  faced	  with,	  through	  experimenting	  with	  modes	  of	  life	  rather	  than	  seeking	  one	  single	  or	  totalisable	  mode	  of	  being.	   	   My	   argument	   therefore,	   is	   that	   the	   failure	   of	   rights	   is	   an	   opening	   for	   this	   form	   of	  experimentation,	   figuration	  and	   creative	  production.	   	  We	   counter-­‐actualise	   the	  questions	   that	  are	   posed	   by	   rights	   failures	   rather	   than	   being	   subsumed	   to	   the	   regime	   that	   rights	   help	   to	  maintain.97	  	   Practically	   speaking,	   what	   is	   of	   interest	   here	   is	   not	   an	   attempt	   to	   fit	   monstrous	  bodies	  into	  existing	  rights	  regimes,	  or	  even	  necessarily	  to	  expand	  rights	  regimes	  to	  encompass	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  monstrosity.	  	  What	  is	  more	  interesting	  (although	  more	  unstable)	  is	  the	  use	  of	  figurations	  to	  embed	  and	  expose	  regimes,	  to	  situate	  the	  activist	  at	  the	  margins	  and	  blind	  spots	  and	   allow	   her	   to	   speak	   difference	   to	   a	   constituency	   that	   does	   not	   yet	   necessarily	   exist.	   	   The	  failure	  of	  rights	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  just	  that	  –	  as	  a	  failure	  or	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves.	   	  By	  taking	  seriously	  this	  failure,	  two	  slightly	  different	  options	  are	  presented	  to	  us	  –	   either	  attempt	   to	  expand	   rights	   regimes	   in	  order	   to	   try	   to	  enfold	  and	  encompass	  new	  demands,	  or	  to	  actualise	  the	  regime	  anew,	  to	  reconfigure	  it	  on	  the	  plane	  of	  immanence	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  the	  problem	  through	  which	  the	  failure	  was	  exposed,	  dissolves.	  	  At	  the	  very	  limit	  then,	  what	  we	  draw	  into	  question	  is	  not	  the	  activist	  or	  the	  non-­‐heteronormative	  body,	  but	  the	  very	  regime	  that	  names	  them	  as	  such	  –	  and	  just	  as	  the	  activist	  and	  non-­‐heteronormative	  body	  can	  be	  folded	  and	  perceived	  anew,	  so	  can	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  fold	  and	  perceive	  the	  very	  system	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	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The	  ‘successful	  failure’	  of	  rights	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  extra-­‐representational	  community	  
and	  disjunctive	  connection	  	  A	   key	   issue	   here	   is	   the	   question	   of	   connectedness	   across	   difference	   and	   action	   in	   radical	  disunity	   and	   disjunction.	   	   The	   nature	   of	   connectedness	   or	   community	   however,	   is	   highly	  complex.	   	   In	   discussing	   these	   issues,	   Halberstam	   uses	   Nancy’s	   notion	   of	   ‘lost’	   community	   to	  highlight	   the	  way	   in	  which	   ‘quests	   for	   community	   are	   always	   nostalgic	   attempts	   to	   return	   to	  some	   fantasized	  moment	  of	  union	  and	  unity’	   revealing	   the	   ‘conservative	   stakes	   in	   community	  for	   all	   kind	  of	  political	  projects,	   and	  mak[ing]	   the	   reconsideration	  of	   subcultures	   all	   the	  more	  urgent.’98	  	  Considerable	  anxiety	  can	  surround	  the	  political	  project	  of	  community	  construction	  –	  at	  stake	  are	  questions	  of	  totality,	  legitimacy	  and	  purity.	  Furthermore,	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  these	  factors	   are	   only	   exacerbated	  by	   a	  political	   context	   that	   includes	   a	   recent	   transition	   (to	   a	   new	  form	  of	  rule	  for	  example99)	  or,	  as	  in	  the	  context	  of	  emergent	  sexual	  rights,	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  subversion	   of	   or	   challenge	   to	   particular	   operations	   of	   power	   or	   identity	   (this	   dynamic	   is	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  Three).	   	   	  The	  stabilising	  role	  of	   the	   law	  is	  particularly	  significant	  here	  as	  the	  law	  ‘creates	  the	  textual	  illusion	  of	  a	  community	  founded	  on	  a	  being	  in	  common.’100	  	  The	  law	  helps	   to	   secure	   an	   ‘invisible	   bond’	   –	   an	   identity	   as	   a	   (member	   of	   a)	   community.	   	   As	   I	   have	  suggested	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  however,	  to	  claim	  a	  communal	  purity	  is	  to	  ‘throw	  a	  cloak’	  over	  deeper	  difference.	   	  This	   tension	   is	   evident	   in	  both	   the	  actions	  of	   gay	   rights	  groups	  and	   in	   the	  arguments	  of	  those	  who	  oppose	  them	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  culture	  or	  tradition.	  	  Two	  broad	  themes	  are	  at	  play	  here;	  the	  first	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  particular	  totalising	  essence	  that	  can	  be	   achieved	   through	   a	   particular	   teleological	   journey	   to	   a	   specified	   utopian	   endpoint.	   	   The	  second	  is	  the	  contrasting	  idea	  of	  a	  mystical	  ‘lost’	  totality	  which	  once	  existed	  but	  is	  now	  gone	  and	  should	  be	  mourned	  or	  recovered.	  	  Community	  in	  these	  iterations	  tells	  us	  what	  we	  are,	  what	  we	  should	  be,	  or	  what	  we	  were.	  	  And	  it	  speaks	  authoritatively	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘we’	  –	  community	  in	  this	  framework	   is	   transcendental	   and	   central	   to	   our	   identity	   -­‐	   it	   tells	   us	  who	  we	   are	   and	  how	  we	  should	   act.	   	   However,	   both	   of	   these	   totalising	   narratives	   are	   a	  myth.	   	   Nothing	   has	   been	   lost,	  nothing	   is	   lost.	   No	   form	   of	   rights,	   law	   or	   activism	   will	   allow	   a	   recovery	   or	   expression	   of	   a	  supposed	  unity,	   indeed,	  on	  the	  contrary	   it	  will	   form	  only	  a	  new	  expression	  which	  will	  contain	  within	   it	   the	   potential	   for	   once	   again	   being	   opened	   up	   and	   expressed	   anew	   as	   the	   law	   as	   a	  machine	  of	  striation	  interrupts	  itself	  in	  its	  ‘alter	  ego’101	  as	  a	  machine	  of	  deterritorialisation.	  	  'We	  alone	  are	  lost,	  we	  upon	  whom	  the	  "social	  bond"	  (relations,	  communication),	  our	  own	  invention,	  now	   descends	   heavily	   like	   the	   net	   of	   an	   economic,	   technical,	   political	   and	   cultural	   snare.	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Entangled	  in	  its	  meshes,	  we	  have	  wrung	  for	  ourselves	  the	  phantasms	  of	  the	  lost	  community.'102	  If	  we	  begin	  from	  representations,	  names	  and	  identities	  we	  start	  in	  the	  wrong	  place.	  	  The	  point	  is	  not	   to	   make	   the	   situation	   encountered	   fit	   within	   some	   already	   conceived	   narrative	   of	  community,	  citizenship	  or	  state,	  but	  to	  open	  up	  what	  is	  new,	  the	  resonances,	  lines	  of	  flight	  and	  expressions	  of	  intensities	  in	  their	  different	  forms.	   	  Law	  and	  community	  here	  are	  not	  a	  map	  for	  action	  but	  one	  actualisation	  that	  can	  be	  played	  again.	  	  	  	  Disunity	  then,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  something	  to	  be	  feared:	  ‘Viewed	  spatially,	  the	  poststructuralist	  subject	  may	  appear	  as	  fragmented	  and	  disunited;	  on	  a	  temporal	  scale,	  however,	  its	  unity	  is	  that	  of	  a	  continuing	  power	  to	  synchronize	  its	  recollections.	  This	  creates	  a	  continuity	  of	  disconnected	  fragments:	  a	  discontinuous	  sense	  of	  time.'103	  	   In	  this	  sense,	   if	  we	  look	  to	  events	  or	  encounters,	  and	  to	  those	  moments	  that	  have	  shaped	  us	  as	  a	  community,	  we	  can	  acknowledge	  the	  event	  as	  becoming,	  but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   reject	   any	  definitive	   interpretation	  of	   it.	   	   So,	   for	   example,	   the	  event	   of	   Stonewall	   and	   the	   reverberations	   of	   Pride	   will	   be	   returned	   to,	   encountered	   and	  engaged	  with	   very	   differently	   as	  we	   return	   to	   these	   events	   from	   different	   spaces	   and	   places.	  	  The	  differently	  located	  person	  and	  community	  will	  have	  a	  different	  threshold	  of	  perception	  and	  engage	  differently	  with	  a	  moment,	  perhaps	  finding	  new	  and	  unactualised	  virtualities	  that	  were	  previously	  overlooked.	  Thus	   the	   event	   might	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   complex	   ‘archive’104	  of	   feeling,	   affect	   and	   history.	   	   An	  understanding	   of	   politics	   from	   this	   perspective	  demands	   that	  we	   try	   to	   unpick	   such	  histories	  rather	  than	  simply	  reacting	  along	  old,	  repetitive	  lines.	  	  Manalansan	  suggests	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  aware	   of	   the	   ‘shadows	   of	   stonewall’105	  or	   to	   escape	   the	   ‘stupor’	   of	   single-­‐issue	   politics.106	  	   In	  essence,	  perhaps	  we	  need	  to	  force	  ourselves	  to	  pause	  and	  stutter	  as	  part	  of	  our	  political	  action	  in	  order	  to	  attempt	  to	  address	  sexuality	  in	  all	  of	  its	  tangled	  complexity.	  	  	  Inherent	   to	   this	   form	   of	   analysis	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   sexual	   rights	   alone	   are,	   and	   will	   never	   be	  sufficient.	   	   In	   conjunction	  with	   this	   is	   the	   problem	   that	  many	   critiques	   of	   rights	   are	   entirely	  accurate.107	  Even	   more	   worryingly,	   arguments	   against	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   sexuality	  rights	   raise	   key	   and	   significant	   points.108	  However,	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   such	   arguments	   and	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debates	   remain	   trapped	   within	   restrictive,	   representational	   paradigms.109	  	   Or	   to	   paraphrase	  Ahmed,	  the	  orientations,	  the	  patterns	  of	  directionality	  towards	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  (which	  are	  treated	   in	   this	  paradigm	  as	  objects	   rather	   than	   flows)	  put	   some	   things	   into	  perspective	  while	  neglecting	   others.	   	   Current	   debates	   and	  more	   particularly,	   deadlocks,	   in	   international	   politics	  owe	  something,	  I	  would	  suggest,	  to	  particular	  repetitions	  of	  particular	  histories	  of	  thinking	  and	  viewing	  rights	  and	  sexuality.	  	  	  Rahul	   Rao’s	   analysis	   of	   Massad’s	   Desiring	   Arabs	   engages	   with	   some	   of	   these	   issues.	   	   Rao	  balances	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  hierarchising	  actions	  and	  language	  of	  LGBT	  international	  movements	  against	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  Massad’s	  argument	  that	  such	  actions	  and	  language	  are	  entirely	  false	  and	  out	  of	  place	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  He	  notes	  that	  –	  	  ‘Rather	   than	   treating	   the	   question	   of	   motivation	   as	   an	   empirical	   one,	   Massad	   has	   in	  effect	  decided	  that	  coming	  out	  as	  gay	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  is	  less	  about	  wanting	  to	  live	  in	  truth	  and	  more	  akin	   to	  buying	   the	   latest	  Calvin	  Klein	  underwear.	  While	  openly	  gay	  Arabs	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	   may	   be	   few	   in	   number,	   their	   characterisation	   as	   faddish	   and	   traitorous	   amounts	   to	   a	  transhistorical	   normative	   claim	   about	   how	   Arabs	   ought	   to	   express	   non-­‐heteronormative	  preferences.	   In	   effect,	   in	   criticising	   cosmopolitan	   rescue	   politics	   and	   its	   local	   interlocutors,	  Massad	   slips	   into	   a	   reinforcement	   of	   communitarian	   authenticity	   narratives	   that	   police	   how	  sexual	  preferences	  ought	  to	  be	  expressed.’110	  	  What	   is	   interesting	   here	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   a	   critique	   (made	   by	  Massad)	   of	   transhistorical,	  normative,	  universalising	  claims,	  becomes	  in	  itself	  a	  transhistorical	  universalising	  claim	  that	  is	  not	   sensitive	   to	   the	  agency	  of	   the	   actors	   involved	  or	   the	   complex	  and	   shifting	   conditions	   that	  enable	  and	  limit	  the	  operation	  of	  this	  agency.	  	  My	  reading	  of	  Rao’s	  critique	  is	  that	  arguments	  like	  those	   put	   forward	   by	   Massad,	   or	   equally	   by	   liberationist	   LGBT	   groups,	   fail	   to	   transcend	   the	  limits	   of	   representational	   politics	   and	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   complex	   histories	   at	   play	   or	   to	  situate	  their	  arguments	  within	  the	  particularities	  of	  material	  embodiment.	   	  The	  more	  complex	  and	   difficult,	   although	   perhaps	   more	   fruitful	   approach	   must	   be	   to	   attempt	   to	   ‘crack’	   this	  representation,	   to	  commit	   to	  unpicking	   issues	  as	   they	  arise	   in	   light	  of	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  discourses	  of	  power	  at	  play	  while	  embedding	  self	  and	  others	  in	  a	  politics	  of	  location.	  	  To	  put	  it	   differently,	   we	   must	   seek	   to	   extract	   from	   a	   location,	   particular	   issues	   and	   modes	   but	   to	  attempt	   to	   think	   these	   trends	  and	  differences	  outside	   the	  stricture	  of	  one	  single	  normative	  or	  historical	  narrative.	  	  	  	  Rao	  concludes	  by	  noting	  that:	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‘At	   least	   three	   sorts	   of	   responses	   are	  possible	  when	  one	   is	   confronted	  with	  polarities.	  First,	  one	  might	  choose	  to	  occupy	  one	  of	  these	  polarities	  and	  defend	  one’s	  position	  accordingly.	  Second,	  one	  might	  seek	  some	  sort	  of	  Hegelian	  synthesis	  between	  these	  polarities,	  a	  middle	  path,	  a	   third	  way.	  Third,	  one	  might	   seek	   to	  hold	   these	  polarities	   in	   tension	  with	  one	  another,	  using	  each	  to	  provide	  critical	  perspective	  on	  the	  other	  but	  recognizing	  the	  kernel	  of	  truth	  in	  both.’111	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  third	  approach,	  Rao’s	  analysis	  suggests	  a	  Deleuzian	  paradox:	  the	  holding	  of	  series	  in	  tension	   without	   subsuming	   them	   to	   representation	   or	   to	   one	   particular	   historical	   narrative.	  	  There	   is	   an	   attempt	   here	   to	   go	   in	   both	   directions	   at	   once,	   recognising	   connection	   despite	  difference:	  connection	  that	  is	  not	  pre-­‐ordained	  but	  produced.	  	  Thus,	  gay	  rights	  politics	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  its	  particular	  forms	  because	  it	  is	  pre-­‐given	  or	  certain	  but	  is	  instead	  a	  result	  of	  particular	  selections	   –	   some	   of	   which	   result	   from	   the	   actions	   of	   agents,	   some	   of	   which	   indicate	   the	  resonance	   of	   larger	   historical	   narratives,	   forces	   and	   laws.	   	   The	   expression	   of	   sexuality	   finds	  stability	   in	   particular	   ways,	   in	   particular	   places,	   at	   particular	   times.	   	   Different	   critical	  approaches,	  Rao	  reminds	  us,	  provide	  different	  critical	  perspectives	  and	  different	  positions	  from	  which	  we	  might	  leap	  back	  into	  virtual	  memory	  –	  what	  matters	  is	  where	  we	  start	  from,	  and	  the	  recognition	  that	  this	  starting	  point	  will	  always	  already	  be	  in	  the	  middle.	  	  Thus,	  we	  might	  argue	  with	  Halberstam	   that	   ‘justice	   in	   the	   end	   lies	   in	   the	   unraveling	   of	   the	   crime,	   not	   simply	   in	   its	  solutions,	   and	  when	  we	   cease	   to	  unravel	  we	  become	  collaborators.’112	  	  The	  expression,	   or	   the	  failure	  of	  expression	  of	  injustice	  is	  not	  a	  beginning	  –	  it	  is	  already	  a	  midpoint.	  	  The	  task	  at	  hand	  is	  to	  unravel	  the	  complex	  assemblage	  that	  surrounds	  the	  ‘crime’	  including	  the	  structures	  that	  have	  made	  possible	  the	  form	  of	  its	  articulation.	  	  	  This	   means	   that	   we	   must	   commit	   to	   an	   unraveling	   of	   ‘crimes’	   or	   perceived	   injustices,	   both	  towards	  and	  beyond	   the	   limits	  of	   codified	   law	  and	  rights.	   	  As	  Rao	  suggests,	   there	   is	  a	   tension	  here	  –	  a	  tension	  that	  an	  activist	  must	  take	  on	  and	  embody	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  transitory	  justices.	  	  Rights	   do	   not	   give	   us	   the	   answer,	   nor	   do	   discourses	   of	   sexuality	   –	   both	   are	   temporary	  actualisations	   of	   larger	   virtualities	   which	   we	   use	   in	   particular	   spaces	   in	   pursuit	   of	   new	  actualisations	  and	  ways	  of	  being	  together	  in	  common.	  	  Or,	  to	  put	  the	  issue	  more	  succinctly,	  the	  question	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  rights	  is	  a	  Deleuzian	  problem:	  it	  carries	  a	  virtual	  side	  that	  is	  repeated	  anew	  with	  new	  solutions	  in	  the	  actual.	  	  It	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  ended,	  but	  only	  opened	   up	   once	   more.	   	   This	   is	   an	   extremely	   awkward	   position	   to	   occupy,	   but	   to	   deny	   such	  tensions	  would,	  we	  might	  argue	  with	  Halberstam,	  constitute	  an	  injustice.	  	  	  This	  means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  should	  do	  rights	  politics	  or	  what	  position	  sexual	  orientation	  might	  occupy	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  Rights	  are	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Ibid.	  p201	  112	  Halberstam,	  In	  a	  Queer	  Time	  and	  Place:	  Transgender	  Bodies,	  Subcultural	  Lives	  p46	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the	  solution,	  but	  they	  do	  offer	  one	  way	  of	  opening	  up	  questions	  of	  sexual	  belonging,	  subjectivity,	  relationships,	  and	  connectivity.	   	   I	  would	  suggest	   that	   the	  moment	  when	  rights	   fail	   to	  speak	   to	  perceived	  injustices	  can	  be	  read	  as	  the	  moment	  of	  radical	  openness.	  	  This	  is	  the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  might	  become	  worthy	  of	  the	  event	  and	  move	  through	  smooth	  space,	  defined	  not	  by	  already	  existing	  cartographies	  but	  by	  new	  distributions	  and	  new	  becomings.	  	  However,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  the	   moment	   at	   which	   we	   decide	   that	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   event,	   the	   demands	   of	   creative	  experimentation,	   are	   ‘too	  much’	   and	   fall	   back	   into	   the	   already	  existing	   strictures	  of	   the	   social	  machine	  of	  which	  we	  are	  part,	  following	  along	  and	  thus	  reinforcing	  an	  already	  established	  mode	  of	  action.	   	  To	  be	  worthy	  of	  the	  event	  is	  to	  counter-­‐actualise	  it:	  to	  play	  it	  differently	  in	  different	  series,	  while	  expressing	  the	  Idea	  as	  a	  particularity.	  	  This	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task,	  nor	  is	  it	  necessarily	  a	  guarantee	  of	  something	  better.	  	  It	  is	  little	  wonder	  then,	  that	  the	  safer	  option	  might	  be	  to	  stick	  to	  already	  established	  pathways,	  to	  move	  within	  the	  parameters	  that	  are	  already	  set	  out,	  slowly	  changing	  them	  as	  we	  do.	  	  And	  while	  we	  can	  point	  to	  the	  achievements	  of	  such	  molar	  politics,	  we	  can	  also	  identify	  the	  limits	  of	  an	  approach	  that	  remains	  trapped	  in	  binaries	  of	  identities	  and	  can	  ultimately	  work	  to	  reinforce	  unjust	  structures.	  	  	  Thus	  we	  might	  conclude	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  human	  rights	  to	  enunciate	  injustices	  experienced	  by	  non-­‐heternormative	   individuals	   becomes	   not	   an	   ending	   but	   a	   demand	   –	   it	   offers	   a	  means	   of	  illuminating	  the	  wider	  terrain	  in	  which	  rights	  operate.	  	  As	  such,	  a	  successful	  failure	  might	  bring	  not	   a	   programme	   for	   action	   but	   a	   programme	   of	   branching	   out	   around	   particular	   actions,	  overturning	   blocks	   and	   binaries.	   	   Playing	   the	   game	   wittily	   involves	   the	   making	   of	   new	  connections	   and	   new	   perceptions,	   new	   modes	   of	   speaking,	   acting	   and	   expressing	   for	   an	  audience	  that	  does	  not	  yet	  exist.	  	  A	  successful	  failure	  sees	  the	  opening	  out	  of	  a	  paradox	  into	  the	  disjunctive	  connections	  of	  an	  open	  politics.	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Chapter	  Seven	  -­‐	  Conclusion	  The	  intersection	  of	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  rights	  represents	  and	  exposes	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  and	   complexities.	   An	   engagement	   with	   these	   challenges	   brings	   into	   question	   both	   the	  theoretical	   and	   historical	   foundations	   of	   rights,	   the	   nature	   of	   subjectivity	   and	   community	  through	  which	   these	   rights	  demands	   are	   increasingly	  made,	   and	   the	  political,	   legal	   and	   social	  structures	  and	  framework	  of	  knowledge	  by	  which	  we	  understand	  these	  demands.	   	  Yet	  despite	  these	   complexities,	   the	   resonance	   between	   sexual	   orientation/sexuality	   and	   rights	   and	   the	  articulation	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  LGBT	  individuals	  in	  terms	  recognisable	  to	  rights	  discourses	  and	  instruments	  appears	  to	  be	  increasing	  rather	  than	  decreasing.	   	  I	  have	  argued	  however,	  that	  the	  increased	   affinity	   between	   rights	   language	   and	   sexual	   orientation	   remains	   something	   of	   a	  double	  edged	  sword:	  rights	  are	  a	  powerful	  discourse	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  claims	  to	  justice,	  but	  they	   also	   operate	   as	   a	   machine	   of	   capture,	   striation	   and	   coding.	   	   The	   complex,	   multifaceted	  nature	   of	   sexuality,	   desire,	   community	   and	   power	   cannot	   adequately	   be	   captured	   in	   static	  articulations	  of	  sexual	  rights.	  	  This	  means	  that	  while	  rights	  may	  grant	  LGBT	  individuals	  a	  voice,	  they	  place	  a	  heavy	  restriction	  on	  the	  language	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  speak.	  	  	  Thus,	   despite	   the	   gains	   that	  have	  been	  made	  and	  without	  disparaging	   the	  work	  of	   those	  who	  have	  helped	  to	  realise	  these	  advances,	  we	  must	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  real	  problems	  that	  occur	  in	  the	  intersection	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights.	  	  These	  problems	  are	  shifting	  and	  context-­‐dependent,	  but	  key	   themes	   that	   have	   emerged	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   include:	   the	   fault-­‐lines	   and	   theoretical	  instabilities	  of	  rights	  regimes	  that	  are	  exposed	  in	  debates	  surrounding	  the	  relationship	  between	  sexuality	  and	  cultural	  authenticity	  at	  the	  UN	  and	  elsewhere;	  the	  tendency	  towards	  the	  adoption	  of	   overcoding	   and	   unresponsive	   ‘identities’	   as	   a	   base	   from	   which	   to	   campaign	   and	   the	  unanticipated	  and	  exclusionary	  consequences	  of	  this;	  and	  more	  broadly,	  the	  tendency	  for	  rights	  to	   act	   as	   a	   transcendental	   or	   abstract	   set	   of	   rules	   into	   which	   material	   circumstances	   are	  subsumed,	   thus	   silencing	   the	   particularities	   and	   singularities	   of	   each	   material	   instant	   or	  encounter.	  	  These	  problems	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  totality	  (positive	  or	  negative)	  of	  the	  intersection	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights,	  nor	  are	  they	  expressed	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  different	  times	  or	  locations.	  	  They	  do	  however,	  give	  some	  indication	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  circumstances	  within	  which	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  can	  resonate	  and	  therefore	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  challenge	  at	  hand.	  	  My	   aim	   has	   been	   to	   engage	   with	   some	   of	   these	   problems	   as	   actual	   occurrences	   and	   as	  virtual/theoretical	   movements.	   	   	   I	   have	   attempted	   to	   move	   from	   actual	   instances	   of	   conflict	  (encounters)	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   both	   the	   virtual	   intensities	   and	   objects	   that	   might	   be	   in	  operation	  and	   the	   theoretical	   complexities	   that	   this	   exposes	   in	   rights	   regimes.	   	  Thus,	   at	   these	  fault	   lines	   -­‐	   the	   problematic	   encounters	   between	   rights	   and	   sexuality	   -­‐	   rather	   than	   trying	   to	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construct	  one	  definitive	  answer	  or	  set	  of	  rules,	  I	  have	  found	  it	  useful	  to	  instead	  attempt	  to	  both	  situate	  and	  depersonalise	  the	  ‘problem’	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  attempt	  to	  look	  for	  the	  virtual	  objects	  in	  operation,	   the	   connections	   that	   are	   being	   made	   between	   different	   regimes,	   identities	   and	  groupings	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   have	   made	   these	   connections	   possible.	   	   Such	   an	   approach	  exposes	  very	  clearly	  the	  temporarily	  of	  our	  rights	  constructions:	  ‘human	  rights’	  as	  an	  idea	  may	  endure,	  but	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  enfold,	   enunciate	  and	  embody	  both	   rights	  and	   ‘humanity’	   is	  fluid	  and	  contingent.	  	  The	  danger	  is	  that	  we	  do	  not	  recognise	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  With	  this	  understanding,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  the	  actual	  side	  of	  rights	  –	  the	  material	  embodiment	  of	  a	  particular	  situation	  of	  injustice.	  	  If	  we	  view	  rights	  as	  always	  double	  sided	  –	  or	  as	  always	  only	  expressing	  a	  small	  part	  of	  virtuality,	  or	  one	  actualisation	  of	  the	  pure	  past	  –	  we	  can	  comprehend	  rights	  not	  as	  abstract	  rules,	  but	  as	  immanent	  tools.	   	  This	  view	  facilitates	  a	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  a	  question	  of	  which	  right	  has	  been	  violated,	  to	  an	  exploration	  of	  which	  connections	  are	  provoked	  by	   our	   use	   of	   rights	   in	   a	   particular	   situation.	   	  What	   does	   their	   activation	  make	   possible,	   and	  more	   significantly,	   when	   pushed	   to	   their	   limits	   and	   when	   used	   creatively,	   what	   are	   rights	  capable	   of	   doing?	   	   This	   approach	   involves	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   actual	   –	   the	  material	   problems	   that	  occur	   at	   the	   intersection	   of	   sexuality	   and	   rights	   –	   that	  moves	   to	   the	   virtual,	   but	  maintains	   a	  mutual	   interaction	  between	   the	   two	   that	   requires	   an	   exploration	  of	   the	   specific	   difficulties	   at	  hand,	   rather	   than	   an	   assumption	   that	   an	   abstract	   rights	   violation	   is	   necessarily	   the	   ‘right	  answer’	   to	  the	  difficulties	  posed.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	   is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  at	  present,	  rights	  are	  what	  we	  have	  to	  work	  with	  –	  they	  form	  a	  powerful	  language	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  injustice	  and	  as	  such,	  theoretical	  and	  foundational	  difficulties	  aside,	  they	  cannot	  simply	  be	  ignored.	  	  We	  might	   conclude	   therefore,	   that	   in	   making	   claims	   in	   relation	   to	   sexual	   orientation,	   we	   cannot	  abandon	  rights	  language,	  but	  we	  can	  be	  careful	  about	  how	  we	  speak	  –	  it	   is	  a	  language	  that	  we	  must	  use	  knowingly	  (wittily)	  –	  informed	  by	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  actual	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  rights	  form	  a	  surface	  of	  meaning	  and	  interaction	  between	  the	  two.	  Thus,	   in	   focusing	   on	   context	   and	   connections,	  we	   can	   view	   rights	   as	  Deleuzian	  machines.	   	   As	  such,	   rights	   can	  be	  understood	  as	   facilitators	  of	   connection,	  maps	  and	  pathways	   that	  work	   to	  code	  and	  channel	  flows.	  	  They	  engage	  in	  a	  process	  of	  breaking	  down	  and	  building	  up	  our	  social	  machines	  and	  in	  this	  way,	  rights	  become	  part	  of	  a	  framework	  of	  stratification	  through	  which	  we	  can	   articulate	  what	   is	   possible,	  what	   is	   impossible	   and	  how	  we	  might	   act	   in	   relation	   to	   these	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	   	  Thus	  rights	  are,	  in	  one	  articulation	  at	  least,	  a	  device	  of	  coding	  and	  of	  power.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  explored	  a	  number	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  when	  rights	  operate	  as	  a	  device	  of	  striation	   or	   coding.	   	   It	   is	   when	   rights	   aid	   or	   facilitate	   the	   operation	   of	   a	   structure	   of	   fixed	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identities	  that	  attach	  to	  the	  individual	  subject	  that	  they	  are	  perhaps	  at	  their	  most	  dangerous	  and	  least	   useful.	   	   Furthermore,	   this	   iteration	   of	   rights	   seems	   to	   demand	   increasingly	   specific	  articulations	   (current	   classifications	   of	   non-­‐heterosexual	   ‘identities’	   give	   a	   good	   indication	   of	  this	  trend	  –	  what	  was	  once	  ‘gay’	  becomes	  ‘LGB’,	  then	  ‘LGBT’,	  then	  ‘LGBTQQI’	  and	  so	  on).	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	   that	  rights	  can	  begin	   to	   function	  at	   the	   level	  of	   the	  biopolitical,	   in	   that	   the	   flows	   that	  rights	   work	   to	   direct	   and	   connect	   relate	   not	   just	   to	   the	   individual	   but	   to	   the	   extra	   or	   infra-­‐individual	  –	  to	  questions	  of	  life,	  death	  and	  necropolitics.1	  	  Braidotti	  calls	  these	  extra-­‐individual	  concerns	   ‘zoe-­‐centred’	   subjectivity,	   based	   not	   on	   hierarchical	   bios	   –	   that	   is	   human	   centred,	  discursive	  and	  intelligent	  subjectivity	  –	  but	  on	  the	  self	  as	  a	  moving	  and	  moveable	  assemblage.2	  	  However,	   she	   also	   warns	   that	   a	   ‘multi-­‐layered	   subject	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   molar	   power	  formations	  have	  been	  de-­‐territorialized:	  a	  change	  of	  scale	  may	  not	  be	  a	  qualitative	  shift.’3	  	  The	  danger	   then,	   is	   that	   rights	   remain	   trapped	   within	   frameworks	   of	   a	   unified,	   singular,	   rights	  bearing	  subject	  (or	  indeed	  a	  multi-­‐layered,	  yet	  still	  unitary	  subject)	  that	  cannot	  comprehend	  a	  non-­‐unitary,	   unstable,	   embedded	   subjectivity,	   that	   exists	   through	   ‘an	   enlarged	   sense	   of	   inter-­‐connection	   between	   self	   and	   others’4	  and	   continually	   tries	   to	   re-­‐draw	   stark	   classifications	   in	  which	  rights	  are	  always	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game	  in	  relation	  to	  questions	  of	  life,	  death	  and	  sexuality.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Ironically	  then,	  and	  despite	  their	  historical	  association	  with	  the	  unitary	  subject,	  we	  can	  trace	  a	  mutation	  of	   rights	   that	   increasingly	  works	   through	   this	  biopolitical	  mode	  and	  classification	  of	  life.	   	   In	   the	   light	  of	   these	  pressures,	   it	   is	  unsurprising	   that	  we	   can	   identify	  moments	  at	  which	  rights	   fail;	   these	   are	   the	  moments	   in	   which	   rights	   cannot	   accurately	   perceive	   or	   articulate	   a	  particular	   situation	  as	   an	   injustice.	   	   I	   have	  argued	   that	   this	  moment	  of	   failure	   is	   a	  moment	  of	  fracture	   –	   a	  moment	   of	   the	   encounter	   –	   it	   is	   also	   the	   point	   at	  which	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   for	  creative	   experimentation	   with	   the	   forces	   and	   singularities	   at	   play	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	  actualisation	  of	  the	  pure	  past,	  which	  is	  selected	  and	  rotated	  into	  a	  particular	  plane,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  future.	  Thus,	   the	   encounter	   facilitates	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   connections	   and	   virtual	   potentials	   that	  inhere	  in	  any	  particular	  material	  moment.	  	  The	  encounter	  demands	  that	  we	  attempt	  to	  explore	  minor	   avenues	   and	   speak	   minor	   languages	   against	   the	   habitual	   paths	   of	   rights	   and	   speech.	  	  Ironically,	  while	   rights	   can	  be	  used	  as	   a	   language	  of	   codification	  and	   striation,	   their	   failure	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See	  for	  example	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  "Rights	  of	  Passage:	  Law	  and	  the	  Biopolitics	  of	  Dying,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Law:	  Forensic	  
Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).	  John	  Protevi,	  "The	  Terri	  Shiavo	  Case:	  Biopolitics,	  Biopower	  and	  Privacy	  as	  Singularity,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Law:	  Forensic	  
Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Macmillan,	  2009).	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Locating	  Deleuze’s	  Eco-­‐Philosophy	  between	  Bio/Zoe-­‐Power	  and	  Necro-­‐Politics,"	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Law:	  Forensic	  
Futures,	  ed.	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Claire	  Colebrook,	  and	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2009).	  2	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  "Affirming	  the	  Affirmative:	  On	  Nomadic	  Affectivity,"	  Rhizomes	  11/12	  (2005).	  3	  Ibid.	  4	  Ibid.	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‘speak’	   points	   to	   the	   potential	   for	   the	   articulation	   of	   a	   minor	   language	   or	   a	   movement	   of	  deterritorialisation.	  The	  question	  of	  habitual	  languages	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  problematic	  binaries	  through	   which	   gay	   rights	   politics	   are	   increasingly	   conducted.	   	   Whether	   these	   binaries	   are	  North/South,	  culture/rights,	  civilised/uncivilised	  or	  some	  other	  combination,	  they	  all	  rest	  on	  a	  permanent	   and	   foundational	   form	   of	   identity	   and	   contradiction.	   	   This	   mode	   of	   thinking	  expedites	   the	   performance	   of	   both	   law	   and	   politics,	   but	   by	   positing	   fixed	   identities,	   it	   is	  necessarily	   exclusionary	   and	   insensitive	   to	   the	   complexities	   that	   tend	   to	   mark	   questions	   of	  sexuality	   and	   rights.	   	   I	   would	   argue	   –	   with	   Deleuze	   –	   that	   part	   of	   escaping	   these	   binaries	   is	  through	  the	  abandoning	  of	  negativity	  and	  contradiction	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  identity.	  	  The	  individual	  is	  instead	  a	  haecceity5,	   the	  subject	   is	  a	  spatio-­‐temporal	  compound	  which	  frames	  (and	  perhaps	   is	  framed	   by)	   the	   boundaries	   and	   processes	   of	   becoming6	  and	   our	   individual	   selfhoods	   and	  identities	  are	  formed	  through	  the	  enfolding,	  repetition	  and	  grouping	  of	  particular	  impressions.7	  	  We	  are	   thus	   located	  within,	   and	   form	  part	  of,	   the	  environment	   that	  we	  occupy,	  we	   cannot	  be	  read	  as	  abstract	  individuals	  outside	  the	  multiple	  dimensions	  that	  make	  up	  this	  environment.	  	  	  This	   approach	   demands	   an	   identity	   that	   is	   based	   on	   location,	   connections,	   production	   and	  action.	   	  Human	  beings	  are	  defined	  by	  their	  conatus	  –	  their	  connection	  and	  being-­‐with-­‐others.8	  	  Subjectivity	  and	  self	  is	  open	  ended	  and	  differently	  selected	  and	  contracted	  according	  to	  location	  and	   circumstance.	   	   Unlike	   an	   approach	   that	   begins	   in	   a	   negative,	   abstract	   binary,	   this	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  person	  is	  much	  less	  stable,	  but	  it	  also	  allows	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  that	  which	  remains	  free	  and	  moving	  outside	  identitarian	  categorisations,	  the	  excess	  or	  the	  code	  that	  always	  escapes	  and	  mutates,	  or	  the	  line	  of	  flight.	  	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  sexuality,	  as	  we	  currently	  understand	  it,	  always	  contains	  this	  element	  of	  excess,	  of	  uncoded	  flow	  and	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  desire	  between	  and	  around	  bodies.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  sexuality	   brings	   different	   bodies	   into	   contact	   and	   different	   series	   into	   resonance	   in	   multiple	  different	   ways.	   	   This	   is	   why	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   insist	   that	   there	   can	   be	   no	   gay	   liberation	  movement	   when	   the	   movement	   views	   itself	   in	   a	   negative	   and	   equal	   relationship	   with	  heterosexuality.	  	  Homosexuality	  and	  heterosexuality,	  as	  oppositions,	  define	  themselves	  through	  a	   negative	   relationship	   with	   each	   other.	   	   However,	   this	   relationship	   assumes	   a	   fundamental	  sameness	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  binary	  –	  each	  is	  not	  the	  other,	  but	  there	  are	  grounds	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  comparable.	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  assumption	  of	  sameness	  is	  problematic	  and	  leads	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Félix	  Guattari,	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus,	  trans.	  B	  Massumi	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  p289	  6	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Transpositions	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2006).	  p163	  7	  Dorothea	  Olkowski,	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  the	  Ruin	  of	  Representation	  (Berkely:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999).	  8	  Rosi	  Braidotti,	  Metamorphoses:	  Towards	  a	  Materialist	  Theory	  of	  Becoming	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2008).	  p100,	  Braidotti,	  Transpositions.	  p148-­‐150	  
	  193	  
to	   the	   articulation	   of	   the	   issues	   faced	   by	   gay	   rights	   movements	   as	   false	   problems	   based	   in	  representations,	   rather	   than	  as	  expressions	  of	  multiplicity.	   	  Or,	  put	  more	   simply,	   the	   terms	  of	  identity	   and	   community	   are	   defined	   through	   a	   (negative/exclusionary)	   relationship	   with	   a	  ‘centralised’	   heterosexuality,	   rather	   than	   through	   a	   productive	   engagement	   with	   what	  ‘homosexuality’	   might	   mean,	   or	   more	   accurately,	   what	   position	   it	   might	   occupy	   and	   what	  connections	  it	  might	  make,	  when	  approached	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  question	  is	  one	  of	  how	   homosexuality	   can	   be	   a	   rhizomatic	   productive	   assemblage	   rather	   than	   a	   contradictory	  identity	  –	  what	  movements	  would	  this	  understanding	  of	  homosexuality	  make,	  what	  orientations	  would	  it	  set	  in	  motion	  and	  how	  would	  it	  move	  and	  interact	  with	  bodies	  and	  selves.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  move	  away	  from	  negativity	  and	  lack	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  action	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  distance	  ourselves	  from	  a	  community	  identity	  that	  is	  based	  in	  exclusion.	   	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	   a	   gay	   community	   or	   identity	   cannot	   or	   has	   not	   been	   built,	   but	   this	   identification	   is	   not	  automatic	  –	   it	   is	  a	  production	  or	  a	  series	  of	  different	  connections	  and	  selections,	  and	  must	  be	  recognised	  as	  such.	  	  Without	  this	  understanding,	  such	  community	  identities	  can	  become	  prone	  to	  false	  foundations,	  representations	  and	  exclusivity.	  The	   question	   therefore	   becomes	   one	   of	   repositioning	   the	   binaries	   that	   striate	   discourses	   of	  rights	   and	   sexual	   orientation	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	   think	   them	   not	   as	   a	   relationship	   of	  contradiction	   between	   an	   identity	   and	   its	   negation,	   but	   as	   a	   particular	   folding	   of	   being	   and	  ?being,	  actual	  and	  virtual.	   	  Thinking	  identities	  only	   in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  material,	  nameable	  and	  identifiable	  expresses	  only	  half	  the	  problem	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  it	  assumes	  sameness	  and	  negativity	  and	  closes	  down	  the	  potential	  for	  connection	  and	  creation.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Conley	  argues	  that:	  ‘Queering	  is	  not	  based	  on	  recognition	  in	  a	  dialectic.	  	  For	  Deleuze	  no	  homosexual	  subject	  clamours	  for	  rights.	   	  Rather,	  the	   ‘new’	  homosexual	  affirms	  himself	  or	  herself	  by	  saying	  that	  no	  one	  is	  homosexual.	  	  Homosexuals	  are	  still	  being	  named	  as	  such	  by	  a	  majority	  in	  power	  but	  they	  are	   already	   elsewhere.	   	   There	   are	   only	   homosexual	   productions	   of	   desire	   and	   assemblages	  (agencements)	  that	  produce	  utterances	  (enonces).’9	  Thus,	  resistance	  must,	  in	  some	  part	  involve	  the	  questioning	  and	  turning	  away	  from	  prescriptive	  linguistic	  forms	  –	  even	  those	  forms	  that	  find	  recognition	  in	  rights	  regimes.	  This	  orientation	  towards	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  is	  complex.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  sexuality	  cannot	  be	   understood	   as	   one	   single	   thing,	   but	  must	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	  mode	   of	   expression	   that	  moves	  through	   and	   orients	   various	   different	   assemblages.	   	   Sexuality	   is	   an	   aleatory	   point	   or	   empty	  square	   that	   brings	   series	   into	   resonance	   but	   cannot	   be	   fixed	   into	   one	   particular	   series	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Verena	  Andermant	  Conley,	  "Thirty-­‐Six	  Thousand	  Forms	  of	  Love:	  The	  Queering	  of	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,"	  in	  Deleuze	  
and	  Queer	  Theory,	  ed.	  Chrysanthi	  Nigianni	  and	  Merl	  Storr	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  2009).p28	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location.	   	  As	  such,	  sexual	  rights,	  and	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  become	  very	  difficult	   to	  express	  with	   any	   permanence.	   	   Sexuality	   (and	   by	   association	   sexual	   orientation)	   is	   problematic	   as	   it	  crosses	  a	  number	  of	  different	  discourses,	  assemblages	  and	  situations,	  yet	  the	  form	  of	  counter-­‐actualised	   responses	   to	   sexuality	   or	   the	   problems	   precipitated	   by	   sexuality	   must	   always	   be	  different	   and	   embedded	   within	   the	   material	   –	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   actual	   rather	   than	   to	   an	  abstract	   or	   transcendental	   rule.	   	  Questions	  of	   sexuality	   connect	   through	   the	   event	   and	   across	  the	  pure	  past,	   but	   the	   form	   taken	  by	   actual	   responses	  must	   necessarily	   differ.	   	   Thus,	   I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  approach	  questions	  of	  sexuality	  and	  rights	  is	  through	  questions	  of	  connectivity	  and	  production	  rather	  than	  adherence	  to	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  or	  rules.	  	  	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  process	  of	  creative	  connectivity	  against	  abstract	  universality	  is	  central	  to	  accessing	   the	  potential	  of	   the	  LGBT	  rights	  discourse.	   	  A	  key	   theme	  of	   this	   thesis	  has	  been	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   repetition	   of	   difference	   in	   relation	   to	   determinate	  material	   circumstances,	  rather	   than	   simply	   replaying	   already	   recognisable	   discourses	   of	   law,	   rights	   or	   identity.	   	   This	  approach	  centralises	  active	  judgement,	  creativity	  and	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  future	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	   potentially	   restrictive,	   unthinking	   repetition	   of	   the	   past.	   	   At	   stake	   is	   the	   ethics	   of	   the	  uncertainty	  of	  law	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  creative	  transformation.	  	  The	  next	  step,	  it	  would	  seem,	  would	  be	  to	  apply	  this	  methodology	  and	  ethical	  outlook	  to	  matters	  of	  public	  policy.	  	  However,	  it	  is	  at	  exactly	  this	  point	  that	  I	  prefer	  to	  draw	  back	  (or	  perhaps	  creatively	  withdraw).	  	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this,	  the	  first	  Deleuzian	  and	  the	  second	  grounded	  in	  a	  recent	  series	  of	  articles	  that	  were	  published	  in	  the	  journal	  Feminist	  Theory	  between	  2005	  and	  2007.	  	  	  The	  Deleuzian	  argument	   follows	   from	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  politics	   that	  sees	   the	  repetition	  of	  virtual	  tendencies	  in	  materially	  determined	  situations.	  	  What	  is	  important,	  as	  Nunes	  reminds	  us,	  is	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  minoritarian	  tendencies	  circulating	  through	  each	  set	  of	  circumstances.	  	  To	  impose	  an	  a	  priori	  form	  that	  is	  ‘filled’	  by	  the	  virtual	  each	  time	  is	  to	  think	  transcendentally.10	  	  	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   approach	   that	   I	   have	   been	   outlining	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   has	   no	  practical	  application.	  	  The	  point	  at	  hand	  is	  subtler:	  I	  am	  wary	  of	  imposing	  a	  form	  onto	  what	  the	  ‘repetition	   of	   the	   future’	   might	   be.	   	   The	   task	   at	   hand	   is	   to	   replay	   the	   event	   as	   a	   counter-­‐actualisation	   in	   response	   to	   material	   occurrences.	   	   Thus	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   the	   most	   useful	  approach	   to	   take	   at	   this	   point	   is	   to	   practice	   a	   politics	   of	   location	   that	   operates	   with	   a	   keen	  awareness	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   power	   dynamics	   and	   differentials	  within	  which	  we	   are	   situated,	  rather	  than	  risking	  imposing	  a	  unitary	   ‘new	  story’	  of	  sexual	  rights	  policy	  and	  law.	  Throughout	  this	  thesis,	  I	  have	  explored	  various	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  power	  differentials	  of	  enfleshed	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rodrigo	  Nunes,	  "Politics	  in	  the	  Middle:	  For	  a	  Political	  Interpretation	  of	  Dualisms	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,"	  Deleuze	  
Studies	  4,	  Supplementary	  Issue:	  Deleuze	  and	  Political	  Activism	  (2010).	  	  p112-­‐113	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materiality	   might	   be	   constituted	   and	   the	   specific	   ways	   in	   which	   questions	   of	   LGBT	   rights	  interact	  with	  particular	  sets	  of	  circumstances.	  	  	  My	  caution	  here	  can	  be	  outlined	  by	  reference	  to	  three	  particular	  articles	  in	  published	  in	  Feminist	  
Theory.11	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  and	  third	  of	  these	  articles,	  Hemmings	  explores	  the	  act	  of	  ‘telling	  feminist	  stories’.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  she	  addresses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  certain	  authors	  become	  synonymous	  with	  particular	   trends	   and	   changes	   within	   what	   is	   assumed	   to	   be	   a	   relatively	   unitary	   or	   linear	  feminist	  history;	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  feminist	  theory	  and	  history	  as	  it	  is	  currently	  understood	  allows	  particular	  stories	  to	  flourish,	  while	  potentially	  closing	  other	  stories	  down.12	  	  Hemmings	  attempts	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  the	  feminist	  stories	  that	  we	  tell	  ourselves	  in	   order	   to	   more	   clearly	   uncover	   the	   multiple	   ‘authors’	   and	   sources	   of	   these	   histories,	   the	  hidden	   narratives	   and	   the	   representations	   that	   work	   to	   overcode	   the	   potential	   for	   a	  multiplicitous	   (perhaps	   acentred)	   feminist	   history.	   	   In	   general,	   Hemmings	   approach	   is	   to	  examine	   the	   techniques	   of	   citation	   and	   knowledge	   production	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   feminist	  historiography,	   rather	   than	   suggesting	   potential	   sources	   for	   the	   outlining	   of	   an	   alternative	  history.	  	  This	  is	  deliberately	  done,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  retaining	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  technologies	  of	  feminist	   storytelling	  over	  any	  kind	  of	  attempt	   to	   ‘set	   the	  story	  straight’.	   	  However,	  Hemmings	  does	  include	  one	  footnote	  in	  her	  original	  article,	  where	  she	  suggests	  some	  alternative	  sources	  of	  feminist	  theory	  and	  history.13	  	  This	  footnote	  is	  later	  singled	  out	  as	  a	  mode	  by	  which	  Hemmings	  fails	   to	   stick	   to	   her	   own	   stated	   goal	   of	   examining	   knowledge	   production	   over	   producing	  revisionist	  history.14	  	  In	  response,	  Hemmings	  notes	  that:	  	   ‘I	  wish	  now	  that	  I	  had	  not	  included	  this	  note,	  except	  insofar	  as	  it	  enables	  me	  to	  restate	  my	   historiographic	   commitment	   more	   strongly	   here:	   I	   am	   absolutely	   convinced	   that	   the	  
proposing	  of	  a	  singular	  feminist	  history	  as	  fact	  requires	  the	  erasure	  of	  its	  contested	  authorization.	  This	   is	  why	   I	   seek	   to	   intervene	  at	   the	   level	  of	  means	  of	  authorization	  of	  dominant	  versions	  of	  that	  history,	  to	  highlight	  the	  politics	  that	  produce	  and	  sustain	  those	  versions	  as	  facts.	  	  To	  correct	  the	  story	  in	  a	  linear	  fashion	  –	  that	  is	  from	  past	  to	  present	  –	  will	  produce	  a	  different	  history	  that	  will	   also	   erase	   its	   own	   construction	   (and	   the	   stranded	   note	   could	   be	   read	   as	   a	   hyper-­‐representation	  of	  this	  erasure),	  and	  produce	  a	  de	  facto	  subject	  of	  authority	  for	  feminist	  theory	  –	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Clare	  Hemmings,	  “Telling	  Feminist	  Stories”	  Feminist	  Theory	  6	  (2005);	  Rachel	  Torr,	  “What’s	  wrong	  with	  aspiring	  to	  find	  out	  what	  really	  happened	  in	  academic	  feminism’s	  recent	  past?:	  Response	  to	  Clare	  Hemmings’	  ‘Telling	  feminist	  stories’”	  Feminist	  Theory	  8	  (2007);	  Clare	  Hemmings,	  “What	  is	  a	  feminist	  theorist	  responsible	  for?	  Response	  to	  Rachel	  Torr”	  Feminist	  Theory	  8	  (2007)	  12	  Hemmings,	  “Telling	  Feminist	  Stories”	  13	  Ibid.	  p132	  n7	  14	  Torr,	  “What’s	  wrong	  with	  aspiring	  to	  find	  out	  what	  really	  happened	  in	  academic	  feminism’s	  recent	  past?:	  Response	  to	  Clare	  Hemmings’	  ‘Telling	  feminist	  stories’”	  p61	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the	   author,	   or	   the	   represented,	   or	   both.	  Which	   authors	   should	  we	   choose?	  Who	  will	   tell	   this	  story?’15	  My	   own	   approach	   differs	   from	   that	   of	   Hemmings	   in	   both	   my	   explicit	   adoption	   of	   a	  Deleuzian/Braidottian	   framework	   and	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   attempt	   to	   trace	   the	   infusion	   of	  particular	  stories	  and	  historiographies	  into	  activist	  and	  legal	  arenas	  rather	  than	  focusing	  solely	  on	   academic	   texts.	   	   However,	   I	   would	   argue	   that	   both	   approaches	   also	   share	   some	   key	  similarities	   –	   particularly	   in	   their	   attempts	   to	   examine	   how	   and	   by	   what	   means	   particular	  stories	  achieve	  a	  certain	  dominance	  within	  a	  field	  of	  knowledge.	  	  Following	  Hemmings’	  example	  then,	  I	  too	  choose	  to	  deliberately	  withdraw	  from	  producing	  an	  alternative	  reading	  of	  the	  history	  of	   LGBT	   rights	   that	   can	   then	   be	   easily	   transferred	   into	   (potentially	   abstract)	   future	   LGBT	  concerns.	  	  To	  do	  so	  would	  risk	  too	  easily	  positing	  a	  singular	  (or	  ‘singular	  alternative’)	  narrative	  of	   LGBT	   progression	   –	   an	   actual	   form	   for	   LGBT	   action	   that	   works	   through	   sameness	   and	  transcendence	  rather	  than	  the	  repetition	  of	  virtual	  tendencies	   in	  each	  different	  set	  of	  material	  circumstances.	   	   I	   would	   suggest	   that	  while	   the	   arguments	   that	   I	   have	   put	   forward	   about	   the	  conditions	   of	   knowledge	   production,	   the	   operation	   of	   power	   in	   relation	   to	   LGBT	   rights	   and	  LGBT	   histories,	   the	   spatialisation	   of	   rights	   and	   the	   operation	   of	   rights	   as	   modes	   of	   creative	  connection,	  can	  all	  be	  profitably	  applied	  to	  (actualised	  in)	  matters	  of	  public	  policy,	  the	  form	  of	  such	   actualisations	   will	   be	   widely	   different	   depending	   upon	   circumstances	   and	   jurisdictions.	  	  Furthermore,	   such	   actualisations	   should	   not	   be	   separated	   out	   from	   the	   circumstances	  within	  which	   they	   are	   enacted.	   	   Hemmings	   highlights	   the	   ‘dangers	   of	   providing	   a	   corrective	  bibliography’16	  that	   does	   nothing	   to	   undermine	   the	   dominant	   linear	   trajectory	   through	  which	  feminist	   stories	   have	   been	   produced.	   	   A	   similar	   argument	  might	   be	   applied	   to	   the	   danger	   of	  telling	  a	  ‘single	  story’17	  of	  LGBT	  rights.	   	  Rather	  than	  engage	  in	  a	  process	  that	  might	  in	  any	  way	  contribute	   to	   the	   crystallisation	   of	   any	   such	   ‘correctives’,	   I	   would	   prefer	   to	   emphatically	  withdraw	   in	   order	   to	   highlight	   the	   danger	   of	   such	   corrective	   moves	   and	   leave	   open	   the	  possibility	  of	  law's	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  face	  of	  smooth	  space	  and	  the	  line	  of	  flight	  into	  the	  creative	  repetition	  of	  the	  future.	  	  However,	  this	  approach	  must	  proceed	  with	  caution;	  Hickey-­‐Moody	  and	  Rasmussen	  note	  that,	  	  ‘Identities,	  politics	  and	  social	  visibility	  are	  at	  stake.	  	  Not	  to	  mention	  lifestyles	  and	  sexual	  pleasure.	  	  It	  seems	  almost	  as	  if	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  would	  have	  women	  dump	  their	  girlfriends	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  “What	  is	  a	  feminist	  theorist	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  for?	  Response	  to	  Rachel	  Torr”	  p73	  16	  Hemmings,	  “Telling	  Feminist	  Stories”	  p119	  17	  Chimamanda	  Adichie,	  “The	  danger	  of	  a	  single	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  Speech	  Delivered	  at	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  accessed	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and	   fuck	   chairs	   outdoors	   in	   order	   to	   affect	   a	   flow	   in	  which	   ‘non	  human	   sex	  mingles	  with	   the	  flowers’’18	  This	  quote	  captures	  a	   tension	   that	   is	  expressed	   in	  various	  different	  ways	   in	  relation	   to	  sexual	  orientation	  rights	  activism.	  	  Sexuality	  and	  rights	  form	  a	  problematic	  encounter	  and	  at	  the	  point	  of	   encounter	   we	   are	   faced	   with	   two	   options	   –	   that	   of	   creatively	   experimenting	   with	   the	  singularities	   at	   play,	   as	   unrestricted	   as	   possible	   by	   the	  molar	   narratives	   and	   histories	  within	  which	   we	   are	   situated,	   or	   falling	   back	   into	   the	   habitual	   reiteration	   of	   particular	   codes	   and	  striations	  of	  sexual	  norms.	   	  For	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	   this	  choice	   is	  not	  clear-­‐cut.	   	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	   may	   demand	   a	   turning	   away	   from	   identity,	   but	   as	   Braidotti	   points	   out	   –	   it	   is	   much	  easier	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  a	  subjectivity	  to	  which	  one	  already	  has	  access.19	  	  Why	  then,	  should	  the	  marginalised	  or	  the	  decentralised	  give	  up	  what	  little	  has	  been	  gained	  in	  order	  to	  plunge	  into	  the	  unknowable	  pure	  past?	  	  A	  limited	  freedom	  found	  in	  registers	  and	  languages	  that	  are	  knowable	  is	  surely	  much	  safer	  than	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	   ‘mad	  becoming’	  or	  the	  demand	  that	  we	  make	  ourselves	  worthy	  of	  the	  event.	  	  	  Yet	  whether	   or	   not	  we	   are	   actually	   presented	  with	   this	   choice,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   an	   abstract	   or	  transcendental	  discourse	  of	  rights	  cannot	  survive	  and	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  actual.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  rights	  are	  double-­‐sided	  and	  explored	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  might	  be	   the	   case:	   they	   are	   machines	   of	   territorialisation	   and	   deterritorialisation,	   modes	   of	  enunciation	  of	  power	  and	  modes	  of	  actualisation	  of	  resistance.	   	  However,	  to	  remain	  relevant,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  rights	  must	  be	  viewed	  as	  immanent	  tools	  rather	  than	  abstract	  rules.	  	  They	  can	  and	  do	  act	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  law,	  sociality	  and	  perhaps	  even	  as	  a	  fractured	  sense	  of	  justice,	  and	  as	  such	   they	  are	  actualisations	  of	  a	  much	   larger	  virtuality.	   	  Accordingly,	  as	  actualisations	   they	  must	  be	  bound,	  responsive	  to,	  and	  enmeshed	  within	  material	  life:	  the	  uneven	  distribution	  of	  the	  flesh	  and	  the	  unequal	  subjection	  to	  biopower.	   	  It	   is	  in	  this	  mode	  that	  rights	  move,	  striate,	  map	  and	   direct	   –	   towards	   both	   order	   and	   disorder.	   	   Thus	  we	  might	   conclude	   that	   although	   rights	  have	   been	   explored	   here	   as	   dual	   sided	   and	   multi	   functional,	   we	   can	   tentatively	   arrive	   at	   a	  unitary	   assessment	   of	   their	   continued	   value	   and	   use:	   rights	   are	   a	   means	   of	   connection	   and	  communication	  upon	  and	  around	  a	  particular	  plane.	  	  The	  task	  facing	  the	  activist,	  lawyer	  or	  actor	  embedded	  in	  the	  particular	  material	  circumstances	  of	  the	  plane	  is	  to	  use	  encounters,	  problems	  and	  questions	  to	  explore	  how	  far	  rights’	  capacity	  for	  connection	  can	  be	  taken,	  and	  to	  follow	  this	  capacity	  as	  it	  becomes	  the	  line	  of	  flight.	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